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1. Aim of the Dissertation 
In dialogues of the middle period (e.g. the Phaedo and the Republic), Plato 
credits non-human animals, the body, and the non-rational parts of the soul with 
beliefs (δόξα). He thinks that when something seems large or beautiful, then this 
‘seeming’ is already a kind of belief (Rep. 505D, 602C–603A). Since what 
seems or appears to us is more often than not outside the limits of our rational 
control, so are our beliefs also. In the middle period, Plato thinks that our belief 
formation does not necessarily require reasoning; beliefs can result directly 
from sense-perception, from what we find pleasant or interesting, or simply 
from what the people around us are accustomed to think. In many or even most 
cases, forming beliefs is simply a passive acceptance. What gets accepted is 
determined by the sort of character one has and the sort of environment one 
lives in. This is why it is of utmost importance to Plato, in his Republic, to 
invent a system that would instil correct beliefs about how one ought to live 
one’s life into those people souls who are incapable of acquiring knowledge and 
who operate solely at the level of beliefs. The line between knowledge and 
belief is sharp. In the Republic, the majority of people never acquire knowledge 
and therefore have to be provided with the right sort of environment for forming 
correct beliefs. Their characters have to be shaped in the right sort of way so 
that they will passively accept what, indeed, happens to be true. Only the ruling 
class, the philosophers, know that and why these beliefs are true. In some cases 
the beliefs instilled into non-philosophers’ souls by the educational system can 
even be false, what matters is that these (false) beliefs generate the kind of 
behaviour that benefits the polis (Rep. 378A, 414B).  
In his later dialogues (e.g. the Timaeus, Theaetetus and Philebus), on the 
other hand, Plato begins to view belief formation as a capacity that necessarily 
involves the reasoning part of the soul (Tim. 37C, 77B). He abandons the view 
that non-rational parts of the soul, or the body or animals, hold beliefs. 
Furthermore, he assumes that beliefs are formed only when the soul engages in 
an inner discussion with itself, considers candidate answers to whatever 
question it asks itself and reflects about how things appear and whether things 
really are as they appear to be (Tht. 189E–190A, Phlb. 38C–E). This suggests 
that belief formation in the later dialogues does not include passive non-rational 
acceptances, but requires the activity of the reasoning part of the soul. Since 
forming beliefs involves reason one can say that forming beliefs becomes, for 
Plato, a rational capacity. 
Hence, there is a crucial difference between Plato’s middle and later 
dialogues: the later Plato takes belief formation to be a rational capacity. This in 
turn raises the problem of why Plato starts to view belief formation as a rational 
capacity. The aim of my dissertation is to offer a solution to this problem, which 
I will refer to as the ‘problem of the rationality of belief’; I shall account for 
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why Plato changes his mind about belief formation, and in what the rationality 
of a belief consists.  
In elucidating Plato’s notion of ‘rationality’, Michael Frede (1996: 6–14) 
points out that the Greek notion of reason and rationality differs from our 
modern conceptions in two important ways. The Greeks thought of reason first 
as endowed with pre-existing knowledge, and second as having desires and 
aims of its own (most notably the desire for truth and the desire for good). My 
solution to the problem of the rationality of belief will focus on the second 
aspect of the Greek notion of rationality. I will argue that belief formation 
becomes a rational capacity for Plato because he recognizes that belief 
formation is by its nature a cognitive activity that aims to find out how things 
are. As Plato states, in forming beliefs the soul ‘yearns after being’ (Tht. 186A). 
This desire for truth and learning (Rep. 581B) is what Plato takes to be the 
distinctive feature of reason in his middle dialogues. Hence it is natural for the 
later Plato to think that forming beliefs is an activity of the reasoning part of the 
soul. In forming beliefs the soul aims to believe truly, i.e. to represent how 
things are, independently of how they seem or appear to be. This is to say, when 
you form a belief that something is the case, you form a belief about something 
that would be the case regardless of whether or not it appears to be the case.  
Thus, my interpretation suggests that in his later dialogues, Plato drives a 
wedge between appearance (seeming) and belief to the extent that he starts to 
view belief formation as an activity that aims at believing truly. Finding out 
how things are involves reasoning and considering candidate answers to 
whatever question the soul asks itself. This is why Plato says that forming 
beliefs requires inner dialogue. Since belief formation is taken to be intrinsically 
goal-directed, it is also sensitive to logical relations, such as contrariety and 
inconsistency. In the middle dialogues Plato sometimes pictures the soul as 
capable of holding contradictory beliefs. This is perfectly understandable, 
assuming that, for Plato in the middle dialogues, some beliefs are appearances, 
for at times sensory appearances conflict with what we think is the case (e.g. 
Rep. 602C–603A). In the middle dialogues, beliefs are formed in an atomistic 
manner, i.e. they do not need to be consistent with other beliefs we hold. In the 
late dialogues, beliefs are formed in a holistic manner, i.e. we form beliefs on 
the background of other beliefs we hold, in the attempt to maintain consistency. 
This contributes to the desired goal, i.e. to believe truly or, to ‘attain being’ 
(Tht. 186C–E).  
Truth-directedness or truth-aimedness of beliefs is an important topic in 
contemporary philosophy. The truth-aimedness is often thought to be the 
distinctive feature of belief, although it has proved difficult to give this notion 
more precise content1. Further, in contemporary philosophy the ‘aim of belief’ 
is often discussed in terms of whether mental states can be explained in 
                                                     
1 A classic paper, where the expression ‘belief aims at truth’ originates is Williams (1970). 
An important paper that revived the discussion for contemporary epistemology is Velleman 
(2000). For an overview of the main positions in the ‘aim of belief’ discussion in 
contemporary epistemology, see Vahid (2009: 1–32) 
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naturalistic terms. If belief has truth as an aim, then ‘belief’ can be seen an 
irreducibly normative notion, which could be an argument against naturalizing 
beliefs qua mental states. Of course, this is not the reason why Plato discusses 
‘attaining being’ as a goal for forming beliefs. As I will argue, Plato is 
interested in ‘being’ as a goal for belief formation because his new, teleological 
notion of belief plays an important part in the rejection of Protagoras’ relativism 
in the Theaetetus and justifying Socratic method against relativistic charges. If 
forming beliefs is aimed at grasping how the world is, independently from 
ourselves, then this makes us all anti-relativists. We all form beliefs and assume 
that the truth of a particular belief is dependent not on the mere fact that we 
hold it (Protagoras’ position) but rather on whether the belief that we are 
forming represents the world as it is.  
My explanation as to why Plato starts to view belief as rational differs 
significantly from the accounts proposed in two important monographs by 
Christopher Bobonich (in his Plato’s Utopia Recast, 2002), and Hendrik Lorenz 
(in Brute Within. Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle, 2006). Their pro-
posals appeal to the first feature of rationality pointed out by Frede. Lorenz and 
Bobonich claim that in his later thought Plato realizes that a prior apprehension 
of Platonic Forms is required for predicative thought (Lorenz) or con-
ceptualization (Bobonich). According to both Lorenz and Bobonich, Plato re-
cognizes that apprehension of Forms is necessary for ordinary thinking and 
belief formation. Since only the reasoning part of the soul has access to Forms 
(Phdr. 247D), it then becomes natural for Plato to think that only reason can 
form beliefs.  
This explanation (henceforth the ‘standard account’) answers the question of 
why belief becomes rational for Plato by invoking the Platonic Forms. The 
standard account maintains that, for the later Plato, apprehending Forms is 
necessary for forming beliefs. In forming a belief ‘x is F’ one apprehends the 
Form of F (Bobonich) or the non-sensible Being that connects x to F in the 
proposition ‘x is F’ or the nonsensible difference and oppositeness necessary for 
identifying the property F (Lorenz). The account that I am proposing in this 
dissertation (henceforth the ‘teleological account’) remains neutral as to the 
precise nature of the relation between belief formation and the Platonic Forms, 
e.g. whether there can be beliefs about Forms or whether Forms are 
apprehended only in knowledge. Unlike the standard account, the teleological 
account does not imply that Forms are apprehended simply in virtue of forming 
a belief ‘x is F’. The teleological account proposed here fits well with the idea 
that, for Plato, forming beliefs is a matter of perception, memory and perhaps 
some competence in speaking a language. Thus at least to a certain extent, Plato 
is an empiricist when it comes to explaining how non-philosophers acquire the 
concepts they use to form their beliefs. However, apprehending non-sensible 
Forms is a task for philosophers, a task that requires disregard for the empirical 
world. When it comes to explaining knowledge, Plato is a rationalist.  
What is at stake here is the choice between two general conceptions as to 
how ordinary non-philosophical thinking relates to the famous Platonic Forms 
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in the late dialogues. In the middle dialogues Plato states (e.g. Phd. 81B, Rep. 
484B) that only a very small elite of human beings has cognitive access to 
Forms, namely the philosophers. The rest of us, the non-philosophers, are 
doomed to spend our lives in a dream-like state (Rep. 476C), thinking that what 
we see and hear around us is all there is, whereas ‘truly real’, i.e. the non-
sensible Forms, remain firmly outside of our cognitive reach. Grasping Forms, 
the fundamental building-blocks of reality, serves as the epistemic goal of 
human life. Without grasping Forms one cannot have knowledge (Rep. 476E–
480A, Tim. 51B–E). Consequently, the majority of people, the non-philo-
sophers, do not have knowledge (Tim. 51A). Non-philosophers hold beliefs, 
true and false, but they lack knowledge, since they do not recognize that the 
Forms exist. They make the choices in their lives believing that, for example, 
sexual attractiveness accounts for why things are beautiful or that being 
pleasurable explains why things are good. However, the non-philosophers are 
wrong – it is the non-sensible Form of the Good and non-sensible Form of 
Beauty that explain why things are good or beautiful. Consequently, the non-
philosophers choose pleasant things over non-pleasant because they hold the 
(false) belief that pleasurable things are (the same as) good. Since non-philo-
sophers are cognitively cut off from Forms they cannot live truly happy lives.  
According to the first conception, Plato radically changes his mind about the 
relation between Forms and ordinary (non-philosophical) thinking in his later 
dialogues. He starts to view some sort of grasp of Forms as necessary for 
forming beliefs and understanding speech. Unlike the Republic or Phaedo, 
Forms explain how we acquire concepts, the concepts we use in our everyday 
thinking, as well as belief formation. According to the second conception, Plato 
never (not even in the late dialogues) thinks that the grasp of Forms explains 
ordinary thought. In a series of papers2 Gail Fine has argued that the passages 
usually taken to express (what she calls) the ‘semantic’ view of Forms can 
plausibly be read in a different manner. Forms are not meant to explain how 
ordinary belief formation is possible. For the later Plato, just like for the Plato 
of the Republic, Forms are real explanatory properties of things, real definitions 
as opposed to nominal definitions. Just as someone with absolutely no 
knowledge of chemistry can have thoughts about water without any awareness 
as to its molecular structure, so non-philosophers can have thoughts involving 
the term ‘beautiful’, without understanding that the real definition of beauty 
expresses the non-sensible Form of the Beautiful. The beliefs of non-philo-
sophers remain cognitively independent of Forms. For the later Plato (as for the 
middle period Plato), Forms are relevant in the epistemological and meta-
physical, but not in the ‘semantic’ sense (in that grasp of Forms explains ordi-
nary thought). It is highly controversial which one of these general conceptions 
                                                     
2  These papers are now rewritten and published in a monograph, On Ideas. Aristotle’s 
Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms (Fine 1993) (see especially chapters II, IV, VII, VIII, 
IX and XI). 
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about Forms in the later dialogues is correct. I believe that the second con-
ception is closer to the truth. 
The problem of the rationality of belief is important in this context, since the 
standard account (which, for the moment, is the only one available in the 
literature) strongly suggests that later Plato views Forms as relevant for ordinary 
belief formation. Therefore, in order to maintain that Forms in later dialogues 
continue to play exclusively epistemological and metaphysical role (and that 
they are not meant to explain ordinary thought), an alternative account for 
rationality of belief in later Plato is required. This is the gap I wish to fill with 
this dissertation. I hope to show that the shift in Plato’s notion of belief is not 
due to his radical rethinking of the relation between ordinary thought and 
Forms, but rather his recognition that in forming beliefs we aim to represent 
things as they are. This does not mean, of course, that Plato does not rethink 
other important issues in his later theory of Forms. He probably does. For 
example, he starts to put much more emphasis on how the Forms are inter-
connected with one another. For the same reason, highly abstract Forms such as 
Sameness and Difference become his focus of attention. But this aspect of his 
middle-period theory remains: grasp of Forms, even for later Plato, is not meant 
to explain ordinary thought. Grasp of Sameness and Difference, and that means 
the Forms in their interrelations, requires knowledge. It is not a cognitive 
precondition of forming beliefs. Plato indeed starts to think more highly of non-
philosophers but this is because he recognizes that forming beliefs (which is 
what all adults do) is not just the question of accepting appearances, but rather 
as a genuine effort to believe truly, i.e. to ‘attain being’. 
 
 
 2. Theaetetus 184B–187A 
One way to argue for my claim is to go through all the relevant passages on 
belief in Plato’s late dialogues. This is not the method I have chosen here. The 
reason is that although the passages in the later dialogues where Plato talks 
about belief clearly show that his notion of belief has significantly transformed, 
these passages do not tell us why this has happened. In that sense they lack 
explanatory value. However, there is one passage, Theaetetus 184B–187E (in 
what follows I will call this passage the ‘Passage of the Commons’), where 
Plato does offer an explanation as to why belief should be regarded as a 
capacity or a state that involves reason. This passage is of the utmost impor-
tance for understanding Plato’s later notion of belief. Yet, scholars have failed 
to reach a consensus about the exact meaning of the passage. In fact, the 
interpretation of this passage is highly controversial3. Consequently, most of 
                                                     
3 The most important recent discussions of this passage include: Bobonich (2002: 295–231), 
Bostock (1988: 110–145). Burnyeat (1976) and (1990: 52–64), Cooper (1970), Fine (1988), 
D. Frede (1989), M. Frede (1987), Gerson (2003: 204–212), Kahn (1981), Kanayama 
(1987), Lorenz (2006: 74–95), McDowell, (1973: 185–193), Modrak (1981), Sedley (2004: 
105–114) and Silverman (1990).  
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this dissertation consists of a critical analysis of this rather difficult passage. I 
hope to show that the passage sheds a great deal of light on Plato’s later notion 
of belief, and serves as an interpretative key to other relevant passages in 
Plato’s late dialogues. Bobonich and Lorenz believe that Theaetetus 184B–
187A supports the view that Plato starts to think belief as requiring prior grasp 
of intelligibles or Forms. In contrast, I will argue that the passage supports the 
teleological account of the rationality of belief. Plato’s point is that in forming 
beliefs the soul aims at ‘attaining being’, it aims to believe what is objectively 
the case.  
Socrates (the character in the dialogue) argues in Theaetetus 184B–187A 
against the Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge as perception. He and Theaete-
tus reach the position according to which perception does not have access to 
‘commons’ (τὰ κοινά), yet grasping commons is necessary for attaining truth, 
since attaining truth requires the grasp of the common ‘being’ (οὐσία). There-
fore perception does not attain truth. Since attaining truth is necessary for 
having knowledge, Socrates concludes that perception is not (the same as) 
knowledge. Aside from this negative result, Plato also claims that the soul itself 
by itself tries to grasp commons (especially being) and not by means of the 
bodily senses. Theaetetus goes on to say that this activity of the soul itself by 
itself should be identified with forming beliefs (δοξάζειν). 
The passage is fascinating for any student of Plato since it can be seen as a 
turning point from Plato’s middle dialogues to his more mature thought in the 
later dialogues4. The topics and doctrines of the late dialogues are intertwined 
with the topics and doctrines of the middle dialogues. The crucial terms such as 
‘being’ can be taken to refer to either as the ‘truly real being’ of the Forms of 
the Republic or as much more modest being as a copula of the late dialogues. It 
can also mean ‘reality’ in a rather non-committal sense (as I will argue). Of 
course, the argument according to which perception does not attain being and 
truth reaches a very different conclusion depending on where the emphasis is 
                                                     
4 Some philosophers think that the passage is crucial for understanding some aspects of the 
history of western philosophy in its entirety. For example, Bertrand Russell has this passage 
in mind when he says that the Theaetetus marks ‘two and a half millennia of muddle-
headedness about ‘existence’’ (Russell 1946/2004: 740). Martin Heidegger says that ‘this is 
the essential and decisive section. Here also the turning point is particularly clear, where 
Greek thought turns away from its origin to go over into ‘metaphysics’, to ground thought in 
the doctrine of being as idea and truth as homoiosis’ (Heidegger 2002: 233). For these two 
philosophers, coming from very different traditions, the influence of the Passage of the 
Commons on subsequent philosophy is mainly negative. Plato’s mistake, from Russell’s 
perspective, is to take ‘existence’ to be a (first order) predicate. For Heidegger, the error lies 
in Plato’s shift towards the propositional understanding of truth, which thereby loses its 
historical origin as ‘unhiddenness’. The scholars of ancient philosophy usually have a more 
positive attitude towards the passage: ‘Plato’s achievement [is] in arriving at the first un-
ambiguous statement in the history of philosophy of the difficult but undoubtedly important 
idea of the unity of consciousness’ (Burnyeat 1990: 58) and ‘Plato’s most important contri-
bution lay in his dramatic narrowing of the content of perception, and his corresponding 
expansion of the content of belief’ (Sorabji 1995: 9).  
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put: does perception not attain the being of Forms or does it lack propositional 
structure, or does it simply fail to represent objective mind-independent world? 
One might think that even if the Passage of the Commons itself is 
ambiguous, then perhaps the context of the dialogue helps to determine which 
reading should be preferred. However, the reason why it has been so difficult to 
reach a consensus about this passage is precisely that the interpretation of the 
Theaetetus as a whole is very controversial (perhaps more so than the inter-
pretation of any other dialogue of Plato). What makes the Theaetetus so difficult 
to interpret is the fact that it is singular in the group of late dialogues in that it 
resurrects the aporetic form of Plato’s early, Socratic dialogues. The dialogue 
ends in an impasse and the definition of knowledge is not found. The main 
speaker, Socrates, holds back from making any positive claims, in striking 
contrast to the Socrates of the Republic and Phaedo who defended quite 
substantial metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical doctrines. Just like the 
Socrates from Apology (21D), Socrates of the Theaetetus claims to be barren of 
knowledge. Since the dialogue ends in an impasse and the chief speaker 
declares himself to be ignorant, it is difficult to say what, if any, positive 
doctrines the dialogue is supposed to express. The Platonic Forms are never 
mentioned (at least not by name, some think that ‘the commons’ might be 
Forms), which is especially striking since one would expect Forms to play a 
prominent part in the discussion about knowledge. The slightly earlier Republic 
(e.g. Rep. 476E–480A) and slightly later or contemporary Timaeus (Tim. 51B–
E) tell us that Plato takes knowledge to be (exclusively) about Forms, it is there-
fore odd that Plato fails to mention them in the Theaetetus. How should one 
explain all this?  
There are many different views about why the Theaetetus has this unique 
character5, but most contemporary scholars agree on one fundamental inter-
pretive assumption – Theaetetus is a dialogue that has more than one dimension 
or level6. The Theaetetus should not be read as doctrinal in the sense of directly 
expressing Plato’s views on knowledge7. This does not mean that there is 
                                                     
5 For an overview of ancient readings of the Theaetetus, see Sedley (1996), for modern 
readings Becker (2007: 390–400). 
6 For example, Burnyeat (1990) and Sedley (2004) pursue each in their own different manner 
the multiple-level strategy of interpretation. 
7 This applies to Plato’s dialogues in general, not just to the Theaetetus. Very broadly 
speaking, there are three basic strategies of thinking about the relation between Plato’s own 
views and the views put forth by the main speakers of the dialogues. Radical doctrinalism 
claims that all views expressed by Socrates (the main speaker in most dialogues), Timaeus 
or Parmenides (main speakers in the eponymous dialogues), the Athenian (main speaker in 
the Laws) or the Eleatic Visitor (the main speaker in the Statesman and the Sophist) express 
Plato’s own views (the most recent defender of this view is Beversluis (2006)). The radical 
anti-dogmatist claims that none of the views expressed by the main speakers can be 
attributed to Plato (the most recent defender is Nails (1999)). Moderate dogmatism claims 
that although not all the views expressed by the main speakers of the dialogues are Plato’s, 
one can still plausibly maintain that many of them are. Plato has various methods for 
indicating which views he takes seriously. One of the recent defenders is M. Frede (1992). I 
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nothing to be learned from the Theaetetus. It means that Socrates might be 
advancing Plato’s views on knowledge, perception, and belief indirectly. What 
these views are is very much open to discussion and, more often than not, 
difficult to determine. But it is agreed on almost all sides that what Plato makes 
Socrates or Theaetetus explicitly declare in the Theaetetus can hardly be flatly 
equated with what Plato himself wants to express. This has been the pre-
dominant view of scholars on Theaetetus throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century, resulting in what might perhaps be considered a fundamental 
transformation of our understanding of the dialogue as a whole8.  
The Passage of the Commons, however, has been quite immune to this 
approach. The prevailing opinion is that whatever the exact content of the argu-
ment in the Passage of the Commons might be, it certainly stands out from the 
rest of the Theaetetus in view of its directness. Here we hear Plato’s own voice. 
Burnyeat expresses the point clearly: ‘In 184A–186E the argument proceeds, 
for the first time in the dialogue, from premises Plato himself accepts as true’ 
(1990: 53). This is the assumption that I wish to challenge. In the course of this 
dissertation I will argue that the ‘doctrinal’ reading of the Passage of the 
Commons is riddled with so many problems that it makes more sense to 
abandon it altogether. Not everything Socrates says in the Passage of the Com-
mons should be taken to express Plato’s own philosophical views. For example, 
when Socrates gives the impression that the ‘commons’ sameness and beauty 
are grasped in all beliefs that the soul forms about beauty or sameness, he is 
relying on what his interlocutor, Theaetetus, thinks about human cognition – 
namely, that cognition always involves a direct grasp of its objects. Thus I aim 
to show that the stretch of text that is usually been seen as evidence for the 
standard account of why belief becomes rational, actually contains nothing of 
the kind. 
I will argue that Socrates’ method of midwifery (Tht. 149B–151D) holds the 
key to a proper understanding of the first part of the Theaetetus and especially 
the Passage of the Commons. Socrates cannot attack directly the deep-seated 
assumptions of his interlocutors. This would conflict with his methodological 
barrenness (Tht. 150C, 157C–D, 179B, 210C). Socrates draws out the impli-
cations of these deep-seated assumptions and shows that these implications 
contradict other beliefs that the interlocutor holds. Socrates often has to speak in 
a way that (apparently) accords with his interlocutor’s beliefs; he often seems to 
                                                                                                                                  
believe that moderate dogmatism is the most fruitful way to read the Theaetetus, especially 
the Passage of the Commons. 
8  For example, not many interpreters nowadays believe that the Heracleitean theory of 
perception developed in the first part of the dialogue is Plato’s own. According to the 
contemporary majority-view, the Heracleitean model perception is introduced on dialectical 
grounds, in support of Theaetetus’ first definition, ‘knowledge is (the same as) perception’ 
(Burnyeat’s (1990) Reading B). Similar transformation (although to a lesser extent) has 
taken place concerning the puzzles of falsity in Theaetetus 187B–200D, which are often seen 
as a part of a reductio of Theaetetus’ second definition, rather than an indication that Plato is 
incapable of explaining false beliefs (e.g. Fine 1979, Benson 1992, Adalier 2001).  
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share the assumptions of his interlocutors. However, this is only apparent, since 
Socrates goes on to show that some of the assumptions that, for instance, 
Theaetetus (unconsciously) makes, are false. In this way, Socratic method 
allows the interlocutor (and the reader) to become aware of their own 
unquestioned assumptions about knowledge (and belief and perception). Soc-
rates does not authoritatively tell his interlocutors to let go of the assumptions 
but he enables the interlocutors understand the reason why they should do so. 
By noticing how questionable some of their assumptions are, Socrates’ 
interlocutors acquire a better position for further inquiry. 
It might seem that giving weight to the dialogical context distracts the inter-
pretation from the proper, ‘philosophical’ topics, making Plato’s dialogues seem 
too ‘psychological’ or ‘pedagogical’. However, it is far from clear whether it is 
at all possible to make the sharp distinction between philosophical thinking 
‘proper’ and dialogical, context-dependent thinking, at least when it comes to 
Plato’s dialogues. I think that the possibility of taking into account the dia-
lectical context of the conversation should be seen as an additional inter-
pretative strategy that sets Plato scholars apart from the majority of historians of 
philosophy. In an essay concerning the methodological questions of studying 
Ancient Philosophy, Michael Frede (1987a: xii) makes the point that only when 
we, as interpreters, have exhausted all possible philosophically good reasons 
why a philosopher might hold or express a certain view, should we try and offer 
reasons that are not strictly speaking philosophical, for example, reasons that 
derive from cultural or social context, from errors in reasoning, etc. In Plato’s 
case, however, there is an additional possibility – if some of the views ex-
pressed or premises of the arguments put forth in the dialogues seem to us to 
have no good straightforwardly philosophical reasons to support them, we can 
go on and ask whether they might be inserted in the dialogue for dialogical 
reasons – as something that the interlocutor might believe or something that 
serves as a premise for an indirect argument. Since there is no sharp distinction 
(or at least it is very difficult to draw the line) between properly philosophical 
and dialogical considerations in Plato, dialogical reasons offer an excellent 
interpretive resource if the text seems confused or to contradict itself. It is 
reasonable to assume (in accordance with the principle of charity) that the appa-
rent confusion or contradiction can be resolved if one takes into account the 
dialogical context. 
I hope to make plausible in this dissertation that even in the case of the 
Passage of the Commons, despite its somewhat doctrinarian air, one must ask 
whether the premises of the arguments put forth are accepted because they 
follow from the definition being tested (are part of a reductio) or are they 
accepted because Socrates’ interlocutor believes them (which is justified by 
Socrates’ method of midwifery), or both, or are they accepted because Plato 
puts them forth as his own philosophical views. I will show that if one takes the 
passage as a straightforwardly doctrinarian piece of reasoning it becomes 
almost impossible to make it cohere both within itself and with the rest of the 
Theaetetus. I will argue that if one takes into account the specific features of 
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Socratic midwifery, the Passage of the Commons contains a solution to the 
problem of rationality of belief. 
 
 
3. Overview of the Dissertation 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 provides the background and 
motivation for a close examination of the Passage of the Commons that follows 
in the next three chapters. In the first section, I argue that there is a shift in 
Plato’s conception of belief: belief formation becomes, in later dialogues, a 
rational capacity. I also introduce the standard account for this shift according to 
which Plato, in his later dialogues, comes to view cognitive access to Forms as 
a necessary condition for forming beliefs. The second section gives an outline 
of two main ways to explain the relation between Forms and ordinary thought 
and belief in the middle dialogues. The ‘Optimistic View’ takes some grasp of 
Forms to be necessary for concept-acquisition and concept-application. Even 
the non-philosophers have a humdrum apprehension of Forms inasmuch they 
use and understand general terms. The ‘Pessimistic View’, on the other hand, 
maintains that Forms remain outside the cognitive reach of non-philosophers. 
Grasping Forms is not necessary for conceptualization but for knowledge 
(understood in Plato’s demanding sense). I give an overview of the most 
systematic account of Forms that denies that Forms are meant to explain 
ordinary concept-application, Gail Fine’s reading of Forms as universals in the 
realist sense, as genuine explanatory properties. Section 3 offers an overview of 
the standard account of the rationality of belief. I will first argue that the 
standard account takes Plato to move from the Pessimistic View of Forms to the 
Optimistic View. I will point out that there are different versions of the standard 
account. In Section 4, I will turn to the assessment of the standard account. I 
will argue that, aside from the difficulties that are inherent in both Bobonich’s 
and Lorenz’s versions of the standard account, there is surprisingly little textual 
support for the standard account in the late dialogues. The main piece of support 
derives from the Passage of the Commons where Plato seems to be committing 
himself to the claim that grasping (at least some) intelligibles is necessary for 
forming beliefs. 
Chapter 2 analyses and criticizes the ‘conceptualist’ interpretation of the 
Passage of the Commons (which is a version of the Optimistic View and which 
supports the standard account). According to this interpretation, the Passage of 
the Commons commits Plato to the claim that there are features of things, ‘the 
commons’, which are grasped in virtue of entertaining a thought involving a 
term that designates a particular common feature (the ‘conceptualist as-
sumption’). Conceptualist reading is committed to interpreting the crucial term 
‘being’ as a copula. Consequently, I will ask whether the copula reading of 
‘being’ is supported by the text. I will argue that it is not. In Section 1, I will 
give a general overview of the main conceptualist readings of the passage and 
what motivates them. In section 2, I will argue that reading ‘being’ as a copula 
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results in an unsatisfactory interpretation of the passage and conclude that the 
conceptualist reading is probably not the correct interpretation of the Passage of 
the Commons. In Section 3, I will present an alternative to the conceptualist 
reading, the realist reading. The realist reading takes ‘being’ to be equivalent to 
the notion of ‘reality’ or ‘objectivity’. I will argue that all the versions of the 
realist reading presented in the scholary literature also fail, since they assume 
that the conceptualist assumption applies to ‘commons’ (especially the to the 
‘common’ ‘being’). This sets the aim for the following chapter – to find an 
interpretation of the Passage of the Commons that does not commit Plato to the 
conceptualist assumption. 
In Chapter 3, I will develop a reading of Socrates’ method of intellectual 
midwifery (maieutics). I will inquire into what the specific features of this 
method are, and how the method is carried out in discussion prior to the 
introduction of ‘commons’ at 185A. In Section 1, I will argue that midwifery is 
a constructive method for giving clear content to the definitions offered by the 
interlocutor and then submitting these definitions to criticism. The specifically 
Socratic aspect of all this is that Socrates, since he is methodologically ignorant, 
always relies on the beliefs of the interlocutor. His method thus remains 
dependent on interlocutor’s beliefs and on interlocutor’s understanding of the 
concepts involved. Further, Socrates’ midwifery also has an aim of uncovering 
mistaken assumptions that lead the interlocutor to giving their mistaken 
definitions. In section 2, I will demonstrate how this method is carried out in the 
first part of the Theaetetus. I will claim that Theaetetus’ definition ‘knowledge 
is perception’ should be understood as ‘knowledge is direct awareness’, where 
‘awareness’ covers beliefs, desires, dreams, memory, cases of hallucinating and 
sense perception in the narrow sense. Theaetetus relies on what I call the 
‘aisthetic model of cognition’: he takes all cognitive acts to involve a direct 
awareness of its objects. Section 3 develops an interpretation, according to 
which the introductory part of the Passage of the Commons (184B3–E7) is best 
understood as Socrates introducing a narrow notion of perception (sense-
perception). This is, in effect, the second interpretation of Theaetetus’ first 
definition, this time: knowledge is sense perception. Furthermore, I will argue 
that the argument for the imperceptibility of the commons (184E8–185B9) 
relies both on this new notion of αἴσθησις as sense perception and other beliefs 
that Theaetetus has acquired during the discussion, most notably the belief that 
all senses are restricted to their proper objects (the ‘Proper Object Theory’). 
This premise is tacitly given up in the next section of the dialogue. Thus it is 
unlikely that the Passage of the Commons expresses Plato’s own theory of 
perception. 
Chapter 4 develops a version of the realist reading that denies that ‘com-
mons’ are grasped in all beliefs and thoughts, i.e. denies the conceptualist 
assumption. The realist reading of Theaetetus 184B–187A enables me to show 
that the passage contains genuinely novel claims about belief, viz. that it is by 
its very nature directed to being in the sense of obtaining states of affairs. I will 
also argue that this novel, teleological notion of belief explains why belief 
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becomes rational for later Plato. Section 1 is dedicated to analysing the maieutic 
aspect the Passage of the Commons. I will argue that (despite appearances) 
Socrates does not claim that in thinking the soul ‘grasps’ the relevant commons. 
The reason why he sometimes seems to do so is dialectical. Theaetetus’ frame-
work of beliefs about cognition is largely governed by the aisthetic model; he 
thinks that all acts of cognition require a direct relation between the subject and 
the object. Socratic midwifery works within this framework of beliefs, hence 
Socrates has to rely on this model himself while posing questions and directing 
Theaetetus. This gives the (false) impression that ‘commons’ are concepts 
(grasped in all thoughts that contain the relevant terms). I propose that this stage 
two should be understood as abandoning the aisthetic model of cognition. 
Socrates stresses that, in order to be able to attain being (one of the commons), 
one needs a significant amount of education. I will argue that ‘being’ should be 
understood as ‘reality of something’. It is difficult and time consuming to learn 
the ‘comparing’ and ‘calculating’ that are necessary to determine whether a 
given property (e.g. beauty) is instantiated. Section 2 developes a notion of 
belief that accords with the realist reading of Passage of the Commons. I argue 
that in the Passage of the Commons Plato developes a conception of belief 
formation as an instrinsically goal-directed acitivity aiming to ‘attain being’. 
The grasp of being, sameness and difference is not a cognitive precondition of 
forming beliefs, attaining ‘being’ (objectivity, reality) is rather the cognitive end 
of belief formation. This is the why Plato starts to think of belief formation as 
necessarily involving reasoning. I suggest that Plato’s main motivation behind 
this novel account belief is his desire to offer a conception of belief that 
supports Socratic method (detecting inconsistencies in interlocutor’s framework 
of beliefs). The novel conception of belief can also be seen as a reaction to 
Protagoras’ relativistic notion of belief as a passive acceptance that does not 
involve reasoning. I will end with an account of how this ‘teleological’ notion 
of belief explains the differences between how Plato conceives of belief in the 
middle and late dialogues.  
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CHAPTER ONE.  
The Standard Account 
1. The Problem of Rationality of Belief 
Between the middle and late dialogues9 there appears to be a significant shift in 
the manner in which Plato conceives of the notion of δόξα10. In the middle 
dialogues, most notably in the Phaedo and the Republic, Plato has a generous 
notion of δόξα. For example, in Phaedo Socrates assigns δόξαι to the body11. 
Socrates says that philosophy should free the soul from the influence the body 
exerts on it, since the body 
 
makes the soul corporeal (σωματοειδῆ), so that it believes (δοξάζουσαν) that 
truth is what the body says it is (ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ). As it 
shares the opinions (ὁμοδοξεῖν) and delights of the body, I think it inevitably 
comes to share its ways and manner of life. (Phd. 83D)12  
 
In the Republic X Plato attributes δόξαι to the inferior and non-rational parts of 
the soul: the spirit (θυμοειδής) and the appetite (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). The argu-
ment against the imitative poets relies on the ability of non-rational parts of the 
soul to form δόξαι on their own. An oar half-submerged in water appears 
crooked, even when calculations and measurements indicate that it is, in fact, 
                                                     
9 The exact chronology of Plato’s dialogues is a complicated issue. Different scholars divide 
the dialogues into three (early, middle, late), four (Socratic, transitional, middle and late) or 
five (Socratic, transitional from Socratic to middle dialogues, middle, transitional from 
middle to late, and late dialogues) groups. I have chosen the first option. The early dialogues 
are the Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Hippias Minor, Ion, Prota-
goras, Meno, Gorgias, Hippias Major and Euthydemus. The middle dialogues are the 
Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, Cratylus, Phaedrus and Parmenides. The late group consists 
of the Theaetetus, Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus and Laws. The dating of the 
Cratylus and the Timaeus is somewhat controversial. The exact dating of the Cratylus does 
not affect my argument. On the other hand, taking the Timaeus to be roughly contemporary 
with the Theaetetus is indeed important to my argument. However, it seems that the majority 
of scholars (with the exception of Bostock (1988) and Rickless (2007) who take the Timaeus 
to be contemporary with the Republic) have agreed on Timaeus being a late work (e.g. 
Silverman 2002, Bobonich 2002, Lorenz 2006).  
10 Plato’s notion of δόξα is an umbrella term for many different and sometimes incompatible 
things. Δόξα means, across the dialogues, ‘thought’, ‘fame’, ‘honor’, ‘belief’, ‘judgment’, 
‘appearance’, ‘opinion’, among other things (Sprute 1962, Lafrance 1981). From a general 
point of view, the Platonic notion of δόξα can be split into two interrelated meanings: 
objective, when used to characterize a quality of things (i.e. fame or honour); and cognitive, 
when used to characterize epistemic states of the soul.  
11 This seems to be the view of the majority of scholars on this matter. Bobonich (2002: 486) 
presents an argument for ‘body as a subject’ and provides references to other discussions. 
12 Translations of Plato’s texts (with the exception of the Theaetetus) in this dissertation are 
from Cooper’s edition of Plato’s ‘Complete Works’ (Hackett 1997). The passages from the 
Theaetetus are translated by McDowell (1973), with slight modifications. The Greek version 
of the text derives from Platonis Opera, Oxford (1995). 
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straight. Socrates makes it clear that in this case the soul has contradictory 
δόξαι. 
 
Something looked at from close at hand doesn’t seem to be the same size as it 
does when it is looked at from a distance. – No, it doesn’t. – And something 
looks crooked when seen in water and straight when seen out of it, while 
something else looks both concave and convex because our eyes are deceived 
by its colors, and every other similar sort of confusion is clearly present in our 
soul. And it is because they exploit this weakness in our nature that trompe 
l’oeil painting, conjuring, and other forms of trickery have powers that are little 
short of magical. – That’s true. – And don’t measuring, counting, and weighing 
(μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι) give us most welcome assistance in these 
cases, so that we aren’t ruled by (μὴ ἄρχειν) something’s looking bigger, 
smaller, more numerous, or heavier, but by calculation, measurement, or 
weighing? – Of course. – And calculating, measuring, and weighing are the 
work of the rational part of the soul (τοῦτό γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐν 
ψυχῇ ἔργον). – They are. – But when this part has measured and has indicated 
that some things are larger or smaller or the same size as others, the opposite 
appears at the same time (ἕτερα ἑτέρων ἢ ἴσα τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ 
ταὐτά). Yes. – And didn’t we say that it is impossible for the same thing to 
believe opposites about the same thing at the same time (τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ 
ταὐτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι)? – We did. – Then the part of the soul 
that forms a belief contrary to the measurements (παρὰ τὰ μέτρα) couldn’t be 
the same as the part that believes in accord with them (κατὰ τὰ μέτρα). Now, 
the part that puts its trust in measurement and calculation is the best part of the 
soul. – Of course. – Therefore, the part that opposes it is one of the inferior 
parts (φαύλων) in us. – Necessarily. (602C–603A)  
 
The best part of the soul is ‘ruled by’ measurement and forms its δόξαι 
according to calculations, while the inferior parts of the soul are ‘ruled by’ how 
things look and believe that things are as they appear. It is very likely that the 
‘best part’ of the soul is to be identified with the reasoning or rational part of the 
soul and, consequently, the inferior part as the appetite or spirited part or both 
together. Since spirit and/or appetite are capable of having δόξαι (in opposition 
to reason), it follows that Plato, at the time of writing the Republic, does not 
think of δόξα as necessarily involving the reasoning part of the soul (τὸ 
λογιστικὸν). The non-rational parts of the soul are capable of forming beliefs 
independently from the reasoning part13.  
                                                     
13  Some scholars have balked at this and searched for ways to avoid the conclusion 
according to which non-rational parts of the soul have δόξαι (e.g. Burnyeat 1997, Nehamas 
1982/1999, Sedley 2004). The Greek of the passage at 602E4–6 is not at all straightforward 
(for different readings, see Adam 1902 vol. 2: 466–467). On the ‘traditional reading’ of the 
Greek, the text divides the reasoning part in two, one that has δόξαι according to measure-
ments and the other that does not. This enables scholars to avoid the conclusion that the non-
rational parts have δόξαι. Recently, however, Lorenz (2006: 65–69) has presented a 
powerful argument for accepting Adam’s version of the text that in fact does commit Plato 
to different parts of the soul having δόξαι. This is Lorenz’s take on the crucial sentence: 
‘What Sentence 1 is saying, in other words, is that (it often happens that) when reason is 
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The above passage also shows that δόξαι, for Plato in the middle dialogues, 
include both perceptual ‘seemings’ (in case of the appetite and/or spirit), i.e. the 
way things ‘look’, and explicit judgments based on deliberation and reasoning 
(in case of reason). These δόξαι can be held by a single subject (although by 
different parts of the soul), regardless of the fact that they conflict and the soul 
is aware of this conflict. This is why some commentators have taken δόξαι of 
the lower parts of the soul in the above passage to be only half-beliefs, since ‘A 
subject cannot consciously hold contrary beliefs ... We have to suppose that his 
argument really applies not to pairs of beliefs but to pairs that contain at least 
one half-belief.’ (Price 1995: 43). It seems that, in Plato’s middle dialogues, 
δόξαι are not necessarily formed in a way that makes conscious inconsistency 
intolerable.  
Δόξαι can be true or false, but there is nothing in the nature of δόξα itself 
that ties it to truth. Most people form δόξαι simply on the basis of how ‘it 
seems’ or, as the passage above suggests, the seemings themselves simply are 
δόξαι. In another passage, Plato makes it clear that people do not care whether 
the δόξαι they form are true or not (Rep. 505D). That one ends up with some 
true δόξαι is more or less a matter of chance. It is for this reason that the δόξαι 
of most people will not ‘stick’. People are liable to abandon their δόξαι when so 
doing is useful or pleasant, or in the face of danger. Of course, one can be 
guided to acquire true δόξαι and be educated to firmly hold on to them. In fact, 
Plato’s Kallipolis is, among other things, designed to assure that the majority of 
people (especially the military class) who are incapable of acquiring knowledge 
would preserve their δόξαι in the face of fear or desire. The preservation of 
δόξαι is not due to their being grounded in reasoning but through external 
instilling of and habituation with correct δόξαι (Rep. 429B–430C).  
Another peculiar feature of Plato’s middle period notion of δόξα is that this 
capacity is shared across species, since Plato says that other animals besides 
humans have δόξαι (e.g. Rep. 430B). That animals are capable of having δόξαι 
confirms that in the middle dialogues δόξα is taken to include automatic and 
non-reflective processes that do not require any reasoning or reflection, since 
Plato explicitly denies reasoning to animals (Rep. 375A). 
In accordance with this broad notion of δόξα, Plato does not think of 
individual δόξαι as such as being epistemologically particularly valuable. Plato 
famously holds that δόξαι are in a kind of a cognitive twilight zone between 
knowledge and pure ignorance (Rep. 476E–478E and Symp. 202A). And it is 
often thought that in the Republic he also argues that the objects of δόξα are 
somewhere between ‘what completely is’ and ‘what in no way is’. Correspon-
dingly, Socrates says that ‘δόξαι without knowledge are shameful and ugly 
things. The best of them are blind, or do you think that those who express a true 
                                                                                                                                  
indicating this or that, what appears to reason are the opposites of the simultaneous sensory 
appearances about the things in question’ (Lorenz 2006: 68). Recent discussions of δόξα in 
the Republic, e.g. by Moss (2008), Ganson (2009), Wilberding (2012), also accept Adam’s 
version of the text, as I do. 
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δόξα without understanding are any different from blind people who happen to 
travel the right road?’ (Rep. 506C).  
Matters are somewhat different in the late dialogues. In direct opposition to 
the Republic (and the Phaedo), the Timaeus stresses that the appetite is ‘totally 
devoid of δόξα, reasoning and understanding, though it does share in per-
ception, pleasant and painful, and desires’ (Tim. 77B). The lowest part of the 
soul, a plausible agent of δόξαι of the middle dialogues, is explicitly said to lack 
δόξαι completely. Nor does the Timaeus ever attribute beliefs to the spirited part 
of the soul. Further, in the passage above, δόξα is listed together with reasoning 
and understanding, suggesting that these three capacities are somehow con-
nected. This is remarkably different from what Plato used to think in the Re-
public X, where reasoning was only one possible means to arrive at a δόξα, 
there was nothing in the nature of δόξα that tied it to reasoning.  
In fact, the Timaeus makes it fairly clear that it is first and foremost the 
immortal part of the soul, i.e., reason, that should now be considered to be the 
subject of δόξαι (37C). This accords well with another distinctive feature of the 
late dialogues. Namely, in the late dialogues δόξα comes to involve quite an 
impressive amount of deliberation. The few times when Plato attempts to give a 
definition of δόξα, he stresses that δόξαι are a result of the soul considering 
candidate answers and trying to figure out how things are. The amount of 
explicit reasoning involved in coming to a definite δόξα far exceeds the passive 
acceptance of sensory appearances in the Republic X. The most remarkable 
example of this comes from a very late dialogue, the Philebus:  
 
And is it not memory and perception (ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως) that lead to 
a belief (δόξα) or the attempt to come to a definite belief, as the case may be? – 
Indeed. – Do we agree that the following must happen here? – What? – 
Wouldn’t you say that it often happens that someone who cannot get a clear 
view because he is looking from a distance wants to make up his mind 
(βούλεσθαι κρίνειν) about what he sees? – I would say so. – And might he then 
not again raise another question to himself? – What question? – ‘What could 
that be that appears to stand near that rock under a tree?’ Do you find it 
plausible that someone might say those words to himself when he sets his eyes 
on such appearances (φανταζόμενον)? – Certainly. – And might he not after-
wards, as an answer to his question, say to himself, ‘It is a man.’ and in so 
speaking, would get it right? – No doubt. – But he might also be mistaken and 
say that what he sees is a statue, the work of some herdsman? – Very likely. 
(Phil. 38B–D) 
 
Similar accounts of δόξα can be found in the Sophist (263E–264B) and the 
Timaeus (37A–C). Here, unlike in the Republic, perceptual appearances do not 
count as δόξαι. The δόξαι are formed only when there is something deficient 
about how things appear, e.g. when one cannot get a clear view of the thing that 
is appearing. Furthermore, forming δόξαι requires an internal dialogue of the 
soul, which seems to involve quite elaborate cognitive resources. This internal 
dialogue is stressed in another late dialogue, the Theaetetus.  
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And do you apply the word ‘thinking’ (διανοεῖσθαι) to the same thing I do? – 
What do you apply it to? – Speech (λόγον) which the mind itself goes through 
with itself (αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν) about whatever it’s considering. Mind you, I 
don’t claim to know the truth of what I’m telling you. It looks to me as if, 
when the mind is thinking (διανοουμένη), it’s simply carrying on a discussion 
(διαλέγεσθαι), asking itself questions and answering them, and making 
assertions and denials. And when it has come to a decision (ὁρίσασα), either 
slowly or in a sudden rush, and it’s no longer divided, but says one single 
thing, we call that its δόξα. So what I call δοξάζειν is speaking (λέγειν) and 
what I call δόξα is speech (λόγον); but speech spoken, not aloud to someone 
else, but silently to oneself. (Tht. 189E4–190A7)  
 
Socrates is claiming that all δόξαι, as they are formed, are preceded by an 
antecedent act of thinking (διανοεῖσθαι). In other words, δόξαι are the results of 
thinking conceived of as an inner dialogue of the soul. Again, read in 
connection with the passage from the Republic mentioned above, this might be 
a good explanation of how the reasoning part of the soul acquires its δόξαι. 
However, the uncritical acceptance of the lower parts of the soul obviously 
would not fall under this description of δόξα14. Δόξα, in the later texts, is a 
result of a process of reasoning. Furthermore, in contrast to the Republic, in the 
Theaetetus (186C–187A) Plato seems to be advocating the view that non-
human animals are not capable of forming δόξαι. Thus, there is a tendency for 
the later Plato to take the value of and the cognitive resources necessary for 
δόξα much more seriously than he had done earlier. Plato comes to think that 
δόξα is a capacity involving reason15. 
Taking into account these features of the notion of δόξα, the question of how 
to best translate this notion becomes quite pressing. Translators usually vary 
between several English equivalents (depending on the context and the 
dialogue): ‘belief’, ‘opinion’, ‘judgment’ and ‘appearance’. None of these terms 
                                                     
14 There is another, perhaps terminological but, I think, still telling difference from the 
Republic. In the Analogy of the Line, in the Republic 509D-511E, Plato distinguishes 
understanding (νόησις) or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), thought (διάνοια), belief (πίστις), and 
imagination (εἰκασία). The first two together are later (533E-534A) on identified as intellect 
(again, νόησις) and the second segment of the line is called δόξα. The first is concerned with 
‘being’ (οὐσία) and the second (δόξα) with ‘becoming’ (γένεσις). Thought (διανοεῖσθαι) is, 
therefore, sharply distinguished from δόξα. The difference from Theaetetus seems to be 
overwhelming – the Republic attaches thought and δόξα to different realms, whereas in the 
passage last quoted thinking (διανοεῖσθαι), far from concerning a different subject matter, is 
actually a cognitive precondition of δόξα. 
15 The amount of deliberation involved in forming δόξαι also explains why δόξαι tends to be 
more valued in the later than in the middle dialogues. Eleatic Visitor calls true δόξαι ‘divine’ 
and ‘more than human’ (Statesman 309C). The Philebus assigns true δόξαι the fourth place 
in the good life, just after reason and intelligence, and together with knowledge and arts 
(Phlb. 66B–C). In the Laws δόξα (and not only true δόξα) is called the ‘leading virtue’ (Leg. 
688B), and the ‘natural ruling principle’ (Leg. 689B). 
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taken singly can encompass the meaning of Greek δόξα sufficiently16. I have 
opted for translating δόξα as ‘belief’ and δοξάζειν as ‘forming a belief’, for the 
following reasons.  
‘Belief’ (unlike ‘opinion’ or ‘judgment’) is a sufficiently vague term to 
capture important aspects of Plato’s notion of δόξα. ‘Belief’, just like δόξα, can 
be conceived of as a conscious occurrence (for example, δόξα is used in the 
occurrent sense throughout the discussion of false belief in the Theaetetus 
(187D–200D)), or as a disposition or as a state (see, e.g. Rep. 429B–433D on 
the preservation of δόξαι). In addition, some philosophers claim that beliefs are 
low-level cognitive states or dispositions, shared by humans and brute animals 
(e.g. Armstrong 1973: 25–31), yet other philosophers take holding beliefs to 
require language (e.g. Davidson 1982) or the ability to think rationally (e.g. 
McDowell 1994: 60). Sometimes perceptual representations themselves are 
taken to be (very closely related to) beliefs (e.g. Quine and Ullian 1970: 6–7), 
sometimes the ability to give reasons for holding a particular belief is taken to 
be necessary feature of belief formation (Williams 2001: 20) 
As we have seen, Plato at different stages of his career wavers between the 
same options. Further, demarcating what beliefs are is not a terminological 
issue; it is a substantial philosophical problem, since it involves fundamental 
questions about the relation between thought and the world. I hope to show in 
this dissertation that Plato, too, comes to use the term δόξα in a different 
manner because of important philosophical and not terminological conside-
rations.  
To be sure, Plato’s notion of δόξα is to a certain degree different from the 
notion of ‘belief’. It sometimes carries an implication of being an inferior 
cognitive state (in this sense it is close to ‘opinion’ or Meinung) which Plato 
distinguishes sharply from knowledge (Rep. V–VII, Tim 51C–E). But the term 
‘belief’ in English can be used in a similar manner, to express uncertainty17. 
And even if contemporary epistemology unanimously takes knowledge to be a 
kind of belief18, and Plato is usually thought to disagree (but see Meno 98A, 
where Plato defines knowledge as true belief bound by ‘account of the reason 
why’), this should not force us to conclude that δόξα and ‘belief’ are different 
concepts – it might simply be the case that Plato has a different philosophical 
theory of the relation between knowledge and belief. In general, it is extremely 
difficult (if it is at all possible) to tell the difference between different concepts 
being used in similar philosophical theories from the same concepts being used 
in dissimilar philosophical theories, especially when there is a significant 
                                                     
16 For some discussion on how to translate δόξα into German, see Szaif (1998: 309–315) and 
Ebert (1974: 37–40), into English: Bostock (1988: 156–157), and into French, Narcy (2005). 
17 ‘This much is true: it is generally misleading to say ‘I believe’ when I could just as well 
say ‘I know’. If you ask me which way to go at a fork in the road it would be misleading for 
me to say ‘I believe we should go left’ when I have carefully checked the route and know 
which way to turn’ (Williams 2000: 18). Of course, this does have to mean that knowledge is 
not a kind of belief (as Williams quickly points out). 
18 But see Hossack (2007), where this view is disputed. 
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temporal distance between the two theories. The above considerations are, of 
course, by no means conclusive for adopting ‘belief’ as a translation of δόξα. 
Hopefully the argument in this dissertation will ultimately justify the rendering 
of δόξα as ‘belief’. 
The differences between the notion of belief in Plato’s middle and late works 
are the following.  
In the middle works: 
(i) all parts of the soul and the body are capable of forming beliefs (Rep. 
602C–603A; cf. Phd. 83D),  
(ii) non-human animals are capable of forming beliefs (Rep. 430B),  
(iii) beliefs include sensory appearances (Rep. 602C–603A, Tht. 152D–179D),  
(iv) beliefs include blind and non-reflective acceptances (Rep. 602C–606D).  
 
Whereas in the late dialogues Plato is committed to the claims according to 
which:  
(i*) only reason is capable of forming beliefs (Tim. 37C, 77B),  
(ii*) non-human animals are incapable of forming beliefs (Tht. 186C),  
(iii*) beliefs differ from sensory appearances (Phlb.38C-E),  
(iv*) belief formation necessarily involves reasoning and deliberation (Tht. 
189E–190A, Phlb. 38C-E).  
The differences between (i–iv) and (i*–iv*) raise the following question. Why 
does Plato, in the later dialogues, commit himself to (i*–iv*)? The standard 
account, presented in great detail by Christopher Bobonich (2002) and Hendrik 
Lorenz (2006), explains this shift in the following manner. For Plato, in the later 
dialogues, (i) belief formation is rational capacity because it involves predi-
cation or conceptualization, (ii) predication or conceptualization, in turn, neces-
sarily involves awareness of (some) Forms.  
The standard account takes a developmentalist stance towards Plato’s philo-
sophy. It combines two possible ways of thinking about the relation between 
δόξα and Forms in the middle dialogues. The first way of thinking takes Forms 
as real properties or essences or universals conceived in realist fashion, and the 
beliefs of someone who is not aware of the existence of Forms (i.e., the non-
philosophers) to be cognitively independent from Forms. Forms are Plato’s 
answer to epistemological (‘what are the objects of our knowledge?’) and 
metaphysical (‘what is the essence of F?’ or ‘what is (truly) F?’) questions19. 
Non-philosophers’ thoughts are cognitively cut off from what is real, since they 
do not recognize non-sensible properties, i.e. Forms. In what follows, I will call 
this the Pessimistic View. The second way of thinking about the relation 
between belief and Forms takes Forms to contribute significantly to the lives of 
non-philosophers enabling them to categorize and identify things. Forms 
function (among other things), very roughly, as ‘meanings’ or ‘concepts’. 
                                                     
19 Forms can also have semantic significance, but only if Plato thinks that Forms (or descrip-
tions attached to Forms) are meanings of some words and assumes that non-philosophers are 
not aware of the the meanings of (some of) the words they use. This is the view defended in 
Bobonich (2002). See also below p. 30, p.45, fn. 60, and pp. 177–178, esp. fn. 229. 
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Therefore, the beliefs of non-philosophers, inasmuch as they involve the terms 
designating the Forms, are dependent on some, albeit dim and confused, 
awareness of Forms. In what follows, I will call this the Optimistic View, since 
it involves an (optimistic) assumption that the thoughts and concepts of every-
one (regardless of their education) correspond somehow with the fundamental 
structure of reality. 
The standard account of the problem of the rationality of belief, as presented 
by Bobonich and Lorenz, states that Plato moves from the Pessimistic View to 
the Optimistic View. In the middle dialogues, beliefs of non-philosophers are 
not dependent on any cognitive contact with Forms. In the late dialogues, 
however, Plato recognizes that the grasp of (at least some) Forms is necessary 
for forming beliefs. Now, it is uncontroversial that only reason has cognitive 
access to Forms. Thus, by making the cognitive access to Forms a necessary 
condition of forming beliefs, Plato commits himself to the view that reason has 
to be involved in forming beliefs.  
There are important differences between the accounts of Lorenz and Bo-
bonich of the rationality of belief. However, before assessing these accounts in 
somewhat greater detail, I think it is very useful to take a closer look at the two 
different conceptions of how belief and Forms are connected in Plato’s middle 
dialogues since the standard account aims to connect these two views by 
claiming that Plato moves from one to the other.  
 
 
2. Two Views on the Relation between  
Thought and Forms 
First, I would like to issue a caveat. The following brief overview concerns only 
the following question – does Plato, in his middle dialogues, take cognitive 
access to Forms to be a necessary condition of belief? I will ignore some of the 
most substantial questions about Plato’s middle-period epistemology and 
metaphysics. The first question is perhaps the most controversial issue in 
Platonic scholarship. What are the Forms? Are Forms definitions, essences, pro-
perties, universals, meanings, or some combination of these things? The second 
question pertains to the relation between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη in Plato’s middle 
works, especially Books V–VII of the Republic. Namely, what is the difference 
between belief and knowledge? Are they distinguished because they take diffe-
rent objects (sensibles and Forms) or because they relate to the same objects in 
a different manner? Can there be knowledge of sensibles and beliefs about 
Forms? The third large question concerns the kind of cognition that belief and 
knowledge represent. Are we dealing with kinds of direct acquaintance or in-
tuition or are belief and knowledge ‘propositional attitudes’? Ignoring these 
three very large issues is justified by the fact that the distinction I aim to make 
simply cuts across these controversial matters. For example, as to the third 
question, one can be an ‘intuitionist’ about δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, but still claim 
29 
that δόξα involves a kind of ‘indirect’ intuition of Forms.20 Or, one can be a 
‘propositionalist’, but maintain that δόξα does not have to involve any aware-
ness of Forms (unless the belief is explicitly about Forms)21. As to the first 
question, regardless of how one construes the exact nature of Forms, one can 
still adhere to either the Pessimistic or Optimistic View. Thirdly, even if one 
allows belief to be about Forms, this does not mean that all beliefs require 
‘cognitive access’ to Forms, it might be that most beliefs do not (again, unless 
they are explicitly about Forms)22. Or, one can say that δόξα can never be about 
Forms (in the sense required in Republic V), but that it still requires some dim 
awareness (grasp, understanding) of Forms23. With this in mind, let us turn to 
the two views. 
 
 
The Optimistic View 
 
The Optimistic View insists that some sort of cognitive relation to Forms is 
deeply embedded in ordinary thought. A version of this view was held already 
in the Old Academy by Xenocrates and in later Antiquity by Proclus24. The 
general idea behind the Optimistic View is that in order to for anyone (philo-
sophers and non-philosophers alike) to think ‘x is F’, one has to have some 
understanding or knowledge of the corresponding Form of F, i.e. some under-
standing of ‘what F is’. The Optimistic View claims that some understanding of 
Forms is necessary for everyone in order to use concepts and understand the 
meanings of general terms.  
One of the ideas behind the Optimistic View is the following. In everyday 
life all (mature) human beings are capable of collecting sensible particulars into 
groups. We easily identify dogs, we distinguish chairs from tables and we 
categorize some things as beautiful and some as ugly. All this is very much a 
part of what people normally do when they think the simplest thoughts about 
their surroundings. Indeed, it seems quite reasonable to say that no thinking at 
all can occur without some identifying, distinguishing or categorizing being in-
volved. When we think of objects, we usually (or always) think of them as 
something, as dogs, as chairs or as beautiful. Since we can think that ‘x is F’ in 
different contexts and about different things, it seems that we grasp something 
general, abstract or universal in thinking these thoughts, something that is inde-
pendent from a particular situation or a particular token-thought, i.e. the uni-
versal F-ness. This idea is often expressed by saying that meanings of general 
terms are universals. This is, for example, how Russell understood the moti-
vation behind Plato’s theory of Forms:  
                                                     
20 This view is expressed by Gonzalez (1996). 
21 See, for example, Fine (1990). 
22 For example, Fine (1990). 
23 This seems to be the view expressed in Szaif (1998: 141–145). 
24 As to Xenocrates’ position of belief as a blend of ἐπιστήμη and αἴσθησις, see (Dillon 
2003:124–5) and as to Proclus, see his commentary on the Timaeus, 248, 14–22.  
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Language cannot get on without general words such as ‘cat’, and such words 
are evidently not meaningless. But if the word ‘cat’ means anything, it means 
something which is not this or that cat, but some kind of universal cattiness. 
This is not born when a particular cat is born, and does not die when it dies. In 
fact, it has no position in space or time, it is ‘eternal’. (Russell 1946/2004: 137) 
 
Secondly, it is reasonable to assume that if one can identify or categorize some-
thing as being F (as a dog, as harmful, etc.), one must be able to distinguish an 
F thing from not-F things, i.e., one must have understanding or knowledge of 
‘what-it-is-to-be-F’ or F-ness. If F-ness is a universal feature, it follows that in 
order to identify, distinguish or categorize something as F one must grasp the 
universal ‘F-ness’25, i.e. the meaning of a term or the content of a concept must 
be transparent to the speaker or thinker. Expressed in Platonic language (and 
assuming that Forms are universals), whenever one thinks (desires, fears) that ‘x 
is F’, one stands a cognitive relation to the universal Form of F (to F-ness, to 
the F itself). The exact nature of this cognitive relation can be left open: it can 
be called ‘awareness’, or ‘cognitive access’, or ‘apprehending’ or ‘acquain-
tance’, or ‘lower-level knowledge’. The central idea is that in order to use the 
term ‘F’ (or represent-as F), one must have some understanding of ‘what-it-is-
to-be-F’, i.e. of the Form of F. For example, when one thinks that Helen is 
beautiful, one stands in a cognitive relation of ‘apprehending of’ or ‘acquain-
tance with’ the Form of Beauty. The central claim of the Optimistic View can 
be expressed as follows: 
 
Optimistic View: In order to represent (identify, categorize, distinguish) x as F, 
one needs to be in cognitive contact with the Form of F. 
It is important to note that the Optimistic View should not be confused with 
a semantic account of Forms. According to the semantic account, Plato’s Forms 
are responsible for general terms being meaningful, significant or informative. 
It is appealing to assume that all semantic accounts of Forms are committed to 
the Optimistic View, since we normally think that even non-philosophers 
                                                     
25 This is how Evans interprets ‘Russell’s Principle’: ‛The principle is that a subject cannot 
make a judgement about something unless he knows which object his judgement is about’ 
(Evans 1982: 89). And ‛We may take a small step from our truistic starting-point, and say 
that in the case of a proposition of the form ‘a is F’, knowledge of what it is for it to be true 
must be the result of two pieces of knowledge, one of which can be equated with an Idea of 
an object, and the other with an Idea of a property, or more familiarly, a concept’ (ibid. 106). 
Evans says further that ‛It seems to me that the idea of how objects of a given kind, Gs, are 
distinguished from each other and from all other things must enter our every conception of a 
state of affairs involving a G. For there is no thought about objects of a certain kind which 
does not presuppose the idea of one object of that kind, and the idea of one object of that 
kind must employ a general conception of the ways in which objects of that kind are 
differentiated from one another and from all other things.’ (ibid. 108). For an argument that 
Plato subscribes to (a form of) Russell’s Principle, see McDowell (1970). 
31 
understand the meanings of general terms26. However, this is might not be 
Plato’s view, since the terms ‘meaning’, ‘signification’ and ‘understanding’ can 
be used in a more demanding sense than usual. For example, even if Forms are 
the meanings of (at least some) general terms (as is very often thought), it is not 
necessarily the case that non-philosophers have any understanding of the true 
meanings or significance of the general terms they use.27 It may very well be, 
and Plato does suggest this (Rep. 515B) that only philosophers understand the 
meaning of the general terms, whereas non-philosophers do not. There is no 
obvious reason to think that the (true) meaning of a term is, for Plato, always 
transparent for the speaker who uses this term. That is, Plato might plausibly 
have a more demanding notion of understanding the meaning of a word than 
contemporary readers are accustomed to. For example, in the Theaetetus 
(147B), Socrates takes understanding a name of a thing and knowing the defi-
nition of a thing to be equivalent28. It is for this reason that some of the passages 
in Plato’s middle dialogues where he apparently connects words/names and 
Forms (e.g. Phd 78E, 102B, Rep. 596A, Crat. 423E) should not be taken to 
automatically support the Optimistic View. The Optimistic View concerns the 
cognitive preconditions for using general terms, rather than what makes the 
general terms meaningful.  
Already in Plato’s early, Socratic dialogues something like Optimistic View 
seems to be expressed. In the Euthyphro, for example, Socrates says that the 
eponymous character should refrain from offering examples of pious things or 
accidental properties that belong to pious things, but rather say what piety itself 
is, the form (τὴν ἰδέαν) of piety, so that Socrates can go on and use this form to 
identify pious actions and things.  
 
Tell me then what this form itself is (τὴν ἰδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν), so that I may 
look upon it and, using it as a model, say (φῶ) that any action of yours or 
another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it not that it is not. (Euth. 6E).  
 
Socrates assumes that in order to say that ‘x is F’, one needs to grasp what F is, 
i.e. the form of F (so that one can use it as a model). Thus, Socrates, at least on 
one reading, requires that one should grasp a (Socratic) form of F in order to be 
                                                     
26 Most of the defenders of the semantic account of Forms take ‘meaning’ and ‘under-
standing’ in the sense of ‘linguistic competence’ (presumably had by all mature human 
beings), thus in fact committing themselves to the Optimistic View. A good example of this 
is found in White (1976:7–9 and 75–77). 
27 An example of the reading that admits that Forms have a semantic role to play but 
nevertheless denies that this implies the Optimistic View can be found in Bobonich (2002: 
305–312). 
28 At Tht. 147B–C, Socrates implies that since he does not know what knowledge is, he does 
not understand the expressions where the term ‘knowledge’ occurs, such as ‘knowledge of 
shoes’. Since Socrates (presumably) has linguistic understanding of the expression ‘know-
ledge of shoes’, he must therefore be addressing ‘understanding the meaning of a term’ in a 
stronger sense than simple linguistic understanding. For some discussion concerning this 
passage, see Burnyeat (1977a) and Sedley and Brown (1994). 
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able to represent things as being F. According to the Optimistic View, grasping 
Socratic forms explains what it means to possess a concept (or grasp the 
meaning of a general term).29 Socratic form of, e.g. piety, is supposed to specify 
features that belong to all and only pious things. To articulate the Socratic form 
of piety is to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application 
of the concept ‘pious’ (or the meaning of the word ‘pious’). The famous 
Socratic ‘what is F?’ question can thus be seen as aiming for clear articulation 
of the humdrum knowledge involved in the use of the concept F, knowledge 
possessed by anyone who possesses the relevant concept. However, the arti-
culation of this humdrum knowledge of concepts can present major difficulties, 
as the Socratic dialogues show.30 
According to the optimistic view, Plato’s Forms, although different in some 
ways from Socratic forms (just how different is a matter of considerable contro-
versy31), perform a similar task of enabling everyday non-philosophical con-
ceptual thought, i.e. that cognitive access to Forms is necessary in order to pos-
sess (or acquire) concepts. The most important piece of evidence for this view 
derives from the first dialogue that introduces the Platonic Forms, the recol-
lection passage in the Phaedo (72E–77A)32. In the Phaedo, Socrates argues for 
the soul’s immortality. He distinguishes the Equal itself from the many sensible 
equals. He says the following: 
 
Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he now sees 
wants (βούλεται) to be like some other reality (ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων) but falls 
short (ἐνδεῖ) and cannot be like that other since it is inferior (φαυλότερον), do 
we agree that the one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to 
which he says it is like, but deficiently so? – Necessarily. Well, do we also 
experience this about the equal objects (τὰ ἴσα) and the equal itself (αὐτὸ τὸ 
ἴσον), or do we not? – Very definitely. We must then possess knowledge of the 
Equal (τὸ ἴσον) before the time when we first saw the equal objects and 
realized that all these objects strive to be like the Equal but are deficient in this 
(ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως). – That is 
so. (Phd. 74C–75A) 
 
                                                     
29 Margolis and Laurence offer the following summary of the classical theory of concepts: 
‘The Classical Theory holds that most concepts – especially lexical concepts – have defini-
tional structure. What this means is that most concepts encode necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for their own application.’ (Margolis and Laurence 1999: 8–9). Then they go on to 
say that Plato’s Euthyphro can be seen as the first expression of the Classical Theory (ibid. 
p. 10).  
30 Vlastos (1981: 411) makes this point especially forcefully. 
31 Aristotle (Met. 13.4) says that unlike Socratic definitions, Platonic Forms are not sensible 
and are separate. However, there is considerable controversy both about what Aristotle 
means by this and in what sense Platonic Forms are non-sensible and separate.  
32 The number of defenders of this view is simply too numerous to provide references here. 
See, nevertheless, Scott (1999: 102) who provides a list of references to what he calls 
reading K (Kantian) of recollection. 
33 
Plato seems to think that to think of sticks and stones as equal (‘x is F’), one 
needs to stand in a relation of explicit comparing of the sticks and stones with 
the Equal itself or the Form33 of Equal (see also Phd. 76D–E). Comparison 
presumably requires cognitive access to both items compared – the equal sticks 
and stones and the Equal itself34. Plato’s point is, on this reading, that since the 
Equal itself is not accessible by means of perception, this means that the 
cognitive resources required for classifying things as equal have to be prenatal, 
i.e. that some concepts cannot be acquired by means of sense perception (Phd. 
75B) and that these concepts have to be acquired before the soul enters the 
mortal body. The recollection argument mentions the Equal, Greater, Smaller, 
Beautiful, Just, Good and Pious (75D–E). Now, what is it about, e.g. the con-
cept of ‘equal’ that makes it impossible to acquire it by means of sense 
perception? Here the answer depends heavily on what it is, exactly, that one 
takes the imperfection of the sensible equals to consist in. Presumably, one 
cannot acquire the concept of ‘equal’ by means of perception because of some 
deficiency in the equal sticks and stones. Namely, that ‘equal stones and sticks, 
while remaining the same, appear [to one] to be equal and [to another] unequal 
(ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὔ)’ (74B).  
The text of the Phaedo allows for several different readings of this defi-
ciency of the sensible ‘equals’. Is the verb ‘appear’ in the previous quotation 
veridical or not, i.e. does Plato mean that equal sticks and stones appear unequal 
or are they unequal? It is also unclear whether the equal sticks appear unequal 
to someone or in relation to something (to other sticks and stones)35? The 
passages in other dialogues (most notably Rep. 523–5) do not help much to 
clarify the issue. Scholars have offered a wide range of explanations for the 
imperfection of sensibles. The most traditional explanation (going back to 
Aristotle, for example, Met. I, 6.) is that sensibles are in some sort of flux 
(either changing in all respects all the time or in some respects all the time or in 
some respects some of the time)36 and are therefore not stably instantiating the 
                                                     
33 In the recollection passage Socrates does not use the term ἰδέα or εἶδος, but talks about the 
‛Equal itself’ or just ‛Equal’. It is quite uncontroversial that he does have in mind the 
Platonic Forms.  
34 ‛In that passage, Plato is emphasizing not so much the notion that we can and ought to 
compare sensible objects to Forms, but rather the idea that we do make such comparisons 
and that such comparisons are involved in our judgments about the sensible world 
immediately from birth (75B10–11)... He seems to believe that even in our first use of our 
sensory apparatus, we make some use of knowledge of Forms, which knowledge we must 
therefore have acquired prenatally (C8–10).’ (White 1976; 76). 
35 The datives τῷ... τῷ... can be read either as neuter or masculine. The first option would 
then be that the stick appears equal to some sticks but unequal to others. If the dative is read 
as masculine, then the meaning would be that equal sticks appear equal to someone, but 
unequal to someone else. A variant text also gives the possibility of reading the text as 
meaning that the equal sticks ‘sometimes (tote men) appear unequal and sometimes not (tote 
d’ou)’. For some discussion, see Bostock (1988: 66–100). 
36 Below, I will discuss a reading (stemming from Irwin and Fine), according to which flux 
means compresence of the opposites in types (not in tokens). 
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properties in question. More modern approaches include the claims that sen-
sibles only approximately instantiate these properties (the sensible triangle is 
only ‘almost’ a triangle, unlike the Form of a triangle which is perfectly 
triangular);37 or that the sensibles instantiate these properties incompletely (the 
sensible equals are always equal to something and unequal to something else, 
whereas the Form of Equal is completely equal)38. Whichever way the imper-
fection of sensibles is construed, the distinctive feature of the Optimistic View 
is the claim that to be able to categorize, identify and to distinguish sensible 
things as equal or beautiful, one has to grasp (or has to have grasped previously) 
the ‘Standard Case’39 – the Equal or the Beautiful itself. The defenders of the 
Optimistic View require that in order to acquire and use the concept of, e.g., 
‘equal’, one has to be acquainted with something that bears this quality per-
fectly or completely. This, at least sometimes 40 , goes hand in hand with 
construing Forms as perfect particulars that bear the properties in a more pure or 
complete sense than the ‘regular’ particulars (the so-called self-predication of 
Forms). 
According to the Optimistic View, in order to learn a concept (of, e.g., 
equality) one has to be acquainted with a non-ambiguous (stable, complete, per-
fect, pure) instance of the property of which that concept is a concept. For 
instance, the non-ambiguous (stable, complete, perfect, pure) instance of the 
property of equality is the Form of Equal. At least some properties are instan-
tiated in the sensible world ambiguously (unstably, incompletely, imperfectly, 
impurely) – a mouse is large compared with an ant but small compared with an 
elephant (the example derives from Irwin 1999: 162). Therefore, one cannot 
encounter an un-ambiguous (stable, complete, perfect, pure) instance of large-
ness in perception. Those concepts that are ambiguously represented by per-
ception cannot be learned or abstracted from perception. 
This leads to the theory of recollection. Plato thinks (according to the Opti-
mistic View) that (at least) concepts of large and small, just and fine, are 
learned before our souls enter our bodies. Recollection is understood as a 
doctrine partly designed to explain how human being acquire the concepts they 
use. The philosophical reflection is a different matter, it proceeds only after 
recollection has taken place. This has been an extremely widespread view on 
how Plato thinks Forms play a role in ordinary thinking in the twentieth 
century41. I offer two samples.  
 
                                                     
37 Nehamas (1975/1999: 139–142) provides some references for the ‛approximation view’.  
38 E.g. Owen (1957), White (1976: 66–69), Nehamas (1975/1999: 151–155). 
39 ‛Where a Paradigm is required for a predicate that is incomplete in its ordinary use it must 
indeed be (as the argument of P faithfully shows) a Standard Case, exhibiting rather than 
being the character it represents’ (Owen 1957: 119) 
40 Again, Owen (1957) is the classic example. 
41 This was, in the twentieth century, an extremely widespread view. The adherents of this 
view include interpretators of Plato who are otherwise worlds apart, such as Heidegger 
(2002), Bostock (1986), Owen (1957), Natorp (1922/1961), Ross (1951) and Taylor (1928).  
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Again, the most important feature of the process of ‘being reminded’ is that 
sense-perception suggests standards to which they don’t themselves conform. 
The same visual sensations which suggest the notion ‘straight’ to me, for 
example, are the foundation of the judgment that no visual stick is perfectly 
straight. The ‘form’ is thus never contained in, or presented by, the sensible 
experience which suggests it. Like the ‘limit’ of infinite series, it is approxi-
mated but never reached. These two considerations, taken together, show that 
the theory does full justice to both parts of Kantian dictum that ‘percepts with-
out concepts are blind, concepts without percepts are empty’. (Taylor 1928: 
188)  
 
Another concise expression of this view derives from David Bostock who says 
the following about the Form Equal in the Phaedo: 
 
The suggestion is that what Plato is talking about is the meaning of the word 
‘equal’. So when he claims, and expects us to agree, that there is such a thing 
as equality, what he is relying on is just that the word ‘equal’ does have a 
meaning. Similarly when he claims that we all know what equality is, what he 
is relying on is that we all know what it means. After all, the word ‘equal’ is 
not an especially difficult and recherché word: we all master that word 
perfectly easily, and use it in our talk without encountering any problems. So 
in an ordinary and common or garden sense we do indeed know what ‘equal’ 
means, and it is perfectly natural to say that what the word means is equality, 
and hence we know what equality is. (Bostock 1986:69–70) 
 
Bostock then goes on to point out that Plato thinks that encountering the Form 
Equal is necessary for us to understand the term ‘equal’ and hence having 
‘common or garden knowledge’ of meanings of (at least some) words presuppo-
ses a previous encounter with the Forms. He furthermore says that mastering the 
word ‘equal’ enables us to classify things as equal. That presumably means that 
representing something as equal requires a previous contact with Equality 
(which means that classification of perceptual ‘equals’ requires at least rudi-
mentary linguistic competence). Thus, according to Bostock, the representations 
involving terms like ‘equal’, ‘just’ etc., require a previous encounter with the 
corresponding Forms.  
It is difficult to say, on the Optimistic View, whether Plato intends grasping 
Forms to be necessary for all identification and categorization involving general 
terms, since it is unclear whether Plato countenances Forms for all general 
terms. The arguments that show that Forms are different from sensibles pre-
sented in the Phaedo 74B–E and in the Republic 523B–D seem to suggest that 
there are Forms for only properties that have opposites, such as equal and 
unequal, big and small, good and disgraceful.42 On the other hand, Plato says 
that there are Forms for ‘each of the many things to which we apply the same 
name’ (Rep. 596A). This suggests that there is a corresponding Form for every 
                                                     
42 See Annas (1981: 217–241) for an illuminating discussion of the ‘Argument from Oppo-
sites’ and what this argument establishes.  
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general term (in the Cratylus (389A) there is the Form of the Shuttle, in the 
Republic (597A) there is the Form of the Bed, in the Timaeus (51B) we 
encounter the Form of Fire). Yet, Plato also says that Forms correspond to 
natural kinds (Phdr. 265E), and terms like ‘barbarian’ or ‘number other than ten 
thousand’ do not have corresponding Forms (Pol. 262B). Thus it is difficult to 
determine whether Plato has a coherent and well-developed theory about the 
exact range of Forms. It may very well be that he does not. These complications 
notwithstanding, the Optimistic View scommits Plato to the view that grasping 
(apprehending, being acquainted with) Forms is a necessary condition of 
categorizing and identifying things that actually do have corresponding Forms.43 
 
 
The Pessimistic View  
 
On the Optimistic View, Forms play an important role in the cognitive lives of 
both philosophers and non-philosophers. Grasping the Form of F enables all 
human beings to identify and classify F things. It is quite difficult to make this 
                                                     
43 There is another passage in Plato that has been taken to support the Optimistic View. This 
is the famous Allegory of the Sun in the Republic, where Plato says that ‘When it [the soul] 
focuses on something that is illuminated by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and 
apparently possesses understanding, but when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on 
what comes to be and passes away, it opines and is dimmed, changes its opinions this way 
and that, and seems bereft of understanding.’ (Rep. 508D). Szaif, for example, says in the 
context of this passage that δοξάζειν is ‘eine defiziente Form der Kognition eines Er-
kenntnisgegestandes’ (see also Heidegger 2002: 35–43). This claim seems all the more 
surprising, since the above passage clearly connects knowledge with Forms and belief with 
‘becoming’. However, according to Szaif, both belief and knowledge stand in a (different) 
cognitive relation to the same object, namely the Form. Szaif argues as follows. A sensible 
thing is presented to the soul (in its state of belief) as a mixture (im Modus der Vermischung 
und Veränderung, p. 142) of a Form, or as an image (Abbild p. 144) of a Form. From this 
Szaif infers that δοξάζειν results in an incomplete representation of the Form or in an unclear 
grasp of the Form (144), presumably because mixtures and images are (ontologically) 
dependent on Forms. Thus, if one has a belief about an image, one stands in a cognitive 
relaton to the thing that the image is an image of, i.e. the Form. However, Bobonich makes 
an excellent point against this sort of reasoning: ‘The idea here seems to be that the onto-
logical relation between the Form and the sensible is so intimate that awareness of a sensible 
brings with it awareness of the Form. But this argument is not obviously persuasive. 
Consider the Morning Star and the Evening Star. The ontological relation between them is 
closer than that between Forms and particulars on any reasonable interpretation, since the 
Morning Star is identical to the Evening Star. But it is plausible to think that I can have all 
sorts of beliefs about the Morning Star, while having no beliefs about the Evening Star’. 
(Bobonich 2002: 497) The point is that one can have a de re attitude towards a thing (e.g. a 
Platonic Form), without any understanding (no matter how unclear or confused) of the thing 
under this particular description (i.e. as a Form). Just a child can have a de re belief (e.g. that 
‘that thing is on the table’) about, say, a microscope, without any conception or awareness of 
what a microscope is so, for Plato, the non-philosophers can have beliefs about just things 
without having any understanding of the Form of Justice. Non-philosophers are ‘people who 
have never seen justice itself’ (Rep. 517D). 
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view cohere with the majority of the passages in Plato’s middle works, where 
Plato seems to be expressing a much bleaker view of the relation between 
everyday (non-philosophical) thinking and the Forms. In (what seems to be a) 
contradiction to Phaedo’s theory of recollection, the Plato of the Republic 
thinks that one has to become a philosopher in order to grasp the Forms and the 
apprehension of Forms is supposed to explain how knowledge is possible. The 
concepts of the majority of people, who do not have knowledge, and who are 
unaware that the non-sensible Forms exist, are not derived from the (un-
conscious) awareness of Forms, but rather from sense-perception or tradition. 
This is the starting point for the Pessimistic View, which allows for significant 
disharmony between ordinary thinking and the structure of reality.44 
 
(Pessimistic View): The cognitive contact with the Form of F is not required to 
represent (identify, categorize, or distinguish) x as F, a cognitive contact with 
the Form of F is required in order to have knowledge of F.  
For example, in this famous passage Socrates distinguishes philosophers 
from everyone else precisely because non-philosophers are incapable grasping 
the Forms: 
 
Since the beautiful (καλὸν) is the opposite of the ugly (αἰσχρῷ), they are two. – 
Of course. – And since they are two, each is one? – I grant that also. – And the 
same account is true of the just and unjust, the good and the bad, and all the 
forms (δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν). Each 
of them is itself one, but because they manifest themselves everywhere in 
association with actions, bodies and one another, each of them appears to be 
many (φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον). – That’s right. – So, I draw 
this distinction: On one side are those you just called lovers of sights, lovers of 
crafts, and practical people (φιλοθεάμονάς τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ πρακτι-
κούς); on the other side are those we are arguing about and whom one would 
alone call philosophers (φιλοσόφους). – How do you mean? – The lovers of 
sights like beautiful sounds, colors, shapes, and everything fashioned out of 
them, but their thoughts are unable to see and embrace the nature (ἡ διάνοια 
τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι) of the beautiful itself (αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ 
καλοῦ). – That’s for sure. – In fact, there are very few people who would be 
able to reach the beautiful itself and see it by itself (δυνατοὶ ἰέναι τε καὶ ὁρᾶν 
καθ' αὑτὸ ἆρα). Isn’t that so? – Certainly. – What about someone who believes 
(νομίζων) in beautiful things, but doesn’t believe in the beautiful itself and 
isn’t able to follow anyone who could lead him to the knowledge (γνῶσιν) of 
it? Do you think he is living in a dream rather than in wakened state? Isn’t this 
dreaming: whether asleep or awake, to think that likeness is not a likeness but 
rather the thing itself that it is like? (Rep. 475E–476C) 
 
This passage expresses the Pessimistic View of the relation between ordinary 
thought and Forms. According to this view, it is only the philosophers who, 
                                                     
44 Just like the Optimistic View, the Pessimistic View had its supporters in Antiquity. See, 
for example, Epictetus’ Discourses, II. 17. 1–18. 
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after years and years of arduous education that Plato describes in detail (Rep. 
522B–534E), come to have cognitive contact with the Forms, i.e. who 
understand what it is to be beautiful, just or good. Non-philosophers (e.g. the 
‘sightlovers) think that beautiful or just are the same as ‘many beautifuls’ 
(πολλὰ καλὰ) or ‘many justs’ (πολλὰ δίκαια) (Rep. 480E). According to the 
Pessimistic View, sightlovers think that beauty is identical with the property of 
being brightly colored and not that beauty is identical with brightly colored 
things. This means that, contrary to the Optimistic View, the non-philosophers 
are not capable of identifying beautiful things by comparing them to Beauty 
itself – rather, they apply their own criteria, in thinking that beauty is bright 
color or sexual attractiveness, thus believing that whatever is brightly colored or 
sexually attractive is beautiful. According to Plato, it is actually the Form of 
Beauty that accounts for why beautiful things are beautiful. Thus, the 
sightlovers believe many things to be beautiful (on the basis of their conception 
of beauty) that actually are not beautiful. They represent things as beautiful (on 
the basis of their conception of beauty) without any understanding of what 
Beauty itself is. Forms have nothing to do with how non-philosophers identify 
or categorize things. 
The middle books of the Republic are replete with similar claims. For 
example, Socrates says that the sophist ‘applies all these names (ὀνομάζοι) 
[fine, shameful, good, bad, just, unjust] in accordance with how the beast [i.e. 
the mob] reacts’ and that ‘he has no other account to give of these terms (ἄλλον 
δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν)’ (Rep. 493B–C), since the majority cannot in 
‘any way tolerate or accept the reality of the beautiful itself, as opposed to many 
beautifuls’ (Rep. 493E). The famous allegories of the Line and the Cave make it 
clear that the majority of people (i.e. non-philosophers) remain on the lowest 
cognitive level – the εἰκασία, i.e. in chains and facing the cave’s wall. The 
prisoners in the cave who are ‘like us’ (515A) think that the words they use 
refer to the shadows on the wall of the cave, when in fact they refer to the things 
outside the cave (their conception of, e.g. justice, does not correspond to what 
justice actually is): ‘And if they could talk to one another, don’t you think 
they’d suppose that the names they used applied to the things they see passing 
before them?’45 (Rep. 515B) The middle books of the Republic leave a strong 
impression that Plato takes ordinary thinking to be separated from (and often in 
                                                     
45 Following J. Adam (1902: 91, 179–180). For justification for accepting Adam’s version of 
the text, see Harte (2007). Harte thinks, however, that prisoners in the cave do have some 
cognitive access to Forms, they have ‘implicit conceptions’ of what it is to be F, which 
enables them to successfully classify the F shadows as Fs. However, it seems possible (an 
option that Harte does not consider) to explain the prisoners’ (partial) success in identifying 
the shadows of F as Fs (prisoners are cognitively successful, since they manage to identify 
the shadows of F as Fs, they are unsuccessful or mistaken, however, since they think that the 
shadows of F are themselves F, whereas they are, in fact, only shadows of F), as based on 
the resemblance of the shadows of F to each other. The recognition of the resemblance 
between the shadows does not imply that there is some dim cognition of the thing that casts 
the shadows. See also p. 36, fn. 43. 
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conflict with) Forms46 and that this is the crucial difference between philo-
sophers and non-philosophers: 
 
Since those who are able to grasp what is always the same and in all respects 
(τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος) are philosophers, while those who are 
not able to do so and who wander among the many things that vary in every 
sort of way (ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἴσχουσιν) are not philosophers, which of 
the two should be the rulers of the city? (Rep. 484B) 
 
What about recollection in the Phaedo, then? According to the Optimistic View, 
the doctrine of recollection was meant to explain how (some) concepts are 
acquired. This would have to mean that even the un-philosophical majority of 
the Republic would need to have some awareness of the Forms of Justice and 
Beauty (since, in categorizing some things as beautiful, they would have to 
compare these things with the Form of Beauty). But Plato says that they are 
‘unable to embrace’ the Forms. Has Plato come to change his mind? This 
assumes that the Optimistic View is correct as the interpretation of Phaedo. 
However, the Optimistic View has its difficulties even concerning recollection 
in the Phaedo and there are good reasons to think that the Phaedo does not 
support the Optimistic View. For example, in the Phaedo recollection explains 
how it comes about that ‘we’ are able to think that the sensible equals fall short 
of Equal itself (Phaedo 72A–B). This means that recollection in case of Equal 
always involves the explicit recognition that there is a Form of Equal. This is 
very difficult to explain if recollection is meant to explain ordinary concept 
acquisition and ‘we’ as covering all human beings, since presumably Plato is 
not inclined to think that concept acquisition involves explicit recognition that 
there are Forms. It is much more natural to take the ‘we’ as designating philo-
sophers. Indeed, Dominic Scott (1995: 13–86) has argued at length that 
recollection is supposed to explain higher-level thought that abstracts away 
from sensibles and focuses on the non-sensible. Recollection is involved in 
philosophical thought and acquisition of knowledge, and it is not involved in the 
belief formation of non-philosophers. Gail Fine makes a similar point: 
 
The theory of recollection, then, does not aim to explain concept acquisition. It 
aims to explain certain innate capacities and our ability to reason in various 
ways once concepts are at hand. There is much to object to in all this—for 
example, capacities need not be grounded in any sort of knowledge, innate or 
prior. But for us, the crucial point is that if the theory of recollection does not 
concern concept acquisition, or thought as such, then it does not concern BT 
[broad thought], and so it does not commit Plato to the Object of Thought 
Argument if that argument is read with BT. More generally, it does not commit 
him to the view that we need to grasp forms in order to understand the 
meanings of terms. It does not even commit him to the view that forms must 
                                                     
46 Also, Rep. 523–5 suggests that even recognizing contradictions (let alone making simple 
judgments like ‘this is hard’) does not have to involve any awareness of Forms. See Bo-
bonich (2002: 498), Irwin (1995: 157–161) and Lorenz (2006: 88–91) for some discussion. 
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exist to confer meaning on general terms. Here as elsewhere Plato ignores 
questions of meaning and linguistic understanding; his concern is how we 
move from belief to knowledge. (Fine 1993:138)47 
 
According to the Pessimistic View, then, in the middle dialogues non-philo-
sophical thought is cognitively independent from Forms in the sense that Forms 
do not contribute to the cognitive lives of non-philosophers – non-philosophers 
are simply ignorant that the Forms exist. Forms are the objects of knowledge. Of 
course, at first glance this is not that different from the Optimistic View, since 
the contemporary notion of knowledge is normally used in a much weaker sense 
(compare Bostock’s ‘common or garden knowledge’ above). However, know-
ledge is, for Plato, a very demanding affair. Every human being is capable of 
attaining knowledge (Meno 85D–E, Rep. 518C) but only very few actually do 
attain knowledge about anything (e.g. Phd. 76B, Tim. 51E), since knowledge 
involves the ability to give an account or the ability to explain why ‘x is F’ and 
this involves the ability to say what F-ness is, i.e., to refer to the non-sensible 
Form of F (e.g. Tim. 51E). Therefore, according to the Pessimistic View, most 
of us do not come into cognitive contact with the Forms of Beauty or Justice or 
Equal, although we are capable of representing (categorizing) things as 
beautiful or equal (according to our conception of beauty or equality).  
 It was suggested above (p. 30–31) that, according to the Optimistic View, 
Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues aims to articulate the content of concepts as 
they are used in everyday thinking. Does this mean that Plato’s Forms are in 
this sense different from Socratic forms? The Pessimistic View denies this and 
takes the Socratic forms, just like Platonic Forms, to be necessary for know-
ledge of F, not for holding beliefs about F (or representing-as F). Socrates 
thinks that to know about anything that it is F, one needs to know the real 
definition of F48. The fact that no interlocutor in any of the Socratic dialogue is 
capable of giving an adequate definition of any of the moral notion discussed, 
shows that the ability to use these notions (e.g. representing something as 
courageous, which all interlocutors are capable of doing) differs significantly 
from the ability to define49 what the underlying moral properties themselves are. 
                                                     
47 Fine is not completely consistent in her denial of the claim that recollection is meant to 
explain concept acquisition. In another paper she says that ‘…we can identify object in this 
world only because we knew PFs [Platonic Forms] in another world … Though I think 
Aristotle is right to attack parts of the doctrine of Anamnesis, as he does, for example, in the 
Posterior Analytics, Plato at least sees that we do not first identify particulars, and only later 
apply general concepts to them; to identify anything, one must already possess general 
concepts. That is the core of truth in the doctrine of Anamnesis that Aristotle’s simple 
account of concept acquisition ignores.’ (1983/2003: 422) 
48 In the literature this aspect of Socratic epistemology is usually referred to as principle of 
the ‘priority of definition’. For some discussion of this very large issue and for further 
references, see Benson (2000, Ch. 6). 
49 It is well known that one should be somewhat careful in attributing to Socrates the search 
for definitions. The term ‘definition’ (horismos) originates with Aristotle, and not all 
definitions accepted by Socrates have the Aristotelian pattern of genus and differentia. For 
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Socrates is not trying to articulate our ordinary use of concepts (e.g. of courage, 
friendship, or temperance)50, he is rather looking to define the essence of the 
real moral properties ‘out there’, so to speak51.  
 He, furthermore, expects that the accounts given by his interlocutors not only 
give necessary and sufficient conditions of what it is to be F, but also that the 
accounts explain why F things have that property. For example, in the 
Euthyphro (10A–11B) Socrates rejects Euthyphro’s account of piety as ‘what 
all the gods love’. This account does succeed (by Socrates’ lights) in picking 
out all and only pious things. It is rejected because it is not sufficiently 
explanatory, it does not explain why gods love pious things, i.e. what makes 
pious things pious. (Irwin 2006). Thus, for Socrates, there is always the possi-
bility that the descriptive content that a given interlocutor associates with a 
particular property-concept (e.g. that temperance is ‘some sort of quietness’ 
(Charm. 159B)) simply fails to pick out the instances of this particular property 
or that it fails to be explanatory. In both cases, the descriptive content fails to 
express the Socratic form. Therefore, Socrates does not assume that there is a 
one-to-one correlation between what we take a concept to entail and how we 
apply it, on the one hand, and what the properties in the world actually are and 
what instantiates them, on the other. Thus, the Socratic dialogues can easily be 
read so as to support the Pessimistic View. 
 What about Platonic Forms? In what follows, I will present the brief outline 
of the most thoroughly worked out52 and systematic version of the Pessimistic 
View, presented by Gail Fine53. Fine takes (both Socratic and Platonic) Forms 
to be genuine explanatory properties. On Fine’s view Forms are properties 
corresponding to real definitions, as opposed to nominal definitions54. To make 
                                                                                                                                  
an overview of the requirements for definitions in Plato’s Socratic dialogues, see, e.g. 
Karasmanis (2006). 
50 ‘He asks about what F is, and what all Fs have in common, not about what the word ‘F’ 
means’ Irwin (1995: 27). 
51 An interesting argument, according to which Socrates (in the Meno) asks two different 
questions: (1) what does the term ‘F’ signify?, and (2) what is the property F?, is offered in 
Charles (2006). Charles thinks that Socrates ultimately confuses the two questions. For a 
reply to Charles, see Fine (2010). Fine argues that, despite appearances, Socrates asks, in the 
Meno and elsewhere, only the second question (and is consequently not confused). 
52 Fine’s papers listed in the next note seem to me to imply the Pessimistic View (as do her 
papers on Republic V–VII and on the Meno, i.e. Fine (1978), (1978a), and (1990). Other 
versions of the Pessimistic View are those of Scott (1995) and Bobonich (2002). 
53 The following sketch of Fine’s account is based on a series of her papers where she de-
fends her view of Forms as universals in the realist sense (Fine 1984, 1986, 1987) and, most 
thoroughly, in her monograph On Ideas. Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms 
(Fine 1993, see note 2 above.). Some of Fine’s claims, most notably about the sensibles 
suffering the ‛compresence of opposites’ appear in Irwin (1977, 1995 and 1999). The term 
‛compresence’ seems to be due to Owen (e.g., Owen 1957: 108), however, unlike Fine and 
Irwin, Owen thinks that Plato is worried about the compresence in tokens (sensible parti-
culars) rather than compresence in types (sensible properties), like Fine and Irwin. Nehamas 
(1975/1999, 138–195) also refers to compresence in types, rather than in tokens. 
54 On the difference between the two types, see Irwin (1995: 25–26). 
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the difference between the two types of definitions clearer, compare, for 
example, the lexical meaning of ‘water’ (the nominal definition, e.g. ‘odourless 
liquid in rivers and lakes’) on the one hand, and the molecular structure of water 
(H2O) on the other. The nominal definitions are easy to find from dictionaries, 
but understanding the real definitions requires extensive background knowledge 
(in the case of water, knowledge in chemistry). Real definitions capture (or 
express) the underlying structure of the properties defined, i.e. they offer an 
explanation as to what it is for a particular property to be instantiated.  
Forms are explanatory just in case a Form of F explains what it is for a given 
thing to have the property F (and only this property). Plato assumes the 
following rule about successful explanation: ‘A property G cannot be the 
explanation of x’s being F if either (1) G is present in y, but y is not-F or (2) G 
is not present in z, but z is F’ (Irwin 1995: 155). For example, the property of 
standing firm in battle (Laches 191C–E) fails to explain what courage is since 
there are some token actions of standing firm in battle that are not courageous. 
This means that the explanation of courage in terms of standing firm in battle 
fails in respect to (1). Or, if there are token actions that do not involve standing 
firm in battle, the proposed explanation fails in respect to (2). Quite often the 
answers proposed by the interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues fail simultaneously 
in both respects, i.e. the answers are both too broad and too narrow (Fine 1993: 
47). It is easy to understand why grasping Forms is, on this account, a very 
demanding affair, since it is quite difficult to come up with a successful real 
definition of, e.g. justice or beauty, a definition that would conform to this rule 
of explanation. 
Fine suggests that when Plato talks about the Forms of Beauty and Justice, 
he has in mind corresponding explanatory properties, properties that make just 
things just and beautiful things beautiful, the inner structure shared by all the 
beautiful and just things. Correspondingly, one does not necessarily grasp the 
Form of F-ness (as a real, underlying property of all things F) when one 
understands a sentence or forms a thought involving the term F. One grasps a 
Form of F only when one knows the real definition of F, since, for Plato, all 
knowledge involves an explanatory account (e.g. Phaed. 76B, Rep. 534B, Tim. 
51E). According to Fine, Forms are not introduced to serve semantic purposes; 
they are not meanings of words. Forms are, rather, introduced for epistemo-
logical (and metaphysical) purposes, to explain how knowledge is possible and 
to explain what is the single unifying property that makes all F things F, for 
example, the single property of Beauty that makes all beautiful things beauti-
ful55. This is how Socratic demand for definitions should be explained – Socra-
tes requires real definitions in order to know (in the demanding sense) which 
action is pious and which is not (Fine 1978). Socrates and everyone else is 
capable of having beliefs about pious things (representing things as pious) 
                                                     
55 Forms are universals in the realist sense. Fine’s account of Plato’s theory of Forms is 
influenced by Armstrong’s theory of universals (Armstrong 1978). According to Armstrong, 
too, universals should be conceived of in the realist fashion. Far from simply being the 
meanings of words, universals are real properties discovered by science.  
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without grasping the real definition of piety (the Socratic form), but in order to 
know whether x is pious, a grasp of the (real) definition of piety is necessary. 
Now, the above rule of explanation was also assumed in Plato’s Socratic 
dialogues but Socrates never claims that the explanatory properties he is 
searching for have to be non-sensible Forms. Why does Plato insist on Forms 
being non-sensible? The answer is that Plato thinks that no sensible property 
can conform to this rule of explanation since all sensible properties suffer from 
the compresence of the opposites. According to Plato, sensible properties are 
context dependent (Irwin 1999: 162). To use a well known example, being 
brightly colored cannot serve as an explanatory property of something’s being 
beautiful, since there are objects that are brightly colored that are not beautiful, 
and there are objects that are beautiful that are not brightly colored. In Platonic 
language, this means that bright color (as opposed to the Form of Beauty) is 
both beautiful and not beautiful. Plato thinks that this is the case with all 
sensible properties; they can always, in different contexts instantiate properties 
opposite to the property that they are supposed to explain. According to Plato’s 
rule of explanation, then, no sensible properties can serve as an explanation of 
what it is to be beautiful. When Plato claims that all the sensible ‘many beauti-
fuls’ are (or appear) also at the same time not beautiful (Rep. 479A–E), he 
means that all the sensible properties cited as explanations for what it is to be 
beautiful fail since they all have not-beautiful instances. The non-sensible Form 
of Beauty, on the other hand, is perfectly beautiful (it is not also not-beautiful) 
since it is a property that has only beautiful instances. Plato therefore concludes 
that no sensible property can serve as an explanatory property and that expla-
nation (of what makes x F) has to involve non-sensible explanatory properties, 
i.e. Forms56.  
I believe that, despite some of its difficulties (for a critique of Fine’s view, 
see Silverman 2002: 127–131 and 299–309), this is a very plausible account of 
the role of Forms in Plato’s middle dialogues. Fine’s account of Forms does not 
make Forms perfect particulars that somehow instantiate the very same 
                                                     
56 Compresence seems to apply to properties such as as bright color, which is both beautiful 
and not beautiful (in the broad sense of ‘is’). However, as we saw (p.31), Plato also (at least 
in some passages) accepts that there are Forms corresponding to sortal- (‘shuttle’) and mass-
terms (‘fire’). Now it seems that nothing is both fire and not fire, or shuttle and not-shuttle. 
Does Plato have any reason to think that there are corresponding Forms? According to Fine, 
the sensible shuttle-types and sensible fire-types do not suffer what she calls ‘narrow 
compresence, ‘which requires something to be F and not F in virtue of some one and the 
same aspect of itself’ but they do suffer from broad compresence: ‘Let us then say that 
sensible samples of fire are fire and not fire in the sense of broad compresence. Something is 
F and not F in the broad sense just in case, in addition to being F, it is also not F in virtue of 
having features that are not essential to being F as such. If something is in narrow 
compresence it is also in broad compresence, but the converse is not true. Although square, 
for instance, is not both shape and not shape in the narrow sense, it is both shape and not 
shape in the broad sense. For it is shape and, since it has features that are not essential to the 
nature of shape as such, it is also not shape. Every F thing other than the property of F is F 
and not F in the broad sense.’ (Fine 1993: 100).  
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properties that they are supposed to be57 . The so-called self-predication of 
Forms, on this account, means simply that the Form of F is F in the sense that it 
explains why all things F are F. The Form of F does not have the property of F 
in the ‘same way’ as all things F58. Fine’s view is also strongly supported by the 
central passages concerning Forms in the middle dialogues that emphasize the 
necessity of education and claim that only philosophers apprehend the Forms.  
Non-philosophers, on the other hand, do not recognize that the non-sensible 
Forms exist. Therefore they are incapable of explaining what makes all and only 
F things F. They are, nonetheless, capable of representing things as F and, at 
least to a certain degree, capable of identifying and distinguishing F things, they 
have beliefs about F things and some beliefs about what F is. Indeed, it might 
be the case that the things they identify as F on most occasions actually are F. 
This is presumably true in the case of large things, or bees (Men. 72B) or clay 
(Tht. 147C), for example (if there are Forms corresponding to the latter two). It 
is reasonable to think that non-philosophers on most occasions correctly 
identify large things (or bees) even though they do not apprehend the non-
sensible explanatory property, the Form of Large. On other occasions, when 
beliefs of different non-philosophers vary greatly (Euth. 7B–D, Phdr. 263B), 
like in the case of things and actions that are just or beautiful, non-philosophers 
are capable of taking things to be just or thinking of them as just, but they are 
much more likely to do so erroneously. This is so because non-philosophers do 
not distinguish beautiful or just things from all other things on the basis of the 
Form of Beauty or Justice (like philosophers), but simply on the basis of the 
conception of beauty or justice that they happen to have, for example, that 
beauty is bright color or sexual attractiveness or that justice is benefiting one’s 
friends and harming one’s enemies. Since only Forms, being the non-sensible 
explanatory properties, allow one to know which things are beautiful or just and 
which things are not, non-philosophers are bound to take many things to be 
beautiful or just that actually lack the property of beauty or justice (and 
similarly with all the other Forms), i.e. they are bound to have false beliefs 
about beautiful and just things. 
To recapitulate, the two views that I discussed in this section come down to 
the following two contradictory claims. The Optimistic View insists that, in the 
middle dialogues, some form of cognitive contact with Forms is necessary for 
                                                     
57 Although there are some passages (esp. concerning the Form of Beauty, e.g. Symp. 211C–
D) in relation to which it is very difficult to deny that Plato takes (some) Forms to be self-
predicative in the sense that the Form of F is supremely F (e.g. that the Form of Beauty is 
supremely beautiful). See Vlastos 1981a: 262–264. 
58 ‛For example, any particular sensible object that is equal is equal in virtue of having the 
same measures as something. But when Plato suggests that the form of equal is equal, he 
does not mean that it has the same measures as something. He means that it is equal because 
it explains why particular sensible things are equal to one another; it does this because it is 
the non-sensible determinable property of equality. For Plato as for Socrates, that is, if x 
explains y’s being F, x is itself F, simply in virtue of its explanatory role. Since the property 
(form) of F explains the F-ness of F things, it is predicatively F, though in a sui generis way, 
simply in virtue of its explanatory role.’ (Fine 1993: 62, my emphasis). 
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everyday conceptual thinking (at least concerning the concepts that have 
corresponding Forms, like Justice, Beauty and Large). The Pessimistic View, on 
the other hand, claims that, in the middle dialogues, cognitive contact with 
Forms is necessary for higher level thought, more precisely, knowledge, and is 
not required for ordinary, non-philosophical thinking. Since Plato is committed 
to the claim that non-philosophers lack knowledge (they are not capable of 
giving an explanatory account of, e.g. what beauty is), he is also committed to 
the claim that non-philosophers do not have cognitive access to Forms.  
I think that the Pessimistic View represents correctly Plato’s conception of 
the relation between ordinary thinking and Forms, i.e. I do think that Plato (of 
the middle dialogues) is a pessimist and leaves Forms outside the cognitive 
reach of non-philosophers59. And I also think that something close to Fine’s is 
the best account of Forms available for Plato’s middle dialogues60 . I have 
                                                     
59 ‘Once we have felt the full force of Plato’s pessimism about the pre-philosophical state, 
we can begin to appreciate his enormous optimism about the ability of human understanding 
to transform itself. Plato was not a skeptic. In his view, if we now happen to be imprisoned 
in the mundane perspective, we are not condemned to remain so. And the greater the 
inadequacy of that perspective, the more remarkable is the power of philosophy to transform 
it.’ (Scott 1995: 85). 
60 Fine denies that Plato’s Forms are meanings. Perhaps this is not quite correct. Fine takes 
‘meaning’ to be ‘what any competent speaker of a language grasps in understanding the 
term’ (Fine 2010: 126). It is obvious that if ‘meaning’ is understood in this manner, then the 
Pessimistic View does rule out the possibility that Forms could be meanings. However, as I 
pointed out above (p. 30), it not necessarily the case that for Plato, all speakers of a language 
have to understand the (true) meanings of general terms. Charles (2003, Ch. 4) argues that, 
for Aristotle, the significance of a term is not determined by what the language-user 
understands by the term. He nevertheless maintains that this can be seen as a part of 
Aristotle’s theory of meaning, if ‘meaning’ is understood in a sufficiently broad sense: ‘The 
gulf that separates Aristotle's theory from Fregean ones may explain why some have doubted 
whether he was interested in meaning at all. His account of signification is certainly not an 
account of meaning, if all such accounts have to consist in dictionary definitions or to 
provide one who understands them with a way to determine the extension of the term. But 
there is a more generic conception of meaning. In it, to give the meaning of a name ‘α’ is to 
state something which determines those conditions under which indicative sentences 
containing ‘α’ are true or false (in so far as they contain ‘α’).’ Charles (2003: 106–107) 
Plato’s theory of Forms could easily be seen as a theory of meaning in this sense, since 
Forms as explanatory properties do determine the conditions under which a sentences such 
as ‘x is beautiful’ are true or false. The question remains what cognitive conditions have to 
be satisfied, for Plato, for an agent to use the term meaningfully. Charles himself remains 
uncommitted as to what Plato’s position concerning this question might be (Charles 2006: 
125, n.20). I think this question is moot, since Plato does not discuss this issue in the 
dialogues, as far as I know. It is unlikely that Plato requires that a speaker be able to produce 
a nominal definition of the term, since non-philosophers are unable to offer necessary and 
sufficient conditions for falling under, e.g. the term ‘just’, although they presumably use the 
term meaningfully. It might be that in order to use the term meaningfully one must have at 
least one true belief about what the term refers to (this is suggested by Benson 1992), or that 
they are able to pick out (some) instances of the things that the term refers to (Fine 2010). 
Thus, it is likely that, for Plato, in order to use a term meaningfully, one does not need to be 
able to cite neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for falling under this particular term. 
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presented the Optimistic View at such length since the standard account 
(discussed in the next section) takes the later Plato to be committed to a version 
of the Optimistic View.  
I would like to end this section by offering a minor consideration in favour 
of the Pessimistic View. Namely, the Optimistic View is a non-starter when it 
comes to solving the problem of the rationality of belief, since it cannot explain 
how the lower parts of the soul come to have beliefs in the first place. The 
defenders of the Optimistic View are committed to the claim that (1) conceptua-
lization requires cognitive access to Forms. It is also plausible that (2) Plato, in 
the middle dialogues, takes Forms to be accessible only to reason61. This would 
mean that beliefs concerning concepts that have counterpart Forms (Beauty, 
Justice, etc.) would have to be assigned to reason. Yet, Plato says, in the 
Republic (602C), that the inferior parts of the soul believe things close by to be 
large and the same things far away to be small, this presumably involves the 
concepts ‘large’ and ‘small’. In the Republic (523E–524C) and Phaedo (75C) 
Plato tells us that there are Forms of Large and Small. On the Optimistic View, 
conceptualizing something as large would then have to involve cognitive access 
to the Form of Large (since it requires comparing large things with the Form of 
Large). But this cannot be, since Plato is clearly referring to the non-rational 
parts as subjects of belief at Rep. 602C. Therefore, in case of Rep. 602C, (1) and 
(2) conflict. Since (2) has Platonic credentials, it seems that (1) should be 
abandoned, i.e. that the Optimistic View cannot be correct. At least at the time 
of writing Republic X, then, Plato does not take cognitive access to Forms to be 
necessary for conceptualization and belief. 
 
 
3. The Standard Account of Rationality of Belief 
This account is represented by Lorenz (2006) and Bobonich (2002)62. Both 
Bobonich and Lorenz agree that the beliefs of non-philosophers and beliefs of 
the non-rational parts of the soul are cognitively independent of Forms, in the 
middle dialogues. According to Bobonich (2002: 328), Plato’s later dialogues 
differ from the middle dialogues in that now non-philosophers, too, are in 
‘cognitive contact’ with Forms (although the kind of contact they have is diffe-
rent from philosophers’ grasp of Forms). According to Lorenz, the later Plato 
makes ‘cognitive access’ to intelligibles necessary for belief formation and that 
this ‘perforates the Republic’s careful distinctions between ‘the visible’ and ‘the 
                                                                                                                                  
However, as I already mentioned, it is difficult to be sure, since he does not discuss this 
question. 
61 There is no clear statement of this in the Phaedo (since the Phaedo lacks partition of the 
soul altogether) or in the Republic (although it could be implied at Rep. 490B), however, a 
slightly later Phaedrus (247D) does make the claim explicitly. 
62 Is is anticipated by very influential scholars who claim that Forms of the middle dialogues 
(as metaphysical entities) change into concepts in the late dialogues (e.g. Stenzel 1917, 
Ackrill 1955) or that, in the late dialogues, Plato focuses on formal concepts or types of 
proposition (Ryle 1939).  
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intelligible’ and between the corresponding modes of cognition (509D1–
511E5)’ (2006:91). In the Republic non-philosophers remain on the level of ‘the 
visible’, and thus presumably do not have ‘cognitive access’ to or ‘contact’ with 
intelligibles. Thus, Lorenz thinks that in the Republic beliefs are cognitively 
independent of Forms. However, both Bobonich and Lorenz think that Plato 
radically changes his views about the role of Forms/intelligibles in human 
cognition. The central point is that Plato, in the later dialogues, makes all beliefs 
cognitively dependent on Forms.  
The standard account involves the following argument: 
(i)  For Plato, any capacity that involves a grasp of intelligibles or Forms 
necessarily belongs to the reasoning part of the soul;  
(ii)  Plato starts to think of belief formation as involving a grasp of intelligibles 
or Forms;  
(iii)  Thus, Plato commits himself to the view that belief formation is a capacity 
that necessarily involves the reasoning part of the soul. 
The standard account suggests the following story: in the middle dialogues the 
grasp of Forms was not a necessary condition of thought. However, in the later 
writings Plato starts to view belief formation as an activity that presupposes 
some sort of cognitive access to intelligibles. So, what used to be the distant aim 
of philosophical thinking in the middle dialogues now becomes a necessary 
condition of belief formation in later dialogues. The standard account presents a 
version of the Optimistic View that is developmentalist in nature. This 
developmentalist stance helps to offer an elegant solution to the problem of the 
rationality of belief. It explains why later Plato thinks that only reason can form 
beliefs. This is so because only reason has access to Forms. And since every 
human, but not every animal, soul has seen the Forms (Phdr. 249B, 249E–
250A), Plato can be seen to conclude that forming beliefs is a specifically 
human affair. However, it is not immediately obvious (and I will return to this 
below) why the necessity of cognitive access to Forms would make belief 
formation into an activity that involves reasoning and deliberation. 
First, how should one understand the notions of ‘cognitive access’ or ‘cogni-
tive contact’ in relation to Forms/intelligibles? Unfortunately neither Lorenz nor 
Bobonich offer a very clear account of what they mean by these notions. 
Bobonich stresses several times (2002: 305, 312, 327) that the non-philosophers 
do not recognize Forms for what they are (i.e. they do not recognize that Forms 
are non-sensible properties), but that their concepts draw on ‘dim awareness’ of 
Forms. He also speaks of ‘degrees of Form-awareness’ (2002: 303). The general 
idea seems to be that non-philosophers concepts are somehow derived from 
(unconscious) awareness of Forms, and this enables them to successfully 
discriminate, e.g. beautiful things from sexually attractive things (2002: 305). 
Lorenz also does not explain what he means by ‘cognitive access to’ (or ‘grasp 
of’) Being, Opposition and Difference. In fact, for Lorenz Plato himself remains 
uncommitted on this issue and never provides an account of what level of 
understanding of ‘intelligibles’ is required for belief formation. Nevertheless, 
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Lorenz insists that for Plato ‘some understanding’ of intelligibles is necessary to 
form beliefs (Lorenz 2006: 92).  
What Forms are required to form a belief ‘x is F’? Bobonich and Lorenz 
offer slightly different answers to these questions. Bobonich’s version is closer 
to the Optimistic View discussed above, in that he thinks that for later Plato, 
most thoughts and beliefs with the content ‘x is F’ require cognitive access to 
the Form of F. For instance, to conceptualize anything as (to represent-as) good, 
just or beautiful, one needs to have some ‘dim awareness’ of the Forms of 
Good, Just, and Beautiful. This is, of course, only in case there is a Form corres-
ponding to the term ‘F’. But even if there is no Form corresponding to the term 
‘F’, one still needs to grasp the Form of Being that connects the terms in a 
proposition (expressed by the term ‘is’). This is the unrestricted version of the 
standard account63.  
(B)  Cognitive access to the Form of F and to the Form of Being is necessary to 
form a belief ‘x is F’ (just in case a Form of F corresponding to the term 
‘F’ exists).  
Lorenz believes that, for later Plato, cognitive access to only some Forms (Lo-
renz speaks of ‘intelligibles’) is necessary to form beliefs. These intelligibles 
include Being, Difference and Opposition. Cognitive access to these intelli-
gibles is required in order to form the simplest perceptual beliefs, such as ‘this 
is sweet’. Lorenz does not say that the cognitive access to the intelligible 
‘Beauty’ to be necessary in order to form a belief ‘this is beautiful’ (although, of 
course, cognitive access to Being, Difference and Opposition is required). This 
is the restricted version of the standard account64. 
(L) Cognitive access to the intelligible of G (G= Being, Difference, Opposition) 
is necessary to form a belief ‘x is F’.  
                                                     
63 In fact, Bobonich thinks that, since for later Plato Forms are conceived of as being inter-
connected with one another, the ‘dim awareness’ of the Form of F requires’dim awareness’ 
of other Forms that are metaphysically connected with this particular Form. ‘Third, Plato's 
later metaphysics emphasizes that Forms stand in complicated relations of superordination 
and subordination; e.g. the Form of Justice and the Form of Virtue. Knowing one Form may 
require knowing its location within a very complicated structure, but some awareness of 
some of these relations may be involved even in dim recollection: recollecting justice may 
involve seeing it as a virtue. Fourth, it might also be the case that recollecting the Form of F 
requires various kinds of reasoning, e.g. distinguishing F from various other items. And if, 
for example, Sameness, Difference, and Being are Forms, they might be thought to be in-
volved in many or all of these judgments, even if one is not explicitly thinking of them as 
Forms. As we shall see below, Plato in the Theaetetus, the Timaeus, and the Sophist thinks 
that some highly abstract Forms are involved in all (or almost all) thought’ (Bobonich 2002: 
551). 
64 Lorenz discusses explicitly only beliefs about perceptual predicates. Therefore it is not 
clear how he would view the cognitive resources required for forming beliefs involving non-
perceptual predicates, such as ‘x is beautiful.’ Do they require cognitive access to the Form 
of Beauty? If so, then Bobonich and Lorenz’s accounts would be very similar indeed. 
However, since Lorenz does not address this issue, it seems reasonable to keep the two 
accounts separated.  
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However, Lorenz seems to waver between two possible versions of restricted 
version. At times he suggests that grasping the Form of Being is necessary to 
connect two terms, thus forming a complete thought, for example ‘this IS red’ 
(this is also assumed by Bobonich). The thought is complete just in case it is 
true or false.  
 
... even simple perceptual beliefs of the form ‘x is F’ (where the value of F is a 
perceptual predicate like ‘salty’) involve at least one common feature, being, a 
feature that is grasped only by the soul’s independent activity. (Lorenz 2006: 
79).  
 
Thus, in order to have true or false beliefs (i.e. beliefs tout court), one needs to 
grasp the ‘intelligible’ of Being. At other times Lorenz suggests that grasping 
the intelligibles Being, Difference and Opposition is necessary in order to 
identify the properties (and things) that the thought is about ‘as what they are’ 
(Lorenz 2006: 87). For example, in order to form a thought ‘this is hard’, it is 
necessary to grasp ‘what it is to be’ hard, and this requires cognitive access to 
Difference and Opposition, the ability to recognize that hardness and softness 
are different from one another and that they are opposed to one another: 
 
‘... to be able to form the belief that something or other bears some feature, you 
have to have some grasp of such relations as difference and opposition, and 
some grasp of the feature in question being different from, and opposite to, its 
opposite (if it has an opposite). (Lorenz 2006: 91)65 
 
These two versions of the restricted version should be kept apart (although 
Lorenz does not keep them apart). Thus we get: 
(L1)  Cognitive access to the intelligible of Being is necessary for connecting 
two terms to form a complete thought, ‘x is F’, 
and 
(L2)  Cognitive access to the intelligibles of Being, Difference and Opposition 
is necessary for identifying the property F in order to form a belief ‘x is 
F’. 
In what follows, I will discuss these positions in turn, and then I will turn to the 
assessment of these views. Bobonich accepts the Pessimistic View on recol-
lection in the Phaedo. He agrees that recollection in the Phaedo is not designed 
to explain ordinary concept acquisition and that non-philosophers do not re-
collect (Bobonich 2002: 487). However, he thinks that recollection is an expla-
nation of how philosophers acquire their concepts. For Bobonich, non-
philosophers and philosophers effectively have different sets of concepts. The 
                                                     
65 In his more recent article Lorenz expresses (L2) as follows: ‘[F]orming any belief involves 
framing a statement or account, and even framing basic statements of the form ‘this is F’ 
requires having grasped at least some basic facts about being F, such as the fact that being F 
is different from being the opposite of F, if being F has an opposite. Moreover, it requires 
having grasped such facts in a way that involves rational sensitivity to logical relations such 
as entailment and incompatibility’. (Lorenz 2012: 239)  
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concepts of non-philosophers are acquired, most probably, by means of 
perception and perhaps tradition. The concepts of philosophers, on the other 
hand, are acquired by reasoning (about Forms). A constitutive part of the 
possession of philosophical concepts is the recognition that the property 
corresponding to the concept is different from all its perceptual instantiations 
and does not suffer from compresence of the opposites (Bobonich 2002: 307). 
Since non-philosophers do not recognize this difference, they do not have the 
same concepts as philosophers. Of course, such a massive difference between 
the content in philosophers’ and non-philosophers’ ‘heads’ is bound to raise 
significant philosophical problems (for example, how could philosophers and 
non-philosophers communicate?)66. This is one of the reasons, according to 
Bobonich, why Plato abandons this view. 
Bobonich claims that Plato, by the time of writing the Phaedrus, has come to 
change his mind; and that Phaedrus’ theory of recollection is significantly 
different from the earlier theory in the Phaedo. According to Bobonich, Plato 
recognizes in the Phaedrus (249B–C) that linguistic competence (the ability to 
speak and understand speech) involves an awareness of Forms (Bobonich 2002: 
314). Starting with Phaedrus, then, all humans recollect (and not just the 
philosophers). Further, in the Theaetetus (184–7) Plato recognizes that grasping 
certain intelligibles (being) is necessary for belief formation and conceptua-
lization. ‘...the soul is capable of such conceptualization and beliefs only by 
drawing on its awareness (perhaps quite dim and indistinct) of Forms’ 
(Bobonich 2002: 332).  
Timaeus, according to Bobonich, goes even further – it deprives the mortal 
parts of the soul of belief and logos. This means that they are incapable of 
conceptualization and belief, which, in turn, means that they are incapable of 
any genuine representational content. Bobonich is unfortunately not very clear 
about why conceptualization is necessary for all content and why he thinks that 
Plato could not take at least some representational content to be non-conceptual 
(this is one of the major differences between Lorenz and Bobonich). This means 
that, Bobonich’s account, Plato has indeed radically changed his mind between 
the Phaedo and the Timaeus. What used to be the distant goal of philosophical 
education in the Phaedo and in the Republic, i.e. the apprehension of Forms, has 
now become the necessary condition of all representation (of, e.g., something as 
just or something as good). Although Plato does not start with the Optimistic 
                                                     
66 Note that this problem does not rise if Forms are not taken to be semantically relevant. For 
example, on Fine’s view, Forms are real explanatory properties, the definitions of which are 
known (in the demanding sense) by philosophers. This does not mean that philosophers have 
different concepts or that the philosopher’s words have different meaning from the words of 
non-philosophers’ (just like the word ‘water’ in my vocabulary does not differ in meaning 
from the word ‘water’ in chemistry professor’s vocabulary, I simply have more false beliefs 
about water and I am more liable to make mistakes in identifying samples of water). 
Bobonich himself also points out (2002: 311), that Plato’s account of names might offer 
resources to solve this problem of ‘reference shift’, in that reference is fixed by external 
factors, and not by what’s in the heads of speakers. See also pp. 177–178, esp. fn. 229. 
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View, he ends up with it. For later Plato, all representational states involve 
conceptualization, and thus involve a grasp of Forms (‘no matter how dim’). 
Belief is a rational capacity since it is a representational state. Bobonich’s 
version of the rationality of belief is the following: belief involves conceptuali-
zation, and in order to conceptualize anything as F, it is necessary have aware-
ness (‘no matter how dim’) of the Form of F-ness and (in case there exists a 
Form of F corresponding to the term ‘F’).  
Lorenz’s account reaches the same conclusion about the rationality of 
belief – it is rational since it involves ‘cognitive access to intelligibles such as 
difference and opposition’ (Lorenz 2006:91). However, the story Lorenz tells is 
quite different from Bobonich’s. According to Lorenz, in the middle dialogues 
Plato has no worked out notion of belief. For this reason Plato also has no 
problem in calling quite different mental states ‘beliefs’. These mental states 
involve non-reflective acceptances, appearances, reflective beliefs, etc. Since 
middle Plato has this generous and non-technical notion of belief, it is only 
natural that he takes all three parts of the soul to have beliefs. However, one has 
to keep in mind that the cognitive psychology behind the genesis of these 
mental states is importantly different. The non-rational part accepts uncritically 
(Lorenz 2006: 56) whatever appears to it whereas the rational part reflects and 
makes inferences and only then comes to hold a belief.  
According to Lorenz, in later dialogues Plato develops a more technical 
notion of belief. Now Plato takes beliefs to be only those representations that 
involve predication. But Plato makes it plain in the Theaetetus (according to 
Lorenz) that predication always involves a successful recognition of some basic 
facts about (‘discerning of being’) the relevant predicates. The ability of the 
soul to ‘discern the being’ of predicates (‘soft’, ‘fine’, ‘just’), it has to have 
‘cognitive access’ to intelligibles like oppositeness and difference. In order to 
form a belief ‘this is hard’, for example, the soul has to be able to tell that 
softness is the opposite of hardness (and similarly with all other predicates, such 
as just or beautiful). Lorenz concludes that forming beliefs requires cognitive 
access to certain intelligibles (such as Opposition and Difference). The reason 
why cognitive access to these intelligibles is specifically rational is that it 
requires grasping logical relations such as entailment and incompatibility 
(Lorenz 2012: 239). Grasping logical relations is therefore another precondition 
of forming beliefs. According to Lorenz, it is natural that Plato starts to view 
belief formation as an ability that belongs exclusively to the reasoning part of 
the soul. However, this does not mean that the lower parts of the soul are 
cognitively impoverished – they do enjoy representations (here Lorenz adopts a 
view opposed to Bobonich’s). In fact, they have the same (or very similar) 
content as they did in the Republic. These representations do not have 
predicative structure and therefore they do not count as beliefs for later Plato. 
For Lorenz, belief becoming rational is almost a terminological point – Plato 
calls beliefs only those representations that, as seen in the Republic, belonged to 
the rational part of the soul (thus leaving the cognitive abilities of the irrational 
parts of the soul intact). In addition, Plato recognizes that these predicative 
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representations necessarily involve a grasp of (some) intelligibles. Lorenz’s 
answer to the problem of the rationality of belief is the following: belief 
necessarily involves predication and predication involves cognitive access to 
intelligibles Opposition and Difference (and Being). 
Now, obviously Bobonich’s and Lorenz’s versions of belief becoming 
rational are somewhat different. The views Bobonich and Lorenz hold about the 
representation below belief are almost directly opposite (Bobonich takes all 
representations to involve reason, whereas Lorenz thinks that there is ‘content’ 
below belief), and the debate continues67. I now turn to some critical remarks 
about both versions of the standard account. 
 
 
4. Assessment of the Standard Account 
In case of both (B) and (L), I will first discuss a few general problems and then 
turn to the question whether each is textually supported. I will argue that the 
most of the relevant passages in later Plato fail to support the standard account.  
First, I would like to note that the standard account does not give a 
completely satisfactory solution to the problem of the rationality of belief. The 
accounts of both Lorenz and Bobonich fail to explain why Plato stresses that 
belief formation involves reasoning and deliberation (esp. Theaetetus 189E–
190A and Philebus 38B–E). In forming a belief, the soul carries on a discussion 
and considers candidate answers to whatever question it asks itself. When it 
finally comes to a decision, this is called a belief. Any account of the rationality 
of belief would have to explain why Plato takes reasoning and deliberation to be 
a necessary component of belief formation. The standard account fails in this 
respect. According to Bobonich, belief is rational since it requires conceptuali-
zation and this in turn requires awareness of Forms. Lorenz takes the 
distinctively rational aspect of belief formation to be predication, which requires 
cognitive access to intelligibles. Neither Lorenz nor Bobonich present 
arguments as to why conceptualization or predication would require the amount 
of deliberation Plato is insisting on68.  
                                                     
67 The most recent additions to this debate are Bobonich (2010) and Lorenz (2012).  
68 Bobonich does not address this issue; all he says (2002: 557) is that these passages show 
that belief is ‘linguistic’. This does not explain why belief formation always involves 
deliberation, however, since surely not all cognitive acts that involve language-use involve 
deliberation. Lorenz tries to offer an explanation (2006: 92–3) to why Plato starts to view 
belief as a reflective activity, involving an inner dialogue, considering candidate answers, 
etc. Lorenz says that this shift follows from the fact that Plato sees belief as rational. This is 
no doubt true, but it is not an explanation as to what it is about reason that makes it 
necessary for Plato to view beliefs as always requiring deliberation and inner dialogue. 
Clearly there is nothing in the notion of ‘predication’ as such (a specifically rational thing 
about belief according to Lorenz) that makes deliberation and inner dialogue a necessary 
feature of belief. Further, Lorenz thinks that reasoning is necessary to acquire concepts (to 
be able to ‘discern’ what it is to be, e.g. hard). But the descriptions of the soul forming 
beliefs in Tht. 189E-190A and Phlb. 38B–E do not concern acquiring basic level 
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Secondly, Plato does not mention intelligibles or Forms when offering his 
descriptions of belief formation in the Theaetetus (189E–190A), Sophist 
(264A), and Philebus (38B–E). Of course, he could still think that the whole 
process of belief formation implies a grasp of Forms but choose not to mention 
it for dialectical reasons. A more natural way to read the late dialogues is to take 
the Forms to be exclusively objects of knowledge (and, perhaps, de re beliefs). 
This is already implied by how much Plato emphasizes that it is only the circle 
of the same (i.e. of knowledge) that ‘reveals the objects of reasoning’ (Tim. 
37C). In fact, in Timaeus he strongly suggests that Forms are outside the 
cognitive reach of δόξαι altogether (51B–E). A similar claim appears in 
Philebus 61D–E. Bobonich and Lorenz do not discuss these passages in any 
depth69, even though they seem quite challenging for the standard account. 
Bobonich’s version of the rationality of belief suffers from problems that are 
typical to all accounts that make the grasp of Forms necessary for conceptua-
lization, which is a matter of reason and this, in turn, is made necessary for 
representational content70. I will discuss these problems in somewhat greater 
depth in the next chapter and, accordingly, here I will confine myself to a few 
short remarks. First, since Forms are accessible to reason only, then the states of 
the inferior parts of the soul – i.e. pleasures, pains, boldness, fear, anger, 
expectation, perception and lust (Tim. 69D) – are not representational. They 
cannot represent anything as being anything, they are un-conceptualized 
movements, and ‘the conceptual content is provided by the rational part of the 
soul’ (Bobonich 2002: 324). It becomes difficult to see how they could play the 
roles that they are meant to play in the Timaeus’ account of cognitive 
psychology. For example, it is unclear how they can originate actions. Bobonich 
                                                                                                                                  
understanding of ‘what it is to be hard’. The passages are clearly not about concept-
acquisition. The soul already has concepts in these descriptions. In this context, it is useful 
to distinguish between reasoning or deliberation and conceptualization (see Wilberding 
2012). Reasoning is a higher-level cognitive achievement and assumes conceptualization as 
lower-level cognitive achievement. Why, then, does Plato stress deliberation and reasoning 
in forming beliefs? In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I will argue that the specifically rational 
feature of belief is that always involves the cognitive aim of representing reality correctly. 
This explains why belief formation involves deliberation and reasoning.  
69 For example, Lorenz relegates discussion of Tim. 37A–C to a short footnote (Lorenz 2006: 
96, n.4), where he claims that this passage shows that the world-soul must apprehend being, 
in order to ‘form beliefs on the basis of this apprehension’. Again, Lorenz assumes that in 
order to have beliefs, there must exist a previous apprehension (‘on the basis of this …’) of 
the being in question. All that the passage actually implies is that the circles of difference of 
the world-soul consist of being, sameness, and difference, in order to form ‘firm and true 
beliefs and convictions’ (37B8), not in order to form any beliefs, true and false, as Lorenz 
reads the passage. The world-soul is a very special kind of soul because it is error-free. It is 
thus a cognitive ideal for individual souls. The ‘apprehension of being’ that Lorenz refers to 
should be taken as a goal that an individual human being must achieve and not what it must 
already have in order to form beliefs. Lorenz assumes that in order to form beliefs, one must 
be able to ‘discern the being’ of the properties that the belief is about. I do not think that 
Plato shares this view. 
70 For example, that of Allan Silverman (1990), (1991). 
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is, of course, alive to this problem (in effect, he argues that this is one of the 
reasons why Plato abandons tri-partition of the soul). His solution is, in effect, 
to split perceptions and desires into two classes; conceptualized desires, 
perceptions and fears, and non-conceptualized desires, perceptions and fears 
(2002: 326). Thus, whatever content perception and desire, for example, have is 
actually provided by the rational part. This is problematic. First, the distinction 
between conceptualized states with content and un-conceptual movements is not 
made by Plato himself and seems rather ad hoc. Of course, any interpretation 
consists (partly) of making distinctions that author himself (in this case Plato) 
does not make. But even if Plato would, if pressed, accept this distinction, it is 
quite unclear what the un-conceptualized movement of, say, fear or boldness 
might be like. Bobonich’s answer for Plato is the following: ‘In human beings 
in the appropriate condition, there is also an accompanying conceptualization. 
(For example, fear involves the belief that something bad is in the offing, e.g., 
Laches 198B8–10, Leg. 646E7–647A2, Prot. 358D5–E1.)’. This seems to get 
the phenomenology of fear exactly the wrong way around. It is not that one first 
has a physical movement and then interprets it as the ‘fear of x’. Why would 
this physical movement arise in the first place? Fear arises because something is 
considered to be bad (and in the offing). Thus, according to the framework 
Bobonich prefers, the description of fear would have to be the following: the 
rational part considers something to be bad and in the offing, this results in a 
physical movement and then this movement is conceptualized as fear. It is hard 
to see how the spirited part could be considered to be the proper bearer of fear at 
all. At least the typical emotions of the spirited part are quite hard to make into 
purely conceptual movements.  
The second worry concerns Plato’s notion of animal cognition. Since Bo-
bonich claims that (i) conceptualization requires awareness of Forms, and (ii) 
animals are not aware of Forms, he is committed to the view that according to 
Plato animals do not ‘conceptualize’. This is indeed what he says: ‘Since the 
lower parts of every human soul are excluded from any contact at all with the 
Forms, the lower parts of the soul have, in kind, the same epistemic resources as 
do the souls of non-human animals’ (2002: 315). This creates a double problem: 
first, non-human animals are cognitively completely impoverished; in fact 
animals start strongly to resemble Cartesian automata. At the same time, it is 
well known that Plato is quite generous when it comes to the cognitive capa-
cities of animals 71 ; second, on Bobonich’s account, the reasoning part of 
animals becomes simply redundant, it contributes nothing to animal cognitive 
lives whatsoever (since Bobonich takes awareness of Forms to necessary for all 
cognitive acts that can be attributed to reason).  
                                                     
71 See, for example, the classic studies of Urs Dierauer (1977), and Richard Sorabji (1995, 
esp. 9–12) and, more recently, Carpenter who claims that Timaeus does not make any 
significant distinctions between human and animal cognitive abilities: ‘The upshot of this 
exploration is to return us to (A1): there is in practice no real difference between us and 
other animals’ (Carpenter 2008: 18). See also Osborne (2007: 43–62). 
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How well founded textually is Bobonich’s version of the standard account? 
Bobonich claims that in order to conceptualize anything as F, one needs to have 
‘dim awareness’ of the relevant Form. This explains why belief is rational. 
However, it is surprisingly difficult to find passages in the later Plato that would 
clearly support this view. There are a few passages where Plato connects dis-
course and Forms, which might suggest that Plato takes the connection between 
understanding speech (and forming beliefs) to require awareness of Forms. 
These passages could then be seen to support (B). The first passage comes from 
the Parmenides. After Parmenides has thoroughly criticized the theory of 
Forms, he says that without Forms the power of discourse would be destroyed.  
 
‘Yet on the other hand, Socrates,’ said Parmenides, ‘if someone, having an eye 
on all the difficulties we have just brought up and others of the same sort, 
won’t allow that there are forms for things (μὴ ἐάσει εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶνα) and 
won’t mark off a form for each one (μηδέ τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου), he 
won’t have anywhere to turn his thought, since he doesn’t allow that for each 
thing there is a character that is always the same. In this way he will destroy 
the power of discourse/dialectic entirely (καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι 
δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ). But I think you are only too well aware of 
that.’ (Parm. 135 B–C) 
 
This might suggest72 that without Forms language loses its meaning, and since 
Forms make language meaningful, it is plausible to infer that whoever grasps 
the meanings of words also grasps the relevant Forms. Interpreted in this way, 
this passage could support (B). There are, however, two objections against this 
reading. The first objection concerns the verb διαλέγεσθαι. It can, indeed, 
simply mean ‘engage in a discourse’ but it often also means ‘dialectic’ as a 
specific philosophical method. If one takes ‘διαλέγεσθαι’ here to mean 
dialectic, then Plato is claiming that without Forms the dialectical method 
would become powerless73. Consequently he would not be making a point about 
the connection between Forms and language at all. It is difficult to decide 
between these two possibilities. Second, even if this passage concerns the 
meaningfulness of language, it does not follow that all speakers of the language 
grasp the meanings of the words they use. That is, Plato might have a 
                                                     
72 For discussion of this and the following passage from the Sophist, and for references for 
further discussions, see Fine (1993: 133–136). 
73 Zeller, for example, says about this passage that ‛Die Wirklichkeit der Ideen leugnen 
heisst daher alle Möglichkeit einer wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung von Grund aus 
vernichten’ (Zeller 1889: 645, my emphasis). For a directly opposed view: ‘Anyway, the 
passage quoted [i.e. Parm. 135B] strongly suggests that what he is now sure of is not that 
there must be Forms as conceived in the middle dialogues, Forms as ethical ideals and as 
metaphysical objects of intuitive and perhaps mystical insight; what he is now sure of is that 
there must be fixed things to guarantee the meaningfulness of thought, fixed concepts – the 
meanings of general words – whose role is to ensure τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν’ (Ackrill 
1955/1971: 208–209, my emphasis). Ackrill’s claim that the interweaving of Forms accounts 
for meaningfulness of sentences has an unfortunate consequence that that sentences such as 
‘Movement is Rest’ (these Forms do not ‘mingle’) come out as meaningless.  
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demanding notion of meaning, i.e., the semantic account of Forms does not 
imply the Optimistic View (see above, pp. 30-31). Unless further textual 
support for (B) is provided it seems that Parm. 135 B–C cannot be taken to 
support (B). 
A similar consideration applies to a second passage. In the Sophist the 
Eleatic Visitor says the following:  
 
In fact, my friend, it’s inept to try to separate everything from everything else. 
It’s the sign of a completely unmusical and unphilosophical person. – Why? – 
To dissociate each thing from everything else is to destroy totally everything 
there is to say. The weaving together of forms is what makes speech possible 
for us (διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν). 
(259D–E) 
 
This is usually taken to mean that the interweaving of Forms makes language 
possible. However, λόγος can just as well mean argument and not speech in 
general (Fine 1993: 314), and Plato can be taken to argue that in order to engage 
in philosophical argument Forms have to be related in a certain way. Again, 
even if the passage concerns language as such, it does not claim that in order to 
think or engage in forming beliefs, one has to apprehend how Forms are 
connected, since it might well be the case that one does not understand (in the 
demanding sense) the words one uses. As a matter of fact, in the very same 
passage Plato suggests that the person who ‘dissociates each thing from every-
thing else’, i.e. does not allow for Forms to be interweaved, is not language-less 
and in complete cognitive darkness. Plato simply says that he is ‘unphilo-
sophical’ (ἀφιλόσοφος). This suggests that this passage does not support (B).  
Neither of the above passages says anything about what the cognitive 
preconditions of belief might be. Bobonich supports (B) mainly with two 
passages. The first passage that Bobonich takes to support his interpretation 
comes from the Phaedrus74. The sentence occurs midway through Socrates’ 
second speech on love. Socrates presents his great myth about the reincarnation 
                                                     
74 Plato maintains in the Phaedrus (248B–E) that the lives that the non-philosophers live are 
dependent on what Forms their souls saw prior to incarnation (e.g. whether one is likely to 
become a doctor or a tyrant). Bobonich thinks that this shows that Forms do play a role in 
everyday non-philosophical thought, namely that pre-philosophical thought has to involve 
knowledge of Forms, at least to a certain degree, i.e. to the extent of the ‛clarity with which 
each [Form] is known’ (302). However, in the Phaedrus Plato does not address the issue of 
whether knowledge of the same object could have degrees (of clarity). In fact, in the 
Theaetetus 165D Plato implies that knowledge cannot have more or less clarity. Knowledge 
(of the same object) is, for Plato, an all or nothing affair. This does not, incidentally, mean 
that if one lacks knowledge of something, one must be in a complete cognitive blank in 
relation to this object. One can always simply have true belief(s) about the object, while 
lacking knowledge (see, e.g. Fine 2010). It is therefore unlikely that in the Phaedrus Plato 
assumes that non-philosophers differ from each other in the degree of clarity of knowledge 
about different Forms. Rather, Plato might be suggesting that different people have certain 
inclinations towards pursuing certain goals. These inclinations, if realized, may lead to 
knowledge of certain Forms. Of course, many people never realize their inner potential. 
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of the soul. Leaving the (rather unclear) details aside, Socrates says that human 
souls can enter animal bodies and vice versa. However, there is an important 
restriction: 
 
In the thousandth year both groups arrive at a choice and allotment of second 
lives, and each soul chooses the life it wants. From there, a human soul can 
enter a wild animal, and a soul that was once human can move from an animal 
to a human being again. But a soul that never saw the truth (οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε 
μήποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν) cannot take a human shape, since a human being 
must understand speech in terms of general forms, proceeding to bring many 
perceptions together into a reasoned unity (δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' 
εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον). 
(Phdr. 249B–C) 
 
Now, at first sight this passage quite unambiguously says that the distinctive 
feature of human souls is that they understand language and that for 
understanding language it is necessary to grasp Forms (κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον). If 
this is the only way to understand the sentence, then it would offer very strong 
support to (B). And indeed, this sentence is quite essential for Bobonich’s 
arguments concerning the Timaeus. Namely, in discussing the parts of the soul 
in Timaeus, Bobonich often infers from the claim that λόγος is necessary for 
belief and representational content (a claim that is in itself quite controversial) 
to the claim that awareness of Forms is necessary for belief and perceptual 
content. This inference is justified only when understanding λόγος requires a 
grasp of Forms.  
As is well known, the above Greek sentence is ambiguous and there is an 
alternative translation of the relevant part. For example, Hackforth’s translation 
is: ‘seeing that a man must needs understand the language of Forms, passing 
from a plurality of perceptions to a unity gathered together by reasoning’. This 
rendering puts the emphasis not on understanding language as such but on 
understanding the language of the Forms (whatever this might mean). It leaves 
the possibility that one can understand (regular) language without grasping 
Forms at all. But even so, Socrates says that a human being must (δεῖ) under-
stand the language of Forms. As Scott pointed out (1995: 79) that sentence can 
(on both translations) be understood in either a prescriptive or a descriptive 
sense. In the first case the sentence describes what human beings ought to do, 
and does not at all imply that this is what human beings in fact do (descriptive 
reading). The point of the passage should be (quite in accordance with the 
Pessimist View) that human beings ought to philosophize. The prescriptive 
reading, of course, does not support (B). This leaves open the possibility that 
one can have beliefs without in any way grasping the Forms and that belief does 
not involve awareness of Forms. The arguments Bobonich presents against 
Scott’s reading are not persuasive.75  
                                                     
75 Even if the εἶδος in the above passage does not refer to Forms but rather natural kinds (as 
Bobonich argues, against Scott (2002: 313–314)), from this fact alone it does not follow that 
58 
Other than this sentence from Phaedrus there is actually just one passage in 
the later Plato that can be taken to support (B). This passage is the rather 
difficult Passage of the Commons in the Theaetetus (184–7) that will be the 
topic of the rest of this dissertation. Socrates, on almost every reading of this 
passage, implies that there are (i) certain so-called ‘commons’ that cannot be 
perceived (being, fineness, numbers, etc.), and (ii) that these commons are 
grasped simply in virtue of entertaining a relevant thought. This is exactly what 
(B) requires. I conclude, therefore, that the textual justification of Bobonich’s 
version of the standard account stands and falls with this particular passage. 
According to Lorenz, belief is not a paradigmatic representational state. Not 
all representations involve belief. The representational states below reason are 
not beliefs. Lorenz seems to think, however, that belief is a paradigmatic 
representational state for the reasoning part of the soul. What distinguishes 
belief from other representations is that it involves predication. The main 
problem for Lorenz is his peculiar notion of predication. At times Lorenz seems 
to think that predication involves nothing more that saying or thinking some-
thing about something (that is, predication involves truth and falsity). Predi-
cation simply involves a complex mental state, i.e. predication is propositional. 
Yet, for Lorenz the specifically rational thing about belief is not that it pre-
dicates something about something, but rather that it ‘discerns’ the being of the 
relevant predicate, which means that it can recognize it ‘as what it is’ (Lorenz 
2006: 87, esp. n44). The recognition of the property ‘as what it is’ requires 
cognitive access to intelligibles or Forms (L2). This seems to mean that for 
predication one has to understand what the predicate really designates:  
 
When you look at a large piece of chocolate cake and a smaller one located on 
a table right in front of you, your non-rational part will have no trouble, and 
will lose no time, in distinguishing the large from the small. In a more obvious 
                                                                                                                                  
all human beings classify things according to natural kinds (as Bobonich seems to infer). 
Plato makes it clear that it is the art of dialectic that carves at the natural joints of things 
(Phdr. 265D–266B) and discovers the εἶδος (a species or a kind). He does not think that 
simply by acquiring language we automatically receive this ability. He further implies 
(266C) that dialectic is involved in all crafts. Taken together with the 249B–C, the ‛must’ 
could still be read prescriptively, in a sense that a human being must divide things in 
accordance with the species or kinds, by, e.g., learning a craft. Thus Phaedrus seems to relax 
the requirements for grasping Forms to a certain extent. Now it is allowed (unlike in the 
Republic or Phaedo) that some non-philosophers, i.e. those who have learnt a craft divide 
things according to Forms. Plato also suggests (Phdr. 251A–C) that divinely mad lovers 
recollect the Form of Beauty. However, being in love (a quasi-mystic experience for Plato) 
is obviously different from being able to use the word ‘beauty’ (or have a concept of 
beauty). This suggests that recollecting Beauty is not required to use the word ‘beautiful’ (or 
to have the concept of beauty) are. Bobonich (2002: 553) denies this and maintains that 
having the concept of beauty requires the right ‘causal ancestry’, i.e. the concept has to be 
recollected. He is therefore committed to the view that most people (who are not divinely 
mad lovers, i.e. who do not recollect) do not have the concept of beauty (i.e. that they do not 
represent things as beautiful), which is certainly an odd result.  
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and important sense, the non-rational part really is unable, as Socrates says it 
is, to distinguish between the large and the small. This is because it has no idea 
what it really is to be large, or small, which is obviously not the same thing as 
appearing through sight to be large, or small, or taking up a great deal of space, 
or very little space, in someone’s visual field. (72, my emphasis).  
 
But predication (framing a propositional structure) and successful predication – 
assuming that this is what the ‘idea of what it really is to be large’ means – 
seem to be two quite different matters. Appearing through sight to be large is 
just as propositional as grasping that something really is large. Of course, 
Lorenz could argue that any predication or framing of a proposition requires 
‘discerning’ what it really is to be large, but he does not explicitly argue for this 
and it is by no means clear that this is how Plato sees things (I will return to this 
in more detail in the subsequent chapter). For example, in the Sophist the 
Visitor says: 
 
But with me I think you need to begin the investigation from the sophist – by 
searching for him and giving a clear account of what he is. Now in this case 
you and I have only a name in common (τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ), and 
maybe we’ve each used it for a different thing (ἔργον). (Soph. 218B–C)  
 
It seems that in this particular case either Theaetetus or the Visitor (or both) do 
not ‘discern’ the being of the sophist. So if they both form a thought ‘x is a 
sophist’ then, according to Lorenz, (at least) one of them would not engage in 
predication in Lorenz’s sense. But this surely is an odd result. Now, is Lorenz’s 
(L2) version of the solution to the problem of the rationality of belief textually 
supported? It is clear that, in later Plato, Forms of very abstract features 
(sameness, difference, being) become the centre of attention. Plato scrutinizes 
the metaphysical and epistemological roles of these Forms in several dialogues. 
The metaphysical aspect of the relations between sameness, difference and 
being is at the forefront in the second part of the Parmenides (137C–166C) and 
in the central part of the Sophist (250B–260A). The epistemological aspect is 
less fully worked out but there are passages in the Philebus (e.g. 14C–18D) that 
discuss this as well. The curious thing is, however, that very much like the 
Forms of the middle dialogues, Sameness, Difference and Being mostly serve 
the purpose of explaining (philosophical) knowledge, and not belief. The para-
digmatic passage comes from the Sophist:  
 
Aren’t we going to say that it takes expertise in dialectic to divide things by 
kinds (κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι) and not to think that the same form (ταὐτὸν 
εἶδος) is a different one or that a different form is the same? Yes. So if a person 
can do that, he’ll be capable of adequately discriminating a single form spread 
out all through a lot of other things (δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν), 
each of which stands separate from the others. In addition he can discriminate 
forms that are different from each other but are included within a single form 
that’s outside them, or a single form that’s connected as a unit throughout 
many wholes, or many forms that are completely separate from others. That’s 
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what it is to know how to discriminate by kinds how things can associate and 
how they can’t. – Absolutely. – And you’ll assign this dialectical activity 
(διαλεκτικὸν) only to someone who has a pure and just love of wisdom 
(φιλοσοφοῦντι). (253D–E) 
 
This passage would require a thorough treatment. Here I simply wish to point 
out that discriminating ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ is, for Plato, a matter of 
philosophical knowledge (dialectic). Plato does not say that discerning 
sameness and difference is necessary for forming beliefs (i.e. predication).  
A possible candidate for support for (L2) is the passage about the 
construction of the world-soul in the Timaeus (37A–C). Here Plato says that the 
World-Soul is made out of a mixture of the Same, Different and Being, and that 
this enables the World-Soul to reach knowledge, understanding and firm and 
true beliefs and convictions. However, this passage fails to support (L2), since it 
does not, at least not straightforwardly, imply that belief formation as such 
requires a grasp of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ of the particular predicate. In 
fact, later on in the Timaeus (43E–44C), Plato says explicitly that the thoughts 
of the new- born fail to grasp sameness and difference (of any given property):  
 
Whenever they encounter something outside of them as characterizable as 
same or different, they will speak (προσαγορεύουσαι) of it as the ‘same as’ 
something, or as ‘different from’ something else, when the truth is just the 
opposite, so proving themselves to be mislead (ψευδεῖς) and unintelligent 
(ἀνόητοι). (Tim. 44A)  
 
This strongly points to the view that predication (and, by implication, 
propositional thought) does not require a successful ‘cognitive contact’ with 
intelligibles. However, in might be that Plato thinks that forming beliefs 
requires that the circles run well. He does say, after all, that newborns cannot 
form beliefs (this seems to be implied in Tht. 186C). This is indeed how Lorenz 
reads the passage (Lorenz 2006: 96). The second possibility is that only after 
the person has received education can he come to recognize sameness and 
difference in things, and the circles of the same and different ‘correctly identify 
(προσαγορεύουσαι) what is the same and what is different, and render 
intelligent (ἔμφρονα) the person who possesses them’ (44B). Timaeus does not 
say that being intelligent is necessary for forming all beliefs. It seems likely, 
rather, that if the circles of the same and different ‘run well’, this explains the 
ability to reach knowledge and ‘firm and true beliefs’ (Tim. 37C), in much the 
same way as, in the Phaedo and Phaedrus, recollection is meant to explain 
philosophical thought. In this case the Timaeus does not require that the 
possibility of predication involve the successful grasp of being, sameness and 
difference. I think Timaeus is neutral between these possible readings, since 
Plato does not show (like in most of the passages we have looked at) much 
interest in what makes belief tout court possible, but rather what makes possible 
the possibility of apprehending things correctly. To be sure, Timaeus is different 
from the Republic, for instance, since it claims that in beliefs it is possible to 
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apprehend being, although of the divisible kind (35A), but it does not say that 
apprehending being is necessary for forming all beliefs. It rather gives the 
impression that (the divisible) being is apprehended in firm and true beliefs.  
Just like (B), (L2) finds strong support in the Passage of the Commons of the 
Theaetetus. There indeed Plato seems to say clearly that the grasp of difference, 
opposition and being characterizes all beliefs.  
Finally, what about (L1)? Does Plato, in his late dialogues say that belief 
requires the grasp of the Form Being in order to connect the subject and pre-
dicate? One passage that might suggest this possibility comes from the Sophist: 
 
We also say that each piece of speech has to have some particular quality. – 
Yes. – What quality should we say each one of these has? – The second one is 
false, I suppose, and the other one is true. – And the true one says those that 
are, as/that they are, about you (τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ). – Of course. – And 
the false one says things different from those that are (ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων). – 
Yes. – So it says those that are not, but that they are (τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα 
λέγει). – I suppose so. – But they’re different things that are from the things 
that are about you – since we said that concerning each thing many beings are 
and many are not. (Soph. 263A–263B) 
 
The language of the passage is ambiguous76. Plato might be saying that the true 
statement says about the things that are that they are (about you). This would 
suggest that every statement does involve the term being. On the other hand, the 
sample sentences ‘Theaetetus sits’ and ‘Theaetetus flies’ do not contain an 
explicit copula. And indeed, the sentence can just as easily be construed as 
saying that the true statement says things that are as they are, in which case the 
sentence does not involve an explicit copula. This is not, however, necessarily a 
problem for (L1), since Lorenz does not require that the Forms of Being, 
Difference and Opposition should figure explicitly in a belief. All he means is 
that the grasp of these intelligibles (and their relations) is a cognitive pre-
condition for beliefs. Yet it is difficult to say whether Plato intends the above 
passage to mean that the Form of Being has to be grasped (implicitly) in every 
thought. The passage is supposed to be an explanation of what makes sentences 
(and beliefs, Soph. 264A) true or false, it does not aim to explain the cognitive 
preconditions of forming a sentence or a belief.  
However (as the reader might perhaps already expect), Theaetetus 184–187 
has often been read in a way that supports (L1). The task of the next chapter is 
to argue that, despite appearances, the Passage of the Commons in the 
Theaetetus fails to support (B), (L2) and (L1), in other words, it fails to support 
all versions of the standard account. I conclude that in order to see whether 
Plato indeed comes to hold some version of the Optimistic View, a thorough 
analysis of this passage is unavoidable. 
In this chapter I argued that there is a significant shift between Plato’s 
middle and late dialogues in respect of the notion of δόξα – namely that δόξα 
                                                     
76 See, for example, M. Frede (1992: 417–418). 
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becomes a rational capacity. I further distinguished between two views about 
the relation between the Forms and ordinary thinking in the middle dialogues, 
the Optimistic and the Pessimistic View. I argued that the standard account, 
according to which Plato, in his later dialogues, endorses a version of 
Optimistic View of Forms, is problematic. It fails to explain the key feature of 
Plato’s later notion of belief, namely that forming beliefs requires deliberation 
and reasoning. The passages sometimes taken to support the Optimistic View 
are ambiguous. However, there is one passage that seems to commit Plato to the 
Optimistic View about Forms (or intelligibles), namely Theaetetus 184–7. Thus, 
assuming that the argument in the this chapter is correct, the standard account 
stands or falls depending on whether it is supported by the Passage of the 
Commons77. 
Even one of the most adamant critics of the Optimistic View about the 
middle dialogues, Dominic Scott, thinks that Theaetetus 184–7 marks Plato’s 
radical departure from his earlier account of how Forms figure in ordinary 
thought and his arrival to the Optimistic View: 
 
This passage in the Theaetetus is a significant stage in Plato’s development. It 
represents a rejection of a view of the senses that runs throughout the middle 
period, a view that is an essential part of D. In recanting his generosity towards 
sense perception and removing from it even the ability to provide unreliable 
information Plato moved towards a new set of considerations similar to those 
that K is importing back into recollection. This is an anachronism, however, 
because recollection is firmly tied to the middle-period ontology and 
epistemology. (Scott 1995: 84) 
 
In the following chapters I want to challenge this view. I hope to show that 
Plato retains his Pessimistic View in his later texts. Especially, Theaetetus does 
not commit Plato to an Optimistic View. The rest of this dissertation has a 
double agenda. First, I will argue that Theaetetus 184–7 does not commit Plato 
to the Optimistic View. Second, I wish to argue that this passage contains a 
different explanation as to why Plato starts to see belief as a rational capacity.  
  
                                                     
77 It is no coincidence that one of the first defenders of the Optimistic View about Forms, 
Natorp (1922/1961: 91–119, see esp. p. 114), thinks of Theaetetus as an early dialogue, 
preceding the Phaedo and the Republic. The fact that Passage of the Commons seems to 
express the Optimistic View about commons enables Natorp to treat the Forms of the 
Phaedo and the Republic similarly as concepts (Begriffe). The standard account retains 
Natorp’s central claim - while maintaining (correctly) that the Theaetetus is a late dialogue - 
by thinking that the Forms become to be (like) concepts for later Plato.  
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CHAPTER TWO.  
Conceptualism and Theaetetus 184B4–187A7 
 
In Theaetetus 184B–187A, Plato seems to commit himself to the claim that 
grasping intelligibles (he calls them ‘commons’ since they are common to or 
shared by the objects of the different senses) is necessary for forming beliefs. 
The most widespread reading of this passage supports the standard account. 
According to this reading, the passage makes the following claims. First, the 
soul grasps certain abstract features of things, i.e. the commons, simply in virtue 
of entertaining a thought involving the terms for these commons. For example, 
a thought expressed in a sentence ‘color is beautiful’ involves the grasp of the 
common of beautiful. Second, these features are not perceptible, hence 
perception cannot account for thoughts involving (e.g.) the term ‘beautiful’. 
Third, all beliefs (including beliefs about perceptible qualities) require a grasp 
of certain special commons, minimally the common of being but maybe also the 
commons of sameness, difference and opposition. Thus the passage can easily 
be read so as to support both versions of the standard account. In this chapter, I 
will argue that this reading (I call this the ‘conceptualist reading’) is riddled 
with problems. According to the conceptualist reading, the crucial notion of 
‘being’ should be construed as a copula involved in all propositional thought. 
This interpretation attributes Plato with a theory of perception that is not 
supported by what Plato says elsewhere, and it furthermore fails to give an 
adequate reading of the second half of the Passage of the Commons. I will 
further discuss an alternative to the conceptualist reading, the ‘realist reading’, 
which takes the notion of ‘being’ to mean objectivity or reality. I will point out 
that, although the realist reading is clearly superior to the conceptualist reading 
in interpreting the second half of the Passage of the Commons, all the available 
versions of the realist readings nevertheless fail, since they also assume that the 
commons are grasped in all thoughts involving the terms for these commons. I 




1. The Conceptualist Reading 
The Passage of the Commons contains the final refutation of Theaetetus’ first 
definition of knowledge, according to which ‘knowledge is nothing but 
perception (οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις)’ (Tht. 151E3). It is useful to 
divide the passage into two stages. This is not only a heuristic device; we shall 
see that there are important philosophical differences between the claims made 
at the two stages. At stage one (184B3–186A1), Socrates argues that one should 
distinguish between ‘with’ what one perceives and ‘by means’ of what one 
perceives. The former expression characterizes the way the soul contributes to 
the act of perception and the latter expression the way bodily organs contribute 
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to it. Socrates then narrows the objects of perception down to the so-called 
proper sensibles. He points out to Theaetetus that there are certain things or 
features of things that are common (τὸ κοινὸν, τὰ κοινά) to proper objects of 
senses. These so-called commons include being 78  (οὐσία), sameness (τὸ 
ταὐτόν), and difference (ἕτερον). These commons cannot be perceived at all 
since senses are restricted to their proper sensibles. Yet the soul has some sort 
of access to these features in thinking that sound and color are, or are different 
from each other, etc. These features are revealed to or grasped (λαμβάνειν) by 
the soul, when it has a relevant thought or asks a relevant question (185B4–5). 
Furthermore, Theaetetus agrees that commons are not common to proper 
sensibles only, but to all things (185C4–5). Theaetetus then says that since the 
commons cannot be perceived, they have to be grasped by a different activity, 
viz. when the soul operates ‘itself by means of itself’ (αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς) and not by 
means of any of the bodily senses. Socrates agrees. At this stage being is simply 
one of the commons and no special importance is attached to it.  
 Stage two (186A2–187A8) opens by Socrates drawing Theaetetus’ attention 
to being as a special common that ‘goes with everything’ (186A3). Theaetetus 
says that being is something that the mind itself by itself yearns after 
(ἐπορέγεται). The list of the commons is expanded to include beauty and 
ugliness, goodness and badness. Theaetetus adds that in case of the beauty and 
ugliness, the sameness and difference (etc.) the soul examines their being (i.e. 
the being of the commons), calculating things in past and future. Socrates then 
goes on to point out that the soul tries to judge (κρίνειν πειρᾶται) the being not 
only of common features like sameness and difference, but even the being of 
perceptual properties like hardness and softness the soul judges itself by itself, 
independently of the body. He asserts that by means of bodily senses soul has 
access to perceptual features but not to their being (186C). Stage two shows that 
being is more than simply one of the commons — it is somehow involved in all 
or at least most of the cognitive acts performed by the soul itself by itself, both 
concerning commons and concerning the perceptual properties. Socrates adds 
that calculating in accordance with being of perceptual affections requires ‘long 
and arduous education’ (186C5). He then argues that attaining being is 
necessary for attaining truth and attaining truth is necessary for having 
knowledge and concludes that since perception cannot attain being, it cannot be 
knowledge. Having reached this conclusion, Theaetetus identifies the activity of 
the soul, ‘busying about the things that are’ itself by itself, with forming beliefs 
(δοξάζειν) (187A7–8). Socrates agrees.  
 This suggests that the commons, as they are introduced at stage one, are 
apprehended by the soul simply in virtue of entertaining a thought involving a 
term for a relevant common. Socrates first asks whether Theaetetus is capable 
                                                     
78 I will refer to the commons themselves simply as being, same, beautiful, etc. For terms re-
ferring to the commons, I will use single quotation marks (‘being’, ‘sameness’, ‘beauty’, 
etc.).  
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of thinking that color and sound are, that color and sound are79 different, etc. 
The context suggests that Socrates is not referring to any peculiar subset of 
thoughts, but rather to thoughts that anyone can have about sound and color. 
Then he poses the following question:  
 
Well now, by means of what do you think (διανοῇ) all these things about 
them? Because it’s impossible to get a hold of what they have in common 
(κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν) either by means of hearing or by means of 
sight. (185B7–9)80 
 
Socrates is here apparently suggesting that Theaetetus gets a hold of or grasps 
(λαμβάνειν) one of the commons whenever he thinks, e.g. that ‘color and sound 
are’, namely the common being. The problem Socrates presents to Theaetetus is 
the following. We hear sounds by means of hearing and see color by means of 
seeing. But we cannot ‘get a hold of’ or grasp a feature that both sound and 
color share (a common feature) by means of hearing or sight. Yet we do ‘get a 
hold of’ being and sameness in thinking thoughts like ‘sound and color are’ and 
‘sound and color are the same’. How do we grasp those common features? It 
cannot be by means of the senses because senses are restricted to their proper 
sensibles.81 Eventually Theaetetus concedes that these features are grasped by 
means of an independent activity of the soul. Thus the argument assumes that 
being and difference are grasped when we have thoughts ‘sound and color are’ 
and ‘sound and color are different’. This receives further support from a few 
lines below. Socrates asks the following question:  
 
Good. Now through what does that power function which reveals to you 
(δηλοῖ σοι) what is common in the case both of all these things and of 
these two – I mean that which you express by the words ‘is’ and ‘is not’ 
(ᾧ τὸ ‘ἔστιν’ ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ ‘οὐκ ἔστι’) and the other things 
mentioned in our questions just now? (185C4–7), trans. Levett/ 
Burnyeat.82 
 
Here it is clearly stated that there must be a power (which Theaetetus goes on to 
identify with thinking and forming beliefs) which ‘reveals’ the commons such 
as being and sameness when the soul thinks that ‘color and sound are’ and that 
                                                     
79 The Greek text omits the verb ‘to be’ in all the sample sentences at 185A10-B5, except for 
the sentence that focuses on ‘being’ (185A8). Unfortunately, the verb needs to be added in 
the English translation. 
80 Throughout this and the following chapters I will use McDowell’s (1973) translation 
(unless otherwise noted), with amendments. 
81 I will discuss the structure of this argument in the next chapter (Section 3). 
82 For the moment I am quoting from Levett/Burnyeat (Burnyeat 1990: 316), since this 
translation states the conceptualist assumption more clearly. McDowell’s translation 
(McDowell 1973: 67) is the following: ‘Good. What about the power which makes clear to 
you that which is common to everything, including these things: that to which you apply the 
words ‘is’, ‘is not’ and the others we used in our questions just now?’ 
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‘color and sound are different’. The commons are named or ‘expressed by 
words’ (ἐπονομάζεις), which makes them close to meanings of words. When 
these two passages are read together, they suggest that Socrates is saying that in 
order to use the verb ‘to be’ in the sentence such as ‘color and sound are’, one 
must apprehend what sound and color have in common, namely being. The 
same applies to other commons (‘the other things mentioned in our questions 
just now’). What other commons are there? 
 The following commons are introduced in Theaetetus 185D–186B: being 
(οὐσία) and not-being (μὴ εἶναι), likeness (ὁμοιότης) and unlikeness 
(ἀνομοιότης), the same or sameness (τὸ ταὐτόν) and different or difference 
(ἕτερον), one (ἕν) and other numbers (τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν), odd (περιττὸν) and 
even (ἄρτιόν), beauty (καλὸν) and ugliness (αἰσχρὸν), goodness (ἀγαθὸν) and 
badness (κακόν). Socrates suggests that being and not-being are grasped in 
thoughts and questions involving the terms ‘is’ and ‘is not’, no reason is given 
to think that being is, in this respect, different from the other commons. It seems 
legitimate to infer that the commons of sameness and difference, and beauty and 
ugliness are also grasped if one applies the terms expressing these properties. 
Thus, presumably, if Theaetetus thinks that ‘color and sound are beautiful’ he 
grasps or gets a hold of the common beauty, and if he thinks that ‘color and 
sound are good’, he gets a hold of the common of goodness. This assumption 
can be formulated as follows:  
 
Conceptualist Assumption (CA): If the soul entertains a thought involving a 
term ‘F’, then the soul grasps or apprehends the common F.  
Perhaps the clearest example of reading (CA) into the text of stage one derives 
from McDowell:  
 
The present passage [185C4–186A1] suggests a different sort of 
formulation: the things which can be thought about anything are repre-
sented, not by phrases of the form ‘that is f’, but by expressions of one of 
the following forms: 
(1) ‘f-ness, or similarly abstract noun verbs, e.g. ‘being’; 
(2) ‘the f’: the Greek rendered ‘not being’ means, literally, ‘the not to-
be’, and the Greek rendered ‘the same’ means, literally, ‘the the-
same’; 
(3) simply ‘f’, e.g. ‘different’ 
There is no difficulty about combining the two sorts of formulation. Plato 
is, I believe, inclined towards a view of judgment according to which the 
mind, in judging, touches or handles, as it were, the terms (in a reasonably 
natural sense) of the judgment it makes. (McDowell 1973: 188) 
 
The defenders of the standard account might not agree with McDowell’s claim 
that the ‘mind’ touches (so to speak) the terms of the judgment. However, the 
defenders of the standard account are committed to the claim that the mind has 
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to have ‘cognitive access’ to or some understanding of the nature of the 
common properties that the general terms designate83.  
(CA) expresses the Optimistic View about commons. It should be clear that 
(CA) supports the standard account. In fact, it seems that (CA) is just a 
restatement of this version 84  on the assumption that the commons of the 
Theaetetus can be identified with Platonic Forms. Further, stage two connects 
forming beliefs closely to the commons of being, difference and opposition. 
Thus, (CA) applied to these commons supports Lorenz’s version of the standard 
account85. It is true that certain important features of Forms are not mentioned 
in the Passage of Commons (e.g. Socrates never says that the commons are 
paradigms or that they are everlasting), but this does not necessarily mean that 
commons are different from Forms. Plato does not mention Forms by name in 
the Theaetetus. But since he takes the commons to be imperceptible and 
accessible to soul when it functions independently of the body and the senses, 
the parallels between Forms of the Phaedo (esp. Phd. 79A-B) and Republic 
(e.g. Rep. 509D–511E and Rep. 523B–525A) are quite suggestive. In fact, there 
is nothing in the passage that would contradict reading commons as being 
(similar to) the Forms. Bobonich makes a good point when he says that  
 
The commons may be Forms, even if they do not have all the features that 
middle-period Forms do. Plato might also think that the commons have 
features beyond what the argument at Tht. 184B—186E establishes. 
(Bobonich 2002: 559)  
 
Here one needs to be careful, however. Forms and commons can be identified in 
two different ways, one of which is ruled out by the text, whereas the other 
                                                     
83  ‘It [the Theaetetus] attributes to all human beings some contact with non-sensible 
properties, the commons (the koina), and holds that contact with them is involved in forming 
most, if not all, judgments. This contact need not involve an explicit recognition of the 
commons, as such, that is, it need not involve recognizing them as nonsensible properties. 
(The commons include being, sameness, difference, fineness, and goodness.)’ (Bobonich 
2002: 327). Bostock represents a position that is quite similar to McDowell’s: ‘We very 
naturally think that we grasp what is expressed by ‘Socrates’ because we are acquainted with 
the thing it stands for, namely the man Socrates. Then it is not so unnatural to suppose that 
we grasp what is expressed ‘wise’ because we are equally acquainted with the thing it stands 
for, namely wisdom. The idea that a word such as ‘wise’ stands for some object is not 
particularly repelling. But having come this far we will evidently be tempted to go on to the 
last step, and say similarly that we grasp what is expressed by ‘is’ because we are acquainted 
with what it stands for, namely being.’ (Bostock 1988: 275) Bostock uses the Russellian 
notion of ‘acquaintance’ in a deliberately vague manner (see p. 275, n. 6), which probably 
does not entail ‘touching’ or ‘handling’ in McDowell’s sense.  
84 That is, (B), according to which, in order to form a belief ‘x is F’, it is necessary to have 
cognitive access to (i) the Form of F (if ‘F’ is a term that has a corresponding Form), and (ii) 
to the Form of Being that connects the terms to form a full thought. 
85  (L): Cognitive access to the intelligible of G (G= Being, Difference, Opposition) is 
necessary to form a belief ‘x is F’.  
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seems quite consistent with it. Accordingly, the first version does not support 
the standard account, whereas the second version does. 
 The historically prevalent interpretive possibility was simply to take οὐσία 
as shorthand for Platonic Forms or essences of the middle dialogues. 86 
However, there are powerful considerations that speak decisively against this 
reading.87 Most importantly, οὐσία is introduced in the text as a nominalization 
of the verb ‘to be’, used in simple sentences (and apprehended in simple 
thoughts) such as ‘color and sound are’. Socrates does not refer to any specific 
way of speaking about color and sound, e.g. expressing their essence or ‘true 
being’. This makes it very difficult to read οὐσία as referring to the ‘truly real 
being’ of Forms in the middle dialogues. The second, much more viable 
possibility (which is assumed by both Bobonich and Lorenz) is to take οὐσία to 
be one of the Forms (Lorenz calls them ‘intelligibles’) and not as shorthand for 
all Forms. In other words, the commons such as being, sameness and difference 
all refer to abstract properties that Plato often discusses in his late dialogues, 
most notably the Sophist. This second option of connecting Forms and 
commons offers quite strong support for the standard account, since, on (CA), 
                                                     
86 A classic example of this reading stems from Proclus: ‘The opinative faculty embraces the 
accounts of sense-perceptible objects (τῶν αἰσθητῶν λόγους) and that it is this faculty that 
knows their essential natures (οὐσίας αὐτῶν γινῶσκον) and examines the ‘what it is’ 
question, but remains ignorant of the cause (αἰτίαν ἀγνοοῦ). Since it is the role of the 
discursive reasoning to know both the essential natures and the causes of the perceived 
objects (διανοίας ἅμα καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς αἰτίας γιγνωσκούσης τῶν αἰσθητῶν), but of 
sense-perception to know neither – for it has been clearly demonstrated in the Theaetetus 
that sense-perception is ignorant of essential nature and completely uninformed about the 
cause of what it knows– it is necessary that opinion (δόξα) be ranked in between [these two] 
and that it know the essential natures of the objects of perception (οὐσίας τῶν αἰσθητῶν) by 
means of the accounts (διὰ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγων γινώσκειν) in it, but remains ignorant of the 
causes. In this way right opinion would differ from knowledge, namely that it would only 
know the ‘what it is’, whereas the latter is able also to examine the cause’ (In. Tim. 240. 10–
22). This is how the Renaissance the translator of Plato, Ficino, understood the passage (see 
Becker 2007: 387). This view was also held by German scholars of the nineteenth century 
and in the twentieth century by Cornford, who takes οὐσία to be catch-all term referring to 
Forms (1935:105–110), and McDowell, who thinks that οὐσία refers to essences. I will 
discuss McDowell’s reading at pp. 151–152.  
87 See also McDowell (1973: 189–190) and Cooper (1970: 366–367), who have provided 
arguments against identifying ‘being’ with Forms. On Cornford’s reading (i.e. Burnyeat’s 
(1990) Reading A), the point of the argument is that perception is not knowledge, since the 
objects of perception are not ‘unchangingly real’ (Cornford 1935: 109). However, one 
should be very careful in identifying the common of being with the realm of Forms of the 
middle dialogues. This is so for several reasons. First, (what count in the Theaetetus) as 
perceptual properties (and not commons), such as largeness, heaviness, etc. were taken to be 
Forms in the middle dialogues (e.g. Rep. 523–5). Secondly, the commons are not 
contemplated in isolation from the sensibles, but rather investigated about the sensibles (see, 
esp. Cooper 1970). Thirdly, the Passage of the Commons clearly allows for knowledge of 
sensibles (esp. 186C), unlike the middle books of the Republic (at least on the majority-
interpretation of the Republic). 
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commons are grasped by entertaining thoughts involving the terms that refer to 
commons.  
 Further, the stage two of the argument focuses on the common being, and 
both Bobonich and Lorenz suggest that Passage of the Commons claims that 
grasping ‘being’ is necessary for forming all beliefs. Stage two also emphasizes 
the importance of sameness, difference and opposition. It furthermore seems 
likely that beauty or good are also apprehended (just like being or sameness) in 
virtue of forming a belief that contains terms such as ‘beautiful’ or ‘good’. 
Thus, all versions of the standard account can reasonably be seen as expressed 
in the Passage of the Commons. Since all these versions of the standard account 
derive from the acceptance of the Conceptualist Assumption in regard to (at 
least) some commons, in what follows I will refer to this family of views simply 
as ‘conceptualist reading’.  
 The conceptualist reading of the Passage of the Commons creates a serious 
problem for the Pessimistic View about Forms.88 Pessimistic View claims that 
ordinary thinking and belief-formation is cognitively independent of Forms. 
Since there is no knockdown argument against the position that regards 
commons as Forms, the Passage of the Commons offers strong justification for 
the claim that later Plato starts to view Forms as relevant for explaining how 
ordinary thinking and belief-formation is possible. The main defender of the 
Pessimistic View, Gail Fine (1993: 134–135), thinks that all that the Passage of 
the Commons claims is that the soul is able to identify the object as being 
something, and that being is necessary for ordinary thought in this minimal 
sense. Fine also remains uncommitted as to whether being in this minimal sense 
should be identified with the Form of Being (Fine 1988: 26). Fine is willing to 
admit that being in the minimal sense is grasped in all beliefs. However, being 
is just one in the long list of commons. Therefore, if (CA) applies to being, it 
should apply to the other commons as well. In fact, Socrates does explicitly say 
in the passage above that ‘the other things mentioned in our questions just now’ 
(sameness, difference, likeness, unlikeness) are also revealed to soul if the soul 
has thoughts involving these terms. He can only be referring to the thoughts 
such as ‘sound and color are different’, etc. Therefore, he means that (CA) 
applies to all the commons, not just being. However, it is quite difficult to read 
‘one’ and ‘number’, ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ is the same minimalist sense that 
Fine attaches to ‘being’. On the contrary, Plato seems to be saying, in 
accordance with the Optimistic View (Fine calls it the ‘semantic view’), that in 
order to understand sentences involving the terms ‘same’ and ‘beautiful’, one 
has to stand in the relation of grasping or apprehending the commons of beauty 
and sameness. One cannot be a conceptualist about being while refusing to be a 
conceptualist about other commons. Therefore, if the conceptualist reading of 
                                                     
88 For example, Scott (1995: 85) says that this passage marks a shift from Plato’s earlier 
pessimism towards a more optimistic position. Similar claims are made by Bobonich (2002: 
327) and Lorenz (2006: 91). 
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the Passage of the Commons is correct then the passage offers support for both 
versions of the standard account and against the Pessimistic View.  
 Now, is it correct to think that (CA) applies to commons? How should one 
approach this issue? I will focus on the common being (οὐσία) in order to 
determine whether the conceptualist reading of the commons is the best possible 
reading. I chose to focus on being because being is by far the most often 
referred to common in the text (185C9, 186A2, 186A10, 186B6, 186B7, 186C3, 
186C7, 186D2, 186E5). It is therefore easier to determine whether the text 
supports (CA) about being. Being also plays a crucial role in the whole 
argument because perception is denied the status of knowledge on account of its 
failure to reach οὐσία. Thus, one can consider whether or not being, as 
understood on (CA), yields a good argument for the conclusion that perception 
is not knowledge. Further, being is crucial because, on all versions of the 
standard account, it is the one intelligible or Form that is grasped in all beliefs.  
 I begin by outlining the main possibilities for interpreting the notion of 
οὐσία. I will argue that the conceptualist reading must take οὐσία to be a copula. 
Otherwise it is unclear in what sense ‘being’ is grasped in all thoughts involving 
‘is’ as a term. Then I will turn to the question of whether being as a copula fits 
with the rest of the Passage of the Commons. If ‘being’ cannot be read as a 
copula, there is good reason to think that conceptualism about commons is not 
Plato’s considered position in the Passage of the Commons.  
Greek οὐσία (a substantive formed on the basis of the present participle of 
the verb ‘to be’, i.e. εἶναι) is an extremely difficult notion, having a wide range 
of meanings89. According to Liddell-Scott dictionary, οὐσία is normally used to 
as meaning ‘wealth’, ‘estate’: ‘that which is one's own, one's substance, 
property’.90 This use of οὐσία is accounted for also in the Theaetetus. When 
Socrates first meets Theaetetus, he says that Theaetetus’ father left him a ‘quite 
substantial property’ (144C7), but unfortunately this οὐσία, Theodorus adds, 
was ‘squandered by some trustees’ (144D2). This pre-philosophical sense of 
οὐσία is probably the only meaning of the word that one can say with certainty 
Socrates and Theaetetus do not have in mind in 185C9–186E10.  
But this is of not much help; Plato uses the term οὐσία in different contexts 
in a variety of ways and it is by no means easy to determine what it is, exactly, 
that he might have in mind. There are three uses of οὐσία, which are relevant in 
                                                     
89 ‘There is no hoarier notion in ancient metaphysics’ (Silverman 2002:5).  
90 This is actually the only meaning of the word οὐσία in classical Greek outside Plato and 
Aristotle. Bernard Suzanne observes that there is only one exception to this rule in 
Demosthenes’ Contra Midias 210, otherwise all occurrences of the term are exclusively 
‘materialistic’, i.e. meaning ‘wealth, property’. ‘Pourtant, une recherche sur les occurrences 
d’οὐσία dans les textes grecs disponibles sur Perseus 6 montre que ce mot, s’il est tardif (on 
ne le trouve pas dans les auteurs antérieurs au Ve siècle avant J. C.), n’est pas un mot rare à 
partir de cette époque (1398 occurrences recensées) et qu’en dehors de Platon et Aristote, on 
ne le trouve que dans son sens matériel.’ (Suzanne 2006, 2) Thus, it seems safe to assume 
that the philosophical meaning of the word originates in Plato and becomes a fixed part of 
the philosophical vocabulary only in Aristotle. 
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the present context: οὐσία can refer to essences 91 , to reality 92  or to the 
copulative use of ‘is’93. Of course, in its most well-known use, oὐσία refers to 
the Platonic Forms of the middle dialogues.94 However, as I have pointed out 
above, there are good reasons for denying that οὐσία in the context of 
Theaetetus refers to the realm of Forms. Occasionally Plato also uses οὐσία to 
designate the essence of something (i.e. what something is) without reference to 
the Forms. In the early dialogues, in particular, οὐσία seems to mean something 
like essential characteristic or definition, and does not carry the ontological 
baggage of the middle dialogues. The second aspect in the meaning of οὐσία is 
close to the notion of ‘reality’. There are passages, where Plato indicates that 
when something has being, it is real or that this something has objective being.95 
The third use of οὐσία is the least demanding: it does not refer to essence or 
reality but to being something or other. This use of οὐσία is common in the 
dialogues that belong to Plato’s later period, especially the Sophist and the 
Parmenides. 96  When Plato talks about something sharing in οὐσία in these 
dialogues, he seems to have in mind nothing more than ‘x is something’ without 
further qualification like ‘is real’ or ‘has an essence’. This meaning of οὐσία is 
closest to the modern notion of copula. Now, all three uses of οὐσία make an 
appearance in Theaetetus as well.97 
Of course, these distinctions between the different aspects of οὐσία are not 
explicitly made by Plato himself. His dialogues give the impression that he 
tends to take οὐσία as a single unitary notion that somehow comprises all these 
different uses. The question of how one should construe the relation between 
the ‘essential’, ‘copulative’ and ‘existential’ uses of ‘being’ is one of the most 
difficult and controversial questions in Plato scholarship. Sometimes (e.g. Crat. 
                                                     
91 Modrak (1981) and and McDowell (1973: 185–193) take οὐσία to designate essences (but 
not Forms). The best arguments against interpreting οὐσία as essence are found in Bostock 
(1988: 137–142). Modrak’s view is extensively criticized in Shea (1985). 
92 Οὐσία as reality is defended by Crombie (1963: 13–14, 28), Cooper (1970), Heitsch 
(1987), Kanayama (1987) and, most recently, by Gerson (2004: 204–212). But see also 
Kahn (1981), who he seems to think that at stage two οὐσία refers to ‘facts’ or ‘reality’. 
Although M. Frede (1987) defends the copula reading, in his slightly later (1990) seems to 
take ‘being’ as reality.  
93 Οὐσία as copula is the most widespread interpretation. The first scholar to hold a version 
of this interpretation seems to be Natorp (1922/1961). This interpretation became orthodox 
after Burnyeat’s influential article ‘Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving’ (1976). See also 
Kahn (1981), Fine (1988), Bostock (1988: 110–145), Shea (1985), Silverman (1990), M. 
Frede (1987), Bobonich (2002:295–231), especially Lorenz (2006: 74–95), and, most 
recently, Nielsen (2008).  
94 For example, Rep. 525B, Phdr. 247C, Phd. 92 D. As to Socratic οὐσία, see Euth. 11B.  
95 See, e.g., Tht. 155E, where Plato refers to people who ‘refuse to admit that actions and 
processes and the invisible world in general have any place in reality (οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς 
ἐν οὐσίας μέρει)’ (trans. Levett/Burnyeat, p. 277). Another set of examples of οὐσία as 
‘reality’ can be found in the gigantomachia-passage of the Sophist 246A-249D. 
96 See, e.g., Tht. 202E-203A, Soph. 260D.  
97 Οὐσία as a copula figures at Tht. 202E-203A, οὐσία as reality at 155E, and οὐσία as 
essence at 202B and 202B–C. 
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423E) Plato suggests that whatever exists must have an essence, sometimes 
(e.g. Parm. 142E) he suggests that whatever has copulative being, must also 
exist. And according to some scholars (esp. Nehamas 1979/1999: 176–191 and 
Silverman 2003: 90–94), middle period Plato fuses the copulative and essential 
uses of ‘is’. That is to say, Plato does not clearly distinguish between sentences 
‘x is F’ and ‘x is what it is to be F’. As Kahn puts this point, ‘To speak of what 
F is or of what is (truly) F is, for Plato, to speak of the same thing’ (Kahn 1982: 
109). So, it may turn out that a complete understanding of Theaetetus 184B–
187A has to take into account several different aspects of the meaning of οὐσία.  
However, even if the notion of οὐσία somehow includes three different 
aspects, it is plausible that one aspect of the notion of οὐσία plays a more 
prominent role in the argument of the Passage of the Commons than others. 
Contemporary scholarship considers copulative use of οὐσία to be the most 
likely candidate for the primary meaning of οὐσία in the Passage of the 
Commons. This is also the only meaning of οὐσία that clearly supports (CA) 
about being. If the term ‘being’ were read as ‘essence’ or as ‘objective reality’, 
it would be difficult to see why Theaetetus would find (CA) about being 
completely uncontroversial and would propose it without hesitation. First, 
‘being’ as essence seems implausible in the context of stage one, since it is not 
clear why Theaetetus would take it for granted that grasping the ‘being’ in the 
the thought ‘color and sound are’ involves the grasp or apprehension of essence 
of color and sound, respectively? The argument also requires that ‘being’ as a 
property is the same in case of sound and color, yet their essences are clearly 
different. Further, being as reality also seems difficult to reconcile with (CA), 
why would Theaetetus think that merely by entertaining a thought ‘color is’, the 
soul succeeds in grasping the objective color ‘out there’? After all, a given 
thought can easily turn out to be false? In that case the soul would obviously fail 
to represent reality.  
Oὐσία as a copula, on the other hand, makes it clear how Socrates and 
Theaetetus could subscribe to (CA) about being: everyone who has a minimal 
command of language has some dim apprehension of being as copula. ‘Being’ 
as a copula is by far the strongest option if one wants to maintain that (CA) 
applies to the common of being. Therefore, the easiest way to assess the 
conceptualist reading of the commons is to ask whether the text supports the 
copula reading of being. If it turns out that the text does not support being as a 
copula, there is good reason to think that (CA) does not apply to being. And if 
(CA) does not apply to being, there is good reason to think that it also does not 
apply to rest of the commons. Therefore, the conceptualist reading stands and 
falls together with the copula reading of ‘being’. 
Now I will survey the main reasons given by the scholars for the copula 
reading of being. I will, furthermore, outline three versions of this reading. 
Then, in the next section, I will turn to the assessment of the copula reading(s).  
The most important philosophical consideration for the copula-reading 
concerns the structure of the argument in the Passage of the Commons. Plato 
argues that perception cannot be knowledge because it does not attain truth 
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(186C6-E10), and it does not attain truth because it does not ‘hit on’ (τυχεῖν, 
186C7) οὐσία. If οὐσία were taken to refer to Forms or essences, then Plato 
would be claiming that perception cannot be knowledge since it fails to grasp 
Forms or essences. However, Plato does not argue that only truths that concern 
essences of things are pertinent to knowledge, whereas truths that are inessential 
(e.g. ‘this is red’) or contingent are not. Plato does not restrict the notion of truth 
in any way, so it seems that one must assume that perception does not ‘attain’ 
any truths whatsoever98. 
 
No defence is offered of the idea that knowledge, let alone truth, pre-
supposes a grasp of being in the specific sense of existence, reality or 
essence, and if any such narrow notion of being were intended, the 
argument would be left to limp on an unargued assumption of the first 
magnitude. That is not Plato’s manner in this dialogue. (Burnyeat 1976: 
25) 
 
On the face of it, there seem to be just two possibilities as to why perception 
does not reach truth: either this is always false or it does not admit of truth and 
falsity at all. Plato does not say that perceptions are always false. In fact, falsity 
is never mentioned in the Passage of the Commons (it becomes the central 
theme in the next section of the dialogue). This leaves us with the second 
option: perception is not something that admits truth or falsity. This is exactly 
what the copula reading claims: perception lacks propositional structure. 
Perception cannot attain being as a copula, and therefore perception cannot 
connect subject and a predicate to form a proposition. Therefore perception 
cannot be characterized as true or false. This means that for Plato all bearers of 
truth and falsity require being as a copula, connecting the subject term to the 
predicate term.99  
Further, οὐσία as a copula fits well with that way in which οὐσία is 
introduced into the discussion. Socrates asks Theaetetus what might be the 
sense-organ by means of which the soul perceives what they used in their 
questions about sound and color just now, ‘that to which you apply the words 
‘is’ and ‘is not’’ (185C5–6). Theaetetus proposes that in having thoughts 
involving the terms ‘is’ and ‘is not’ the soul is considering οὐσία and μὴ εἶναι 
just by itself, and not by means of any of the senses. Socrates agrees. This 
suggests a very close connexion between οὐσία, as it is introduced, and 
preceding uses of ‘is’. There are only two occurrences of the verb εἶναι in the 
previous questions that Socrates and Theaetetus might be picking up. At 185A9, 
Socrates asks if Theaetetus can think about sound and color ‘that they both are’ 
(ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν), and a few lines later, at 185B10, Socrates inquires what 
would be the organ by means of which Theaetetus would consider whether 
                                                     
98 For additional reasons why the essentialist reading of ‘being’ is questionable, see pp. 151–
152. 
99 Burnyeat (1976), Bostock (1988), Frede (1987), Fine (1988), Kahn (1982), Lorenz (2006) 
among others are the defenders of this version of the argument. 
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‘color and sound are salty or not’ (ἐστὸν ἁλμυρὼ ἢ οὔ). In the first sentence 
ἐστόν is syntactically complete, whereas in the second it is incomplete, i.e. the 
verb requires a complement, in this case ‘salty’, whereas in the first it does 
not.100 It would be natural, then, to take the first occurrence of οὐσία to be a 
nominalization of either the complete or incomplete use of εἶναι. Is it plausible 
to take both uses of the verb ‘to be’ as instances of copula? Normally we would 
read a sentence like ‘color is’ as meaning ‘color exists’. However, in Greek 
things are slightly more complicated. Kahn (1981, 2009) and Brown (1991, 
1986/1999) argue that Greek verb εἶναι behaves quite differently from ‘to be’ in 
English, and that it does not allow for a clear-cut distinction between existence 
and copula. This enables the defenders of the copula reading to maintain that 
οὐσία designates a copulative use of the verb ‘to be’ even when it is used 
without the complement. According to Kahn and Brown, the syntactic 
distinction between complete and incomplete uses of εἶναι does not map upon 
the semantic value of the verb (the complete use does not simply mean 
‘existence’ and the incomplete use does not rule ‘existence’ out). 
 
The syntactic distinction between copulative and absolute constructions is 
real enough but superficial, a feature of surface structure only for the 
Greek verb. (Kahn 2004: 112) 
 
Kahn and Brown stress that the existential and the copula use of the verb εἶναι 
form a continuum. The incomplete use of the verb has existential force, and 
similarly, the complete use is, as Kahn puts it, ‘pregnant with the incomplete 
copula’ (Kahn 1982: 108, 123). According to Brown (1986/1999: 460), the 
Greek verb εἶναι behaves in a similar manner as English verb ‘to teach’. Just as 
in English ‘Jane teaches French’ implies that ‘Jane teaches’, in Greek ‘color is 
salty’ implies that ‘color is’. And conversely, just like ‘Jane teaches’ implies 
‘Jane teaches something’, ‘color is’ implies in Greek that ‘color is something’. 
The so-called ‘overdetermination’ (Kahn 1982) of Greek εἶναι (that the verb 
expresses simultaneously both existence and copula, and that it is impossible to 
draw a clear line between them) is important for the copula reading. Οὐσία can 
be seen as performing a double function: it posits a subject for predication and 
at the same time enables to predicate something about the subject. Thus, 
applying the concept ‘being’ (‘grasping being’) can be taken as being equivalent 
to forming a complete thought (a thought that can be true or false), because 
being understood in this way is necessary for predicative or propositional 
structure. This implies that one grasps ‘being’ each time one predicates 
something of something, e.g. whenever one forms a belief that color is salty 
(quite independently of whether the belief is true or not).  
Plato’s use of the term οὐσία in the Passage of the Commons presents two 
minor problems for the copula reading (I discuss these problems in order to set 
                                                     
100 ‘[An incomplete use is] a use in which a subject-expression and the appropriate form of 
the verb require complement in order to constitute a complete sentence; though in an 
elliptical sentence the complement may be omitted’ (McDowell 1973: 118). 
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out the copula reading more clearly). But they too can be easily avoided, if one 
takes into account the specific character of the Greek verb ‘to be’. First, at stage 
one οὐσία is used in statements ‘about’ (περὶ) something. Socrates stresses that 
Theaetetus grasps being if he considers being (or any other common) about 
sound and color (or anything) (185B7, 185B9, 185C6, 185D1, 185E1) e.g. 
Theaetetus ‘thinks being’ about sound and color (185B7). This supports the 
copula reading because these expressions seem to refer to the propositional 
nature of thought. However, at stage two the about-clauses disappear, and 
Socrates and Theaetetus talk about ‘considering’ or ‘judging’ the being of 
sameness, difference, good and bad, or simply ‘attaining being’ tout court 
(186A2, 186A10, 186B6, 186B7, 186C7, 186D2, 186E2), and it is simply not 
mentioned that being is apprehended in relation to or about something. Thus, it 
could be objected that even if it is assumed that οὐσία enters into the discussion 
as a replacement for a copulative use of εἶναι, there is no indication at stage two 
that ‘being’ is understood as a copula connecting a subject with the predicate. 
Does this perhaps indicate that Plato has in mind a direct grasp of being, in 
isolation from the subject-predicate structure of a thought? The copula reading 
has an answer to this objection: the lack of about-clauses can be accounted for, 
if one takes the occurrences of οὐσία at stage two as elliptical. That would mean 
that ‘reaching out’ for the being of sameness or difference simply means to 
consider about something whether/that a thing is same or different, where the 
thing under consideration is left unspecified, i.e. considering whether this 
something is same or different (as something else).101  
Second, the copula reading takes ‘deciding the οὐσία of beauty’ at stage two 
to be an elliptical restatement of ‘deciding whether/that x is beautiful’. But 
being is introduced at stage one in a different manner: the statements that the 
introduction of being picks up are ‘sound and color are’ and ‘sound and color 
are salty’. When the soul grasps being ‘about’ sound, it considers whether (or 
that) it is and whether (or that) it is F (e.g. same). But if one construes οὐσία at 
stage two in a parallel manner, one would expect ‘deciding the οὐσία of 
beautiful (or beauty)’ to mean the same as ‘deciding whether (or that) beautiful 
(or beauty) is’ or ‘whether (or that) beautiful (or beauty) is F’. The problem is 
that stage two does not mention predicates that are supposed to attach to the 
                                                     
101  Here I am indebted to Lorenz’s (2006) reading: ‘We may assume, then, that when 
Theaetetus... speaks of the soul’s ‘reaching out’ for such things as being, likeness, sameness, 
etc., (186A2–7), he has in mind raising and settling questions involving such common 
features, with regard to something or other. In other words, he has in mind considering 
whether something or other is or has being, is like something else, is the same as itself, etc. 
These questions correspond precisely to the assertoric thoughts mentioned at 185 A8–B5. So 
when we come to 186A10–B1, the context certainly allows us to supply some things or other 
with regard to which the soul considers the being of fineness and disgracefulness, and 
goodness and badness. Once one sees this, it becomes attractive to think that what the soul 
considers in considering the being of the features in question is whether they are or have 
being with regard to something or other—say, with regard to a person or a law’ (Lorenz 
2006: 84–85). Similar points are also made by Cooper (1970), Bostock (1988: 130) and M. 
Frede (1987).  
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term ‘beautiful’. On the contrary, it seems that here ‘beautiful’ is not the subject 
but rather the predicate of the sentence. The most natural way to understand 
‘deciding the οὐσία of beautiful’ would be to take it as deciding the οὐσία of 
(the predicate) beautiful about something, i.e. deciding whether something is 
beautiful. This means that there is a shift between stage one and stage two: 
οὐσία at stage one is applied to the subject, and οὐσία at stage two is applied to 
the predicate. The copula reading has an answer to this objection as well.  
It is perfectly natural for Plato to reformulate the statement ‘x is F’ in both 
ways: as grasping ‘the being of F about x’ or grasping the ‘being of x in relation 
to F’. As Frede says:  
 
And it is easy to see how Plato could think this, given his views on being. 
For he assumes that any belief, explicitly or implicitly, is of the form 'A is 
F', and he thinks that in assuming that A is F one attributes being both to 
A and to F-ness. To assume that Socrates is just is, on this view, to 
attribute being to Socrates and to justice. (1987: 379)  
 
Thus there need not be any kind of shift in the meaning of the term οὐσία 
between stage one and stage two, even though ‘being’ is attached to the subject 
of the sentence in stage one and to a predicate in stage two. ‘Being’ is a Janus-
faced notion. A single thought can be rephrased in two different manners, and 
accordingly, grasping οὐσία can mean two different, but obviously related, 
things.  
 
Copula reading of οὐσία 
(a) Stage one: grasping the οὐσία of x indicates grasping x’s being (F), for 
example, the ability to form a belief that color is (salty);  
(b) Stage two: grasping the οὐσία of indicates grasping the being of F (about an 
unspecified x), for example, the ability to form a belief that beauty is (of or 
about the person). 
According to the copula reading ‘being’ is a necessary concept for any belief 
(inasmuch as for Plato every act of forming a belief is supposed to have a 
propositional structure). The general idea is expressed nicely by Bostock: ‘His 
argument is that in order to make any judgment one must grasp the notion of 
being, for every judgment involves this notion’ (1988: 128).  
 The role of οὐσία (as copula) in forming beliefs varies on different 
readings.102 I will briefly discuss three slightly different interpretations, which I 
                                                     
102  The differences among the defenders of the copula reading are greater than they 
themselves seem to acknowledge. For example, Fine (1993: 313) thinks she is following 
Burnyeat (1976) in claiming that grasping the copulative οὐσία is necessary for identifying 
the subject of the sentence. However, Burnyeat says that ‘the inability of perception to grasp 
being stems, we said, from an inability to frame even the simplest proposition of the form ‘x 
is F’. In his final proof that perception is not knowledge Plato is interested in the perfectly 
general point that true judgment involving the verb ‘to be’ is a necessary condition for 
knowledge’ (1976: 49). This means that Burnyeat is inclined to take being as necessary for 
connecting terms in a judgment rather than identifying the subject of a judgment. 
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will call ‘copula reading A’, ‘copula reading B’ and ‘copula reading C’, 
respectively.  
 
Copula Reading A (Bostock, Burnyeat): Grasping being is necessary for 
connecting a subject and a predicate in order form a full thought. 
According to Burnyeat (1976: 45) and Bostock (1988: 132), grasping οὐσία 
is necessary for forming any judgment that x is F – οὐσία simply connects a 
subject and a predicate. Neither of the two terms thus related in a proposition 
must be a general term (i.e. a ‘common’). However, οὐσία, expressed by ‘is’, 
that relates the terms, must be a general term (e.g. ‘this IS red’). The complexity 
of a proposition always involves generality (since being is a general notion).103 
According to this version of the copula reading, every judgment can be 
rephrased into a judgment involving the copula; e.g. ‘Theaetetus sits’ could be 
rephrased into ‘Theaetetus is sitting’ (or ‘there is a sitting Theaetetus’). Bostock 
argues that this is probably Aristotle’s view (see De Int. 12, 21B), and it could 
be attributed to Plato as well (1988: 132). 
 
Copula reading B (Fine, M. Frede): Grasping being (as copula) is necessary 
for identifying the subject and the predicate.  
According to this version of the copula reading, grasping being (as a copula) is 
necessary in order to identify the subject of a sentence or a thought. Fine says 
that:  
‘If I am to do more than merely perceive the color, but also make 
judgments about it, then I must be able to identify it as being something 
or other’. (Fine 1988: 25) 
 
The being involved in identification is οὐσία as a copula. For Fine, the ‘identi-
fication as’ is a mental preliminary of making judgments about anything. This 
‘identification as’ has a judgmental structure involving a copula and, therefore, 
grasping being as a copula becomes necessary for cognitive content. It seems 
that for Fine ‘being’ is not necessary for identifying something correctly (as 
what it is), but simply for representing something as something. M. Frede 
(1987) makes a similar proposal, but Frede seems to think that it is indeed 
necessary for identifying a thing correctly, before one can form a belief about 
this thing. According to Frede, (unlike Bostock and Burnyeat), it is in true 
beliefs that one grasps the being of F. In order to have true beliefs, the soul has 
to ‘settle the question of being correctly’ (1987: 380). However, Frede also 
maintains that in order to form a belief (full stop) the soul must have arrived at 
some idea of what it is to be something:  
                                                     
103 The position that Burnyeat and Bostock attribute to Plato is reminiscent of Russell’s 
position: ‘It will be seen that no sentence can be made up without at least one word which 
denotes a universal... Thus all truths involve universals and all knowledge of truths involves 
acquaintance with universals’ (Russell 1912/1953: 92). The difference is that, for Russell, 
hardness and softness would be universals, whereas hardness and softness do not count as 
commons for Plato. Universality in a proposition is due to the common of being. 
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To be able to form the belief that A is F, the mind has to have arrived at 
some idea of what it is to be for A and what it is to be for F-ness, or what 
it is to be for for an F, and it has to find out whether A is such as to be an 
F. (Frede 1987: 381)  
 
This seems to suggest that one needs to grasp being in order to form any beliefs 
at all, not just true beliefs. I am not sure how these two claims are to be 
connected. Frede might think that in order to have a belief (even a false one) 
about F, the soul needs to have true beliefs (‘settle the question of being 
correctly’) about F. He does not specify what precisely he has in mind with an 
expression like ‘some idea of what it is to be for A’ (see above quote). 
Presumably he does not mean knowing the essence of A, but grasping some 
(unspecified) minimal conditions required for forming beliefs involving A. Be 
that as it may, both Fine and Frede think that grasping the copulative being is 
necessary to identify (or identify as) the subject and the predicate of a given 
thought. Copula Reading A says that ‘being’ is required to connect the subject 
and a predicate to form a sentence. Copula reading B adds that ‘being’ is (also) 
required for identifying the subject and a predicate as being something. 
 
Copula reading C (Lorenz): Grasping being (as a copula) and sameness and 
difference is necessary for recognizing the predicate that is attached to the 
subject.  
 
To discern the being of (say) hardness with regard to something involves 
judging that the thing in question is hard, and being competent to judge 
whether something is hard requires some awareness of the opposition 
between hardness and softness. But any such awareness, indeed even any 
attempt to attain it, belongs to the soul’s independent activity. The same 
goes for attempting to find out that one perceptual feature is different 
from its opposite: difference, too, is a common feature that the soul 
investigates through itself. (Lorenz 2006: 90) 
 
According to Lorenz, to be able to form a belief ‘x is F’ one has to ‘discern’ the 
being of F. This is exactly what Frede says, but Lorenz adds that in order to do 
this the soul has to have a sufficient grasp of the intelligibles of sameness, diffe-
rence and opposition. In order to predicate (e.g.) hardness of something, one 
needs to recognize hardness for what it is, and this, in turn, requires application 
of sameness, difference and opposition. It is important that, according to Lo-
renz, ‘sameness’, ‘difference’ and ‘opposition’ do not have to figure in beliefs 
about sensible qualities as explicit terms. Rather, sameness and difference of 
sensible qualities are grasped implicitly, in order to enable predication of the 
terms that refer to these sensible qualities. Lorenz assumes that, for Plato, 
predication requires some awareness of what the property that is being 
predicated is.  
 Thus, the copula readings differ in details. On the one hand, οὐσία is taken to 
be a simple nominalization of the copula use of the verb ‘to be’. On the other 
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hand, most scholars (with the exception of Burnyeat) think that the copulative 
use of ‘to be’ enables successful recognition of the subject and the predicate of 
the sentence.104 That is to say, that the copulative οὐσία is required in order to 
recognize (‘identify as’) the terms figuring in the sentence (belief, thought) as 
what they are. Now, the answer to the ‘what is x?’ question is, in the Platonic 
language, ‘the essence of x’. Thus, the copula readings tend to assume that the 
aspect of οὐσία as ‘essence’ is also relevant to the argument. But unlike the 
defenders of the essentialist reading of οὐσία105, the grasp of ‘what x is’ is here 
not taken to be the cognitive goal of thinking about x, but rather as something 
that makes all thinking about x possible.  
 The above versions of the copula reading share one crucial assumption; 
namely, that the grasp of the copulative-essential οὐσία is a mental preliminary 
of all thinking and belief formation. According to all three copula readings, the 
soul has to grasp the intelligible ‘being’ in order to form beliefs. Therefore, all 
versions of the copula reading subscribe to (CA) about being. Most copula 
readings also rely on an unargued assumption that, for Plato, forming beliefs 
about F (predicating F, making judgments involving the term ‘F’) necessarily 
requires the ability to correctly identify106 or recognize ‘what F is’ or ‘what it is 
to be F’. Eventually I hope to show that although οὐσία in the Passage of the 
Commons can indeed plausibly be seen as combining all three (‘essentialist’, 
‘realist’ and ‘copulative’) aspects of the meaning of this difficult notion, the 
grasp of οὐσία should not be considered to be a mental preliminary, but rather 
as a goal of forming beliefs. That is to say, belief aims at correctly 
apprehending whether ‘x is F’ and for the correct apprehension that ‘x is F’ one 
is necessarily required to be able to identify or recognize ‘what F is’. However, 
it is a mistake to assume (as conceptualist reading does) that this ability is 
required in order to form beliefs tout court (true or false). 
 
  
                                                     
104 Even Bostock, who stoutly defends the view that being is simply the copula connecting 
the subject and predicate eventually slips into saying that applying words like ‘hard’ or 
‘salty’ (which presumably means nothing else than using the copula to connect terms for ‘x’ 
and ‘hard’ or ‘x’ and ‘soft’ to form a thought ‘x is hard’) requires ‘grasping the relevant 
similarities between all hard things and all salty things’ (Bostock 1988: 125). Therefore, 
Bostock also assumes that using ‘being’ as a copula somehow involves a successful 
recognition of the qualities that are being predicated using the copula as a connector. 
105 See, e.g. McDowell 1973, ad loc., or Silverman 1990. 
106 I am not certain whether this captures Fine’s position. All she says is that in order to 
make a judgment, one must identify the subject as being something. This does not 
necessarily mean that this identification has to be correct. One can identify X falsely as 
being Y, and still make a judgment about X. Frede and Lorenz would presumably say that in 
that case one is still required to identify Y as ‘what it is’. I am not certain whether Fine 
would agree. 
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2. Assessment of the Conceptualist Reading 
In this section I will argue that the conceptualist reading of being (and other 
commons) is unsatisfactory as an interpretation of the Passage of the Commons. 
‘Being’ as a copula enables the conceptualists to apply (CA) to οὐσία and, 
indirectly, to other commons. My assessment of the conceptualist reading will, 
consequently, take the form of assessing the copula readings of οὐσία. If the 
copula readings of οὐσία do not work, it is legitimate to infer that the fault lies 
within conceptualism in general. The problems I shall raise for copula readings 
are not new. However, I do not think that any of the solutions proposed in the 
literature proves to be satisfactory. The adherents of the conceptualist reading 
are either forced to ignore certain aspects of the text or saddle Plato with a 
theory of perception and belief that is quite implausible and not supported by 
what Plato says about perception and belief elsewhere.  
The first problem is that the text of the Passage of the Commons does not 
support the extremely narrow notion of perception attributed to Plato by the 
copula reading. The copula reading claims that perception cannot reach truth. 
What, then, is the contribution of perception to the cognitive life of the soul? If 
‘being’ is read as copula and perception does not attain being, then perception is 
non-cognitive, i.e. it does not have any representational content (otherwise it 
would have truth conditions and this means, on this account, that it could attain 
truth). This line of reasoning has been adopted by virtually all recent 
commentators who favour the copula-reading. Perception is taken to be ‘passive 
affection’ (Frede 1987: 382), ‘non-cognitive’ (Fine 1988: 26), ‘transaction of a 
determinate kind between the perceiver and certain items ‘out there’’ (Burnyeat 
1976: 50), non-judgmental ‘having of experiences’ (Bostock: 142), ‘non-cogni-
tive information’ (Silverman 1990: 160), etc. Since Plato himself is not overly 
precise concerning the scope of perception, the commentators understandably 
vacillate between perception as non-cognitive awareness of the proper sensibles 
(e.g. seeing red is like feeling pain) and perception as physical process.  
This interpretation of the scope of perception is problematic, since in 
summing up the results of stage one, Socrates says that one should distinguish 
between two kinds of things, and two corresponding means of access to these 
things: ‘there are some things (τὰ μὲν) which the soul itself considers 
(ἐπισκοπεῖν), by means of itself, and some (τὰ δὲ) which it considers by means 
of the capacities of the body’ (185E6–7). The most natural way to read this 
sentence is that the second activity mentioned is identical with perception,107 
whereas the first refers to an independent activity of the soul (such as thinking 
or forming beliefs). This suggests that the soul is active in perception and that 
perception does have cognitive content, i.e. the content that comes to the soul 
by means of the senses. It would be difficult to read the verb ‘consider’ 
(ἐπισκοπεῖν) as specifying some sort of non-cognitive mental state or simply 
physical movement (it is, after all, an activity of the soul). Further, at 185B9-C3 
                                                     
107 This is contested by Kanayama (1987).  
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Socrates implies that there are certain judgments that that the soul makes by 
means of a perceptual faculty, like ‘this is salty’.  
 A way to explain this can be found in Lorenz (2006: 77–78)108. Lorenz’s 
point is that the difference between stage one and two should be seen as 
dialectical: stage one shows that there are some features of things that are 
outside the scope of perception (but it allows for perception to make judgments 
and form beliefs). The goal of stage two is to point out that there are some 
features (being, difference and opposition) which are accessible only to the soul 
itself by itself. These features are necessary for forming all beliefs, including 
beliefs with the content ‘this is salty’. Thus stage two tacitly corrects the claims 
made at stage one. Even the activity of the soul ‘by means of the senses’ must 
include, minimally, the grasp of ‘being’, if it is to have any representational 
content. Thus, the defenders of the non-cognitive view about perception could 
maintain that Theaetetus only recognizes that perception is devoid of all content 
at the end of stage two. Thus, the claims made about perception at 185E6–7 do 
not express Plato’s own opinion. However, Lorenz’s solution is problematic for 
those who hold that perception is non-cognitive, because Socrates states 
explicitly that some things are considered by means of the body and some by 
the soul itself by itself, and even insists that this is what he (Socrates) also 
thinks (185E7–8). This is the only time in the Theaetetus where Socrates 
renounces his role as a barren midwife and it is difficult to maintain that he goes 
on to deny this very same point a few lines later. Thus, the first problem for the 
copula reading is that Plato does seem to take perception to have cognitive 
content, unlike the copula reading suggests. 
 Second, at least one version of the copula reading – Copula Reading A – 
commits Plato to a position that in a false beliefs soul is grasping οὐσία. I 
cannot find a single occurrence of the term οὐσία in the Platonic corpus where it 
is used in this sense. Even in the Sophist, where we are supposed to get the most 
elaborate account of being in Plato, the Eleatic Visitor is careful to point out 
that the false statement ‘Theaetetus flies’ is false because it says things that are 
different from the ‘things that are’ (263B3–9). Relatedly, the copula reading 
suggests that Socrates and Theaetetus are both aware that having beliefs 
involves a complex mental activity of predicating something about something. 
But ignoring this is precisely one of the reasons why the puzzles of falsity will 
arise. They will arise because Socrates ignores the complexity of thought. He 
says just a few Stephanus pages later: 
 
                                                     
108 Note that Lorenz himself does not think that perception is non-cognitive (2006: 76). He is 
is trying to explain why Socrates, at stage one, seems to indicate that perception can form 
simple judgments to the effect that ‘this is salty’. Lorenz’s point is that Theaetetus has not 
yet understood that ‘being’ is in fact apprehended in all judgments (and not only in 
judgments explicitly about being such as ‘color is’). This really is an excellent way to 
resolve this seeming inconsistency in the text. Lorenz’s solution cannot be appropriated by 
those who think that perception is non-cognitive, however, for reasons indicated in the text. 
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Well now, what if someone forms a belief? Doesn’t he have in his belief 
some one thing? And if one has in one’s belief some one thing, isn’t it the 
case that one has in one’s belief a thing which is? So if someone has what 
is not figuring in his belief, he has no one thing in his belief. But if one 
has nothing in his belief, one isn’t believing at all (ὅ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ 
παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει). (189A6-A12)  
 
It is obvious that Socrates takes judging/believing to be a kind of a direct grasp 
of its object. Why would this be if he and Theaetetus are so clear about 
thought’s propositional nature? The scholars usually do not address this 
problem, since they concentrate only on the Passage of the Commons and leave 
the second part of the Theaetetus out of consideration. Therefore, no serious 
solutions have been offered. Bostock (1988: 166–167), though, acknowledges 
that there is a problem: ‘So again it seems that the conclusion of the first part of 
dialogue [184–7] has been ignored’ (166–167). But he does not explain why 
propositional complexity should be ignored in this manner. Unless a reason for 
this is proposed, one is forced to conclude that propositional nature of belief 
was not the main point of the Passage of the Commons at all. Burnyeat admits 
that the paradox of ‘being and not being’ rests on the assumption that belief is 
not propositional:  
 
Precisely because there is a distinction between what a judgment is about 
and what is judged about it – a distinction with no parallel in perceiving 
or naming – there is a difference between judging what is not about 
something and judging without anything to judge. (1990:78) 
 
Since Burnyeat, too, thinks that the message of the Passage of the Commons is 
to point out that belief is propositional whereas perception is not, one would 
expect him to give a reason for Theaetetus’ sudden amnesia concerning this 
vital issue. But he simply says that the paradox is ‘grand fun’ (ibid.) and will be 
solved later on in the Sophist, and is silent as to why Theaetetus does not protest 
against Socrates’ treatment of belief as non-propositional.109 Now, an obvious 
                                                     
109 The puzzles of falsity can be (and have been) read as an indirect critique of Theaetetus’ 
second definition that knowledge is true belief (Fine 1979, Benson 1992). This is quite 
plausible in case of paradox of knowing and not-knowing (and the corresponding ‘other-
judging’ paradox). However, with the paradox of being and not-being things are more 
complex. Fine’s ‘acquaintance model’ (that she takes to be sufficient for the truth of 
Theaetetus’ second definition) explains only the paradoxes of knowing and not knowing. It 
does not help much to explain why Socrates ignores the propositional nature of belief in 
paradoxes of being and not-being. Benson reads the falsity puzzles as a straightforward 
reductio. According to Benson’s reading, the puzzle of knowing and not-knowing is 
generated by combining genuine Platonic principles about knowledge and belief with the 
false assumption that knowledge is true belief. That this results in a falsehood (false belief is 
impossible) shows that Theaetetus’ second definition is false. In that case, the characteristics 
attributed to true belief in the ‘being and not being paradox’ should really be characteristics 
of knowledge, and the paradox would arise because of the false identification of true belief 
with knowledge. True belief is taken to be a non-propositional direct grasp of its object (state 
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suggestion is that propositionality (and, consequently, being as copula) was not 
the issue at 184B–187A to begin with. From the fact that ‘being’ in Greek is a 
notion that implies complexity, reference, predication and propositionality, it 
does not follow that Plato explicitly recognizes it as implying all these things, 
and that he consequently takes the grasp of being to be identical with forming a 
complex thought. 
Third problem – and this is by far the most serious problem for all copula 
readings – arises from a consideration that the stage two connects mind’s 
independent activity, i.e. considering being, with quite demanding mental acti-
vities. Theaetetus says that in case of beauty, ugliness, goodness and badness 
‘the soul considers their being in relation to one another, calculating in itself 
things past and present in relation to things in the future’ (186A10-B1). Socrates 
adds that even in case of hardness and softness the soul itself by itself tries to 
judge the being and the oppositeness of hardness and softness and the being of 
this oppositeness ‘by reviewing them and comparing them with one another’ 
(186B8). Finally, Socrates says that the perceptual experiences are shared by all 
animals and humans, but  
 
the calculations about those things, with respect to being and usefulness 
(περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν), they’re 
acquired, by those who do acquire them, with difficulty and over a long 
time, by means of long troublesome education (διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων 
καὶ παιδείας). (186C2–5) 
 
The problem is the following: according to copula reading A, ‘being’ is a 
simple copula found in sentences ‘this IS hard’. According to copula readings B 
and C, ‘being’ refers to some minimal cognitive conditions for applying the 
concept ‘hard’. On all three versions of the copula reading, Plato is making the 
point that representing something as hard requires reviewing, comparing and 
calculating which, in turn, requires education. It is rather difficult to explain 
why Socrates would be inclined to think that using a copula requires such an 
amount of education. On most versions of conceptualism, 110  Plato makes 
concept-application necessary for perceptual content. If, for example, concepts 
are just discriminatory abilities,111 then this is perhaps a fairly good theory of 
                                                                                                                                  
of affairs), at 189A. If this is because of the equation of knowledge with true belief, then it 
seems that Plato takes knowledge to involve non-propositional direct grasp. However, in that 
case the message of 184B-187A cannot be that propositionality (or subject-predicate 
complexity) is a necessary condition for knowledge, as the copula reading claims.  
110 There are many interpretations that take Plato to be subscribing to some sort Kantian 
theory of perceptual content. The most influential recent interpretations include Burnyeat 
(1990: 62) and Kahn (1981: 121). However, the theory of ‘projecting concepts’ in perception 
was quite widespread already in later antiquity, see Sorabji (2005: 37–44). For a recent 
clearly argued case for Plato being a conceptualist about perception, see Silverman (1990; 
1991). 
111 Just like in some contemporary philosophers attribute concepts to (e.g.) bees. See, e.g., 
Carruthers (2009). 
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how perceptual experience works. But this is, in fact, not how concept-
application is understood by conceptualist readings of Plato. The above passage 
does not allow taking concept application in this non-demanding sense. Plato 
makes it clear that calculating in accordance with being requires education and 
is not even achieved by all humans (he says that calculations about being 
require education for ‘those who do acquire them’, implying that not everyone 
acquires the ability to calculate according to being). The copula reading sets the 
need for concepts on a very low level of cognition (the ability for perceptual 
representation), while at the same time setting high requirements for concept-
application.112  
All versions of the copula reading claim that propositional structure is, for 
Plato, necessary for representational content.113 This reading implies, then, that 
long and arduous education is necessary for the ability to represent anything as 
anything. This is quite problematic. First of all, it would follow that Plato 
commits himself to the view that animals do not perceptually represent their 
environment. Otherwise animals would ‘reach truth’ (their perceptual repre-
sentations could be correct), given that the notion of representation is defined by 
its truth-conditions114. Second, Socrates implies that not even all mature human 
beings are able to calculate according to being (186C5) (see esp. D. Frede 
(1989) on this point). This would have to mean that there are mature human 
beings who do not represent the world in any way (otherwise they would reach 
truth). Third, how is one supposed engage in παιδεία (education) if one cannot 
represent anything whatsoever? If there is no representational content, then one 
cannot come to acquire any truths during the process of education. It is usually 
thought that education and concept-acquisition proceeds from more simple 
representations towards more complex ones.115 Since ‘calculations according to 
being’ are, for the copula reading, results of education, and necessary conditions 
of all representation, the assumption is that ‘long and arduous education’ is 
                                                     
112 Conceptualism was a an orthodoxy (Smith 2002: 70) throughout the twentieth century, 
which help to understand why so many scholars of Plato have found the idea to make Plato 
into a conceptualist about cognition/perception, appealing. Many influential philosophers 
have defended a view that makes concept-possession necessary for perceptual 
representation; for one of the most recent examples, see McDowell (1994). Usually the agent 
who is representing reality perceptually has to be able to represent the conceptual aspect in 
experience independently of the particular perceptual situation. Burge (2010: 111–283) has a 
useful survey of most of the eminent philosophers who advocate views belonging to this 
family. He calls this family of views ‘Individual Representationalism’.  
113 With the exception of Lorenz, who claims that being is necessary for predication but also 
that there is ‘content’ below predication (2006: 76). As we have seen, Lorenz has a rather 
special notion of predication. 
114 One can deny that representation is defined by truth conditions in the above sense, and 
claim that, e.g. that the perceptual represenatation in animals is defined by correctness- or 
accuracy conditions. But in that case one should also offer an additional argument as to why 
correct perceptual representations in animals cannot be cases of knowledge. Plato offers no 
such argument.  
115 Carey (2009: 18) calls it a ‘truism that all learning involves building new representations 
from antecedently available ones’  
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necessary to represent anything. There has to be some miraculous threshold 
between non-representational states of children and the representational states 
of adults. First the child receives education (without representing anything, 
since she cannot use the copula) and then slowly acquires the conceptual 
apparatus for perceptual representation. It is difficult to attribute such a 
problematic position to Plato, unless there is evidence that he is committed to 
this position in other dialogues. As far as I know, there is not such evidence.  
There have been three main attempts to solve the ‘problem of education’.116 I 
will now show that they all fail. 
The first possibility is to say that Socrates changes the topic between stage 
one and stage two. For example, at the first stage Socrates and Theaetetus 
discuss being and other commons as they are grasped in our ordinary, humdrum 
and non-reflective beliefs or judgments. This seems to be licensed by Socrates’ 
claim that οὐσία and the rest of the commons are grasped whenever the soul 
applies a term designating them (185C4–7), i.e. (CA). At the second stage, 
however, Socrates changes gear. He and Theaetetus are not talking about our 
humdrum grasp of the commons but rather about reflective judgments about the 
commons. The point is that all human beings (and perhaps animals) are able to 
‘apply common concepts’, though not many are able to make them into an 
object of theoretical reasoning.117 
 
Since all thought is propositional, it requires the use of this common [i.e. 
being]. Since all normal adults think, all have access to being. Few, 
however, have reflected on the nature of this concept and even fewer still 
have acquired knowledge of it, i.e. can say what being is. The distinction 
applies to all concepts. (Silverman 1990: 169) 
 
However, nothing in stage two suggests that Socrates talks about some different 
relation of the soul to the common of being. There is nothing corresponding to 
Silverman’s ‘knowledge of the nature of the concept being’. Plato’s message at 
186B11-C5 cannot be that perception and knowledgeable grasp of being are 
different. Or else what is the point of the ensuing argument? Immediately after 
the crucial passage where Socrates says that ‘calculations according to being’ 
are difficult and require education, he goes on to suggest (186C7) that it is 
impossible to reach truth without reaching being. This must imply that 
‘reaching being’ and calculations according to being (186C3) are, or involve, 
the same kind of activity. Further, if Socrates discusses a completely different 
activity (reflective, philosophical) at stage two, then the crucial stretch of stage 
                                                     
116 The forth approach is simply to ignore that the problem exists. A star example of this 
approach is Burnyeat’s influential essay ‘Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving’ (1976). 
Burnyeat claims that grasping ‘being’ in judgments of the form ‘x is F’ is necessary for any 
sort of awareness and consciousness in general. He neglects to mention that it means to say 
that one needs a great deal of arduous education in order to be conscious. In fact he does not 
discuss the uncomfortable claims (for the copula reading) made by Plato at stage two in any 
depth. 
117 See also D. Frede 1989. 
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two (186A2-C5) would simply be redundant to the argument that perception 
does not reach being and truth.  
 The second solution is offered by Bostock: ‘Perhaps, then, the long and 
troublesome education that he refers to is the process of learning to talk. After 
all, it takes time and only humans can do it’ (1988: 124). According to his 
solution, forming propositions ‘x is F’ is indeed a very demanding activity, 
since it presupposes a command of language. A small, preliminary point (made 
by D. Frede 1989) against this solution is that since Socrates implies that not 
even all human beings are capable of calculations according to being (186C5), 
he has to be referring to learning-disabilities in humans. This is not very likely 
(Plato never refers to mature human beings who cannot speak) but it is at least 
possible. However, there are two more serious objections to Bostock’s solution.  
 First, the entire terminology used at stage two (ἀναλογιζομένη at 186A11; 
ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα at 186B8; ἀναλογίσματα at 186C3, παιδεία at 
186C4; ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ at 186D3) can hardly refer to simply 
language-learning and language-using, or attaching predicate to a subject. Plato 
never calls learning a language παιδεία. The term ἀναλογίσματα appears just in 
the target passage, but the related verb ἀναλογίζομαι is more common in Plato, 
but it always refers to making inferences and calculating (e.g. Rep. 524D), 
activities that are more complex and demanding than ‘framing a proposition’ or 
forming a sentence; συλλογισμός occurs only twice in the Platonic corpus: here 
and in the Cratylus (412 A-B) where it is connected to knowledge. The related 
verb συλλογίζομαι usually means118 ‘to draw a conclusion from an argument’ or 
‘to infer’119 and I have found no occurrence of συλλογίζομαι where it simply 
refers to connecting a subject to a predicate.120 Futher, it is difficult to see what 
calculations according to past and future (186B1) have to do with language 
learning or framing propositions. 
                                                     
118 See Robinson (1953: 21–22) 
119 For example, Philebus 41C or Gorgias 498E. The most demanding use of συλλογίζομαι 
can be found in a celebrated passage from the Republic: ‘Finally, I suppose, he’d be able to 
see the sun, not images of it in water or some alien place, but the sun itself, in its own place, 
and be able to study it. - Necessarily so. - And at this point he would infer and conclude 
(συλλογίζοιτο) that the sun provides the seasons and the years, governs everything in the 
visible world, and is in some way the cause of all the things that he used to see’ (Republic 
516 B–C). The case is similar with the verb ἀναλογίζομαι, it usually refers to quite 
demanding calculations. An example: ‘One needs to reflect (ἀναλογίζεσθαι) that wisdom 
and friendship, when stated to be the aim in view, are not really different aims, but identical’ 
(Leg. 693C). 
120 An interesting parallel (that no commentator I am aware of has mentioned) to the 
Theaetetus 186C can be found in the Cratylus. ‘The name ‘man’ (ἄνθρωπος) indicates that 
the other animals do not examine, or consider (ἐπισκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἀναλογίζεται), or look up at 
(ἀναθρεῖ) any of the things that they see, but man has no sooner seen—that is, ὄπωπε—than 
he looks up at and considers that which he has seen. Therefore of all the animals man alone 
is rightly called man (ἄνθρωπος), because he looks up at (ἀναθρεῖ) what he has seen 
(ὄπωπε).’ It is hard to say what force the ἐπισκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἀναλογίζεται carry here. Is Plato 
referring to propositional thought or some higher cognitive capacity?  
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Second, the theory of representational content attributed to Plato is dubious. 
The theory amounts to a claim that only linguistic creatures represent the world. 
Of course, it is possible that Plato thinks that one ought to learn language before 
one can perceptually represent anything. However, other than the supposed 
statement of the theory here, in the Passage of the Commons, there is no 
indication that Plato is inclined toward such a view. For example, in the 
Timaeus Plato describes the newly incarnated soul, i.e. the soul of an infant. 
Although the orbits of the soul are initially disfigured, the infant is clearly able 
to engage in representation (although she gets everything wrong): 
 
Whenever they encounter something outside of them as characterizable as 
same and different, they will speak (προσαγορεύουσα) of it as ‘the same 
as’ something or ‘different from’ something else when the truth is just the 
opposite, so proving themselves to be mislead and unintelligent. (43E1–
44A8) 
 
Plato probably does not think that that the newborn infants literally speak. He is 
likely to mean that the newborns attempt to identify and distinguish things, 
although they fail to do it successfully. They have not learned the language but 
yet they do represent the world. In the Timaeus, then, Plato does not take 
language to be necessary for representation. Admittedly, it is possible that Plato 
subscribes to a different theory in the Passage of the Commons, i.e. a theory that 
requires that one should go through long and arduous education in order to 
represent. But at the very least the Timaeus passage suggests that Plato is not 
committed to this dubious theory of perception. More precisely, the Timaeus 
suggests that the (rational) soul is active in perceptual representation, but not 
that this activity involves a successful grasp of the identity of what is 
predicated. Nor does it suggest that perceptual representation requires edu-
cation. It is also important that Timaeus does not call these (‘propositional’) 
representations beliefs. 
There is yet a further possibility to disarm the problem of education. This is 
offered by Lorenz (2006). According to Lorenz, to engage in predication the 
soul has to ‘recognize’ what it is to be hard and what it is to be soft. To do this, 
the soul has to recognize ‘that they are in fact two features’, ‘an inference from 
the observation that hardness is sometimes perceived without softness being 
perceived at the same time, and vice versa’, ‘that they are separate and different 
from one another’ etc. He concludes all these cognitive activities ‘involve a 
great deal of time and effort’ (Lorenz 2006: 91). In effect, Lorenz is here close 
to adopting the interpretation of οὐσία as essence. The ‘orthodox’ essence-
reading (Modrak 1981, McDowell 1973), however, differs from Lorenz’s in that 
grasping οὐσία is usually taken to be a cognitive goal and not the cognitive 
precondition of belief-formation. Lorenz thinks that in order to ‘predicate’ 
hardness of anything (form a thought ‘x is hard’) one has to ‘recognize’ a great 
deal about what hardness is. All these acts of recognition have propositional or 
88 
predicational form (‘that p’). Lorenz’s Davidsonian121 point is that in order to 
engage in simple predication one has to have a certain amount of true beliefs 
(including beliefs involving very abstract features) about this feature (e.g. 
hardness). 
There are two problematic points in Lorenz’s interpretation. First, as I noted 
in the previous chapter, Lorenz’s account of predication does not correspond to 
the way Plato conceives of predication. In the late dialogues (Sophist, Laws) he 
allows for someone who does not ‘recognize’ what F is to predicate F-ness of 
things (of course, this results in false beliefs). Plato indeed recognizes (e.g. 
Philebus 18C-D) that knowledge has a holistic character, but he never says that 
in order to hold a belief about something, one needs a network of inter-
connected true beliefs. Second, Lorenz’s interpretation of the crucial sentence at 
186B6–9 is dubious. Socrates says:  
 
But their [hardness and softness] being and that they are and their 
oppositeness to each other, and the being, in its turn, of this oppositeness, 
are things which the mind itself tries to decide for us, by reviewing them 
and comparing them with one another (Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὅτι ἐστὸν καὶ 
τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ 
ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν). 
(186B–9) 
 
The most natural way to read this sentence is to take Socrates to refer to 
cognitive activities in the increasing order of complexity. This is also the way 
Lorenz seems to understand this passage (Lorenz 2006: 87, n44). The mind 
starts with perceiving hardness (first level), then (second level) it tries to decide 
(‘discern’) the hardness about something (i.e. decide whether something is 
hard), then (third level) recognizes the difference between hardness and 
softness, and then (fourth level) predicates the opposition about hardness and 
softness (i.e. forms a belief that hardness is opposite to softness). Yet, when 
Lorenz tries to explain why predicating hardness is a difficult activity (requiring 
education, etc.) he suddenly claims that it is difficult, because it already 
presupposes the cognitive activity of predicating opposition. It is difficult to see 
how the cognitive activity of a lower (second) level presupposes a cognitive 
activity of a higher (fourth) level.  
                                                     
121 Davidson says: ‘As remarked above, there may be no fixed list of beliefs on which any 
particular thought depends. Nevertheless, much true belief is necessary. Some beliefs of the 
sort required are general, but plausibly empirical, such as that cats can scratch or climb trees. 
Others are particular, such as that the cat seen running a moment ago is still in the 
neighbourhood. Some are logical. Thoughts, like propositions, have logical relations. Since 
the identity of a thought cannot be divorced from its place in the logical network of other 
thoughts, it cannot be relocated in the network without becoming a different thought. 
Radical incoherence in belief is therefore impossible. To have a single propositional attitude 
is to have a largely correct logic, in the sense of having a pattern of beliefs that logically 
cohere’ (2001: 99). 
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Further, Lorenz translation of κρίνειν as ‘to discern’ seems dubious. In the 
Theaetetus Plato uses κρίνειν exclusively in the sense ‘to decide’ or ‘to judge’ 
or ‘to lay a verdict’ (comp. Tht. 150B and especially the defence-speech of 
Protagoras, at Tht. 166A–168D). In fact, it has been convincingly argued (Ebert 
1984) and that the sense of κρίνειν as ‘discern’ or ‘distinguish’ or ‘recognize’ in 
a cognitive (perceptual) context originates with Aristotle’s De anima. This is 
important, since it is much more difficult to take explicit ‘judging’ or ‘deciding’ 
the oppositeness of F as a mental preliminary for the ability to predicate F-ness. 
I conclude, therefore, that Lorenz’s account of predication is not the most 
natural reading of the text and it also seems to be internally inconsistent. These 
three options of dealing with the problem of education are the only available in 
the literature. None of the solutions is entirely satisfactory. 
I have claimed that reading ‘being’ as a copula is the strongest version of the 
conceptualist reading. Only this reading can account for why being is grasped in 
all thoughts involving the term ‘is’, i.e. it shows why (CA) applies to being, and 
it also gives Plato a good argument to the conclusion that perception is not 
knowledge (since it connects being with a reasonably mundane notion of truth). 
However, if the results of this section are correct, then the copula reading, and 
hence also conceptualism in general, faces serious problems. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that if there are viable alternatives to the conceptualist 
reading, the conceptualist reading should be abandoned.  
 
 
3. The Realist Reading 
In Chapter 4, Section 1, I will argue that οὐσία understood as reality is the best 
possible reading of οὐσία. According to this reading, Plato is saying in the 
Passage of the Commons that determining how things are (‘out there’, so to 
speak) is necessary and sufficient for ‘attaining truth’. In this section I will take 
a quick look at the versions of the ‘realist readings’ proposed in current 
scholarly literature. I conclude that realism about οὐσία cannot be defended if 
one accepts (CA) about commons, and suggest that since the realist reading is 
the best reading of οὐσία, (CA) should be abandoned. 
Οὐσία understood as reality has been defended by several scholars (‘reality’ 
and ‘existence’ in Cooper (1970) or ‘objectivity’ in Gerson (2004) or ‘fact’ in 
Kanayama (1987), or ‘So-sein’ in Heitsch (1987)). The copula reading main-
tains that οὐσία has to be taken in the formal mode of speech, as referring to the 
concept ‘being’ that one has to grasp in order to engage in thinking. ‘Attaining 
being’, understood in this sense, is necessary for ‘hitting on truth’ (since all 
truths require propositional structure), but not sufficient (since there are false 
propositions). But οὐσία can also be taken in the material mode referring to 
actual things and properties ‘out there’. Here οὐσία would mean reality, not the 
concept of ‘reality’. Plato’s argument would then be that perception is not 
knowledge because it does not attain being in the sense objectivity, i.e. it does 
not attain how things are in the mind-independent world. ‘Attaining οὐσία’ 
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would thus be both necessary and sufficient for ‘hitting on truth’. This reading 
fits well with the claim of some scholars that for Plato the verb ‘to be’ always 
carries the implication of ‘being real’ (see Szaif 1998: 344–356), and that the 
purely formal notion of copula as a connector of subject and predicate 
originates with Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 3 (Szaif 1998: 462).122  
Now, the realist reading conflicts with (CA) because being in the sense of 
reality (i.e. in the sense of how things objectively are) is not grasped in all 
thoughts involving the term ‘is’. This is so because there are thoughts and 
beliefs that are false. In a similar manner, the thoughts and beliefs involving the 
terms ‘same’ and ‘beautiful’ do not involve the grasp of the corresponding 
commons, if a belief such as ‘x is beautiful’ is false. I will argue that the only 
way to maintain the realist reading of the Passage of the Commons is to deny 
that (CA) applies to the commons.  
To set out the main idea of the realist reading more clearly, it is helpful to 
appeal to Charles Kahn’s distinction between the syntactic and semantic role of 
the verb ‘to be’. Kahn argues that the syntactic role of the verb is its role as a 
copula, whereas a semantic use of the verb is an ‘expression of extra-linguistic 
reality’ and ‘includes existence for subjects, instantiation for predicates, and 
truth or occurrence for the sentence as a whole’ (2009: 10). In other words, the 
syntactic role of the verb ‘to be’ is a linguistic copula that connects the noun to 
the verb thus creating a sentence (or a thought). The verb in its semantic role, on 
the other hand, connects the subject (the extra-linguistic object) to a predicate 
(the property), expressing that a given property really belongs to the object in 
question. It implies the actual existence 123  of the object designated by the 
subject term and instantiation of the property designated by a predicate term. 
The copula reading insists that being should be construed in its syntactic role. 
However, it is also possible to focus on the verb ‘to be’ in its semantic role. 
Thus, the notion of ‘grasping being’ at stage one and at stage two would 
correspond, according to the realist reading, to the following two claims: 
 
Realist reading: 
(a)  Stage one: grasping the οὐσία of x indicates correctly apprehending a state 
of affairs of x being (F). For example, the ability to apprehend whether 
color is in fact (salty). 
(b)  Stage two: grasping the οὐσία of F indicates correctly apprehending a state 
of affairs of F being (about x). For example, the ability to apprehend 
whether beauty is in fact (about the person). 
Note that the realist reading also assumes that the complete use allows for a 
possible addition of the predicate, preserving the ‘overdetermination’ of the 
verb ‘to be’ (see Section 1 of this chapter). Therefore, ‘being’ in its semantic 
                                                     
122 Although it is plausible that for Aristotle, too, the copula has some existential import. 
See, esp., Bäck (2000: 11–31), who provides further references. 
123  Thus, ‘exists’ expresses that an object is part of extra-mental reality. Imaginary, 
intentional, or intralingusitic objects might not exist in this sense. Szaif (2003: 35) calls this 
the ‘positional’ use of the term ‘exists’. 
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role is not equivalent to the notion of ‘existence’. Burnyeat (1976) was the first 
to notice that at 185C9 it is claimed that being and not-being are common to 
everything. If being is rendered as ‘existence’, this would lead to an absurd 
consequence that non-existence is common to all things. But being in its 
semantic role also comprises instantiation (and not merely existence). Thus 
Theaetetus’ claim at 185C9 can be understood simply as stating that not-being 
is common to everything since (i) every F is not since it is not instantiated by 
some things and (ii) every x is not since there is some property F that x does not 
instantiate (thus ‘not-being’ attaches both to the object and the property). 
The difference between the conceptualist and realist readings is that the 
former appeals to the concept ‘being’, necessary for the complex structure of 
thought, whereas the latter takes οὐσία to be expressing objectivity (states of 
affairs or facts in the world). It certainly seems more natural to read the 
argument at stage two as referring to reality – to how things really, actually are. 
According to the realist reading, the argument at stage two shows that soul, in 
‘reasoning and calculating’, tries to find out whether abstract properties like 
sameness or beauty (186A2-B1) or perceptual properties like hardness (186B2–
9) really apply to unspecified objects, i.e. whether these objects ‘have reality’ in 
each particular case. In other words, Socrates does not use οὐσία to refer to a 
copula enabling predication (or propositional content) but rather to facts and 
states of affairs in the world. His point is that perception cannot determine how 
things are, for that one has to engage in reasoning and calculations. The realist 
reading, so conceived, stands in diametrical opposition to the conceptualist (or 
semantic) reading, nicely summed up by Bostock: 
 
For it is clear that that theory is an attempt to explain how we understand 
the propositions which employ such notions; it is not designed to tell us 
how we can sometimes know that they are true (Bostock 1988: 124, 
author’s emphasis) 
 
The realist reading reverses Bostock’s claim: Plato is not making a point about 
understanding (or about ‘perceptual content’). Rather, he is saying that 
determining how things are requires independent work of the soul (comparing, 
calculating). Plato’s point is epistemological rather than semantic. ‘Attaining 
being’ is a goal of forming beliefs, not its precondition. And attaining being 
requires reasoning and calculating.  
When Socrates says at 186B11 it is necessary to compare and review the 
past and future when determining the οὐσία of (e.g.) goodness, this means that it 
is necessary to compare and review the past and future to determine whether 
(e.g.) a person is (really) good, i.e. whether ‘goodness is’ (in regard to or about 
a person or a law). This helps to explain why grasping being of goodness 
requires education and involves ‘reviewing and comparing’, for it is intuitively 
clear that to determine whether or not someone is really good is much more 
difficult than forming a simple thought that a given person is good. Second, the 
realist reading does not commit Plato to the view (otherwise unattested in the 
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dialogues) that being is grasped in false beliefs. According to copula reading A 
(defended by Bostock and Burnyeat), being is grasped in every thought that 
involves a copula (either explicitly or implicitly). According copula readings B 
and C (defended by Fine, Frede and Lorenz), being is grasped in every belief, 
since being is necessary for recognizing the feature ‘as what it is’ in order to 
engage in predication. This is where the realist reading is importantly different – 
being is not grasped in all beliefs, but only in beliefs that conform to reality. 
This means that, in the final argument, grasping being in the sense of reality is 
not only necessary for truth (as it is on the conceptualist reading) but sufficient 
for it as well. Realist reading explains stage two of the argument very well. 
Furthermore, the realist reading explains another peculiar feature of stage two.  
Namely, Theaetetus says that soul ‘yearns after’124 (ἐπορέγεται, 186A4–5) 
being of sameness and difference, beauty and ugliness. Socrates adds that also 
in the case of hardness and softness the soul is ‘trying to’ (κρίνειν πειρᾶται) 
decide the being (of hardness and softness) and the being of sameness and 
difference (of hardness and softness) (186B6–9). It is difficult to make sense of 
these claims on the conceptualist reading. On this reading, grasping the being of 
hardness is a matter of forming a belief that ‘x is hard’, and grasping the being 
of beauty means forming a belief ‘x is beautiful’. But in what sense is the soul 
trying to grasp something that must be already grasped in order to form a 
belief? Is the soul trying yearning after the concept ‘being’? It is more natural to 
take οὐσία as reality or instantiation of properties of beauty and hardness. The 
soul is trying to find out whether something is really beautiful, whether it is 
really soft, just as the realist reading suggests. In order to determine whether a 
given property (be it a common or perceptual property) ‘has reality’, the soul 
needs to determine whether sameness and difference are instantiated (whether a 
property of e.g. hardness is same or different as the property of softness). Again, 
this is a goal of belief formation, not its precondition. Not all beliefs reach this 
goal (especially not false beliefs). Therefore, the commons are not 
‘apprehended’ or ‘grasped’ in all beliefs.  
Nonetheless, the realist reading has problems of its own 125 . The main 
problem for the realist reading is that the commons – especially being – when 
introduced at stage one, are very much like concepts. This means that being is 
grasped in every thought involving the term ‘is’. Of course, this is what 
commons should be if one supports the copula reading of being. However, for 
the realist reading the conceptualist assumption creates a serious problem, since 
reality is not grasped in all thought involving the term ‘is’. In fact, as I will 
                                                     
124 See Kanayama (1987:39), who argues that this is the right translation of ἐπορέγεται (and 
not ‘apprehend’ as in Cornford’s translation). 
125  Another problem is that it is difficult to determine what perception can accomplish 
assuming that it does not attain being in the sense of reality. Is perception confined to 
appearances? Can it make simple judgments like ‘this is red’? I will return to this problem in 
the following chapter (Section 3). To anticipate, my solution to this problem will be to deny 
that the Passage of the Commons aims at presenting a theory of perception at all. 
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argue, the realist reading of being cannot be consistently maintained if one 
accepts the conceptualist assumption. 
The problem for the realist reading is the following. If οὐσία is grasped in all 
thoughts involving the word ‘is’ (185C5), then οὐσία cannot mean reality, since 
reality is not grasped in all thoughts involving ‘is’ as a term. Reality (not 
‘reality’) is not a concept; it is the world out there. The defenders of the realist 
reading have offered unsatifactory answers to this problem. Consider, for 
example, Gerson’s answer:  
 
Thus, I interpret ta koina in contrast to ‘private’ or ‘unique’ terms (ta 
idia). That the mind attains universals or common predicates is just an 
irrelevant point. It is objectivity, not universality that is germane. (Gerson 
2004: 207–8)  
 
Problems with Gerson’s proposal are the following. First, although τὰ κοινά can 
be translated as ‘public’ properties (as mind-independent features shared 
between perceivers), the commons are not introduced as properties of things 
that are common for more than one perceiver. Plato says that the commons are 
common to the things perceived (185B4). Otherwise it would be a complete 
mystery why the commons could not be perceived. The whole argument 
requires that the commons are shared by the proper sensibles of different senses. 
Plato never hints that it is the common objective world that is ‘germane’ to the 
argument. Secondly, if the commons are by definition features of mind-
independent world, then it is not at all clear why Plato should focus on οὐσία at 
stage two and not just any other common. Gerson simply denies without 
argument that (CA) is of any relevance to the text. However, there are passages 
motivating (CA) – esp. 185B7–9 and 185C4–7 –, and these passages play an 
important role in the argument for the conclusion that commons are not 
sensible.  
Another defender of the realist reading, Kanayama (1987: 67), affirms that 
the commons at stage one are grasped each time one entertains a thought. 
However, Kanayama distinguishes between the act of entertaining a thought 
(stage one) from the act of ‘considering’ (stage two). Considering becomes 
central at stage two and involves trying to find out the facts, that is, how things 
really are. His interpretation suggests that being functions as a concept (copula) 
at stage one and as ‘facts’ (reality) at stage two. I do not find this convincing. 
The problem is that this would make the argument equivocate on ‘being’. The 
concept ‘being’ and the world out there are two very different things. If Plato 
would argue from the imperceptibility of the first to the imperceptibility of the 
second, he would need additional premises to show how the two are connected. 
Second, the question becomes which one of these meanings of the expression 
‘being’ Plato has in mind in the final part of the argument? In light of these 
complications, I believe that Kanayama cannot consistently ascribe (CA) to 
Plato at stage one, and then argue that οὐσία means objectively obtaining states 
of affairs or facts at state two. 
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The same problems affect Cooper’s (1970) reading. According to Cooper, 
stage one makes a point that the application of some concepts (the commons) is 
beyond the power of sense perception. However, just like Kanayama, Cooper126 
affords a special place to the common being (which he takes to mean 
‘existence’). Perception does not reach ‘existence’ since it only grasps how 
things appear:  
 
On this interpretation the failure of perception to grasp the οὐσία of its 
objects would be taken to mean that in perception one notices only the 
color (etc.) a thing appears to have and says nothing about what its real 
color is. As I remarked above, οὐσία is an undifferentiated concept of 
being; but it seems naturally interpreted in this passage (at, e.g., 185a9) as 
expressing existence. To judge that a color exists one must engage in the 
kind of calculation of past and present perceptions with a view to the 
future which Theaetetus mentions in connection with judgments of value; 
and just as Plato insists that judgments of value imply the existence of 
objective standards which experts constantly use to guide their thought, so 
one must be guided by objective standards in saying how things in the 
world are. This is the work not of perception but of reflective judgment. 
(Cooper 1970: 373) 
 
‘Existence’, at stage one, is taken by Cooper to be a ‘concept’ that is applied to 
the proper sensibles (see, esp. Cooper 1970: 371). At stage two, however, 
Cooper takes ‘existence’ to mean how things are (as opposed to how they 
appear). It is clear from the above quotation that Cooper does not have in mind 
a simple application of the concept ‘existence’ but rather the correct application 
of the concept of ‘existence’, which involves determining whether color really 
is (about or of something) or whether beauty really is (about or of something). 
Otherwise it would be hard to understand why the application of the concept 
‘existence’ (using it in forming a sentence or a belief) is more difficult and 
requires ‘objective standards’ than the application of the concept ‘appears’. In 
fact, some have argued that possessing the concept ‘appears’ already pre-
supposes the grasp of the concept ‘is’.127 Further, why does it take education 
and inference-making and taking into account past and future in order to apply 
the concept of ‘existence’ to color, i.e. to think ‘color exists’? Thus, it seems 
that for Cooper it is not the kind of ‘concepts’ that are applied to perception that 
                                                     
126 Actually, this is only one of the two interpretations that Cooper considers. The other 
interpretation is the familiar conceptualist reading, which insists that perception does not 
make any judgements, because to does not ‘have access’ to being as a copula. However, in 
the end Coopers prefers the realist reading (Cooper 1970: 373–375). 
127 ‘Thus, when I say ‘X looks green to me now’ I am reporting the fact that my experience 
is, so to speak, intrinsically, as an experience, indistinguishable from a veridical one of 
seeing that x is green. Involved in the report is the ascription to my experience of the claim 
'x is green'; and the fact that I make this report rather than the simple report ‘X is green’ 
indicates that certain considerations have operated to raise, so to speak in a higher court, the 
question 'to endorse or not to endorse.' I may have reason to think that x may not after all be 
green.’ (Sellars 1997: 39) 
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matter, but rather the features of the world that they capture – in comparing and 
reviewing the soul captures things as they really are, whereas in perception it 
stays on the level of what appears. Therefore, Cooper has switched (without an 
argument) from the application of the concept ‘existence’ to grasping how 
things really are (Cooper 1970: 373). Cooper does not offer any justification as 
to why he suddenly shifts form ‘existence’ as a concept to ‘existence’ as reality. 
He seems to assume that (CA) applies to the term ‘being’ at stage one but seizes 
to apply to it at stage two, i.e. that ‘being’ has different meanings in the course 
of the argument.  
Now, Gerson, Kanayama and Cooper could, in principle, argue that without 
the concept of οὐσία (i.e. without οὐσία in taken in the formal mode of speech) 
the soul cannot ‘attain’ οὐσία in the material mode of speech, i.e. reality. In that 
case the argument in the Passage of the Commons would not straightforwardly 
equivocate on ‘being’. However, there is a problem with this suggestion. It is 
not the way Socrates argues. He does not indicate that the meaning of οὐσία is 
importantly different between stage one and stage two of the argument. Of 
course, one could maintain that Plato simply confuses these two meanings of 
οὐσία. This is Kahn’s position. 
 
We must recognize that Plato does not always sharply distinguish between 
οὐσία as reality, or being-so in the world, and ousia as content of a 
description of reality, the being-so in a truth claim. He seems to slide here 
(in pros ousias at 186C3) from the intentional to the objective being-so, 
just as he sometimes slips from knowing or saying of what-is that it is (hos 
esti intentionally understood) to knowing or saying it as it is (hos esti 
objectively understood). (Kahn 1981: 126) 
 
Kahn adds that the need for drawing this distinction in the context of the 
Passage of the Commons is not obvious. However, one could argue that 
representing reality (being objectively understood) does not presuppose having 
the concept of reality (being ‘intentionally’ understood)128. If this is true then 
Plato’s argument would be fallacious. Be that as it may, the problem is that in 
any case an important part of stage two of the argument (186A1–186C6) is not, 
on Kahn’s construal, strictly speaking relevant. The conclusion of stage one 
(that the concept being is not perceptible or not applied by means of the senses) 
suffices for the argument (186C7-E12) to reach its conclusion. It is not at all 
obvious why Plato sees it necessary to emphasize that it is difficult to attain 
being in the sense of objective reality between the end of stage one and the final 
conclusion. In addition, in the text Socrates and Theaetetus infer from the claim 
that it takes education and reasoning to ‘attain being’ of even perceptual 
properties like hard and soft (οὐσία as reality) to the claim that οὐσία and truth 
are always grasped in reasoning (συλλογισμῷ, 186D3) and not in perceptual 
affections (παθήματα, 186C2, 186D2). This inference would not be licensed if 
οὐσία is ‘intentionally’ understood in the final argument. But if οὐσία in the 
                                                     
128 This is position is defended by Burge 2010.  
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final stage of the argument should be taken as reality, then the first stage would 
be redundant. Thus it seems best to assume that οὐσία has the same meaning 
throughout stage one and stage two. 
 Thus, the main problem that affects all the realist readings lies in the difficulty 
of connecting stages one and two, because Plato’s use of the term οὐσία is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, he seems to suggest that being is grasped in all 
thoughts involving ‘is’ as a term. On the other hand he suggests that ‘attaining 
being’ requires education and reasoning. If it is possible to read the Passage of 
the Commons so that Plato is not made to confuse the two uses of οὐσία, this 
reading should be preferred. I think that my arguments against the copula 
reading show that it is quite difficult to import being as a copula into stage two. 
This leaves just one option. Stage one must, if possible, be interpreted so that 
Plato is not committed to (CA), despite appearances. Only then would we avoid 
attributing to Plato the confusion between what it takes to form beliefs tout 
court and what it takes to form true beliefs. So the question becomes – is it 
possible to read stage one in a way that does not commit Plato to (CA)? Can the 
claims made at 185C4–7 and 185B7–9, usually taken to imply (CA), be read in 
a different manner? In the next chapters I will argue this is indeed an option, if 
one takes into account the specific features of Socratic method. 
 
I have argued in this chapter that the standard account of why belief becomes a 
rational capacity for later Plato depends on one particular interpretation of the 
Passage of the Commons, namely conceptualism. Conceptualism is committed 
to (CA), according to which, in ordinary thinking and belief-formation, the soul 
stands in a cognitive relation to the common features of things. I argued that 
conceptualism does not provide a satisfactory interpretation of the Passage of 
the Commons. This means that the passage does not have to be taken to support 
the standard account of the rationality of belief.  
I also presented an alternative to conceptualism – the realist reading. How-
ever, the current versions of realist readings prove inadequate because they, too, 
accept (CA). Thus, I concluded that the realist reading of Passage of the 
Commons can only be defended if (CA) is abandoned. The task of the next 
chapter is to place the Passage of the Commons in its dialectical context, in 
order to show that Plato is not committed to (CA). Only then will I return to the 
problem of rationality of belief. In the final chapter I hope to show that on the 
realist reading the Passage of the Commons contains an alternative to the 
standard account of the rationality of belief. 
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CHAPTER THREE.  
Socratic Midwifery and Perception 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Plato’s notion of ‘being’ (οὐσία) in the 
Passage of the Commons presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the passage 
seems to commit Plato to the conceptualist position about commons, especially 
the common being. According to conceptualism, the common being that is 
grasped in all thoughts involving, either implicitly or explicitly, is the copula 
‘is’. Thus, ‘being’ should be understood as a nominalization of the copula use of 
εἶναι. On the other hand, a significant portion of the passage (186A–C) suggests 
that ‘being’ refers to ‘reality’, i.e. the way things are independently of the 
thinking mind. This ambiguity in the meaning of the term ‘being’ forces us to 
accept either the conceptualist or a realist reading of the Passage of the 
Commons. The conceptualist reading leaves Plato with a dubious theory of 
perception, which is not attested in other dialogues. It also fails to explain 
certain significant features of the second stage of the passage. The realist 
reading, on the other hand, either attributes Plato an invalid argument or makes 
a portion the second stage of the passage redundant. The solutions presented in 
the literature to this dilemma are inadequate. Since, for Plato, the notion 
forming beliefs is closely connected to the notion of οὐσία, it becomes difficult 
determine what is Plato’s conception of belief in the Theaetetus 184B–187A. 
In this chapter, I will take some preliminary steps towards a solution to this 
dilemma, and, consequently, towards the clarification of Plato’s notion of belief 
in the Theaetetus. I will argue that the seriousness of this problem can be 
minimized by taking into account Socrates’ method of intellectual midwifery, 
which plays an important role in the Passage of the Commons. I will argue that 
a crucial feature of Socratic midwifery is its dependence on interlocutor’s 
beliefs. Socrates sometimes uses, as premises of arguments, beliefs that he 
himself (or Plato) does not hold. This is especially so with deep-seated 
assumptions that remain on the background of the discussion, assumptions that 
the interlocutor is not aware of making. The most important background-
assumption of the first part of the Theaetetus is that all human cognition 
(including beliefs) is perception-like, i.e. it involves a direct grasp of its objects. 
This helps to explain why Theaetetus, at stage one of the Passage of the 
Commons, assumes that the soul grasps being and other commons simply by 
entertaining a thought involving the relevant terms. 
 
1. Socratic Midwifery 
At the beginning of the Passage of the Commons Socrates makes the following 
statement: ‘What we must do is to try, by means of my midwifery, to deliver 
Theaetetus of what he had conceived on the subject of knowledge’ (184B1–3). 
Socrates stresses that the method he is following is that of midwifery (μαιευτικῇ 
τέχνῃ). In the course of the dialogue (157C-D, 161A-B, 184B, 210B–C) 
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Socrates refers several times to his initial self-description as a midwife of souls 
(148E7–150D4). It seems safe to assume that Plato intends the metaphor of 
midwifery to give the reader a hint as to what methodology Socrates uses in the 
discussion with Theaetetus. Hence, to give an adequate reading of the Passage 
of the Commons, it is important to take a closer look at what Plato means by the 
notion of Socratic midwifery. 
The notion of ‘midwifery’ is introduced immediately after Theaetetus has 
expressed his puzzlement towards defining knowledge. On the one hand, he 
does not think he is capable of saying anything adequate on the matter. But at 
the same time, he ‘can’t stop worrying about it either’ (148E3–5). Socrates then 
explains to Theaetetus that he is actually pregnant and in labour, and there 
follows the famous self-description of Socrates as an intellectual midwife 
(149A–151D).129 Socrates starts by singling out the characteristics of regular 
midwives, and then proceeds to show how some of them apply to him as an 
intellectual midwife. Regular midwives have the following characteristics: (i) in 
order to be a midwife, the woman has to be past the age of childbearing herself 
(in honour of the virgin-goddess Artemis); (ii) the midwives cannot be barren 
women, since they must have childbearing experience; (iii) they recognize best 
who is pregnant and who is not; (iv) they can (by singing incantations and 
giving drugs) bring on the pains of labour and make them milder, and bring 
about birth and miscarriage, (v) they are the best of match-makers.  
Socrates’ intellectual midwifery shares these characteristics with regular 
midwives (only, of course, in relation to souls rather than to bodies). Socrates 
claims that he can tell who is intellectually pregnant and who is not, he is good 
at intellectual matchmaking and he can make the birth easier and harder. Just 
like regular midwives, Socrates himself is not capable of doing what some of 
his interlocutors can; namely, giving birth to intellectual children. There are two 
major differences between Socrates and the regular midwives. First, Socrates is 
able to tell whether the intellectual child of the interlocutor is genuine or just a 
phantom, i.e. whether it is true or false (150C, 161A). Second, Socrates himself 
has never given birth to intellectual children, he is intellectually barren. ‘God 
compels me to be a midwife, but has prevented me from giving birth.’ (150C9-
D1) Socrates’ ability to test the intellectual offspring of his interlocutors and his 
intellectual barrenness are the most important features of Socratic midwifery. It 
will prove useful to discuss these features in greater detail before returning to 
the Passage of the Commons. 
The feature that is particularly relevant in the context of the Passage of the 
Commons is Socrates’ intellectual barrenness. The terms ‘Socratic ignorance’ 
and ‘Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge’ have long ago become a common 
                                                     
129 There is a discussion whether the historical Socrates saw himself as a midwife. However, 
since Plato makes Socrates say that he has kept his midwifery ‘a secret’ (149A) it seems 
reasonable to assume that it is Plato’s invention. For some discussion, see Burnyeat (1977). 
In what follows, whenever I refer to ‘Socrates’, I mean Socrates as a character in Plato’s 
dialogues (especially the Theaetetus) and not the historical Socrates. 
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currency in the scholarship. Perhaps the most famous expression of Socratic 
ignorance is found in Socrates’ speech in the Apology:  
 
So I withdrew and thought to myself: ‘I am wiser than this man, it is likely 
that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows 
something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I 
think I know’ (ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ 
οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι). (Ap. 21D)  
 
Similar pronouncements of Socratic ignorance are found in other passages of 
the early dialogues.130 It is well known that Socratic ignorance in the early 
dialogues allows for a variety interpretations. Does Socrates disavow all kinds 
of knowledge but yet take himself to be in possession of non-trivial true beliefs, 
as some have suggested (Irwin 1995: 28–29)? Or does he disavow just one kind 
of knowledge, e.g. ‘the divine knowledge’ or ‘certain knowledge’, and yet 
accepts that he has knowledge in some weaker sense, e.g. eristic knowledge 
(Vlastos 1994: 39–67)? Or is he a genuine sceptic, like some of the ancients 
thought (Sedley 1996)? There is no scholarly consensus on these matters when 
it comes to early dialogues and the situation with the Theaetetus is no different. 
The professions of ignorance in the Theaetetus can be read so as to ac-
commodate all these possibilities. It would be a mistake, however, to treat 
Socratic ignorance in the Theaetetus as being on par with the claims made in 
Plato’s earlier dialogues. It is unlikely that Plato subscribed to some unitary 
interpretation of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge throughout his career.131 
The pertinent question is, rather, what the midwife-metaphor is intended to 
convey in the Theaetetus.  
In the Theaetetus, too, Socrates expresses his ignorance in slightly different 
ways. He says that he is ‘unproductive of wisdom (ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας)’132 
(150C4), or that he does not ‘know anything of that kind [i.e. what the ‘wise 
know’] (157C7-D1), or that he is ‘someone with no knowledge (ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ 
ἀνεπιστήμονι)’ (179B2–3). He says that he is ‘not entirely wise’ (150D1)133. He 
professes to have a τέχνη, e.g. ‘have you heard that I practice the same craft 
                                                     
130 See, e.g., Ap. 20C, 21D, 23B, Charm. 165 B–C; 166C-D, Euth.5A–C 15C, 15E–16A, 
Lach. 186B, 188C-E, 200E, Lys. 212A, 223B4, H.Maj. 286C-E; 304D-E, Gorg.506A, 509A, 
Meno 71A, 80C-D, Rep. 337E, Symp. 216D.  
131 ‘As a matter of fact I doubt that any one interpretation will work for all the Socratic 
dialogues, if only because Plato himself may have had considerable trouble deciding just 
what spin to put on Socrates' disavowal. He probably suspected at times that Socrates knew 
more than he let on, and his tendency—which increased dramatically in his middle period—
to put solid doctrines in Socrates' mouth could well be a measure of that suspicion. But this 
can be a matter for little more than speculation. What we might more usefully do is ask what 
spin Plato was putting on his master's disavowal of knowledge at the time of writing the 
Theaetetus.’ (Sedley 2004: 31, author’s emphasis).  
132 All the translations of the Theaetetus are McDowell’s (1973), with some amendments. 
133 That this is likely the correct translation of the expression οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός is argued in 
Sedley 1996. 
100 
[midwifery]?’ (149A4–5). This craft involves that Socrates is ‘able to get an 
argument from someone else, who’s wise, and to accept it in proportion to its 
merits’ (161B4–5). So, Socrates does not disclaim all knowledge; what he 
seems to be saying is that his knowledge is limited to the craft (τέχνη) of 
midwifery.134 As the argument at 146D–147C shows, he takes the notion of 
τέχνη to imply the notion of knowledge. Therefore, Socrates of the Theaetetus 
does not lack knowledge altogether. Socrates also seems to hold his fair share of 
beliefs and to express these beliefs in assertions. These include mundane 
beliefs, e.g. Socrates believes Theaetetus is the son of Euphronius (144C). He 
also has some moral beliefs and he makes some moral assertions to the effect 
that younger people should not disobey older and wiser people (146C). Yet he 
says that he does not make any ‘pronouncements about anything’, since he does 
not have knowledge (αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν 
ἔχειν σοφόν) (150C). How should one reconcile these seemingly contradictory 
claims?  
All claims of ignorance in the Theaetetus (with the exception of 179B2–3) 
belong to the context where Socrates is explaining his approach to the discus-
sion with Theaetetus. Unlike in the Apology, he does not claim that his re-
cognition of ignorance is somehow morally important (although he does not 
deny it ether, see 210C), or that the recognition of his ignorance makes him 
(humanly) wise. I think that that Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge in the 
Theaetetus concerns mainly his reluctance to express commitments to 
philosophical definitions135 and theories136 (161A). Socrates’ point is that he 
does not know what ‘the great and admirable men’ of the past and present know 
(210C5–6). He does not make any philosophically loaded pronouncements or 
assertions. Of course, he does hold beliefs and he does make assertions about 
mundane things, and he does even have knowledge of midwifery. Does he lack 
beliefs about philosophical matters? And if not, why is it important for him to 
withhold those beliefs? 
Socrates expresses his beliefs about philosophical matters at least once in the 
Theaetetus, at 185E. The same passage gives an important hint why Socrates 
refrains from making similar pronouncements in the rest of the Theaetetus, and 
why says at 150C that he ‘never’ makes pronouncements or assertions. 
Theaetetus has said that the soul considers some things by means of the body, 
and some by means of itself, independently from the body. This is how Socrates 
replies: ‘That was what I thought myself, but I wanted you to think so too (τοῦτο 
γὰρ ἦν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι, my emphasis) 
(185E7–8). If this is the case, why didn’t Socrates just tell Theaetetus that this is 
how he sees things? I think the answer is that Socrates wants Theaetetus to 
                                                     
134 Sedley (2004: 30–35) gives an overview of what kind of expertise the craft of midwifery 
might involve. 
135 Socrates is not ignorant of all definitions. He is, for example, quite capable of producing 
a definition for ‘clay’, that it is ‘earth mixed with water’ (147C). Socratic ignorance con-
cerns definitions that are not ‘commonplace and simple’ (φαῦλόν που καὶ ἁπλοῦν) (147C).  
136 See also McDowell (1973) ad loc. and Giannopoulou (2007). 
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come to this insight on his own, and not because of Socrates’ authority.137 
Socrates wants his interlocutors to reach certain conclusions by themselves, 
sometimes even make unavoidable mistakes by themselves. Why is this so 
important for Socrates? I believe that the answer lies in certain assumptions that 
Socrates (and Plato too) makes about knowledge. Knowledge cannot be 
acquired simply by accepting one particular proposition. Knowledge requires 
understanding the implications of a proposition, an ability to place a proposition 
in a systematic and coherent whole with other propositions. In this sense 
knowledge always implies knowing-how (and not only knowing-that). 138 
‘Human nature is too weak to acquire skill in matters of which it has no 
experience’ (149C). What Socrates expects from his interlocutors (that they 
think for themselves and make mistakes for themselves) is directly opposed to 
Aristotle’s conception of an ideal learner who ‘accepts on faith what the expert 
tells him are the principles of the subject. ‘The learner ought to believe’ he says 
(SE 2, 165B3)’ (Robinson 1953: 16). In order to elicit answers from his 
interlocutors Socrates refrains from making any substantial claims on the 
subject matter. He helps to deliver intellectual offspring, bringing out what his 
interlocutors think and believe and to see whether their thoughts turn out to be 
philosophically significant. 
It is for this reason that Socrates, while performing his midwifery, does not 
express any beliefs about the subject matter discussed. He wants his inter-
locutors to draw their own conclusions from arguments put forth, so that they 
can familiarize themselves with the particular conceptual terrain (understand the 
connections between different propositions and the concepts involved in those 
propositions) that the notion in question (in this case the notion of ‘knowledge’) 
belongs to.  
 
How fond of arguments you are, Thedorus! It’s splendid of you, the way 
you think that I’m a sort of bag of arguments, and will easily pick one out 
and say how that theory goes wrong. You aren’t bearing in mind what’s 
happening. None of the arguments ever comes from me (ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν 
λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ); they always come from the person who is 
having the discussion with me (ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ 
προσδιαλεγομένου). I know no more than he does, apart from the tiny bit, 
                                                     
137 Similar suggestion is made by Nozick (1995): ‘Moreover, Socrates cannot simply tell 
people the truth; they cannot reach knowledge of the good through the say-so and authority 
of anyone else. At best, that will give them an unstable true belief, open to upsetting by the 
next contrary ‘authority’. The only way to aid their knowledge of the good is to get them to 
think through issues about the nature of the good and its relation to other things, that is, to 
engage them (or to get them to engage themselves) in elenchus concerning these matters.’ (p. 
152) 
138 I am well aware that I am very briefly touching on an immense topic. I hope, however, 
that the remarks made here suffice for the task at hand. The general idea that knowledge, for 
Plato, always involves a craft, or a know-how, or, even more generally, ‘understanding’, is 
expressed by many scholars. See, for example, Moravcik (1992: 11–54) and Burnyeat 
(1981). 
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enough to be able to get an argument from someone else, who’s wise, and 
to accept it in proportion to its merits (ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ 
ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως). That’s what I’m going to do now: I’m going to try 
to get an argument from him, not to say anything myself (καὶ νῦν τοῦτο 
παρὰ τοῦδε πειράσομαι, οὔ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν). (161A7-B6)  
 
Socrates insists that everything in the discussion comes from (ἐξέρχεται) his 
interlocutor – he himself never offers any statements or theories to support or to 
undermine the thesis under consideration. Now, it seems reasonably clear that 
Socrates does offer quite many arguments. It is Socrates, for example, who 
proposes that Theaetetus definition might mean something similar to Prota-
gorean Measure Doctrine139, and who connects the Measure Doctrine to the 
Secret Doctrine of Protagoras, according to which everything is in constant flux. 
In what sense, then, does everything (or almost everything) proposed by 
Socrates in the dialogue come from Theaetetus? I think that there is only one 
reasonable sense in which Theaetetus is the originator of all the claims or 
theories Socrates introduces to the discussion. Namely, unlike Socrates, 
Theaetetus is doxastically committed to what is being said in the discussion. He 
believes that the definitions under discussion and the theories introduced to 
support them are true. This is especially clear if one takes a closer look at the 
way in which the definitions are introduced. With the first definition 
Theaetetus’ commitment is clearly stated:  
 
It seems to me (δοκεῖ οὖν μοι) that a person who knows something is 
perceiving the thing he knows. The way it looks to me (φαίνεται) at the 
moment is that knowledge is nothing but perception. (151E1–4)  
 
Theaetetus does not say: ‘Let’s discuss the question whether perception could 
be knowledge’ or ‘Let’s assume...’. Rather, he commits himself to the definition 
– this is what he really thinks and believes. The second and third definitions are 
offered more carefully. The second definition is, on a first sight, introduced by 
Theaetetus in a non-committal way:  
 
I can’t say it’s false judgment in general, Socrates, because there is false 
judgment as well; but perhaps (κινδυνεύει... εἶναι) true judgment is 
knowledge. Let that be my answer (ἀποκεκρίσθω). If it turns out, as we 
go along, that it isn’t as good as it seems now, we’ll try to find something 
else to say (ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν). (187B4–9) 
 
But shortly after this passage, Theaetetus admits that he said that because this is 
how he sees things, that he really takes knowledge to be true belief (τοῦτο γὰρ 
αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται, 187C7–8). The third definition is offered as something 
Theaetetus once heard from someone (201C8–9), but Socrates quickly forces 
                                                     
139 ‘Because he [Protagoras] says, you remember, that a man is the measure of all things: of 
those which are, that they are, and of those which are not, that they are not’ (152A). 
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Theaetetus to commit himself to the definition: ‘And are you satisfied with it 
(ἀρέσκει οὖν σε)? Are you prepared to lay it down on those lines (καὶ τίθεσαι 
ταύτῃ), that true judgment with an account is knowledge?’ (202C7–9). 
Theaetetus says that he is. Thus, Theaetetus commits himself to all the defini-
tions advanced. Socrates, by contrast, remains uncommitted: he does not take 
the position of authority in the discussion, which enables him to evaluate the 
mental offspring of his interlocutors who are committed to the definitions 
offered.140  
Thus, we have established that Socratic midwifery requires Socrates to 
ignorant about the truth or falsity of the definition discussed and the interlocutor 
to be committed to the truth of the definition. What else does midwifery 
involve? A clearer picture of Socratic midwifery emerges if one takes into 
consideration the comments Socrates makes during the discussion of the first 
definition. Socrates connects Theaetetus’ definition ‘knowledge is perception’ 
to Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine, according to which everything that appears (to 
be true) to the person is (true) for this person (152A1 ff.), and to the complex 
ontology of the Secret Doctrine, according to which everything that exists is in 
flux (152D2 ff.). The bewildered Theaetetus asks whether Socrates himself 
believes the doctrines advanced. This is how Socrates answers this question:  
 
You’re forgetting that I neither know nor claim as my own anything of 
that kind (ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν), 
but, on the contrary, I’m incapable of giving birth to them (εἰμὶ αὐτῶν 
ἄγονος). I’m practicing midwifery on you, and that’s why I’m singing 
incantations, and offering you bits to taste from the products of each 
group of wise men, until I can help to bring what you think out to light 
(ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα συνεξαγάγω). Once it has been brought out, 
that will be the time for me to look and see if it turns out to be the result 
of a false pregnancy or genuine (σκέψομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε γόνιμον 
ἀναφανήσεται). Come one, persevere and don’t lose heart; answer like a 
good brave man, and tell me what you think about whatever I ask about 
(ἃ ἂν φαίνηταί σοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐρωτῶ). (157C7-D5) 
 
This passage sheds a good deal of light on how Socrates takes his midwifery to 
function. First, as expected, Socrates says that he himself does not know nor 
subscribe to any of the complex theories that he has just presented. It is also 
noteworthy that his inability to give birth to them (literally ‘sterility’) covers 
both his inability to produce knowledge himself and to (explicitly) support any 
foreign theories. This fits well with the proposal that Socrates’ ignorance is 
methodological. He does not propose his own theories nor does he expect his 
interlocutors to accept the theories of great philosophers simply on the basis of 
Socrates’ authority. The interlocutor must think for himself whether the theories 
presented are true.  
                                                     
140 Here my account of midwifery is indebted to Giannopoulou (2007). 
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Further, the above passage shows that Socratic takes his midwifery as a 
process to have two stages: first Socrates determines what his interlocutors 
think or believe and only then he goes on to examine whether these thoughts are 
true or false. A similar two-stage strategy seems to be implied at 154E and 
161E–162A. The second stage seems to be identical (or at least similar) to 
Socratic elenchus, which I will discuss in somewhat more detail below. What 
about the first stage? At this stage, Socrates offers the theories of wise men 
(Protagoras and his Secret Doctrine) to Theaetetus in order to bring what 
Theaetetus thinks (δόγμα) ‘out to light’. Theaetetus has already offered his 
definition ‘knowledge is perception’; he has also committed himself to this 
definition by saying that this is ‘the way things look to me at the moment’ 
(151E2). Normally we would say that what Theaetetus thinks is already out in 
the open – he obviously thinks that knowledge is perception. Therefore, one 
might think that there is hardly any need for additionally bringing his thoughts 
‘out to the light’, especially by connecting Theaetetus’ definition to the theories 
as complex as Protagoras’ Secret Doctrine.  
Scholars 141  usually take Socrates to be bringing out the philosophical 
implications of Theaetetus’ first definition.142 It is assumed that Theaetetus’ first 
definition already has determinate content; what Socrates does is to show what 
sorts of other theses are implied (Protagorean Measure Doctrine and the Secret 
Doctrine) by Theaetetus’ definition. Socrates point would be, then, that it is 
necessary to examine the implications of a given philosophical thesis in order to 
lay a verdict on the thesis (determine whether it is true or false). However, I 
                                                     
141 See, e.g. Burnyeat (1977): ‘What Theaetetus has to discover is not, presumably, the right 
words to express his opinion – he managed that when he gave his definition – but whether he 
really does believe them. In philosophy, at least, to know what ones opinion is, it is not to 
have formulated the proposition in words; one must have thought through its implications in 
a systematic way, confronting it with other relevant beliefs and considering whether these 
require it to be withdrawn or revised’ (p.12). 
142 The traditional reading (e.g. Cornford 1935) suggests that Plato simply supports the 
Secret Doctrine and that for Plato the sensible world (as opposed to the realm of Forms) 
suffers (or is, 156A) permanent change. The modern reading (defended, for example, in 
Sayre (1969), and in a series of influential papers by Burnyeat (see, esp., Burnyeat 1982 and 
Burnyeat 1990) and by Fine (1994)) insists that the Measure Doctrine and the Secret 
Doctrine are introduced for dialectical reasons, in order to be able to evaluate Theaetetus’ 
definition. The Measure Doctrine and the Secret Doctrine either support (Fine 1994: 135, n. 
10)) or imply (Burnyeat 1982: 5–7) Theaetetus’ definition. Consequently, the critique of the 
Measure Doctrine and the Secret Doctrine should be taken to be an indirect critique of 
Theaetetus’ definition (or a reductio of Theaetetus’ definition). According to the modern 
reading, Plato himself is not committed to any of these doctrines. In what follows, I will 
simply assume (with a large majority of scholars) that the modern reading is correct. First, 
the modern reading fits much better with the notion of Socratic midwifery. Socrates 
explicitly says that the Measure Doctrine and the Secret Doctrine are introduced in order to 
bring what Theaetetus thinks ‘out to light’ (157C). Second, Socrates claims (160D-E) that 
the three theses come to mean the same thing. Since Theaetetus’ definition is officially 
refuted, it can hardly be the case that Plato supports the doctrines (e.g. the Secret Doctrine) 
that are said to have the same content as the thesis refuted. 
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think that Socrates’ goal should be taken in a slightly stronger way; namely, 
Theaetetus’ first definition is vague in the sense that it lacks determinate 
content.143 For Socrates, the content of a given thought is not transparent to the 
person who holds this thought.144 
 
But since, as things are, we’re ordinary people (ἰδιῶται), we’ll want first 
of all to inspect (θεάσασθαι) our thoughts themselves, in relation to one 
another, to see what, exactly, they are (αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτὰ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἃ 
διανοούμεθα) and whether we find they harmonize with one another 
(ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ) or absolutely fail to do so. (154E3–6)  
 
Most importantly, Theaetetus never explains what he means by αἴσθησις. 
Socratic midwifery, then, gives to Theaetetus’ definition and the concepts 
involved in the definition a more precise content. Its aim is to clarify what 
Theaetetus takes the concepts of the definition (‘perception’, ‘knowledge’) to 
mean and how these concepts can form a coherent whole with other, closely 
connected concepts (‘appearance’, ‘truth’, ‘thinking’, etc.) so as to give the 
result that Theaetetus’ definition comes out true. Only then can the definition 
and whatever other theses that are brought in to support the definition, be 
critically evaluated. This is the goal of introducing the Measure Doctrine and 
the Secret Doctrine. Once it has been determined what Theaetetus definition 
means (by bringing into play both theories of Protagoras), Socrates moves on to 
the second stage of midwifery – that of testing the intellectual offspring, seeing 
whether the beliefs that Theaetetus holds about perception and knowledge 
harmonize with the definition and its implications.  
The second stage of Socratic midwifery is very similar to the elenchus of the 
early dialogues. Indeed, the verb ἐλέγχειν occurs at Theaetetus at 161E, and this 
activity of ‘testing’ or ‘refuting’ is taken to be a component of midwifery and 
dialectic. In the early dialogues, the interlocutor is expected to give an answer to 
the Socratic ‘what is F?’ question.145 This is followed by the ‘testing’ (elenchus) 
of the definition in a dialogue form. Socrates is asking questions and the 
                                                     
143 ‘When Socrates introduces Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine by saying it is ‘the very same 
thing’ as Theaetetus’ definition, only ‘put in rather a different way’, he is not saying that the 
two are equivalent, or that Theaetetus is already committed to it... Since Theaetetus’ 
definition is ambiguous between a number of interpretations, Socrates is asking for a 
clarification of (T), in the form of a substitute, (P), whose commitments are clearer.’ (Lee 
2006: 79) 
144 This is also the case in early dialogues. In Gorg. 474B Socrates assigns to his interlocutor 
Polus a belief that Polus is not aware that he has. In fact, Polus denies that he has the belief 
(that it is better to suffer injustice than to cause it), he thinks he believes the opposite. Hugh 
Benson summarizes the situation as follows: ‘Socrates here includes among Polus’ beliefs 
not only those doxastic phenomena on the basis of which Polus is disposed to act, and which 
Polus thinks he has, but also those which are deducible (whether Polus recognizes it or not) 
from those phenomena Polus is disposed to act on or thinks he has’ (Benson 2011: 188). 
145 In the Meno Socrates asks ‘what is virtue?’, in the Charmenides ‘what is temperance?’, in 
the Laches ‘what is courage?’, in the Lysis ‘what is friendship?’, in the Euthyphro ‘what is 
piety?’, in the Greater Hippias ‘what is beauty?’, in Republic I ‘what is justice?’. 
106 
interlocutor answering them. This leads the interlocutor up to the recognition 
that his beliefs are not consistent. On the account of Socratic elenchus that I 
favour, Socrates shows that the interlocutor holds beliefs that are inconsistent 
with the proposed definition, also believed to be true by the interlocutor.146 
Since consistency in beliefs is a necessary condition for knowledge, Socrates is 
able to lead the interlocutor to recognize his lack of knowledge. 
Taking into account that Socratic elenchus demonstrates inconsistency of his 
interlocutor’s beliefs, the question becomes how Socrates can demonstrate the 
falsity of some of those beliefs (i.e. the definition offered by the interlocutor)? 
Would he not have to assume that most beliefs held by his interlocutor are, in 
fact, true and that the interlocutor is capable of ruling out the false belief that is 
responsible for the inconsistency? This is a very difficult question. Socrates 
sometimes seems to think that what shows that a given belief is false is its 
inconsistency with other beliefs held by the interlocutor (see Vlastos 1983). The 
situation is similar when it comes to the Theaetetus. Socrates claims that his 
midwifery helps to decide whether his interlocutor’s ‘newborns’ are true or 
false (150B, 160E)147, yet all he manages to show is that the interlocutor has 
conflicting beliefs on subject. In that sense Socratic midwifery, just like the 
early elenchus, is a peculiarly ‘local’ method. The ‘falsity’ of a given belief 
remains dependent on which one of the inconsistent beliefs the interlocutor is 
inclined to abandon.148  
                                                     
146 Similar account is defended in Benson (2000). 
147 Socrates actually expresses himself much more carefully after each of the theses under 
consideration has been refuted. Indeed, Theaetetus and Theodorus seem to be more 
impressed by the results of the discussion than Socrates himself. For example, after refuting 
Protagoras, Socrates leaves open the possibility that the refutation only applies to the 
argument as it has been presented by Socrates and accepted by Theodorus (171C-D). 
Similarly, after refuting Theaetetus’ second and third definitions of knowledge, Socrates 
says that it seems (ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἑκάτερον εἶναι) that knowledge and true belief are different 
(201C6–7) later on (210A) that ‘it would seem’ (note the optative mood of the verb) that 
knowledge is not perception or true belief or true belief with an account. Thus Socrates 
leaves the possibility open that a better defense for all the definitions could, at least in 
principle, be given. The strongest statement made in the whole dialogue, namely that ‘it has 
become absolutely clear that knowledge is something other than perception’ (186E) is put 
into Theaetetus’ mouth shortly after the only time Socrates has expressed his own opinion 
about matters (and, therefore, the denial that perception is knowledge has received support 
from outside the scope of midwifery). 
148 It is not clear why Socrates is confident that the interlocutor will abandon a belief that 
actually is false. After all, he claims that he does not know which of the beliefs is true. 
Historically (see Sedley 1996) it has been common to refer, in this context, to the doctrine of 
recollection. According to this view, Socratic midwifery helps his interlocutor’s to recollect. 
However, there are powerful arguments against this view. For example, later on in the 
Theaetetus Socrates claims, in direct contradiction to the doctrine of recollection, that our 
souls are empty at birth (197E). Further, in contrast to the doctrine of recollection, the 
‘newborns’ of Socrates’ interlocutors are likely to be false (McDowell 1973: 117). And, 
thirdly, Socrates says that some people do not seem to be pregnant at all (151B), whereas 
according to the theory of recollection, all human beings are capable of recollection. Thus it 
seems that recollection does not offer a solution to the problem of why Socrates assumes that 
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Bringing his interlocutor to contradict himself and to abandon a particular 
belief is not the only goal of Socrates’ midwifery. Socratic midwifery is more 
constructive than Socratic elenchus.149 Namely, Socrates also has to show where 
the interlocutor’s mistakes originate. Plato puts this point (somewhat ironically 
perhaps) into Protagoras’ mouth (that is, Socrates speaking for Protagoras). 
Socrates initially conducts the elenctic part of the discussion with Theaetetus 
(161C–164C) in a manner that is not genuinely philosophical, but relies on 
‘logic-chopping’ (ἀντιλογικῶς, 164C7), i.e. ‘with the view to verbal consis-
tency’. In reaction to this Protagoras (Socrates as Protagoras) says:  
 
In controversy (ἀγωνιζόμενος) one may joke, and trip up people as much 
one can, but in dialectic (ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι) one should be serious, and 
help up the person one is talking to (ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον), 
showing up (ἐνδεικνύμενος) to him only those of his mistakes (τὰ 
σφάλματα) where his tripping up is his own fault or due to the company 
he used to keep (ἃ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν 
παρεκέκρουστο). If you behave like that, the people who spend their time 
with you will blame themselves, not you, for their confusion and 
difficulties (τῆς αὑτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας); they’ll run after you and 
like you, but they’ll hate themselves and seek refuge from themselves in 
philosophy, so as to become different people and get rid of those they 
used to be (ἵν' ἄλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἳ πρότερον ἦσαν). 
(167E–168A)  
 
Protagoras says that a proper, dialectical, way of discussion (which I take here 
to apply to Socrates’ midwifery) should not be content with simply bringing the 
interlocutor to contradict himself. What Socrates must do is to show where the 
mistakes derive from. He futhermore indicates that noticing these mistakes is a 
life-changing (one might perhaps even say ‘existential’) experience for the 
interlocutor. As a result of noticing his mistakes, Socrates’ interlocutor will 
‘hate himself’ and try to become someone else, leaving his former self behind. 
It is therefore unlikely that by ‘mistakes’ (τὰ σφάλματα) Protagoras has in mind 
trivial logical fallacies that can be easily corrected or unimportant false beliefs 
that can easily be discarded. I suggest, rather, that Protagoras is referring to 
deep-seated assumptions or what are sometimes called ‘central beliefs’ 150 , 
                                                                                                                                  
his interlocutors will be able to pick out a false belief from the inconsistent set of beliefs. It 
has also been suggested (Bostock 1988: 31–36), that Socrates’ midwifery requires some 
lower-level knowledge of ‘meanings’. This proposal seems to suffer from the same problems 
as the recollection-solution (e.g. not everybody is pregnant, i.e. there are (mature) people 
who do not have the low-level knowledge of meanings). It has also been thought 
(Giannopoulou 2008) that it is the divine mandate of Socrates’ mission (mentioned several 
times at 149A-151D) that somehow enables Socrates to tell true from false beliefs. 
149 For the argument that elenchus of the early dialogues should be taken to be mainly 
destructive, see Robinson (1953: 7–20). 
150 ‘A central belief is a belief that is so fundamental for a person or group that they could 
not abandon it without abandoning many other beliefs (and perhaps some epistemic 
standards) as well. /--/ Central concepts and central beliefs are intimately related, since 
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beliefs or assumptions that determine one’s way of understanding things.151 In 
Theaetetus’ case these are likely to involve assumptions about knowledge and 
perception, and human cognition in general. Socrates’ midwifery must, by 
means of its elenctic question and answer method, be able to uncover these 
problematic deep-seated assumptions that the interlocutor might not be even 
aware of. Once they are uncovered, the interlocutor will ‘hate himself’, but at 
the same will be in a better epistemic condition for further inquiry – the mis-
taken assumptions distorting his understanding of the problems and concepts in-
volved will be removed. This goal of ‘showing’ the interlocutor where his 
mistakes lie sets Socrates’ midwifery apart from the more destuctive elenchus 
of the early dialogues.  
Revision of beliefs is often based on authority. We are told (by someone we 
consider to have knowledge) that a particular assumption that we (sometimes 
unconsciously) make is false and in light of this we come to change our mind 
about other, connected beliefs too. This option is not open for Socrates. Since 
he cannot authoritatively tell his interlocutors where they make mistakes and 
which of their (sometimes unconsciously made) assumptions are false, he has to 
rely on his ‘testing’ the interlocutor’s already existing framework of beliefs, 
showing that this framework is inconsistent and in need of revision. If all goes 
well, the interlocutor eventually realizes which of his assumptions are false and 
willingly discards this assumption, and also understands why the revision is 
necessary (this is not necessarily the case if the beliefs are revised simply on 
someone’s external authority). In this sense Socratic showing or displaying of 
the interlocutor’s mistakes must be indirect – it is the interlocutor himself who 
has to notice which one of his background assumptions is problematic and 
discard this assumption. Socrates cannot simply point out the mistake (this 
would conflict with Socrates’ ignorance). Socrates’ midwifery quite literally 
‘shows’ (ἐνδεικνύμενος) the mistakes of the interlocutor, not by telling or 
                                                                                                                                  
concepts are typically central because they figure in central beliefs, and central beliefs often 
involve central concepts. /--/ Even if we could somehow divest ourselves of such beliefs, 
doing so would leave us with a very different picture of the world from the one most of us 
have now.’ Swoyer (2003) 
151 Plato does, in dialogues other than the Theaetetus, explicitly recognize the possibility that 
a few central beliefs might distort someone’s grasp of the whole conceptual field. For 
example, in the Phaedo the non-philosophers lack understanding of the true nature of virtues 
(esp. moderation and courage) since one of their central beliefs connects virtues with the 
body (Phd. 68B-69D). Another (not wholly unrelated) example comes from the Republic, 
where the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ refuse to acknowledge that Beauty (and the rest of 
the Forms) has being apart from the many beautiful things (Rep. 476C), which causes them 
to live in a dream-like state. Beliefs such as this one are plausible candidates for the meaning 
of the metaphorical ‘bonds’ (ἐκ παίδων ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς, Rep. 514A) that hold the gaze of 
the prisoners fixed onto the shadows of the wall in Republic’s Cave. The Theaetetus lacks 
the sharp distinction between the philosophers and non-philosophers that is typical to Plato’s 
middle period dialogues. Thus one might assume that Socrates is more optimistic about 
Theaetetus’ central beliefs about knowledge. However, I shall propose in the next chapter 
that it is useful to read the first part of the Theaetetus as a critique and eventual discarding of 
Theaetetus’ central belief that all human cognition is perception-like. 
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admonition, but by revealing the problematic consequences of these mistakes, 
thus enabling the interlocutor to recognize which of his assumptions are 
problematic. This is the ‘endeictic’ aspect of Socrates’ midwifery.152  
This creates a paradoxical situation: in order to show his interlocutor where 
he makes mistakes, Socrates has to rely on his interlocutor’s beliefs which are 
partly formed on the same mistaken assumptions that Socrates is trying to point 
out. As I have emphasized before, Socrates cannot bring anything into the 
discussion that is not explicitly accepted by Theaetetus (or Theodorus, who 
replaces Theaetetus and also commits himself to the claims made, see 181C). 
Therefore, the discussion conducted by Socrates is heavily dependent on 
Theaetetus’ understanding of the central concepts involved.153 Socrates has to 
conduct the discussion in a language that Theaetetus understands.  
It is likely that the interlocutor’s understanding of the central concepts used 
in the discussion is partial and distorted for the following reason. Individual 
beliefs are not held in isolation. Each of our beliefs is supported by many other 
beliefs that we hold. This is also the case with false beliefs, which are in part 
supported by other false beliefs. For example, Theaetetus believes that know-
ledge is perception. This belief must be supported by certain background 
assumptions Theaetetus makes about both the nature of knowledge and the 
nature of perception. These assumptions make the definition ‘knowledge is 
perception’ plausible to Theaetetus. Since the definition is ultimately shown to 
be false, it is likely that Theaetetus’ background assumptions about the notions 
of perception and knowledge that make the definition initially plausible to him, 
are also false. This means that Theaetetus’ grasp of the concepts involved must 
be problematic from the outset. From this it follows that since Socrates has to 
perform his midwifery in terms that the interlocutor understands, he also has to 
make concessions to certain mistaken assumptions made by the interlocutor, 
hoping that the discussion will later on offer an opportunity for the interlocutor 
to (implicitly or explicitly) correct his way of seeing things.  
It is important to note that after Protagoras’ criticism of Socrates’ initial 
controversialist approach to Theaetetus, the discussion switches over to 
Theodorus, who answers Socrates’ questions on Protagoras’ behalf (168D–
184B). The discussion with Theaetetus resumes only at the beginning of the 
Passage of the Commons. If I am right about how Socrates’ midwifery works, 
                                                     
152 The above passage influenced the ancient commentators to describe some of Plato’s 
dialogues as endeictic: ‘According to this passage [Tht. 167E-168A], the difference between 
anatreptic and endeictic dialogues ought to be the desire to induce errors in former and the 
desire to bring to light existing errors in the latter.’ (Tarrant 2000: 79) 
153 Maybe the clearest expression of this requirement can be found in Meno 75D, where it is 
said that the terms of the argument have to be known (εἰδέναι) to those engaged in a 
discussion. Of course, it is not easy to determine what Socrates means by requirement. In the 
literature it has sometimes been called the ‘dialectical requirement’. Fine expresses it in the 
following manner: ‘If it [i.e. the argument] is to be genuinely dialectical, then, as Plato 
explains in the Meno (75D), it should only use claims that are (believed to be) true, and that 
the interlocutor accepts; this is Plato’s dialectical requirement (DR).’ (Fine 1990/2003: 87) 
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then in the Passage of the Commons Socrates should (among other things) aim 
to point out the mistaken (and perhaps unconscious) assumptions lead 
Theaetetus to identify knowledge with perception. But before turning to the 
Passage of the Commons, it is useful take a closer look at Theaetetus’ 
definition. This is the task of the next section. 
 
 
2. The Aisthetic Model of Cognition 
When we take into account the specifics of Socrates’ method (namely, that it 
remains dependent on the interlocutor’s framework of beliefs), it is worth 
asking what beliefs Theaetetus can be said to hold in the Passage of the 
Commons. Theaetetus holding certain beliefs or making certain assumptions 
(and Socrates adjusting the discussion accordingly) could help to explain why 
the relation of the soul to ‘being’ is portrayed in an ambiguous manner in the 
Passage of the Commons. In this section, I will argue that Theaetetus takes, 
throughout the discussion of his first definition, all human cognitive acts to 
involve direct apprehension or grasp of its objects. In fact, Theaetetus thinks of 
human cognition as being the same or similar to perception. Perception should 
be construed here, however, quite generally as ‘direct awareness’ and not 
narrowly as ‘sense-perception’. 
What does Theaetetus mean with his first definition? ‘It seems to me that a 
man who knows something perceives what he knows (δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ 
ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται), and the way it appears 
(φαίνεται) at present, at any rate, is that knowledge is simply perception (οὐκ 
ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις)’ (151E). Theaetetus says that knowledge is 
nothing but perception. This sounds like an identity claim. And indeed, 
throughout the first part of the dialogue Socrates addresses Theaetetus’ 
definition as claiming that perception is knowledge or that knowledge is 
perception or that they are simply ‘the same’ (158A5–6, 160D5–6, 160E1–2, 
164A6, 164D9–10, 165D7, 179D1, 182E7, 184B6, 186E9, 210A9).  
The fact that Socrates and Theaetetus take knowledge and perception 
(‘hypothetically’, 165D1) to be identical fits well with Socratic requirement for 
definitions of the earlier dialogues. The requirement is that the definiens (in this 
case perception) of F (in this case knowledge) should apply to all things F (all 
instances of knowing should also be instances of perceiving) and definiens 
should not apply to things not-F (there should not be any instances of perceiving 
that are not instances of knowing). Dancy (2004: 80) calls this ‘The Substitu-
tivity Requirement: its [i.e. the definition’s] definiens must be substitutable 
salva veritate for its definiendum.’154 Indeed, Socrates explicitly asks Theaetetus 
                                                     
154 Dancy takes the Substitutivity Requirement to entail the following: ‘An alleged definition 
can be overthrown by counterexamples. Counterexamples can either be cases that satisfy the 
alleged definiens but not the definiendum, or cases that satisfy the definiendum but not the 
alleged definiens. Cases of the first type show that the definiens is not a necessary condition 
for the application of the definiendum; cases of the second, that it is not a sufficient 
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to gather all ‘knowledges’ into one account (πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἑνὶ λόγῳ 
προσειπεῖν, 148D9), which is presumably exactly what Theaetetus aims to 
accomplish with his first definition, ‘knowledge is perception’. Hence, it seems 
safe to assume that Theaetetus’ definition is an identity claim. 
However, there is a second and slightly more complex question. What does 
Theaetetus identify knowledge with?  
‘Liddell-Scott’ Dictionary gives two meanings of αἰσθάνεσθαί:  
 
(i) to apprehend by the senses, to see, to hear;  
(ii) to apprehend by the mind, to understand. 
 
The former (a) is the narrow meaning of the word αἰσθάνεσθαί, i.e. ‘sense-
perception’ (perception by means of the five bodily senses). The latter (b) 
indicates a much broader use of the term, where it means ‘understanding’, 
‘recognizing’ and ‘being aware of...’ 155  on a very general level and is not 
necessarily confined to the bodily senses. Which one of these two meanings of 
αἰσθάνεσθαί does Theaetetus have in mind, when he says that knowledge is 
αἴσθησις? Majority of the commentators (e.g. Bostock 1988, Burnyeat 1990, 
Fine 1994, Sedley 2004) assume that αἴσθησις has to mean sense-perception in 
the first, narrow sense – hearing, smelling, seeing, etc156. One reason behind this 
assumption is, no doubt, that the notion of ‘sense perception’ is so deeply 
entrenched in our conceptual repertoire (the same does not necessarily apply to 
Plato). If this reading is correct, Theaetetus expresses a strongly empiricist 
theory of knowledge – knowledge is not only derived from or grounded in sense 
perception, it is identical to sense perception. This reading finds support in 
Theaetetus’ and Socrates’ using αἴσθησις in the conclusion of the first part of 
the dialogue in the narrow sense:  
 
‘S. Now what name would you give to the former – seeing, hearing, 
smelling, feeling cold and warm? T. I call that perceiving – what else 
could I call it? S. So the whole lot taken together is perception? T. 
Necessarily.’ (186D8-E3).  
 
                                                                                                                                  
condition.’ (Dancy 2004: 82). Dancy also (p. 82–114) provides references to passages in the 
Socratic dialogues that exress Socrates’ adherence to this requirement.  
155 ‘Though aisthanesthai presumably is formed from a root which signifies ‘hearing’, its 
ordinary use is quite general. It can be used in any case in which one perceives something by 
the senses and even more generally in any case in which one becomes aware of something, 
however it this may come about...It is used whenever someone becomes aware of something. 
And up to Plato’s time, and often far beyond it, there is no clear recognition that there are 
two radically different ways in which we become aware of something, one by sense-
perception and the other in some other way, e.g.. by a grasp of the mind.’ (M. Frede (1987: 
377–378))  
156 The following scholars are among the few that resist identifying αἴσθησις with sense-
perception: Dancy (1987), Frede (1987) and Lee (2005: 77–117). 
112 
Is Theaetetus, at 151E1–3, then claiming that knowledge is the same as seeing, 
hearing, smelling, i.e. the ‘whole lot taken together’ (implying that these are the 
only αἰσθήσεις)? I think that to read the claims made at 186D–E into 
Theaetetus’ initial definition would amount to reading the dialogue backwards. 
It might be the case that the discussion starts with the broad notion of 
‘perception’ and switches to narrow notion at the Passage of the Commons. I 
shall maintain that the narrow notion of αἴσθησις indeed only emerges in the 
Passage of the Commons, the discussion that precedes relies on ‘perception’ in 
the broad sense. Of course, pre-Platonic Greek does not clearly distinguish 
between these two uses of the verb 157 . It is perhaps one of Plato’s great 
achievements in the Passage of the Commons to clearly delineate a novel, 
narrow notion of ‘perception’ as ‘sense perception’ (this claim is made by M. 
Frede 1987). I will argue that it is difficult to make sense of the whole first part 
of the Theaetetus (151E–184B) if one reads into the whole discussion the 
narrow notion of αἴσθησις.  
First, αἰσθάνεσθαί rarely means ‘perceive by means of the senses’ in Plato. 
Browsing through the dialogues for the occurrences of αἰσθάνεσθαί, it quickly 
becomes evident that the large majority of the uses of the verb have no special 
relation to perceiving by means of the senses at all. It is only in special, one 
could almost say ‘technical’, contexts where sensory aspect of αἰσθάνεσθαί is 
stressed.158 The pre-theoretical use of αἰσθάνεσθαί is reflected by the very large 
variety of different English translations of this verb. Here is a sample of how the 
verb has been translated in Plato’s dialogues: ‘to perceive’, ‘understand’, 
‘notice’, ‘recognize’, ‘see’, ‘hear’, ‘find’, ‘apprehend’, ‘observe’, ‘realize’, 
‘become aware’, ‘be aware’, ‘sense’, ‘experience’, ‘know’, ‘feel’, etc. The 
objects that one ‘recognizes’ or is ‘aware of’, have in majority of cases nothing 
to do with perceptual properties in the narrow sense. The ‘pre-theoretical’ 
notion of αἰσθάνεσθαί is apparently completely neutral as to the objects of this 
particular mental activity. The objects of αἰσθάνεσθαί can be very complex 
states of affair (Lys. 209D), propositions (Rep. 500E), conclusions of an 
argument (Gorg. 478C and 496E), even the Forms (Rep. 538 B–C), the soul 
(Rep. 608D), etc. The verb αἰσθάνεσθαί is often followed by a prepositional 
clause introduced by ὅτι (i.e. ‘that’), it also occurs with περί (i.e. ‘about’), 
meaning ‘to understand that’, ‘to recognize that’ (indicating propositional 
complexity), but can also take a simple object in which case it normally means 
to ‘recognize’.  
The term ‘awareness’ suggested by M. Frede (1987: 377–378) captures the 
large variety of different cognitive relations very well. Plato never characterizes 
αἴσθησις as being mistaken or false, just like in English one cannot be falsely 
aware of anything. The variety of different translations quoted above – ‘to 
apprehend’, ‘observe’, ‘realize, and ‘recognize’ – shows, too, that the thing or a 
                                                     
157 For an overview of the many nuances of meaning of αἰσθάνεσθαί in Pre-Platonic Attic 
Greek, see Schirren (1998, esp. 3–16). 
158 For example, Phd. 65D-67B and Rep. 523E-524C. 
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state of affairs realized or apprehended exists or obtains. There are two 
important features (in light of the present task) of the verb αἰσθάνεσθαί: 
(i)  αἰσθάνεσθαί is always used as a success-verb, which implies that there is 
no false αἴσθησις; and its objects, i.e. the states of affairs or propositions, 
either exist (in case of objects) or are true (in case of propositions).  
(ii)  αἰσθάνεσθαί designates an occurrent state of mind, lacking dispositional 
characteristics, being an event-like and implying immediate or direct grasp.  
Now, if Theaetetus takes all human cognition to involve awareness in the above 
described sense then it would make sense to propose, in the Passage of the 
Commons, that the soul apprehends ‘being’ simply by entertaining a thought 
involving (explicitly or implicitly) the term ‘is’. This simply fits with the notion 
of ‘awareness’ as requiring the existence of its objects. However, before I 
defend this position in greater detail, it is necessary to show that αἴσθησις 
should indeed be taken in this broader sense throughout the discussion that 
precedes the Passage of the Commons. This is what I will attempt to do now. 
First, Theaetetus’ definition is not the first answer to Socrates’ question 
‘what is knowledge?’ (145E and 146C), it is simply the first correct kind of an 
answer, i.e. the first answer that fits the requirements of a definition (146D–
147C)159. Theaetetus' original attempt was to enumerate examples of things that 
he takes to be knowledge, a mistake common to many Socrates’ discussion 
partners in Plato’s earlier dialogues. 160  The examples listed by Theaetetus 
include geometry, cobbling and ‘the subjects you enumerated just now’ (146D), 
by which Theaetetus presumably means ‘astronomy, arithmetic and music – all 
that an educated man should know’ (145A). This answer is criticized and only 
then does Theaetetus offer the first (formally) satisfactory answer to Socrates’ 
question – ‘knowledge is the same as αἴσθησις’. Does Theaetetus intend there to 
be a relation between his examples of knowledge and his first definition? I 
think that the text leaves no doubt that he does. The definition of ‘powers’ that 
Theaetetus and his friend (younger) Socrates came up with aims to ‘collect the 
powers into one (συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἕν) by which we could refer (προσαγορεύσομεν) 
to them’ (147D8-E1). Socrates explicitly says that this is exactly what 
Theaetetus should do concerning the ‘many knowledges’ he has listed: ‘Just as 
you collected them [i.e. the powers], many as they are, in one class (ὥσπερ 
ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες) try, in the same way, to find one 
account by which to speak of many kinds of knowledge (οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς 
ἐπιστήμας ἑνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν)’ (148D5–9). The subsequent definition is 
supposed to ‘gather into one’ the examples of knowledge just listed. If αἴσθησις 
is taken to mean sense-perception, it is impossible to explain how Theaetetus (a 
budding mathematician, after all, 147D–148B) could think that they all fall 
under this class.161 On the other hand, definition that takes (e.g.) geometry or 
cobbling to be cases of αἴσθησις in the sense of ‘awareness’ would make good 
                                                     
159 See Sedley (2004: 19–28, esp. 20–21) for an overview of what these requirements are. 
160 For example, Eyth.5D-6E, Lach. 190E, Meno 72E-74B. 
161 Geach (1966: 372) 
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sense. We could, of course, complain that the definition is uninformative or 
vacuous (see, e.g. Dancy 1987), but it doubtless fits the required form of the 
definition and could reasonably be seen as necessary and sufficient for both the 
‘theoretical’ and the ‘practical’ branches of knowledge. Thus, what has 
happened previously, before Theaetetus proposed his definition, strongly 
suggests that αἴσθησις should be read in the broad sense as ‘understanding’ or 
‘awareness’.  
The situation is quite similar when one takes a closer look at what happens 
next in the dialogue. This is especially important since Socrates’ next moves 
(made with Theaetetus’ consent) aim to give Theaetetus’ definition a more 
determinate content.  
 Theaetetus’ definition is immediately connected to Protagoras’ Measure 
Doctrine, according to which all appearances are true – everything is for the 
person the way it appears to the person (151E9–C3). At first it looks as if the 
connection between Theaetetus definition and Measure Doctrine is supposed to 
cover only perceptual appearances (152C1–2). However, as soon as the Secret 
Doctrine is introduced, it turns out that Measure Doctrine in connection with the 
Secret Doctrine is supposed to cover everything, i.e. all properties are such that 
they fall under the scope of Protagoras’ two doctrines (152D1-E1). Perceptual 
predicates in the narrow sense serve as paradigmatic cases for introducing 
‘appearings’ that are not perceptual in the narrow sense.162  
If Theaetetus’ definition should cover only perception in the narrow sense, 
then the Measure Doctrine and the Secret Doctrine would not support the 
definition, but would actually be inconsistent with it163. Plato makes it quite 
                                                     
162 Maybe the claim that ‘appearing and perception are the same, in the case of that which is 
hot and everything of that sort’ (152C) have to be read as restricting αἴσθησις to narrow 
perceptual qualities? No. My suggestion is simple: Socrates is not identifying αἴσθησις with 
the ‘appearing’ of perceptual properties (in the narrow sense). I think that the clause ‘hot and 
everything of that sort’ should not be read as restrictive but rather as explanatory – 
Theaetetus is supposed to grasp that Protagoras equates appearance and perception (‘and this 
‘appears’ is perceiving’ (152b12)). In order to make his equation plausible, Socrates 
concentrates on the paradigmatic cases of perception, e.g. when someone feels (the wind to 
be) cold, for example. This is not meant to restrict αἴσθησις to perceptual qualities in the 
narrow sense, but rather explain how perception and appearance come to be the same thing 
in certain paradigmatic cases. See also Burnyeat (1976a: 45). 
163 This is admitted by McDowell (1973: 121). Burnyeat thinks that Theaetetus’ definition 
offers no grounds for introducing Protagoras’ claim that all appearances are true (not only 
perceptual appearances), and says that ‘Protagoras applied the same principle to non-
perceptual cases, where, one might think, "It appears to a that p" hardly amounts to more 
than that a judges or believes that p. The extension may have little but bluff to support it.’ 
(1976a: 45). See also Fine (1994: 134, n. 9). However, the problem is not only that there are 
no sufficient grounds in the dialogue for making non-perceptual appearances come out true. 
The problem is that Theaetetus’ definition comes out false, if non-perceptual appearances are 
all true and Theaetetus’ definition concerns perception in the narrow sense. However, if 
‘perception’ is taken in the broad sense, it is clear both how Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine 
supports Theaetetus’ definition and it is also clear that Theaetetus’ definition does justify 
Protagoras’ position according to which all appearances to be true.  
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clear that Theaetetus’ definition is to be taken as an identity claim. Now, if 
Theaetetus had in mind only perceptual acts in the narrow sense, then 
Protagoras, in claiming that dreams and beliefs and fears, etc., are all true and of 
‘what is’ – that is, they are cases of knowledge (157E–160D) – would imply 
that not all cases of knowledge are in fact cases of perception (beliefs, thoughts, 
and fears, etc., are different from perception in the narrow sense, minimally 
because they can be about properties that are not perceptual, e.g. ‘this is just’). 
If all beliefs (concerning both perceptual and non-perceptual properties) are true 
and ‘of what is’, then there are cases where x is an instance of knowledge but x 
is not an instance of perception. The identity between perception and 
knowledge would break down. Thus we must assume that dreams, beliefs, 
thoughts, memory, etc., simply are perceptions, which means that perception 
has to be taken in its broad sense. Since Socrates stresses several times that 
Theaetetus’ definition and Protagorean Measure-Doctrine and the Secret 
Doctrine come much to the same thing (esp. 160D–E), it is mandatory to take 
perception in Theaetetus initial definition to be broad in scope. Further, 
Socrates’ connecting Theaetetus’ definition with a theory that is obviously 
inconsistent with this definition would seriously undermine Socrates’ role as a 
midwife, as the one who is supposed to bring out the implications of his 
interlocutor’s definition.164 Implications of a proposition cannot be inconsistent 
with it. If one wants to preserve the integrity of Socrates’ method in the 
Theaetetus, I see no other option but to take ‘perception’ in the broad sense 
What is the nature of the relation between Theaetetus’ definition 
(‘knowledge is the same as awareness’), Protagoras Measure Doctrine (‘all 
appearances are true’) and the Secret Doctrine (‘everything is in constant flux’)? 
If perception is taken in the broad sense, then the most reasonable way to 
understand the relation is roughly the following. Theaetetus, while offering his 
definition, is relying on a vague idea that to have knowledge is the same as to 
have direct awareness of how things are. He tentatively proposes that 
knowledge is ‘some sort of awareness’, having a characteristic of immediate 
recognition. When Socrates brings Protagoras into the discussion, he does not 
                                                     
164 This conflicts with the views expressed by several eminent scholars, such as Fine (1994), 
Sedley (2004: 49–54), among others. Their position is, roughly, the following. ‘Perception’ 
should be read in the narrow sense, as ‘sense-perception’ (neither Fine, Sedley, nor Bostock 
consider the alternative possibility). Consequently, one should also distinguish between 
Broad and Narrow Protagoreanism. Narrow Protagoreanism maintains that perceptual 
appearances are true. Broad Protagoreanism maintains that all appearances (both perceptual 
and non-perceptual) are true. Broad Protagoreanism entails Narrow Protagoreanism. Narrow 
Protagoreanism supports Theaetetus’ definition that knowledge is the same as sense 
perception. The problem I mentioned in the last paragraph is that Broad Protagoreanism 
contradicts with Theaetetus’ definition, since it entails that non-perceptual appearances are 
also instances of knowledge. Neither Fine nor Sedley offer any way towards how one should 
resolve this difficulty. Thus it seems more economical to assume that the text does not 
distinguish between Narrow and Broad Protagoreanism. And, since Theaetetus’ definition is 
said to mean the same as Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine, it is likely that it should be 
construed as entailing ‘perception’ in the broad sense. 
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suggest that Theaetetus’ definition implies Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine. All 
he says is that Protagoras put ‘the same point in a different way (τρόπον δέ τινα 
ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα)’ (152A1–2). Bringing in Protagoras is supposed to 
clarify Theaetetus’ position, to give it determinate content. And, as Socrates 
soon points out, it is a good interpretation, since it makes αἴσθησις infallible 
(152C5–6). The Secret Doctrine is, in turn, meant to describe the world in 
which Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine applies, a world in which Theaetetus’ 
definition is correct. In this world all appearances (all acts of awareness) are 
true simpliciter.  
Thus, to use Fine’s (1994) terminology, I take Protagoras to be an 
infallibilist, and not a relativist. For a relativist (in Fine’s terminology) there are 
no absolute truths, all truths are true relative to the person who holds the belief. 
Another possibility, according to Fine, would be to maintain that Protagoras is a 
perceptual relativist, who claims that perceptual properties exist only relative to 
a perceiver. However, both types of relativism leave it a complete mystery as to 
why the Secret Doctrine is introduced at all (see Fine 1994). There is no 
obvious connection between the doctrine of universal flux and the doctrine of 
relative truth (or perceptual relativism). Truth could easily be relative without 
everything moving or everything could move without truth being relative 
(Bostock 1988: 45). However, in case of infallibilism the connection is clearer. 
The Secret Doctrine is supposed to show how appearances or perceptions in the 
broad sense can be true simpliciter (not relatively true)165. Plato presumably 
relies on a version of correspondence theory of truth, according to which truth 
depends on the way the world is. According to the Measure Doctrine, all 
appearances are true. This is equivalent to Theaetetus’ definition that all 
perceptions (in the broad sense) are instances of knowledge, since knowledge is 
always true and ‘what is’ (152C5–6). In order to hold on to the Measure 
Doctrine and Theaetetus’ definition, it is required that the world changes 
relative to appearances, since it is assumed that truth requires correspondence 
                                                     
165 What, exactly, is the difference between relativism of truth and infallibilism? Relativism 
is a theory of truth that denies that there are objective truths – a belief is true for the person 
who holds this belief (in more modern language, truth is relative to some ‘framework’, see 
Swoyer 2003). Relativism of truth, in this sense, implies that truth does not consist in strict 
correspondence of thought with reality (for some discussion, see O’Grady (2007: 39–43)). 
‘True’ simply means ‘true for someone’ (or ‘believed by someone’, or ‘true in some 
framework’). Thus, relativism of truth does not imply anything about ontology or about how 
the world is. Infallibilism, on the other hand, is not a theory of truth. It simply assumes that 
truth consists in (some form of) correspondence with reality. The infallibilist claims, 
however, that reality (or facts) are dependent on the person who holds a belief, and that 
therefore each belief of a person is objectively true. Thus, infallibilism is a theory about 
belief that does have ontological implications. One could, perhaps, say that relativism of 
truth and infallibilism come to mean the same thing if one subscribes to both relativism of 
truth and correspondence-theory of truth (see next footnote). For some discussion, see Fine 
(1994: 138–141). 
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with reality, and appearances (perceptions) conflict.166 This is why the doctrine 
of flux plays such an important role in the text. However, I think that Sedley 
(2004: 50 n. 15) is correct to insist that ‘relativism’ is a term that captures 
Protagoras’ meaning better than Fine’s ‘infallibilism’. Thus we could speak of 
‘relativism of worlds’ or ‘relativism of facts’, as opposed to ‘relativism of 
truth’. According to this theory, the way the world is, is dependent on the 
perceiver. 
The Secret Doctrine makes no clear distinction between perceptual acts in 
the narrow sense and other cognitive acts. Although the Secret Doctrine uses 
perceptual (in the narrow sense) properties as examples of how the ontology of 
flux explains cognition, it is clear that it applies to all cognitive acts whatsoever. 
When Socrates lays out the ontology of the Secret Doctrine, he says that: 
 
There are two kinds of change (τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη), each unlimited 
in number, the one having the power of acting and the the power of being 
acted on (δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν). From their 
intercourse (ὁμιλίας), and their friction with one another, there come to 
offspring, unlimited in number but coming in pairs of twin (δίδυμα), of 
which one is a perceived thing (αἰσθητόν) and other a perception 
(αἴσθησις), which is on every occasion generated and brought to birth 
together with a perceived thing (μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ). (156A6-B2) 
 
The list of ‘perceptions’ that Socrates goes on to give is the following: 
 
Now we have names for these perceptions, of the following sort: seeings, 
hearings, smellings, feelings of cold, feelings of heat; also what are called 
pleasures, pains, desires, fears and others. The nameless ones are un-
limited in number, but those which have been given names are extremely 
numerous. (156B2–6)  
 
Socrates includes, with Theaetetus’ silent consent, in the list of perceptions 
pleasures, pains, desires and fears. This means that the ontology of αἴσθησις he 
is laying out is supposed to cover a scope that is much broader than the narrow 
notion of αἴσθησις, confined to the five senses (perception as understood in the 
Passage of the Commons). In fact, he stresses that αἰσθήσεις are unlimited in 
number. Socrates continues:  
                                                     
166 ‘So a correspondence theorist will resist most forms of cognitive relativism. Nevertheless, 
one may query whether this really has to be the case. It is true that those currently defending 
correspondence theories of truth, for example Michael Devitt or John Searle, are avowed 
anti-relativists and explicitly use their correspondence theories to challenge various forms of 
relativism. Yet could there be a correspondence theorist who held to ontological relativity, 
that there is no one way the world is, and yet held that truth is correspondence with multiple 
realities?’ (O’Grady 2007: 40, my emphasis). I think this is precisely the position attributed 
to Protagoras by Plato, only that he does not speak of multiple realities (although this, too, 
might be implied at 160C), but of one reality that is constantly changing in relation to the 
perceiver. 
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On the other side, the appropriate class of perceived things shares a 
common origin (ὁμόγονον) with each set of perceptions: colors of every 
kind with seeings of every kind, sounds with hearings in the same way, 
and the other perceived things with the other perceptions, coming into 
being from the same origin (συγγενῆ γιγνόμενα). (156B7-C4) 
 
It turns out that all properties that things can be said to have are explained in the 
similar fashion, as a result of the intercourse of the relevant bodily organ with 
its object: ‘We must think of the other cases, too, in the same way: we must take 
it that nothing is hard, hot, or anything just by itself’ (156E8–157A1). The 
ontology of flux concerns all the properties that things can have: none of them 
have separate ‘being’ from the cognisant; rather, all of them are ‘offsprings’ of 
the two slow motions (the perceiving eye and the thing perceived, e.g. a stone, 
156D–E). This is, I think made obvious by the fact that after Socrates has 
finished the overview of the ontology of flux, he lists moral and aesthetic 
properties amongst the properties that are dependent from the perceiver: ‘Once 
again, then, tell me if you’re satisfied with this: nothing is good, beautiful, or 
any of the things we were going through just now, but things always come to be 
so?’ (157D7–9). If the ontology presented by Socrates, at 156A3–157C2, would 
concern only perceptual properties in the narrow sense, it would be a mystery 
why Theaetetus would call the inclusion of properties ‘good’ and ‘just’ under 
the heading of Secret Doctrine ‘extraordinarily reasonable’. It seems, then, that 
αἴσθησις is, in the discussion of the Secret Doctrine, implicitly taken to be 
broad in scope by both Theaetetus and Socrates. 
In the subsequent discussion of Protagoras’ doctrine, neither Socrates nor 
Theaetetus draw a clear line between the cognitive acts that require the use of 
bodily senses and the cognitive acts that do not. Dreaming (158E1ff.), desiring 
(156B6), fearing (156B6), thinking (158B4) and remembering (163D–164C) 
are all lumped together, thereby forming a single cognitive faculty that, 
according to Protagoras’ doctrine, is infallible and always about ‘what is’. This 
cognitive faculty is bound to its objects by necessity, since all the ‘per-
ceptions’ – i.e. the acts of believing, thinking, remembering and perceiving – 
are dependent on their objects, just as the objects are dependent on them. This 
leaves no room for falsity: 
 
Whenever I come to be perceiving, I necessarily come to be perceiving 
something (Ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος 
γίγνωμαι); because it’s impossible to come to be perceiving, but not to be 
perceiving anything (αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον, 
ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι). And whenever it comes to be sweet, bitter, or 
anything of that kind, it necessarily comes to be so for someone (τινὶ 
γίγνεσθαι), because it’s impossible to be sweet, but not sweet for anyone 
(μηδενὶ). (160A7-B3)  
 
Thus, according to the Secret Doctrine, Theaetetus’ αἴσθησις and Protagoras’ 
‘appearance’ come to mean the same thing. The Secret Doctrine understood 
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along these lines represents a specific understanding of how cognition works. 
And since it represents an interpretation of Theaetetus’ definition, it also ‘brings 
out to light’ (157D) what Theaetetus thinks about cognition in general. 
According to this model of cognition:  
(i)  αἴσθησις (or ‘appearance’) is a single cognitive faculty of the soul, com-
prising perception in the narrow sense, but also thinking, dreaming, 
fearing, etc;  
(ii)  each of the different αἰσθήσεις (or ‘appearances’) is attached to its proper 
object and there always is an object corresponding to an αἴσθησις (or 
‘appearance’); 
(iii)  αἴσθησις (or ‘appearance’) always involves a direct interaction with the 
sense organ and the object.  
In what follows, I will refer to it as the ‘aisthetic model of cognition’, since it 
fits well with the wide notion of αἴσθησις as an infallible state of mind that 
implies immediate contact with its object. Does the aisthetic model apply to 
beliefs, too? I think that it does and that applying this model to beliefs results in 
a particular (Protagorean) notion of belief that will be discarded in the Passage 
of the Commons.  
When Socrates is laying out the ontology of the Secret Doctrine, he does not 
mention beliefs. However, after the discussion of the ontology of the Secret 
Doctrine is complete, he quickly connects the Secret Doctrine with dreams, 
hallucinations and madness. Theaetetus agrees that in these cases people are 
usually thought to hold false beliefs (158B), e.g. that they are flying or that they 
are gods. Socrates points out to Theaetetus that the Secret Doctrine can account 
for these situations as well. One simply has to assume, with Protagoras, the 
beliefs held by Socrates-ill and the beliefs held by Socrates-well are not held by 
the same people: Socrates-ill is a different person from Socrates-well (159D). 
The αἴσθησις resulting from the collision of Socrates-ill with wine, results in an 
αἴσθησις of bitterness, whereas an αἴσθησις resulting from the collision of 
Socrates-well with of wine, results in αἴσθησις of sweetness. According to the 
Secret Doctrine, these perceptions of bitterness and sweetness are both true. The 
same applies to the cases of sleep, madness and hallucinating, beliefs, thoughts, 
etc. 
This suggests that Socrates and Theaetetus do not draw a clear line between 
αἰσθήσις and belief. It seems that cases of dreaming to fly and hallucinating 
being a god simply are beliefs (Sprute 1962: 36–42). This is why Socrates can 
easily rephrase claims made about perception and appearance in the Secret 
Doctrine into a claim that all beliefs are true (e.g. 161D, 167C-B). This claim 
can be substantiated by two considerations. The first consideration is textual. 
Throughout the discussion of Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine, Socrates slides 
between the verbs for ‘perceiving’, ‘appearing’, ‘holding a belief’ and 




So my perception is true for me – because it’s always of the being that’s 
mine (τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί ἐστιν) – and, as Protagoras said, it’s for me 
to decide (ἐγὼ κριτὴς), of the things that are for me, that/how they are, 
and of the things that are not, that/how they are not (τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ ὡς 
ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν). – Apparently. – Well then, if I’m 
free from falsehood (ἀψευδὴς), and don’t trip up in my thinking (διανοίᾳ) 
about the things that are, how could I fail to have knowledge of the things 
I’m a perceiver of (οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην ὧνπερ αἰσθητής)? (160C-D) 
 
Here Socrates does not distinguish between perceiving, deciding or judging and 
thinking. Similar slides occur elsewhere, e.g. 161D, 161E, 166E–167C. The 
Protagorean notion of ‘appearance’ covers very different forms of cognitive 
activity. And since perception, thinking, believing, etc. are all indiscriminately 
referred to as ‘appearances’, it is only natural that the limits between different 
types of appearances are very hazy, even non-existent.167 
Secondly, there is a philosophical consideration that supports making the 
connection between appearances, perception and beliefs very close. If per-
ceptions and beliefs were recognized as two different types of cognitive 
activity, then the Secret Doctrine would not offer Protagoras the support that 
Socrates assumes it does. For example, if beliefs were formed on the basis of or 
about perceptions and appearances, while being distinct from these perceptions 
and appearances, this would allow for mistaken beliefs about the very same 
perceptions and appearances. Socrates-ill, for example, could mistakenly judge 
that the wine tastes sweet (for him), whereas in fact it tastes bitter (for him). 
Protagoras insists that his Secret Doctrine licences the conclusion that all beliefs 
are true (167A–C). If perceptions, appearances and beliefs were taken to be 
different cognitive states then Protagoras would need an additional argument as 
to why the mechanics of αἴσθησις presented in his Secret Doctrine justifies his 
global relativism about belief. I think that the most natural way to read the text 
is to take Protagoras’ notions of perception, appearance and belief to have 
roughly the same extension (this is licensed and explained by the fact that 
Theaetetus’ notion of perception is broad). This is why Protagoras can gene-
ralise from perception to appearance to belief and claim that they are all 
infallible.  
The Protagorean notion of belief has the following characteristics that result 
from the aisthetic model of cognition. First, Protagoras (i.e. Socrates speaking 
for Protagoras) takes belief formation to be passive. Beliefs simply reflect how 
                                                     
167 There was a discussion in German literature (see Sprute (1962: 36–42), Ebert (1966), 
Sprute (1969)) whether δόξα, in the first part of the Theaetetus should be translated as 
Vorstellung or as Meinung. It seems that the text supports Sprute’s position, according to 
which it is not possible to draw a clear distinction between Vorstellung and Meinung in the 
first part of the Theaetetus. See also Lafrance (1981: 245–249). However, it is important to 
bear in mind that this vague notion of δόξα is not Plato’s own, but rather results from 
Protagoras’ and Theaetetus’ understanding of human cognition, i.e. it results from the 
aisthetic model of cognition. Socrates comes to a much clearer notion of δόξα in the Passage 
of the Commons, where he also implicitly criticizes the aisthetic model.  
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things appear to us. If the wine appears sweet to Socrates, Socrates also (by the 
same token) believes that the wine is sweet. There is no difference between 
wine appearing sweet and the belief according to which it is sweet, the two are 
identical. The same applies to properties that are not perceptual (in the narrow 
sense), like ‘just’, or ‘convincing’ (e.g. 172A). That beliefs are coextensive with 
what appears to us, whereas we remain passive is, I think, supported by the 
claim Protagoras makes in his defence speech. He implies that it is not even 
possible to have a belief that transcends one’s present experience, i.e. what 
someone passively (πάσχῃ) experiences. Beliefs are not formed in taking into 
account the possible alternative candidate-beliefs.  
 
It’s not that anyone ever makes someone whose beliefs are false (ψευδῆ 
δοξάζοντά) come, later on, to believe what’s true: after all, it isn’t 
possible to have in one’s belief the things which are not (οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ 
ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι), or anything other than what one’s experiencing, 
which is always true (οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ). 
(167A-B)  
 
Second important feature of Protagorean notion of belief is that (since belief-
formation is passive) one does not choose among possible propositions to 
believe. The beliefs just ‘come to’ one. All belief-formation is first-order, 
second-order considerations, like the question whether, (e.g.) I am in the right 
epistemic condition to form a belief that the wine is sweet do not play any role 
in forming beliefs. If something appears as sweet, I semi-automatically generate 
the relevant belief. More precisely, the appearance simply is belief. Forming 
beliefs is, for Protagoras, flat, it never involves second order considerations.168  
Thirdly, beliefs are atomistic for Protagoras, beliefs are not formed on the 
background of the other beliefs that the person holds. If something appears to 
me, at the moment, just or sweet, then I believe that this thing is just or sweet, 
regardless of all the other beliefs I might hold about these matters. As a matter 
of fact – and this where Protagoras’ theory is truly radical – a given person 
cannot have more than one belief, by acquiring a (new) belief a person becomes 
someone else. This is a consequence of Secret Doctrine’s ontology; the 
appearance (the belief) that the wine is sweet is just a momentary combination 
between the ‘slow movements’ of the tongue and the wine. Both the perception 
(the belief) and the quality perceived exist only for this particular moment. 
Protagoras goes even further; he denies the persistent identity of the subject in 
time: ‘So, for my part, I’ll never come to be perceiving any other thing in just 
this way; because there’s another perception for the thing and it makes the 
perceiver otherwise qualified and another thing’ (159E). This suggests that a 
person can receive only one appearance (belief, perception); if she is a subject 
of another appearance (belief, perception), she becomes a different person. 
Thus, beliefs are, for Protagoras, atomistic by definition.  
                                                     
168 I am borrowing this term from McCabe (2000: 35–36). My discussion of Protagorean 
notion of beliefs is heavily indebted to her. 
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As scholars have noticed (McCabe 2000, Ch. 1), these features of Prota-
gorean notion of belief pose a genuine threat to Socrates, since the Socratic 
method (as I showed in the previous section) relies on demonstrating 
inconsistencies within the framework of beliefs of the interlocutor. It requires 
that the interlocutor give up the beliefs found to be inconsistent with the rest of 
the beliefs that the interlocutor holds. Socrates requires that beliefs were not 
taken to be passive, flat and atomistic, but rather formed as a result of an active, 
reflective process, in relation with other beliefs held. Socrates recognizes that if 
Protagoras’ notion of belief is correct, his whole elenctic project is in jeopardy:  
 
I say nothing about my own case, and how much ridicule I’m bound to 
incur for my art of midwifery (τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς); and I 
suppose the same goes for the whole business of dialectic (σύμπασα ἡ τοῦ 
διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία). It must be (mustn’t it?) a long and protracted 
bit of foolery to set about inspecting (ἐπισκοπεῖν) and testing (ἐλέγχειν) 
one another’s appearing and beliefs (φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας), if 
everyone’s are correct (ὀρθὰς): as they are, if Protagoras’ Truth is true, 
and it wasn’t as a joke that it issued its oracular sayings from the book’s 
inner sanctum (161E–162A) 
 
Here Socrates emphasizes that elenchus would be pointless, if everyone’s 
beliefs are correct. But, of course, making beliefs into passive and atomic 
appearances is the price Protagoras has to pay in order to maintain that all 
beliefs are true. As soon as Protagoras allows for reflection about appearances 
and for genuine inconsistency between beliefs, he also allows for the possibility 
of false belief. Thus, by claiming that all beliefs are correct, Protagoras 
simultaneously commits himself to a passive and atomistic notion of belief. And 
passive and atomistic notion of belief makes Socratic elenchus pointless. I hope 
to show that, in the Passage of the Commons, Plato comes to reject all three 
Protagorean characteristics of belief. Plato will show that belief-formation is not 
passive, nor are beliefs flat and atomistic. 
Before turning to that passage, it is important to note that the subsequent 
refutation of Protagoras does not have to mean that Theaetetus is forced to 
abandon the aisthetic model of cognition. The arguments are not directed 
against this general model of cognition, but rather focus on specific problematic 
aspects of Protagoras’ theory. Namely, that the theory will be in trouble in case 
it has to account for beliefs that range over other beliefs, and similarly in case of 
beliefs about the future. It is furthermore shown that the doctrine of universal 
flux results in Theaetetus’ initial definition coming out both true and false. 
None of these arguments address the general picture of cognition that underlies 
Theaetetus’ definition. This is only natural, since the interlocutor defending 
Protagoras is Theodorus and not Theaetetus. 
 There are three sets of arguments against Protagoras in the dialogue (not 
taking into account the arguments of ‘logic-chopping’ and the arguments 
relying on ‘plausibility’ at 160B–165E). First is the infamous self-refutation 
argument (169D–170D). I will not go into the details of this very complex and 
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controversial argument. What is uncontroversial, however, is that the self-
refutation argument is directed at Protagoras’ claim that all beliefs are true. The 
self-refutation results if Protagoras’ allows beliefs (or judgments) to range over 
other beliefs (or judgments) and be true (for the people who hold them). If one 
focuses on Protagoras’ own belief that all beliefs are true (for the people who 
hold them) then this results in the following. Protagoras’ will have to admit that 
the beliefs of the majority who believe that his belief, namely that all beliefs are 
true, is false, is true (for the people who hold them). Which means that 
Protagoras himself has to admit that his belief, namely that all beliefs are true, is 
false (for the people who hold this belief). The main question of interpretation is 
whether Socrates is justified in omitting the clause in parenthesis and 
concluding that the Measure Doctrine is false for Protagoras, too.169 Be that as it 
may, the Self-Refutation argument demonstrates that there are appearances 
(beliefs) that Protagoras cannot allow to be infallible, namely beliefs about 
beliefs.  
The ‘argument of the future’ (172E–173B and 177C–179D) restricts the 
truth of beliefs to present experiences – two conflicting beliefs about future 
(involving terms like good or useful) cannot both be true. Socrates claims that 
the belief of a layman about whether he is going to have a fever ‘and that degree 
of heat’ (178C) and a contradictory belief (that the layman is not going to have 
a fever) held by a doctor, cannot both be true. The gist of the argument is that 
the doctor is going to be right about what it will seem or appear to the layman 
later on, whereas the layman will be wrong (by his own lights). Socrates uses as 
examples the narrow perceptual qualities like the doctor and the fever (178C3–
8), vine grower and the sweetness of wine (178D1), musician and being in tune 
(178D4–7), cook and the pleasantness of dinner (178D7–9). But then, without 
any warning, he goes on to talk about Protagoras himself and the convincing-
ness of speeches (178E6–7) and legislation. Clearly Socrates does not draw a 
sharp distinction between narrow perceptual properties and properties like 
‘just’. Socrates’ point is that beliefs about what will appear in the future cannot 
all be true. He further argues that some properties, like usefulness (179A), are 
essentially tied to the future, and therefore all beliefs about these properties 
(even if these beliefs are not explicitly about future time) cannot be true170. In 
conclusion, Socrates says that this argument does not apply to ‘each person’s 
present experience’ (179C). Commentators (e.g. McDowell 1973: 120) think 
that here a clear line between perceptual and non-perceptual predicates is finally 
drawn. However, it is likely that ‘the present experience’ also applies to 
properties like just, since these properties are not essentially tied to what will 
transpire in the future (177D), unlike properties such as usefulness.  
                                                     
169 Fine (1998) argues convincingly that the argument is valid if Protagoras’ position is taken 
to be infallibilism and not relativism of truth. A more complex defence of Plato’s argument 
can be found in Burnyeat (1976b). 
170 See Puster (1993), who thinks that the whole ‘argument of the future’ relies on the notion 
of a ‘dispositional property’. 
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What about the argument against the doctrine according to which everything 
flows (181C–183B)? Is it conceivable that Theaetetus (in the Passage of the 
Commons) still holds on to the aisthetic model of perception, even after the flux 
theory has been refuted? The aisthetic model of cognition was initially built on 
the ontology of flux of the Secret Doctrine. As with most passages in the 
Theaetetus, scholars have very different opinions on how the flux theory is 
refuted. Some think that it is refuted by showing that universal flux makes 
meaningful language impossible, 171  some think it is because flux makes 
dialectic impossible.172 For the present purposes it suffices to point out that the 
theory of flux that is refuted at 181C–183B is actually more radical version of 
the theory than its counterpart presented at 156A–157E. Here the flux theorists 
claim that everything is constantly changing in every way, whiteness is 
constantly becoming not-whiteness and seeing is constantly becoming not-
seeing. Nothing like this was ever stated in the original version of the theory. 
The original version seemingly allowed seeings and other perceptions to remain 
identical for at least some time. Thus, it seems that one could easily hold on to 
the basic features of the aisthetic model of cognition without holding on to the 
theory of radical flux.  
It is quite plausible that Theaetetus holds on to the basic features of the 
aisthetic model of perception by the time of the final (second) refutation of his 
definition ‘knowledge is perception’. He still takes all human cognition to 
involve a direct awareness of its objects and he still takes all human cognition to 
fall under the same genus, whether it be ‘appearance’ or ‘perception’. In the 
Passage of the Commons Socrates shows that both these assumptions are false. 
However, since Socrates is methodically barren, he cannot simply tell 
Theaetetus to give up these assumptions. He rather relies on Theaetetus 
framework of beliefs in posing his questions, so that Theaetetus himself can 
acquire the insight that cognition is a diverse phenomenon and that not all acts 
of cognition involve direct awareness of their objects.  
 
 
3. Perception in the Passage of the Commons 
It might be objected that if ‘perception’ is taken to be broad in scope throughout 
the discussion up to 184B, then the final argument at 186C-E, which attacks the 
narrow notion of ‘perception’ (seeing, hearing, smelling and feeling hot and 
cold) would simply be equivocating on the notion of ‘perception’. The 
argument would purport to show that Theaetetus’ original definition ‘know-
ledge is perception’ (in the broad sense) is false by showing that ‘knowledge is 
not perception’ (in the narrow sense), thus resulting in a fallacy of equivocation. 
However, this objection does not take into account the specific features of 
Socratic midwifery. Not only does Socrates critically test (elenchus) the theses 
put forward by his interlocutor, he also helps to deliver the definition in the 
                                                     
171 Most recently it has been maintained by Silverman (2000). 
172 Sedley (2004: 89–104)   
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sense of providing determinate content to the definitions. How does this help to 
answer the above objection? Quite simply – we are dealing with two different 
interpretations of Theaetetus’ definition (the definition itself was vague enough 
to allow for to interpretations). 
Socrates statement at the beginning of the Passage of the Commons is in a 
way quite remarkable. He says that he will have to, by means of his midwifery, 
‘deliver Theaetetus of what he had conceived on the subject of knowledge (ὧν 
κυεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολῦσαι) (184B1–2). 
The reason why this is remarkable is that earlier, after having introduced the 
Secret Doctrine (160D–E), Socrates had claimed that the first stage of his 
midwifery on Theaetetus first definition is already complete, that the newborn 
has been delivered and now begins the second stage of testing whether the 
newborn is ‘real or phantom’. Why does he then later on say that he will deliver 
what Theaetetus has conceived,173 implying that the birth of the newborn is not 
finished after all? It seems that the Passage of the Commons is intended to be 
read as an independent maieutic episode, comprising both stages: first Socrates 
gives a novel interpretation of Theaetetus’ definition and then proceeds to show 
that even on this novel interpretation the definition is false. This means, 
however, that the maieutic procedure on the first newborn (i.e. the first 
interpretation) is already finished. And this, in turn, means that there is a 
difference between the two interpretations of the definition and of the concept 
of αἴσθησις involved in the definition. In this way one can avoid attributing 
Plato a fallacious argument while maintaining that there is a difference in the 
notion of ‘perception’ as it is used in the Passage of the Commons, and as it is 
used in the preceding argument. 
If I am correct about Socrates’ method of midwifery, then we should expect 
to find the following. Socrates has to offer a new interpretation of Theaetetus’ 
definition, since the interpretation of Theaetetus’ definition (as implying 
Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine and the Secret Doctrine) has been refuted. Again, 
Theaetetus has to commit himself to this interpretation, and then consider 
whether perception, on this interpretation, is the same as knowledge. I think that 
the stretch of the text from 184B6–184E7 establishes a new interpretation of the 
crucial notion of ‘perception’. The ensuing argument at 184E7–187A11 shows 
that perception understood in this sense is not knowledge. I will show at the end 
of this section that one has to be careful in attributing this novel notion of 
perception to Plato himself. The discussion takes place under the assumption 
that knowledge is perception (Socrates reminds Theaetetus of that at 184B3–6), 
and this assumption (which Plato obviously does not accept) enforces certain 
claims made about perception in the Passage of the Commons, most 
conspicuously the claim that each sense perceives only its proper objects. 
                                                     
173 The verb ἀπόλλῡμι means to ‘to lose’, ‘to ruin’, ‘perish’ (Liddell-Scott), but in this 
context it likely means ‘to deliver’. Socrates does emphasize that Theaetetus is still pregnant 
(Θεαίτητον ὧν κυεῖ), which would be irrelevant if Socrates had only in mind the testing of a 
new-born (that has already been delivered). This is indeed how McDowell (1973: 65), 
Levett/Burnyeat (1990: 314) and Schleiermacher/Becker (2007: 139) translate this sentence.  
126 
In developing a novel conception of ‘perception’ Socrates first makes a 
distinction that is somewhat difficult to comprehend. He asks Theaetetus 
whether it is correct to say that a man hears high and low and sees white and 
black ‘with’ the ears and eyes (Ὄμμασί τε καὶ ὠσίν, later Socrates speaks more 
abstractly of ‘with what’ i.e. τῷ, both expressions are in dative). Theaetetus is 
inclined to say that it is, indeed, with the eyes that one sees. Socrates goes on to 
contrast the expression in dative with another expression that is quite similar in 
meaning, namely the (δι' οὗ) (διά+genitive). Socrates apologizes for paying too 
much attention to the expressions used, but insists that the distinction he is 
about to make is important. Theaetetus decides (with some help from Socrates, 
since Socrates has uncharacteristically hinted that Theaetetus’ previous answer 
was not correct, 184C5) that the latter expression is actually more accurate, 
namely that it is ‘by means of’ the eyes that we see. What is the intended 
difference between these the two semantically close expressions? What 
difference does it make to say that we see with our eyes or that we see by means 
of our eyes? Socrates’ question sounds innocent and, on the first sight, seeks to 
identify the instrument that a man uses in perceiving. No doubt this is also the 
way Theaetetus first understands him, since the agent involved in seeing and 
hearing is identified as ‘a man’ (184B9), at least for the time being. Why would 
Theaetetus rethink his earlier suggestion and consider the διά+genitive 
construction to be more accurate? This depends on what the difference between 
these two grammatical expressions – ‘by means of which’ and ‘with what’ – 
amounts to.174  
The dative seems to be used in the instrumental sense175 and the preposition 
διά+genitive can mean both ‘through’ in the spatial sense (the senses are the 
medium of perception, as in ‘through the door’), but also in instrumental sense 
(as in ‘by means of a hammer’). From the grammatical point of view, Socrates 
might be distinguishing between two kinds of instrumentality,176 one expressed 
by dative and the other by διά+genitive (since both of these constructions do 
convey instrumentality). The meanings of the expressions are very close.177 
Thus, it seems that the only way to understand the difference between the two 
expressions is to see what Socrates says next. 
The use of the dative to describe the function of eyes and ears is quite 
common in Greek,178 and therefore Socrates can simply be picking up on an 
everyday expression. But taking into account the preceding discussion (as 
Socrates, near the beginning of the Passage of the Commons, suggests that we 
                                                     
174 The following is heavily indebted to Burnyeat (1976). 
175 ‘The Greek dative, as representative of the lost instrumental case, denotes by which or 
with which an action is done or accompanied.’ (Smyth 1954: 346) 
176 This is proposed by Campbell: ‘The difference between between ᾧ and δι’ οὗ, direct and 
indirect instrumentality, is obvious but difficult to render exactly.’ (Campbell 1862:158) 
177 ‘‘Only a nuance' is indeed the express verdict of one of the grammarians cited earlier, 
Jean Humbert, in his work La disparition du datif en grec (Paris 1930), 116–17.’ (Burnyeat 
1976: 38). 
178 Burnyeat (1976) 
127 
should do) one recognizes that the ‘with’ idiom was used in the discussion of 
the Secret Doctrine to describe the process of perceiving (e.g. 165C1–3). This 
points towards the fact that Socrates is well aware that Theaetetus tends to think 
of perception (and cognition in general) along the lines of the Secret Doctrine 
and that Socrates is trying to help Theaetetus to ‘give birth’ to the notion of 
perception that differs from the notion of perception that was in play in the 
Secret Doctrine. Further, it is important to notice that even here it is not obvious 
that Socrates is addressing ‘perception’ in the narrow sense – it could just as 
well be that seeing and hearing serve as paradigmatic cases of the broad notion 
of perception. Having in mind the clear-cut notion of sense perception 
expressed at 186D10-E3, it is easy to ignore the dynamics of the discussion. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that this clear-cut notion of sense perception 
is something that the passage achieves rather than assumes. However, both the 
exact scope and nature of perception as well as distinction between the two 
expressions ‘with’ and ‘by means of which’ is still, at 184C, rather vague. 
The meaning of this distinction becomes much clearer from Socrates’ next 
question:  
 
S: Yes, because it would surely be strange (δεινὸν) if we had a multitude 
senses/perceptions sitting in us, as if in wooden horses (εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν 
ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται), and it wasn't the case 
that all those things converged (πάντα ταῦτα συντείνει) on some one kind of 
thing (ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν), a mind/soul or whatever one ought to 
call it (εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅτι δεῖ καλεῖν): something with which we perceive all 
the perceived [things] by means of them as if by means of instruments (ᾗ διὰ 
τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά). T: Yes, I think the second 
alternative is better than the first. 
 
Socrates says that it would be strange or terrible (δεινὸν) if several αἰσθήσεις 
would be sitting in us and not converge to some one thing i.e. the soul. It is for 
this reason it is better to think of senses as those ‘by means of which’ we 
perceive, rather than ‘with which’ we perceive. Now, why would it be terrible if 
we perceived ‘with’ the many senses? The point seems to be the following: if 
one says that it is the eyes a man sees with, then one is, at least implicitly, 
saying that the eyes are the subjects or agents of perception.179 The Greek dative 
can function so as to express the subject of an action and does not have to be 
taken ‘instrumentally’.180 The wooden horse analogy then says that if ‘a man’ 
                                                     
179 This conclusion is brilliantly presented by Burnyeat (1976). However, roughly the same 
conclusion, namely that the dative should here be taken as designating the subject or the 
agent of perception, is arrived at already by Schmidt (1878) and also by Heidegger (2002). 
Burnyeat probably was not aware of the second of these texts (since Heidegger’s lecture 
series on the Theaetetus, though held in 1931, was published only after Burnyeat’s article). 
180‘Der griechische Dative hat, wie Rumpel in seiner Casuslehre S. 261 in überzeugender 
Weise nachgewiesen hat, die Grundbedeutung ‘er sei es, dem in die Satzsubstanz liegende 
Gedankenbewegung gelte, dem sie angehöre’. Diese Bedeutung fühlte der Grieche auch 
noch in dem sogenannten instrumentalen Dativ oder dem Dativ mit der Ablativleitung durch, 
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sees with eyes (and similarly with other ‘perceptions’ or ‘senses’), this makes 
the single subject of perception impossible; we would rather have a multiplicity 
of perceivers within each body. It is as if all senses were acting as autonomous 
agents within a wooden horse (‘a man’) that is itself insatiate. As Heidegger 
succinctly puts it: if senses are agents, then this means that there is ‘nobody 
there to perceive’ (2002: 124). There has to be something; namely, the soul 
towards which all perceptions ‘converge’, and the ‘with-idiom’ is supposed 
capture this intuition.  
This brings us to the διά+genitive construction. This idiom is supposed to 
capture the role played by the senses in the perceptual act. There are two 
possible ways to understand this expression: (a) by διά+genitive Socrates means 
that senses are the instruments the soul (as an agent) uses in perception, or (b) 
that it is through the senses, in the spatial sense, that the soul (as an agent) 
perceives.181 The present passage speaks strongly in favour of the instrumental 
reading. Socrates refers to each bodily sense ‘by means’ of which we perceive, 
as ὄργανον, a term that usually refers to equipment.182  
Plato does not say much about what he takes the notion of the soul to 
involve. It seems that he deliberately leaves this notion vague (‘the soul or 
whatever we ought to call it’). Thus it seems useless to make conjectures 
whether he has in mind only the rational part of the soul or all three parts of the 
soul, or whether he abandons the notion of the parts of the soul altogether. The 
passage does not address this issue, leaving it thus undetermined. What Plato is 
after is to point out that we all assume (there is no argument in the text, all that 
Socrates says is that the opposite case would be ‘strange’) that the bodily senses 
themselves cannot be agents. Further, it is important for the ensuing argument 
that the agent would be capable of comparing or relating the input from the 
different senses. We are obviously capable of doing this. Thus, I do not think 
that Plato is making an important philosophical point about the parts of the soul 
(which are never mentioned in the Theaetetus). He is simply conducting his 
argument based on premises Theaetetus (and the readers) are willing to accept 
as commonsensical (i.e. not ‘strange’). The ‘with’ idiom is supposed to capture 
                                                                                                                                  
wenn er sich auch derselben im gewöhnlichen Gebrauche nicht bewusst war’ (Schmidt 1877: 
519–520).  
181 There are, actually, more possibilities: ‘And it is not too difficult to persuade oneself that the 
'through' idiom is, in fact, ambiguous, that there are two distinct senses of the Greek διὰ or the 
English 'through' which might be involved in the present context: (i) a spatial sense concerned 
(literally or figuratively) with the passage taken by a process through a space, and (ii) a causal 
one (in the grammarians' sense of 'causal') concerned with the means through which something 
is brought about, this causal sense in turn being subdivided according as the means in question 
is (a) an animate agent through whom one acts or (b) an inanimate thing, e.g. a piece of 
equipment, through which a certain result is effected.’ (Burnyeat 1976: 37) 
182Campbell says (and many scholars approve of this claim): ‘The term ‘organ of sense’ 
perhaps originates with this passage’ (Campbell 1862: 158). However, Plato refers to eyes as 
sense-organs already in the Republic (508B3), saying that they are the most sun-like on 
organs (tools, equipment) of αἰσθήσεις: ἡλιοειδέστατόν γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις 
ὀργάνων. 
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this commonsensical belief that one should distinguish between the senses that 
are used in perceiving and the agent that uses them.  
When Socrates refers to the soul’s activity by means of the αἰσθήσεις, does 
he refer exclusively to perceptions by means of the five senses or does he still 
take perceptions to be infinite in number (including fears, pleasures, thinking 
and remembering)? I think that perhaps the best way to characterize the 
situation is that Socrates is slowly acquiring Theaetetus’ consent in order to 
narrow perception down to the five senses (i.e. αἴσθησις in the narrow sense). 
Theaetetus still thinks that perception covers the wide variety of cognitive acts 
(fearing, etc.). All he agrees to, at the moment, is that a man uses eyes and ears 
as instruments in seeing and hearing. There is nothing really controversial about 
that, and it is easy to understand why Theaetetus would agree with this. 
Theaetetus has also agreed with Socrates’ proposal that every act of perception 
involves some sort of instrument. But it is important to see that this does not yet 
commit him to any specific kind of instrument. Indeed, in case of seeing and 
hearing the instruments are eyes and ears. But when Socrates mentions, in the 
wooden horse analogy, that there would be πολλαί αἰσθήσεις sitting in us, he is, 
I think deliberately ambiguous as to the exact nature of the αἰσθήσεις. The term 
πολλαί does not usually mean ‘several’ (as, for example, in McDowell’s 
translation). It refers to a great number or a multitude (see Chappell 2004, ad 
loc.). Therefore, it would be wrong to maintain that there is a clear-cut notion of 
‘sense’ (as in ‘five senses’) in play already here. Socrates refers back to the 
unlimited number of αἰσθήσεις (156B7–8) from the Secret Doctrine. He is 
claiming that all perception takes place ‘by means of’ an instrument. What the 
instrument might be is left unspecified.  
By 184C7 Socrates has secured Theaetetus’ agreement concerning the 
‘instrumental’ nature of perception. Next, Socrates makes another crucial 
move – he connects all perceptual instruments to the body. Up to now Socrates 
has been discussing seeing and hearing, pointing out that they always involve an 
instrument. Now Socrates wants to know whether Theaetetus thinks that the 
instrument involved is something that always belongs to the body as an 
instrument.  
 
S. If the question is put to you, will you be able to refer everything of that sort 
to the body (ἕξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν)? But 
perhaps it would be better that you should state the point by answering 
questions, rather than I should interfere on your behalf. Tell me this. Take the 
things by means of which you perceive [things which are] hot, hard, light, and 
sweet (θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι᾽ ὧν αἰσθάνῃ). You classify 
each of them [the organs] as belonging to the body, don't you (τοῦ σώματος 
ἕκαστα τίθης)? Or do you think they belong to something else? T. No, they 
belong to nothing else. (184D6–E7) 
 
The important thing to notice is that in the previous passage Socrates was 
limiting the range of objects of perception by insisting that only what is 
perceived by means of an instrument is genuinely perceptible, whereas here he 
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follows the converse route. He seeks to identify the nature of the instrument in 
reference to its object. Socrates offers Theaetetus a set of properties (hot, hard, 
light and sweet), and asks whether all these belong to the things (i.e. the 
instruments) that ‘belong to the body’ or are ‘of the body’ (τοῦ σώματος). 
Theaetetus agrees. What he agrees to, apparently, is that in perception one 
always uses some sort of bodily instrument. Thus we have two important and 
novel claims here: there is a single enduring soul that is the subject of 
perception and this soul always, in perceiving, uses a bodily organ as an 
instrument. I think that at this point the narrow notion of αἴσθησις has finally 
began to emerge – Theaetetus admits that only those acts of the soul that have 
bodily instruments count as perceptual. And it is reasonable to assume that fears 
or emotions, for example, do not have bodily instruments like seeing, hearing 
and tasting do. It does not seem to make much sense to ask for the organ by 
means of which one feels fear or by means of which one thinks. The novel 
(narrow) notion of αἴσθησις has the following important features: 
(i) an enduring soul is the agent of perception; 
(ii) the soul always perceives ‘by means of’ the body. 
These two claims are opposed to the Secret Doctrine’s notion of perception. 
Most notably, the assumption that there is a single agent in all perception is 
fundamentally alien to the Protagorean notion of how perception works. In 
several passages, in which Socrates develops the Secret Doctrine (e.g. 153E4–
154A3, 156C1–4, 156E1–157A3, 159E8-B4), perception is taken to be an 
isolated event (fast change), taking place between the slow movements of a 
sense-organ (eye) and its object (e.g. the stone). Nowhere in the discussion does 
Socrates mention mind or soul in relation to perception. In fact, Socrates makes 
it clear that the person perceiving is just a part of the perceptual event (and 
nothing over and above), and is different in each perceptual situation (159E1–
160A4). Here, by contrast, Socrates stresses (184D8) that there is indeed the 
same thing (αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ)183 that is involved in each perceptual act that 
involves black and white, and other things. This means, in contrast to the Secret 
Doctrine, that there is something that remains identical throughout different 
perceptual acts.184 Further, it is stressed that perceptual acts always involve the 
                                                     
183 The phrase is somewhat difficult, but the sense seems to be that it is indeed the same 
thing with which we get at different perceptual objects. Schleiermacher, for example 
tanslates: ‘ob wir mit mit einem und demselben in uns...’ (Becker 2007: 141) and Narcy 
‘quelque chose que nous est propre, quelque chose d’identique...’ (1995: 228). Levett/ 
Burnyeat has ‘one and the same part of ourselves’. McDowell completely under-translates 
this expression with ‘with which’. 
184  This is where Burnyeat memorably says (in a passage quoted in the Introduction): 
‘Plato’s achievement [is] in arriving at the first unambiguous statement in the history of 
philosophy of the difficult but undoubtedly important idea of the unity of consciousness.’ 
(Burnyeat 1990: 58) As a matter of fact, Burnyeat was not the first to make this point 
(although in the English speaking literature he is usually the only scholar referred to in this 
context). D. Peipers, for one, also sees the importance of the passage in its emphasis on the 
unity of consciousness, i.e. Einheit des Bewusstseins or Einheit des Seelenslebens, ‘mit 
diesem is die einfachste, primitivste Akt geschildert die ein Erleben für die Seele möglich 
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body, a claim that was never made in the context of the Secret Doctrine (for the 
simple reason that the Secret Doctrine did not distinguish between the soul and 
the body). 
 What about the objects of perception: do we see white and black things or do 
we simply see white and black (color)? The last option would indicate that at 
least some aspects of the Secret Doctrine’s notion of perception still hold. 
Burnyeat (1976), for example, insists that it is indeed the white and black things 
Socrates is referring to, and that Secret Doctrine has been completely 
abandoned. As evidence for this he cites the use of the verb ἐφικνέομαι (184D8) 
which has the meaning ‘reach out’ or ‘extend’ (McDowell translates ‘get at’), 
which, according to Burnyeat, should be read as ‘the soul gaining access to the 
world’ (1976: 42).  
 However, Socrates claims that the soul has access to white and black by 
means of eyes and to other things with other instruments. This indicates that 
Socrates is talking about white and black (color), since white and black things 
are obviously accessible to other senses (see McDowell 1973 ad loc.). Socrates 
therefore seems to restrict visual perception to colors, not to colored things. By 
parity of reasoning, the same restriction should apply to other senses as well 
(e.g. we hear sounds and not the things that make these sounds). According to 
the first possibility, Plato is advancing the ‘Proper-Object-Theory’ of perception 
– each sense is confined to its proper objects. For example, the sight sees only 
colors and the like, and the hearing hears only sounds and the like. The second 
reading, inaugurated by Burnyeat (1976, 1990), takes the scope of perception to 
be much broader. It includes material objects (e.g. houses) and cross-modal 
perceptual features (e.g. shape). This conforms well to common sense, and to 
the way Plato usually talks about sense perception – we see things, colors, and 
shapes. Which reading should we prefer? 
This is an important question. An answer is required in order to determine 
whether all claims about perception made in the Passage of the Commons are 
supported by Plato himself, or whether the novel interpretation of the notion of 
‘perception’ still assumes that Theaetetus’ definition holds. In the latter case not 
all claims made about perception by Socrates should be attributed to Plato 
himself.  
In the next section of the dialogue (191B–194E, see esp. 192D), Socrates 
and Theaetetus speak of perceiving (seeing and hearing) things and persons. 
Thus, if the theory of perception laid out in the Passage of the Commons 
precludes perceiving things and requires that only colors are seen and only 
sounds heard, there is good reason to think that the theory of perception of the 
Passage of the Commons is dependent on the previous discussion and especially 
on the assumption that perception is knowledge. 
The best way to determine which of these options is correct is to take a 
closer look at what the scope of perception should be in order for the ensuing 
                                                                                                                                  
macht’ (Peipers 1874: 531). In general, Peiper’s intepretation of the Passage of the 
Commons is quite similar to Burnyeat’s. 
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argument to be valid. What are the limits of perception the argument assumes? 
What can we be said to perceive? The premise of the argument is the following: 
‘Will you also be willing to agree that if you perceive something by means of 
one power, it’s impossible to perceive the same [thing] by means of another’ 
(184E6–185A1). From this premise, then, it is argued to the conclusion that ‘it’s 
impossible to get hold of what they [sound and color] have in common either by 
means of hearing or by means of sight’ (185B7–9). The passage sets the limits 
to what can be perceived. It is then stated that ‘common’ features of objects of 
both sight and hearing cannot be apprehended by sight and hearing, 
respectively. Theaetetus concludes (185E1–3) that these features are not 
apprehended by the senses at all. Not only is it not possible to apprehend the 
sameness or difference ‘about’ both sound and color, but it is also not possible 
to apprehend the sameness or difference of two colors (‘everything’ at 185C5–
7). 
The impossibility of a given sense to have access to the objects of another is 
a principle the whole argument is built on. The problem is, though, that the 
principle limiting the senses to their sets of objects is somewhat ambiguous. The 
statement: ‘if you perceive something by means of one power, it’s impossible to 
perceive the same [thing] by means of another’ can be interpreted in two 
different ways:  
The Proper Object Theory: the senses are restricted to their proper objects; 
there is nothing that can be perceived by two or more senses.  
The Common Sense Theory: the senses have two kinds of objects, some 
accessible through several senses, some accessible by only one sense. 
By ‘common sense’ I mean simply what people are usually (in their un-
philosophical moments) inclined to think about perception, and not Aristotle’s 
theory of ‘common sense’, as presented in De Anima (III.1–2.) and De Sensu. I 
will now argue that the attempts to construe the argument as based on the 
Common Sense Theory fail and it has to be accepted that the argument relies on 
the Proper Object Theory. According to the Common Sense Theory,185 there are 
things that one can see only through sight, i.e. colors. But there are also objects 
and features of objects both visible and accessible to other senses. According to 
Burnyeat (who is the main proponent of the Common Sense Theory about the 
                                                     
185 In what follows I will focus on Burnyeat’s version of the Common Sense Theory. ‘P2: 
Colours and features of colours which are perceived through sight cannot also be perceived 
through hearing, sounds and features of sounds which are perceived through hearing cannot 
also be perceived through sight, and similarly with other senses’ (Burnyeat 1990: 56–57). 
Burnyeat concludes: ‘It follows even from the weaker principle P2 that it cannot be through 
either sight or hearing that we are aware of the common features mentioned in our example. 
It cannot be through hearing if sameness and the rest are features of a colour, and it cannot 
be through sight if they are features of sound. Some third mode of apprehension must be 
involved. The next step is to argue that the third mode of apprehension is itself perceptual 
only if we can find a sense or a sense organ giving access to the feature in question. /--/ But 
no bodily organ or sense can be found to give access to the common features in our example. 
As a later philosopher would put it, there is no such thing as an impression of being or of 
sameness or of unity.’ (Burnyeat 1990:58) 
133 
Passage of the Commons), Plato focuses in the argument on ‘proper sensibles’, 
but that does not mean that they are the only objects we can be said to perceive. 
Thus the premise of Socrates’ argument is that each ‘proper sensible’ is 
(perceptually) accessible to the soul by means of only one sense-modality. 
Besides there being proper and common objects of the senses, there are also 
‘proper’ and ‘common’ features186 of these sensibles. A shape is a common 
feature of a common sensible, a table, for example. It is a common feature in the 
sense that it can be both seen and felt, of an object that can also be both seen 
and felt. In addition, there are also features of things that are proper to one sense 
only, for example, the color of this particular table. Thus common sensibles can 
have both common features and proper features. Proper sensibles also have 
features – colors can have shade, which is a proper feature of the same (visual) 
sense modality, but colors also have (crucially) difference or sameness in 
relation to other colors. What the argument claims, according to Burnyeat, is 
that if there are features shared by proper sensibles (such as sameness or 
difference), these features themselves cannot be perceived by any of the senses, 
because the features of proper sensibles are either proper features or they are not 
sensible at all. ‘Being’ and ‘sameness’, as features shared by proper objects (but 
not themselves proper features) cannot be perceived. It is not difficult to see that 
this argument, in order to reach the conclusion, needs an additional premise: all 
perceptual features of proper sensibles are themselves also necessarily proper 
objects of the same sense modality or they are not perceptible at all.  
But is this principle plausible? Why can't it be the case that in case of sight 
we see the shape of a color, and in case of touch we touch the shape of a 
(tangible) table? Shape, in this case, would be a shared (common) feature of 
proper sensibles that is itself a perceptible feature. Another assumption seems 
to be necessary to block this possibility: if F common perceptual feature of x, 
then, for every F and every x, F has to be perceivable by more than one sense. 
But this principle is obviously false. Shape is a common feature, but we cannot, 
e.g. touch the shape of a color-patch. We cannot have access to the shape of a 
color patch by means of any other sense than sight. Almost every (Aristotelian) 
common sensible 187  - shape, number, movement - can be such that it is 
sometimes (in regard to certain objects) perceivable by only one sense, and not 
the others. Common features are not the kinds of features that are always 
perceivable by means of more than one sense; it is enough that they are 
sometimes accessible by means of more than one sense. This is a major problem 
for the Common Sense Theory: why can't being, difference and sameness be 
common (perceptual) features of the proper objects 188 ? There seems to be 
nothing in the argument to rule this possibility out.189 
                                                     
186 The term ‘feature’ is meant to be taken very loosely, i.e. anything that ‘can be said of 
something’. Thus feature is not necessarily a predicate. 
187 De an. III, 1 (425A16–18) 
188 ‘If ‘feature of a proper object’ is construed quite broadly, the ‘weak’ premiss appears to 
be as strong as Plato's formulation. If ‘feature of a proper object’ is narrowly construed so as 
to exclude relational and contextual features of the proper object, it will turn out that some of 
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The problem evaporates if one takes the argument to rely on the Proper 
Object Theory. This theory says that all the senses are confined to their proper 
objects, i.e. the objects of a given sense are never accessible (to the soul) by 
means of any other sense. Common sensibles are not allowed at all, and for this 
reason being and sameness cannot be perceptual features, because they are 
common to objects of two or more different senses. According to the Proper 
Object Theory, being and sameness are either proper sensibles or not 
perceivable. Since they are not proper sensibles (they are common to proper 
objects), they are not perceivable. It follows that they cannot be perceived tout 
court and they have to be apprehended by means of another cognitive 
capacity.190 
The argument for the imperceptibility of commons requires the Proper 
Object Theory. The question becomes, now, what grounds does Socrates have 
for expecting Theaetetus to accept it? Some have claimed that this just is how 
Plato conceives of perception – that he actually endorses the Proper Object 
Theory of perception, and it is therefore natural for Plato to have Theaetetus 
accept without further ado191. But this is unlikely. First, it is by no means clear 
                                                                                                                                  
the κοινά mentioned in the argument (e.g., difference, usefulness) are not features of proper 
objects in the relevant sense, in which case the weak premiss is too weak to do the work 
required of it.’ (Modrak 1981: 37) 
189 A similar problem faces the accounts (McDowell 1973, Silverman 1990, Lorenz 2006) 
that try to make the cognitive act of thinking about both sound and color to be sufficient for 
the argument to work. Granted, thoughts about both sound and color cannot be accounted for 
by any individual sense. This is a fact about thoughts of this kind. The fact that the being of 
color and sound is imperceptible might simply be due to the special nature of these thoughts, 
namely that in thinking we can have both sound and color ‘present for the mind’, although 
there is no occurrent perception of them. Why must we conclude from this that being is a 
non-perceptual feature? It might simply be non-perceptual in this particular case (in thoughts 
involving objects of different senses). To put the point in another way, the sample thought 
involves three terms, ‘sound’, ‘color’ and ‘is’. Shouldn’t one also infer, by parity of 
reasoning that ‘sound’ and ‘color’ (as objects of thought or concepts) are also not perceptual, 
inasmuch there is something we think about both of them (this conclusion is actually 
endorsed in Silverman 1990)? This would completely destroy the desired contrast between 
perceptual features and common features. 
190A small addition is necessary in order to disprove the (rather unlikely) possibility that one 
particular sense could have access to the ‘commons’. ‘It appears theoretically possible, if not 
very plausible, that we see, for example, existence, even though this existence attaches to 
sounds and objects of other senses as well as to colors. Thus it appears theoretically possible 
that existence is the object of just one sense – say the sense of sight’ (Holland 1973: 105). 
Why can't the sense of smell ‘have access’ to features of colors? Empirical grounds 
obviously will not do, since they would in one way or another be question-begging. Here’s 
Holland’s additional premise that that yields the argument valid: ‘A2: Whatever both is an 
object of just one sense and is applicable to an object which is an object of just one sense, is 
an object of the same sense as the object to which it is applicable.’ (Holland 1973: 105) This 
additional premise is similar to the one mentioned above. However, on the reading based on 
Proper Object Theory, the premise is not problematic anymore (as it was on the Common 
Sense Theory), since no common sensibles are allowed.  
191 This is assumed by Bostock (1988) Kahn (1981), Modrak (1981), among many others. 
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that, e.g. Timaeus’ theory of perception is in fact a Proper Object Theory. 
Indeed, Timaeus does connect each sense to its specific object (Tim. 45B-D and 
61E–68D). However the Timaeus never excludes the possibility that some 
properties (or things) might be perceivable by several senses. Some things Plato 
says imply that this has to be the case. For example, Timaeus (52E) clearly 
assumes that things around us are perceptible. Secondly, be that as it may, 
Socrates cannot expect Theaetetus to have read Timaeus – Theaetetus should be 
inclined to accept the Proper Object Theory on the grounds that are offered in 
the Theaetetus. A promising suggestion is that Theaetetus still hangs on to 
(some aspects) of the Secret Doctrine: 
 
Now we have names for these perceptions, of the following sort: seeings, 
hearings, smellings, feelings of cold, feelings of heat; also what are called 
pleasures, pains, desires, fears and others. The nameless ones are unlimited in 
number, but those which have been given names are extremely numerous. On 
the other side, the appropriate class of perceived things shares a common origin 
with each set of perceptions: colours of every kind with seeings of every kind, 
sounds with hearings in the same way, and the other perceived things with the 
other perceptions, coming into being from the same origin. (156B5-C4) 
 
In this passage Socrates clearly states that each perception is related to its own 
separate object and the implication clearly is that what is seen cannot be 
touched, etc. But the extreme flux theory has been refuted. Why would 
Theaetetus still hold on to parts of it?  
 Some scholars (Cornford 1935, Modrak 1981) claim that Plato accepts this 
part of the Secret Doctrine and that it is for this reason why Proper Object 
Theory is inserted in the Passage of the Commons. But this solution does not 
work either, since Socrates and Theaetetus soon go on to deny Proper Object 
Theory:  
 
S. Now sometimes I see you and sometimes I don’t, sometimes I touch you, 
sometimes not; sometimes I hear you, or perceive you in some other way, and 
sometimes I have no perception relating to you. T. Certainly.’ (192D5-E1).  
 
This suggests that Socrates and Theaetetus either use perception in this passage 
in a different (non-technical) sense, or he Proper Object Theory has been 
abandoned. Cooper maintains that:  
 
Furthermore, though without arguing the point, Plato seems to limit perception 
to what may be called elementary sense-perception, i.e. the perception of the 
‘proper objects’ of five senses: colors, sounds, tastes, smells, and a supposed 
analogue for touch. He does not indicate how he regards seeing or otherwise 
perceiving a physical object, but presumably he would wish to say that this is 
not perception, strictly conceived, but already involves some of those higher 
reflective activities of mind to be introduced in a moment. (Cooper 1970: 359). 
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If Cooper is correct, then it would have to mean that in the false belief section 
Plato uses the term ‘perceive’ in the way that perception already entails 
conceptual capacities. However, if Plato used the term αἰσθάνεσθαί in such a 
way that perception would entail (a tacit) judgment or belief, the Wax-Block 
model would lose its explanatory force in the context of explaining the 
possibility of false beliefs. At this point of the discussion, it is assumed that it's 
impossible to have in one's belief terms that one does not know, because (to put 
it very crudely) in order to form a belief about anything one has to know the 
concepts or terms involved in the belief. Since knowledge entails infallibility, it 
turns out that I cannot make mistakes about the terms or concepts involved in 
my beliefs. In this context perception as a non-conceptual cognitive capacity 
offers a way out. Socrates can perceive Theaetetus and think that it is 
Theodorus, precisely because perceiving Theaetetus is not conceptual. If 
perception here is taken to be (a hidden or implicit) perceptual judgment or a 
belief, then the problems of knowing and not-knowing would immediately 
resurface, since one would have to know the terms of the (tacit) perceptual 
judgment, and the miss-fitting of perception and memory-trace would again 
become impossible. It is necessary, for the Wax-Block model of perceptual 
judgment to work, that ‘perceiving Theaetetus’ would not have a conceptual 
structure.  
 Therefore, one should seriously consider the possibility that Plato does not 
endorse the Proper Object Theory. The theory is there because it belongs to 
Theaetetus’ framework of beliefs. This framework of beliefs includes, pro-
minently, the belief that perception is knowledge. More precisely, Theaetetus is 
inclined to believe Proper Object Theory because he believes that knowledge is 
perception. It is psychologically easy to see why he would, since Proper Object 
Theory played a significant part in the Secret Doctrine. There is also a 
philosophical consideration behind Theaetetus’ acceptance of Proper Object 
Theory. Namely, it does offer quite good support for the claim that knowledge 
is perception (quite independently of the Secret Doctrine). A reason why Proper 
Object Theory can easily be seen to support Theaetetus’ definition is that if 
different senses had access to the same perceptible properties (e.g. shapes) and 
objects (e.g. houses), this would create the possibility of inter-modal conflict. 
For example, if by means of sight one would see the same thing as round but by 
means of touch one would feel the same thing to be triangular, then, presumably 
one of the perceptions would have to be mistaken, and therefore, not a case of 
knowledge. Since Theaetetus has already agreed that there is a single enduring 
soul as an agent in both of these perceptual acts, he cannot avail himself of the 
Protagorean claim that the seeing eye and, say, touching hand are different 
agents (and avoid the conflict in this manner). Thus, it is only natural that 
Theaetetus would so eagerly accept Socrates’ proposal that restricts each sense 
to its own proper objects, and implies that we cannot really perceive things out 
there. This is the only possible way for Theaetetus to avoid inter-modal conflict 
and maintain perception’s claim to be knowledge.  
137 
This is, admittedly, a speculative solution to the problem. But, given that 
Proper Object Theory is renounced a couple of pages later and that the 
argument in the Passage of the Commons requires Proper Object Theory, it 
seems only natural to take Theaetetus’ acceptance of Proper Object Theory to 
be due to his belief that knowledge is perception. Socrates shows that the Proper 
Object Theory leads to the conclusion that perception is not knowledge. 
Perception, limited to its proper objects, does not grasp ‘being’ and it therefore 
also fails to reach truth (and therefore fails to be knowledge). Yet, in order to 
maintain perception’s claim to be knowledge, Theaetetus has to assume the 
Proper Object Theory. The argument, therefore, is indirect192. After Theaetetus 
has come to learn that knowledge is not perception, he abandons the Proper 
Object Theory, as the exchange at (191B–195B) clearly demonstrates193.  
In addition, Socrates himself also hints that not all the premises of the 
argument for the non-perceivability of the commons should be endorsed. He 
says that  
 
‘And besides being handsome, you’ve done me a favour: you’ve let me off a 
very long argument (με μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας), if you think that there 
                                                     
192 An excellent account of why indirect arguments are so prominent in Plato’s Socratic 
dialogues can be found in Robinson (1953: 20–32). An indirect argument uses the thesis to 
be refuted as one of its premises. If Theaetetus accepts Proper Object Theory because he 
believes that knowledge is perception, then the latter claim is a premise of the argument 
(even though this premise is tacit). One possible way to construe the argument as indirect 
would be the following:  
Premises 
(1) Perception is knowledge. 
(2) Perception is knowledge only if perception is restricted to its proper objects. 
(3) The soul has access to common features, such as being, sameness and difference. 
(4) Grasping being is necessary for grasping truth. 
(5) Grasping truth is necessary for knowledge. 
Argument 
(6) Perception is restricted to its proper objects, therefore  
(7) The soul’s access to the common features is not perceptual, therefore 
(8) The soul does not grasp being by means of perception, therefore 
(9) The soul does not grasp truth by means of perception, therefore 
(10) Perception is not knowledge.  
193 Gerson takes the same attitude towards the Passage of the Commons: ‘One final point. 
Like the fruitless debate over whether sense-perception involves judgement, the debate over 
whether Plato actually endorses the theory of sense-perception developed here is bound to go 
nowhere. For what we in fact have is a theory of sense-perception based on the assumption 
that sense-perception is knowledge. That is, we have a theory of what sense-perception must 
be if it is to meet the inerrancy and reality criteria. Since it does not meet these criteria, it is 
really beside the point to ask whether Plato endorses this theory. I think in all probability he 
does not. But we cannot know this for certain because he is only developing a theory of 
knowledge based on the proposed criteria. Telling us what knowledge is does not reveal 
what the criteria for sense-perception are’ (Gerson 2003:214). Sayre argues for the same 
conclusion (2005: 206–217). 
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are some things which the soul itself considers, by means of itself, and some 
which it considers by means of the body.’ (185E5–7) 
 
What might Socrates mean by saying that Theaetetus has let him off ‘a very 
long argument’? 194  If my argument in this section has been correct, then 
Socrates is glad because Theaetetus has accepted the conclusion that Socrates 
himself also accepts (that some things are considered by the mind on its own) 
based on the argument that has questionable premises – namely the premiss 
according to which all senses are confined to their proper objects (the Proper 
Object Theory). Socrates is saying that even though the some of the premises of 
the argument are questionable, the conclusion is, as a matter of fact, correct. 
Socrates hints that the argument, in its proper form - starting, perhaps, from 
genuinely Platonic premises - would be very long. One can only guess what the 
proper argument for Socrates’ claim (that some things are not percetual and 
apprehended by the mind itself) would have been. 
This could be seen as a somewhat disappointing result. Indeed, this means 
that the ‘theory of perception’ presented in the Passage of the Commons cannot 
be dogmatically attributed to Plato (and indeed that there is no reason to try and 
extract a well developed theory from the passage at all). However, Socrates and 
Theaetetus think that they have proved the definition ‘knowledge is perception’ 
to be false (186E9–12). They think, apparently, that they have shown more than 
an inconsistency within Theaetetus’ framework of beliefs.  
An indirect argument, i.e. the argument containing the thesis to be refuted as 
one of the premises, can only hope to prove the thesis false if the other premises 
of the argument are in fact true (Benson 2000: 49). From the Passage of the 
Commons we can therefore learn quite a bit about what Socrates and Theaetetus 
(and perhaps Plato) take perception to be, namely that perception always 
involves the body as an instrument and the soul as the agent. We furthermore 
learn that there are properties that all objects share (such as being and sameness) 
and that the soul has some sort of access to these objects. These premises have 
to be true in order for the indirect argument to successfully show the falsity of 
Theaetetus’ definition. We simply should not attribute Plato the dubious 
principle according to which all senses only perceive their proper objects. This 
claim is meant to support Theaetetus’ definition but eventually proves to be the 




                                                     
194 For a few suggestions as to what he might mean by this, see McDowell (1973: 190) and 
Lorenz (2006: 81–83). 
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CHAPTER FOUR.  
Belief and Being 
 
In this chapter, I will argue that at no juncture of Theaetetus 184–7 does Plato 
endorse that commons are grasped in all beliefs. In order to see this, the 
Theaetetus-passage should be read in its dialectical context. The Passage of the 
Commons fails to support the standard account of the rationality of belief. I 
hope to show, however, that the passage does contain genuinely novel claims 
about belief – namely that by its very nature, belief is aimed at being, i.e. aimed 
at obtaining states of affairs or simply at ‘reality’. 
Section 1 is dedicated to developing a version of the realist reading of the 
Passage of the Commons. Theaetetus` framework of beliefs about cognition is 
largely governed by the aisthetic model – he thinks that all acts of cognition 
require a direct relation between the subject and the object. Socratic midwifery 
works within this framework of beliefs, hence Socrates has to rely on this model 
himself while posing questions and directing Theaetetus. I will propose that 
stage two should be understood as an abandonment of the aisthetic model of 
cognition. Socrates stresses that, at least with one common, namely being, one 
needs a significant amount of education in order to be able to calculate 
according to it. I will argue that ‘being’ should be understood as ‘the reality of 
something’; it is difficult and time-consuming to learn the ‘comparing’ and 
‘calculating’ that are necessary to determine whether or not a given property 
(e.g. beauty) is instantiated.  
In Section 2, I will consider what sort of notion of belief emerges from the 
Passage of the Commons. The main difference between perception and belief is 
that the latter is a cognitive state aiming to ‘attain being’, whereas the former is 
not. In Theaetetus Plato supports a teleological or goal-directed account of 
belief formation. I will argue that this teleological notion of beliefs explains the 
differences between Plato’s account of belief in the middle and the late 
dialogues. Plato assumes that only reasoning and deliberation can lead to 
attaining being (i.e. determining how things are). Since Plato recognizes that 
forming beliefs is intrinsically aimed at acquiring true beliefs, he also comes to 
view reasoning and deliberation as necessary components in forming beliefs.  
 
 
1. A Realist Reading of the Passage of the Commons 
In the previous chapter I argued that Socrates’ method of intellectual midwifery 
is dependent on the interlocutor`s framework of beliefs. The commons are 
introduced step by step, and not everything said or implied during the 
introduction is necessarily part of the conception of the soul’s relation to the 
commons toward which Socrates is directing Theaetetus. Since midwifery has 
to make concessions to what the interlocutor believes, some claims are made 
with a view to making certain points plausible to Theaetetus. These claims may 
be subjected to revision later on.  
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 In fact, as I will now try to make plausible, this is exactly what happens at 
stage one (up to Tht. 185E). Socrates is relying on Theaetetus’ framework of 
beliefs about cognition, especially on Theaetetus’ central belief that all cogni-
tion involves a direct apprehension of its objects. At the end of stage one, 
Theaetetus reaches the (preliminary) conclusion that there are objects that 
remain outside the reach of the bodily senses (the commons)195. He nevertheless 
still thinks that the soul grasps these objects in a perception-like manner, simply 
by virtue of entertaining a relevant thought. This creates the illusion that the 
commons are like concepts or semantic entities. However, stage two goes on to 
correct this line of thought. It turns out that grasping commons (especially to 
‘attain being’) requires hard work and education.  
It is useful to start with the conclusion of stage one, which is expressed as 
follows: 
 
S. Theaetetus, you're handsome not ugly, as Theodorus was saying; because 
someone who speaks handsomely is handsome, and a fine person too (καλὸς 
γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός: ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων 
καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός). And besides being handsome, you've done me a favour: 
you've let me off a very long argument (πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με μάλα 
συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας), if you think there are some things which the soul 
considers by means of itself and some which it considers by means of the 
capacaties of the body (εἰ φαίνεταί σοι τὰ μὲν αὐτὴ δι᾽ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ 
ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων). That was what I thought for 
myself, but I wanted you to think it too (τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, 
ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι). (185E3–9) 
                                                     
195 There is a reading that denies that Socrates’ argument is designed to show that certain 
objects (or features of objects) are outside the reach of the senses (Cooper 1970). According 
to this view, the argument shows that there are two kinds of judgments. One kind of 
judgment requires applying predicates that are common to the objects of several senses, 
whereas the other kind does not. The main reason behind Cooper’s claim is that the 
commons are often (185B7, 185B9, 185C7, 185D1 and 185E1) used with ‘about’ clauses – 
Socrates assumes that the soul considers the commons about something (especially sound 
and color). This might indeed suggest that Plato is interested mainly in the ways that 
judgments about sensibles differ from one another. Now, although it is true that the 
commons are introduced first as constituents of thoughts that Theaetetus admits he can form, 
e.g. Theaetetus can think about sound and color that they are, that they are different from 
each other, etc (185A4-B4), shortly afterwards the emphasis clearly shifts to the common 
objects that are grasped (λαμβάνειν at 185B8) or revealed (δηλοῖ σοι at 185C5) in forming 
these judgments. One should not attach too much weight to the about-clauses, for the 
following reason. It seems to be that about-clauses are there not to emphasize the 
‘propositional’ nature of judgments, but simply to refer back to the claim that whatever is 
thought or perceived about the proper objects of the senses cannot be perceived by the 
senses. Here it is not the ‘aboutness’ of judgment that matters but simply the inaccessibility 
of the senses to features shared by the proper objects (note the dual at 185B7). The about-
clauses serve to remind Theaetetus of the crucial premise of the argument – that if the 
inaccessibility principle holds, the commons cannot be perceived. For a convincing critique 
of Cooper’s view, see Bostock (1988: 132–137). 
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This is the only occasion in the dialogue where Socrates expresses his own 
opinion. For this reason what he says here should obviously be taken very 
seriously. Socrates makes a distinction here between two kinds of things – those 
that are considered by means of the senses and those considered by the soul ‘by 
means of itself’. This strongly suggests that this is precisely what the foregoing 
argument has demonstrated: there are two kinds of objects and, correspon-
dingly, two different means of access to the objects in question.  
 How is the relation between the soul and commons conceived of at stage 
one? There are two options. The prevailing view takes the relation to be one of 
‘grasping’ or ‘apprehending.’ Commons function like meanings or concepts, i.e. 
one has to grasp commons in order to form thoughts (nicely expressed in 
Bostock 1988: 128–132). The realist reading, on the other hand, takes commons 
to be real properties of things. If the commons are construed as real properties, 
then the soul does not necessarily ‘apprehend’ commons simply by forming a 
belief or a thought; indeed, the soul can form many beliefs about the commons 
that are simply false. According to the first construal, when Theaetetus 
formulates the thought ‘color is different from sound’, Theaetetus stands in a 
relation (of grasping) to ‘difference’, regardless of whether or not the given 
color really instantiates difference (in relation to something, e.g. sound). 
According to the second construal, when Theaetetus forms a thought such as 
‘color is different from sound’, Theaetetus grasps the ‘difference’ only in case a 
given color really instantiates difference (in regard to sound). According to the 
first reading, the soul’s relation to commons is addressed in semantic terms; 
according to the second reading, it is rather the epistemological aspect that 
matters.  
 As I demonstrated in Chapter Two, the realist reading of ‘being’ (and 
consequently other commons) is difficult or even impossible to defend if one 
accepts the Conceptualist Assumption (CA):  
Conceptualist Assumption (CA): If the soul entertains a thought (or holds a 
belief) involving a term ‘F’, then the soul grasps the common F.  
To recapitulate the results of Chapter Two, the textual reasons for holding (CA) 
are the following. (i) When Socrates first introduces the commons, he lists 
several sample thoughts, like ‘color and sound are’, ‘color and sound [are] 
different’. Theaetetus agrees that he is indeed capable of thinking these 
thoughts. Socrates’ next question is the following:  
 
Well now, by means of what do you think all those things about them 
(ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν διανοῇ;)? Because it's impossible 
to get hold of what they have in common either by means of hearing or by 
means of sight (οὔτε γὰρ δι᾽ ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι᾽ ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ κοινὸν 
λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν). 
 
Socrates appears to be to suggesting to Theaetetus that if he manages to think 
that ‘color and sound are’ and ‘color and sound are different’ he must be 
somehow grasping (or getting a hold of, λαμβάνειν) being and difference. The 
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train of thought at 185A4–15B9 seems to rely on the assumption that if 
Theaetetus is capable of entertaining a thought ‘x is (F)’, where ‘is’ and ‘F’ 
both refer to a common feature, Theaetetus must grasp or apprehend the 
common feature in question. (ii) Socrates rephrases his previous question in the 
following way:  
 
S. Good. But what about the power that reveals to you that which is 
common to everything, including these things (ἡ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις 
τό τ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι), that to which you 
apply the word/ ‘is’, ‘is not’, and the others we used in our questions 
about them just now (ᾧ τὸ ‘ἔστιν‘ ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ ‘οὐκ ἔστι‘ καὶ ἃ 
νυνδὴ ἠρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν)? 
 
This again suggests that there is some power that reveals (δηλοῖ σοι) the 
commons whenever a term designating a common is used, such as ‘is’ or ‘is 
not’, and presumably also ‘beautiful’ and ‘good’. 
 These two passages make (CA) look very plausible, at first sight, any attempt 
to deny (CA) might seem simply quixotic. However, this is where the results of 
the previous chapter become relevant. Practically all commentators assume that 
the above claims simply express Plato’s own opinion about how thought (or soul) 
and commons relate to each other. However, if one takes into account (i) the 
specific methodological features of Socratic midwifery, and (ii) Theaetetus’ 
commitment to the aisthetic model of cognition, one can avoid attributing (CA) 
to Plato.  
Socratic midwifery is a peculiar method of teaching that is heavily 
dependent on the framework of beliefs of the interlocutor’s framework of 
beliefs. In the last chapter I argued that an important part of Theaetetus’ 
framework of beliefs is the aisthetic model of cognition. According to this 
model, all cognition involves a direct grasp of its object. The aisthetic model of 
cognition involves (see Chapter Three, Section 2) the assumption that all 
cognition requires direct interaction between the cognitive act and its object. 
 In this sense, all cognition is rather similar to sense-perception. Socrates’ 
procedure at stage one is an exemplary case of his midwifery – while relying on 
his interlocutor`s beliefs, Socrates goes on to show that there are certain features 
of things that are not perceptual (since perception requires bodily senses). This 
is by no means all Socrates intends to show. At stage one Theaetetus still thinks 
that the activity of the soul ‘itself by means of itself’ is very much like 
perception. According to Theaetetus, if the soul thinks that ‘color and sound are 
different’ it stands in a direct quasi-perceptual interaction with the property of, 
e.g. difference. No doubt Socrates knows that Theaetetus` thinking has been 
following such a course. It is the goal of stage two to make it clear to Theaetetus 
that the soul’s relation to commons (especially the common ‘being’) is not 
perception-like, and that (the being of) commons is not grasped in all thoughts 
involving the terms that refer to these commons.  
It is important to note that both of the above passages that are usually taken 
to support (CA) derive from a context where Theaetetus still assumes that there 
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might exist a perceptual way of access to the commons; indeed, Socrates 
reinforces this assumption with his questions. First, Socrates asks several times, 
‘by means of what’ does the soul perceive the commons (185A5–6, 185C7–8). 
This is also the way Theaetetus understands him at 185D3. The διά+genitive 
idiom (‘by means of’) was firmly attached to perception (184C-D5), and 
designated instrumentality (see Chapter Three, Section Three). It is as if 
Socrates were looking for a bodily instrument ‘by means of which’ the 
commons are perceived. For example, he says (185B7–8) that it is not by means 
of sight or hearing that Theaetetus’ grasps the commons. Socrates is thus 
working on the assumption that grasping commons is similar to perceiving 
sounds and colors.  
This is where the curious τεκμήριον that has puzzled the commentators196 
becomes important. Here is what Socrates says:  
 
S. Well now, by means of what do you think all those things about them (ταῦτα 
δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν διανοῇ;)? Because it's impossible to get hold of 
what they have in common either by means of hearing or by means of sight 
(οὔτε γὰρ δι᾽ ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι᾽ ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν). 
Besides, here's another indication of the point we're talking about (ἔτι δὲ καὶ 
τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν). If it were possible to investigate whether 
both are salty or not (εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἴη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι ἆρ᾽ ἐστὸν 
ἁλμυρὼ ἢ οὔ) of course you'll be able to say with what you'd investigate it 
with: it would clearly be neither sight nor hearing, but something else (οἶσθ᾽ 
ὅτι ἕξεις εἰπεῖν ᾧ ἐπισκέψῃ, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοὴ φαίνεται, ἀλλά τι 
ἄλλο.). T. Yes, of course: the power that's exercised by means of of the tongue 
(τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει, ἥ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις;). (185B7-C3) 
 
The aim of this example is by no means obvious. Some scholars197 think that 
Socrates is trying to reply to a possible objection to the claim that commons are 
not perceptible – namely that it could, in principle, be possible that one 
particular sense (e.g. taste) could perceive the commons about sound and color. 
And since taste does not have access to color and sound, this would then go to 
show that none of the senses can have access to the commons about color and 
sound). However, this seems to miss the point of the passage. As Kanayama 
(1987: 33) notes, the use of the optative mood (εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἴη) does not 
commit Socrates to the impossibility of investigating the saltiness of color and 
sound. Socrates remains uncommitted as to whether or not this is possible. 
Rather, the point seems to be the following. Socrates has assumed (in 
accordance with Theaetetus’ aisthetic model of cognition) that thinking is like 
perceiving – only the objects are different. Thinking of ‘sameness’ and 
‘difference’ about color and sound is, in a way, like tasting the saltiness of color 
and sound. Socrates next goes on to inquire from Theaetetus what is the ‘power 
that reveals the commons about everything’ (185C5), as if the commons were 
                                                     
196 For example, Bostock (1988: 121) calls this passage ‘odd in several ways”.  
197 McDowell 1973, ad loc. 
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(similar to) perceptual features. This is the context from which the second 
passage in support of (CA) derives. It seems that Socrates assumes (in 
accordance with the aisthetic model of cognition) that commons are revealed 
simply by having a relevant thought because he assumes that grasping commons 
is like a special kind of perception – the kind that has access to common 
features.  
 Throughout stage one Socrates and Theaetetus use verbs like ‘to think’ 
(διανοέω, 185A9, B7), ‘to consider’ (ἐπισκέπτομαι, 185B5, C1, E2, E7), ‘to 
examine’ (σκέπτομαι, 185B10), ‘to perceive’ (αἰσθάνομαι, 185A6, 185B8, 
185D3), ‘to reveal’ (δηλόω, 185C5), ‘to grasp’ (λαμβάνω, 185B8) inter-
changeably. These verbs fall, very roughly, into two categories. The first three 
verbs refer to non-factive mental states. One can think that ‘x is F’ without the 
state of affairs ‘x-being-F’ actually obtaining. This holds also for ‘considering’ 
and ‘examining’ (the representation involved in examining can be false). ‘To 
perceive’, ‘to grasp’ and ‘to reveal’ are, on the other hand, success-verbs, i.e. 
they carry an implication that representation is true. One can perceive some-
thing only when this something is really there to be perceived. Similarly, one 
cannot mistakenly grasp something, nor can something be mistakenly revealed 
to one.  
At stage one Socrates and Theaetetus move easily back and forth between 
these two types of verbs and their corresponding mental states. Throughout 
stage one Socrates and Theaetetus take the soul’s relation to the commons to be 
perception-like (185B8, 185C5, 185D3). Even if the states of affairs that the 
commons are part of are complex (as is suggested by the repeated use of 
expressions like ‘thinking’ or ‘grasping’ about), there is no sign at stage one 
that Theaetetus takes the soul’s grasping of these states of affairs to involve any 
work or activity on the soul`s part. For Theaetetus at this stage, thinking is 
similar to ‘picking up’ the properties of or about things (color being different 
from sound, etc.). This is so because he thinks about cognition along the lines of 
his aisthetic model.  
Even Theaetetus’ final conclusion at stage one leaves the strong impression 
that he has not abandoned his aisthetic model of cognition (indeed, he has not 
yet been given reasons why he should). After Socrates has asked him what 
might be the organ or instrument that the soul uses in grasping the commons, 
Theaetetus says: 
 
Well, good heavens, Socrates, I couldn't say (ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε 
οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν), except that I think there simply isn't any instrument of 
that kind peculiar to those things as there is in the case of those others (πλήν γ᾽ 
ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ᾽ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον 
ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις). On the contrary, it seems to me that the soul itself, by means 
of itself, considers the things which apply in common to everything (ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὴ 
δι᾽ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν).  
 
This is the view that Theaetetus has arrived at now – that the soul investigates 
the common features ‘by means of itself’. As I mentioned earlier, ‘by means of’ 
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expresses a perceptual relation. Thus still relying on his aisthetic model of 
cognition, Theaetetus thinks that the soul uses itself as an instrument in 
investigating the commons. The peculiarity of this expression (itself by means 
of itself) suggests that there is something Theaetetus still has to learn. Actually, 
the difference between the with-idiom and the ‘by means of which’ idiom was 
plausibly seen (Chapter Three, Section 3) as expressing the difference between 
the agent and the instruments that the agent uses. Theaetetus` final conclusion 
blurs this earlier distinction – his view is that the agent uses itself as an 
instrument in quasi-perceiving the commons. At stage one, Socrates can only 
show that even within Theaetetus’ aisthetic model, there are certain features of 
things that remain outside the scope of perception. What Socrates has yet to 
show is that, in fact, the soul’s relation to commons is different from perception 
not only in its objects, but also in ‘mode of access’ to these objects.  
This is the reason why, in posing his questions at stage one, Socrates moves 
easily between thinking, grasping, and perceiving. He assumes that Theaetetus 
takes all acts of cognition to be perception-like. For a reader who ignores 
Socrates` maieutic method of discussion, this quite naturally creates an impres-
sion of being and other commons as ‘concepts’, which are somehow operative 
in every act of thinking. But this is only an illusion, since, as the argument at 
stage two goes on to show, grasping being and other commons involves more 
than entertaining a thought about them, and there is ‘a great deal of education’ 
required for getting things right.  
We are now prepared to ask, what exactly happens at stage two? Indeed, 
commentators are usually in trouble in explaining why stage two is inserted in 
the text at all (see Chapter Two, Section 3). Theaetetus has (at the end of stage 
one) already openly agreed that οὐσία remains outside the scope of perception. 
This is all that Socrates needed in order to clinch the final argument, since the 
final argument connects οὐσία with truth and knowledge and claims that 
without ‘attaining being’ there can be no knowledge, and since perception fails 
to attain being, it also fails to be identical with knowledge. I believe that the 
central goal of stage two is to stress the act of reasoning in regard to οὐσία. 
Even though, at stage one, Theaetetus admitted that there were two kinds of 
objects - commons and perceptible features - he still thinks that the commons 
are apprehended by the soul ‘by means of itself’ directly and effortlessly. 
Socrates’ aim at stage two is to point out that this is not the case. It is difficult to 
judge whether properties like beauty or goodness are of or about something, 
e.g. whether a given person really is good or just. He further points out that 
(correctly) deciding the reality (or the instantiation) of even perceptual features 
is difficult, involving a great deal of independent activity by the soul. Nowhere 
in the discussion does Socrates refer to the difficulty of ‘framing a propositional 
structure’ (as the standard account maintains). It is not difficult to form a 
proposition ‘x is just’ or ‘predicate justice’ of or about the person. But it is 
difficult to determine whether or not a given person really is just, e.g. whether 
justice has being (‘has reality’) in regard to a person.  
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Throughout stage two, ‘being’ should be understood as ‘reality’. Thus, to 
repeat what was already said in Chapter Two, Section 3, ‘being’, should 
throughout be taken in the semantic sense (in Kahn’s terminology), designating 




(a)  Grasping οὐσία of x indicates correctly apprehending a state of affairs of x 
being (F). For example, the ability to apprehend whether color is in fact 
(salty). 
(b)  Grasping οὐσία of F indicates correctly apprehending a state of affairs of F 
being (about x), for example, the ability to apprehend whether beauty in 
fact is (of or about the person). 
It is still unclear, however, how one should understand the status of the rest of 
the commons. Stage one mentions the following commons (in addition to being 
and not-being): likeness (ὁμοιότης) and unlikeness (ἀνομοιότης), sameness (τὸ 
ταὐτόν) and difference (ἕτερον), one (ἕν) and other numbers (τὸν ἄλλον 
ἀριθμὸν), odd (περιττὸν) and even (ἄρτιόν). Stage two goes on to add beauty 
(καλὸν) and ugliness (αἰσχρὸν), goodness (ἀγαθὸν) and badness (κακόν). Might 
it not be plausible to take these to be concepts of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’, 
etc., and maintain simply that ‘being’ has a special status? In other words, might 
it not be the case that (CA) applies to all of the commons, with the exception of 
being and not-being? The problem with this proposal is that, at stage one, Plato 
does not even hint that one should distinguish between being and not-being and 
the rest of the commons in such an important way. Thus, one should expect that 
just like being and not being, the rest of the commons are also not apprehended 
simply by virtue of using the terms that refer to these commons. If commons are 
not concepts, then what are they? Unfortunately, the text of the Passage of the 
Commons is not very forthcoming on this issue. Assuming that the rest of the 
commons should have a status similar to the common of being, I suggest that 
they should be taken to be genuine properties of things. And, analogously to 
being and not-being, stage one assumes that the soul stands in a quasi-
perceptual relation to the being of these properties, whereas stage two goes on 
to show that this is, in fact, not the case.  
I will now try to make it plausible that stage two aims at making Theaetetus 
understand that the apprehension of commons (especially being) is not 
perception-like, but rather that it necessarily involves calculation, deliberation, 
and education. At the beginning of stage two Socrates seems to recapitulate the 
results of stage one, asking Theaetetus whether being belongs to the list of 
commons, and then adding beautiful, ugly, etc., to this list as well (186A2–9).  
 
S. Well now, in which [class] do you put being? Because that's pre-eminently 
something that goes with everything (ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ 
μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται).  
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The majority of commentators take this to be a simple recapitulation of what 
was said at the end of stage one. But Theaetetus has already openly agreed that 
‘being’ does indeed belong to the class of those things that are grasped by the 
soul itself by itself. Why would Socrates need to address this issue for the 
second time? It is quite likely that Socrates has something else in mind when he 
seemingly repeats his question about the status of the common ‘being’. First, it 
is worth noting that Socrates adds a new aspect to the notion of ‘being’. At 
stage one it was agreed that all the commons mentioned are common to 
everything (185C4–5, E1). Here Socrates singles out ‘being’ as that which most 
(μάλιστα) accompanies everything. What does he mean by this? According to 
the realist reading that I am defending, this means that being real, in both senses 
(a) and (b), is the most common property there is. Of course, the second reason 
why Socrates might be focusing on being is that this notion will play a crucial 
role in the ensuing argument; after all, the inability to attain reality proves fatal 
to perception’s claim to be knowledge. I think there is also a third reason behind 
Socrates’ stressing being. Indeed, as it emerges from Theaetetus’ answer, for 
him the common ‘being’ is not something that is simply picked up by means of 
thinking about it. Rather, the soul’s relation to being is something more akin to 
desiring or yearning. Theaetetus says that 
 
T. I put it in that [the class of things] which the soul itself yearns after, by 
itself (ἐγὼ μὲν ὧν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐπορέγεται). (186A2-A4)  
 
The verb ἐπορέγεται is often translated as ‘apprehending’ (e.g. by Cornford 
1935: 106, Narcy 1995: 232). This would fit very well with the verbs of 
‘grasping’ and ‘revealing itself’ at stage one. However, it has convincingly been 
argued (Heidegger 2002: 146–147, Kanayama 1987: 37) that the translation 
‘yearn after’ is, in fact, correct here. Suddenly, in contrast to stage one, 
Theaetetus is claiming that the soul ‘yearns after’ being. This is surprising. If 
being indeed does mean reality, he must mean that the soul yearns after reality 
in the sense of aiming to finding out how things are. This means that, for 
Theaetetus, the soul does not apprehend being simply in virtue of thinking ‘x is 
(F)’, but rather that he takes apprehending reality as a goal. What has 
Theaetetus seen now that he did not see earlier? Socrates has drawn Theaetetus’ 
attention to οὐσία as a specific common that stands out from the rest. Why is 
being special? Why would Theaetetus be inclined to abandon his aisthetic 
model of cognition when it comes to being? I think that the answer can be found 
from the previous course of the dialogue. Socrates has just (179D–183A) 
refuted (a version of) Protagoras’ Secret Doctrine, according to which 
everything is in motion (in every way). This doctrine of universal flux was 
initially designed to support the claim that there is no perceiver-independent 
οὐσία: 
 
So my perception is true for me – because it’s always of the being that’s 
mine (τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί ἐστιν) – and, as Protagoras said, it’s for me 
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to decide (ἐγὼ κριτὴς), of the things that are for me, that/how they are, 
and of the things that are not, that/how they are not (τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ ὡς 
ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν). – Apparently. – Well then, if I’m 
free from falsehood (ἀψευδὴς), and don’t trip up in my thinking (διανοίᾳ) 
about the things that are, how could I fail to have knowledge of the things 
I’m a perceiver of (οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην ὧνπερ αἰσθητής)? (160C-D) 
 
Everything that is real is real in relation to someone (160C); being results from 
an interaction between the perceiver and the perceived object; there is no being 
that is perceiver-independent. I argued in Chapter Three, Section 2, that in this 
passage (and in the previous discussion as a whole), ‘perception’ should be 
taken in its broad sense, covering all acts of cognition. The Secret Doctrine thus 
supported Theaetetus’ aisthetic model of cognition, according to which all acts 
of cognition (believing, remembering, and thinking) involve a direct relation to 
their objects. Indeed, according to the Secret Doctrine, there are no ‘beings’ 
outside this relation. The Secret Doctrine has just been officially refuted (183C). 
This doctrine was meant to be the main support (160A–C) for the claim that 
there is no independent οὐσία. Further, Socrates has shown Theaetetus that 
there are things (the commons) that cannot be perceived at all. Theaetetus 
himself has to take the final step and conclude that soul’s non-perceptual 
relation to being is not one of direct and effortless grasping, i.e. to abandon the 
aisthetic model, at least when it comes to being as reality. 
 I think that here it is possible to see the ‘endeictic’ (see below, pp. 108-109) 
aspect of Socrates’ maieutic method. Throughout the discussion, Theaetetus has 
taken human cognition to be perception-like (involving direct awareness). First, 
Socrates has brought out the implications of Theaetetus’ definition, and thereby 
he has also brought out the implications of the background assumption (the 
aisthetic model of cognition) that made this definition plausible to Theaetetus. 
One of the implications of Theaetetus’ definition was that οὐσία has to be 
conceived of as being perceiver-dependent. But this required admitting that 
everything is in constant movement (the Secret Doctrine). Since the Secret 
Doctrine is shown false, it is also likely that οὐσία is not perceiver-dependent. 
Socrates has drawn Theaetetus attention to the ‘commons’, and has pointed out 
that the commons are not perceivable. Since Socrates is methodologically 
barren, he has relied on Theaetetus’ framework of beliefs in posing his 
questions (which includes the aisthetic model). He has gotten Theaetetus to 
admit that there are certain features of things that are not perceptual (in the 
narrow sense). Thus, Socrates has given Theaetetus’ two reasons to think that 
soul’s relation to οὐσία cannot be perception-like direct awareness. First, οὐσία 
is not perceiver-dependent (in the broad sense). Secondly, οὐσία is no even 
perceptual (in the narrow sense). It is therefore quite natural that, after a 
moment of reflection, Theaetetus would admit that the soul’s relation to being 
(as reality) cannot be perception-like picking-up that it was assumed to be at 
stage one. If there is objective perceiver- (or mind-) independent reality, then 
the thinking soul is not constantly in contact with it, because thinking is 
different from perceiving. This being the case it is indeed far more natural for 
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Theaetetus to see the attaining of objective being to be the goal of thinking. As 
Socrates goes on to show, this applies to all properties – the soul needs to work, 
calculate, and reason to represent reality as it is. Representing reality as it is 
(‘attaining being’) needs to be achieved (this implicitly contradicts Protagoras, 
which will be further discussed below, in Section 2). Therefore, Socrates has 
shown (ἐνδεικνύμενος, 167E) without openly telling it to Theaetetus, that soul’s 
relation to the common of οὐσία should not be construed as a direct ‘picking up’ 
of how things are.  
 Socrates’ next question brings this out even more clearly. He asks about 
‘like’ and ‘unlike’, ‘same’ and ‘different’, ‘good’ and ‘disgraceful’, ‘beautiful’ 
and ‘ugly’ (186A6–9). Seemingly Socrates is still compiling a list of commons. 
Theaetetus’ answer is significant: 
 
S. And the like and the unlike, the same and different (ἦ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ 
ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον)? T. Yes. S. What about beautiful and ugly, 
good and bad (τί δέ; καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν)? T. They, too, 
seem to me to be pre-eminently things whose being the soul considers in 
relation to one another, calculating/reasoning in itself things past and present in 
relation to things in the future (καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς 
ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ 
παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα). (186A5-B1)  
 
First, one would expect Theaetetus to say that good, beautiful, etc., belong to 
the class of commons. What Theaetetus actually says is quite different; he says 
that their οὐσία, too, is something that the soul considers by itself (i.e. without 
the aid of the senses). Why, all of a sudden, does he slip into talking about the 
being of beautiful, etc., and not simply of beautiful tout court? Secondly, how 
come Theaetetus stresses that the soul considers the οὐσία of beautiful and ugy, 
good and bad, same and different (notice the ‘too’ (καὶ) at 186A10) in relation 
to (πρὸς ἄλληλα) each other? This is quite unexpected compared to stage one, 
where the commons were considered or grasped in isolation (albeit ‘about’ 
things). Thirdly, the soul considers the οὐσία of all these things while reasoning 
about past, present, and future. Again, this is something that was completely 
missing at stage one. 
As to the first question, this widening of the notion of ‘being’ to cover not 
only reality full stop, but also the reality of sameness and difference, good and 
bad, etc., is supported by the fact that already at stage one ‘being’ was taken to 
be the ‘being of something’ (185B–C). Since Theaetetus has already agreed that 
being in the sense of reality is not apprehended in all thoughts, it is only natural 
for him to expand this to cover the reality of beauty, sameness, and goodness. 
The soul attempts to determine whether these properties are instantiated in a 
given case – whether a given sound is different from a given color, whether a 
given law is just or not, or whether a given person is beautiful or ugly. Since 
Theaetetus has in mind the objective being of these properties (in any given 
case), he is inclined to think that the soul needs to engage in comparisons and 
take into account the past and future to determine what is, in fact, the case. 
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Here it seems obvious that ‘being’ as the reality (of something) is the only 
option of rendering οὐσία. The realist reading claims that ‘being’ should be 
construed as a state of affairs in a very broad sense. This would explain why 
Theaetetus takes this to involve, first, comparing and, second, taking into 
account past, present and future time. As to the first, in order to successfully 
determine whether a given person is good, one has to compare good and 
disgraceful actions. This comparing of putatively good things to putatively bad 
things probably eventually leads to some understanding of what goodness is. 
This has tempted some commentators into thinking that Plato has in mind the 
‘being’ of beautiful in the sense of essence or nature of beauty (e.g. McDowell 
1973 ad loc., Modrak 1981, Silverman 1990). It seems reasonable to assume 
that correctly apprehending whether ‘x is F’ contributes somewhat to 
understanding what F is. It is also likely that one is in a better position to decide 
whether ‘x is F’ correctly if one has some grasp of what F is.  
Similarly, one is also liable to make mistakes in determining whether F is 
instantiated, if one has an insufficient grasp of what F is. There are at least two 
ways in which the soul can fail to apprehend the property of, e.g. difference, 
even regarding such simple matters as sound and color. For example, the soul 
can mistakenly think that two sounds are the same, when they are in fact 
different. In this case, the soul fails to apprehend the relevant property (i.e. 
difference), since it represents falsely, i.e. it fails to attain the being (reality) of 
difference in regard to these two sounds; it fails to attain the fact that difference 
is (about or regarding these two sounds). On the other hand, the soul can think 
that a particular color is beautiful, whereas in fact it is not. The soul can make 
this mistake since it does not properly understand what it is to be beautiful in 
the first place. The second example involves ignorance (or at least some false 
beliefs) about the very nature of the given property, whereas the first concerns 
(what we would call) a mistaken application of a concept that is otherwise 
known.  
It is important to see that Plato does not draw a clear line between these two 
kinds of mistakes. In fact, as stage two goes on to show, it seems that Plato 
regards determining that a given property ‘has reality’ (about or in regard to 
something) and determining what this property itself is as two sides of the same 
coin. This might be due to the fact that Plato’s position results from his 
(unconscious) conflation of the existential and essential uses of the verb ‘to be’ 
(see, e.g. Kahn 1981). But Plato can equally well be taken to be expressing an 
epistemological position, according to which the mistakes in what we would 
call concept application always result from an insufficient understanding of the 
nature of the property that the concept aims to capture. It is indeed quite 
plausible that if S mistakenly judges, e.g. a law to be just, then the problem lies 
in S’s insufficient grasp of what it is to be just, i.e. of the property of justice. 
There is nothing obviously counter-intuitive in the claim that if S takes two 
different sounds to be the same, this is because S has an insufficient grasp of 
what the property, for example, the difference (of sounds) is.  
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Perhaps this assumption might help to explain why Plato uses the notion of 
οὐσία in the Passages of the Commons in a way that might suggest its 
interpretation as ‘essence’ rather than reality. Determining what F is helps 
enormously to determine whether F is instantiated (whether F has being in 
regard to x). In that sense ‘being’ as essence is not far below the surface of the 
text of the Passage of the Commons, however I do not think that ‘being’, at 
stage two, should simply be identified with essence.  
In Chapter Two, Section 1, I discarded the essentialist reading of ‘being’, on 
the grounds that it had difficulties in accommodating the Conceptualist 
Assumption. However, now I have argued that Socrates does not, in fact, 
subscribe to (CA). In that case the essentialist reading becomes, again, a viable 
alternative. It is plausible that at stage one Socrates probably does not have in 
mind being as essence (since ‘being’, at stage one, is a nominalization of the 
complete use of the verb ‘to be’). However, the defenders of the essentialist 
reading could claim that ‘being’ at stage one means ‘existence’, whereas being 
at stage two means ‘essence’. Thus there might be a shift from the existential 
(complete) use of ‘being’ to the predicative (incomplete) use of ‘being’ at stage 
two.  
In Chapter One I indicated that this shift is rather typical in Plato (C. Kahn 
and L. Brown have persuasively argued for this claim). The general idea is that, 
for Plato, to be is always to be something (to have an essence). Thus it can be 
that determining whether a thing exists (or whether a property is instantiated) 
goes hand in hand with (perhaps even means the same as) determining the 
thing’s (or property’s) essence198.  
I believe that this proposal has its merits and that Plato does think that 
determining the thing’s (or property’s) essence is relevant for determining 
whether it exists (or is instantiated). However, it is hard to claim that ‘being’ at 
stage two simply means essence, mainly for following two reasons.  
 (1) The passage insists on a very close connection between ‘being’ and 
‘truth’. 186C-E makes it clear that ‘attaining being’ is taken to be necessary 
(and maybe also sufficient) for ‘grasping truth’. According to the essentialist 
reading, Plato would be claiming that determining thing’s essence is necessary 
for grasping (any) truth about this thing. This probably means that the notion of 
‘truth’ Plato has in mind is restricted to truths about essences (or at least that 
grasping truths about essences is necessary for grasping all truths). It can, 
perhaps, be maintained that ‘truth’ in Plato’s middle period is sometimes 
strongly connected to Forms (or essences), and that sometimes Plato thinks that 
only statements about Forms can be true in stricto sensu (e.g. Phd. 65B–66A). 
However, in the Theaetetus Plato clearly recognizes that statements such as ‘the 
wine is sweet’ or ‘this man was robbed’ can be true (these are not, at least not 
obviously, truths about essences). Thus there is no reason why Socrates would 
say (and Theaetetus would accept) that truth can only be reached if one ‘attains 
being’ in the sense of essence.  
                                                     
198 This was suggested by J. Szaif. 
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McDowell (1973 ad loc.) proposes that Plato might not have in mind any 
grasp of truths but that he might be referring to a knowledgeable grasp of truths 
(which requires grasping essences). But, of course, Plato does not restrict the 
notion of grasping truths in any way, but speaks quite generally about ‘hitting 
on truth’. Thus it seems that the essentialist reading is forced to either limit the 
notion of ‘truth’ (to truths about essences) or the notion of ‘grasp’ (to a 
knowledgeable grasp) in a way that is not at all warranted by the text. 
(2) Aside from this general (but I think decisive) consideration against the 
essentialist reading, there are also some minor reasons for rejecting the 
essentialist reading. For one, Theaetetus says (at 186B1) that the soul takes into 
account the past and future in order to investigate the ‘being’ of something. This 
is an odd claim, if ‘being’ means essence, since Plato usually thinks that 
essences are a-temporal, and, consequently, when it comes to grasping 
essences, Plato usually regards the temporal dimension as irrelevant too (e.g. 
Tht. 174E–175C). McDowell (1973 ad loc.) thinks that Socrates’ next remark 
‘Hold on!’ (‘ἔχε δή’) is supposed to indicate that Theaetetus is making a 
mistake, and that temporal dimension is not pertinent to the discussion after all. 
However, as Kanayama (1987: 77) has persuasively argued, the expression 
‘Hold on’ is normally used in Socratic dialogues precisely to point out that the 
interlocutor has made an important step forward.  
Secondly, at 186B6, ‘being’ is coupled with the expression ‘ὅτι ἐστὸν’ (‘that 
it is’) by means of the epexegetic καὶ (meaning ‘i.e.’). This indicates that, for 
Plato, the ‘being’ of hardness and softness means the same as what the 
expression ‘ὅτι ἐστὸν’ expresses. That is, it refers either to facts (the realist 
reading) or to statements about facts (the copula reading). McDowell (1973 ad 
loc.) thinks that ὅτι can be rendered here as ‘what it is’. This would support the 
interpretation of being as ‘essence’. However, Bostock (1988: 139–140) has 
presented convincing counterarguments against this proposal.199  
                                                     
199 For example, McDowell’s rendering would, first, make the relevant sentence at 186B6 
come out ungrammatical (Bostock 1988: 139). Secondly, since the expression ‘ὅτι ἐστὸν’ 
clearly means ‘that it is’ at stage one (185A9), it is hard to imagine that Plato would use the 
same expression in a different sense and connect this expression again with ‘being’ at 186C. 
This would be simply misleading (Bostock 1988: 140). However, Bostock’s second 
objection is not necessarily a problem for the essentialist who wants to maintain that there is 
a real shift in the meaning of the term ‘being’ and that Plato is unaware of this shift. To use 
Nehamas’s (1979) phrase: for Plato, there is no difference between the statement ‘x is (F)’ 
(stage one) and ‘x is what it is to be F’ (stage two). Since, according to this reading, Plato 
does not realize that there is a difference between the two expressions, he is also unaware 
that there is real shift in meaning of the term ‘being’ between stage one and stage two. This 
would, of course, explain why Plato stresses the difficulty of attaining being and the 
necessity of education (truths about essences are hard to achieve). However, the result would 
be, in the context of the Passage of the Commons, that statements that express contingent (or 
non-essential) truths come out as not true (in the strict sense of failing to express the 
essential characteristic of a thing). I pointed out above, throughout the discussion of 
Protagoras’ doctrine, and later in discussing Theaetetus’ second definition, Plato assumes 
that there are contingent truths (e.g. 200E-201C). Thus he would need to offer some 
argument (in the Passage of the Commons) as to why certain truths fall outside the scope 
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Thus it seems much more likely that what Plato has in mind is simply 
determining whether given things instantiate a given property and not grasping 
the essence of that property (although this might eventually turn out to be very 
helpful). In order to determine whether a given person is in fact good, one has to 
take into account his past and present actions, and what he is likely to do in the 
future. Theaetetus can easily make these claims about considering the being of 
goodness, since Socrates and Theodorus raised exactly this point about 
determining the goodness of laws in the ‘argument of the future’ (177–9). 
However, it is unclear why Theaetetus would be inclined to think the same 
about the beautiful and ugly. Although one might agree that determining 
whether something is beautiful requires comparing the beautiful thing with ugly 
things, it seems that normally we would not think that the consideration of 
whether something is beautiful would require taking into account past, present 
and future. Why would Theaetetus think this? In my view, the answer is found 
in Socrates’ praise of Theaetetus just a few lines above. Socrates says that 
Theaetetus is beautiful and good, and not ugly, as Theodorus said (143E). He 
further implies that his discovery of Theaetetus’ beauty was the result of the 
foregoing long discussion. In discovering Theaetetus’ beauty, Socrates himself 
has certainly taken into account both the past and the present (and the future 
too, 142C5-D3).  
Thus, it seems that, e.g. ‘considering the οὐσία of beautiful’ is well 
accounted for by the realist reading. It explains why Theaetetus would think that 
the soul has to consider the οὐσία of the good in relation to the disgraceful. The 
realist reading also explains why Theaetetus thinks that deciding the οὐσία of 
beautiful and ugly, and of good and bad involves taking into account both past 
and future. In fact, it that seems the other main possibility of rendering οὐσία 
(i.e. as a copula) would be in serious trouble here. According to the copula 
reading, considering the being of beautiful would have to mean forming a 
proposition ‘x is beautiful’ (or ‘beauty is about x’). I can see no explanation as 
to why one must take into account past and future to do that. One can think to 
oneself that ‘x is beautiful’ while completely disregarding past, present and 
future (in fact, it seems that this was precisely what Theodorus did when he 
thought that Theaetetus is ugly (143E).  
With just a couple of questions, Socrates has directed Theaetetus quite far 
from his initial understanding of the nature of commons and, especially, being. 
First, by focusing on the common of being and then bringing into the discussion 
properties like goodness and badness, Socrates has helped Theaetetus to 
discover that the soul does not stand in a perception-like relation to the common 
‘being’, nor does it stand in this relation in regard to the being of properties like 
goodness, badness, or sameness.  
                                                                                                                                  
‘truth’ and ‘being’ as these terms figure in the Passage of the Commons. Plato offers no such 
arguments. He, furthermore, continues the discussion of Theaetetus’ second definition 
(‘knowledge is true belief’) in focusing mostly on contingent (or non-essential) truths (187B-
201C). This would be distinctly odd, if the thought that Passage of the Commons established 
that only essential truths are pertinent to knowledge. 
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The next step taken by Socrates is crucial for the whole argument in the 
Passage of the Commons. He proposes that the states of affairs or facts are 
difficult to grasp even in the case of perceptual properties. In this way he is 
showing Theaetetus that the soul always (not only in case of more abstract 
features such as ‘good’) has to engage in deliberation and reasoning in order to 
judge the ‘being’ of a perceptual feature.  
 
S. Hold on. It'll perceive the hardness of what's hard by means of touch, won't 
it, and the softness of what's soft in the same way (ἔχε δή: ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν 
σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν 
μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως;)? T. Yes. S. But their being, and what/that they both are 
(τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὅτι ἐστὸν), and their oppositeness to each other, and the 
being, in its turn, of this oppositeness (καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ 
τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος), are things which the soul itself tries to decide 
for us, by reviewing them and comparing them with one another (αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ 
ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν). T. That's 
quite right (πάνυ μὲν οὖν).  
 
First, the passage seems to offer perhaps the best support for the copula reading, 
since here οὐσία is connected (by means of epexegetic καὶ) to ‘that they 
[hardness and softness] are’ (ὅτι ἐστὸν). This seems to imply that the soul does 
perceive hardness and softness by means of the senses (i.e. touch), but that the 
soul is incapable of forming the thought that ‘color is’ without grasping at least 
one of the commons, namely ‘being’. However, I argued at length in Chapter 
Two (Section 3) that this reading is difficult to defend. It is hard to explain why 
Socrates would be inclined to think that forming thoughts like ‘color is’ would 
be so difficult as to require ‘a great deal of troublesome education’.  
Can the realist reading fare better? First, it is important to note that trying to 
make judgments (about sound and color) ὅτι ἐστὸν does not have to mean that 
the soul is trying to form a thought that ‘hardness is’. There is no reason why 
the verb ‘be’ should be taken in its syntactic sense here, as opposed to the 
earlier semantic sense. According to the realist reading, Socrates simply means 
that the soul is trying to judge whether hardness has being (about something), 
i.e. whether hardness is really instantiated. The soul is not simply trying to form 
a judgment; it is trying to judge correctly whether or not a given perceptual 
feature is instantiated. To look forward in the argument (186D4), the soul is 
trying to ‘attain the being’ of hardness and softness (about or in relation to 
something), and this, in turn, requires the ‘attaining of being’ of opposition 
(about or in relation to hardness and softness). This attaining of opposition can 
be achieved by comparing and reviewing, in short, by reasoning. Later on, at 
187A8, this activity is identified as forming beliefs. Now the question is this – if 
reasoning is a necessary part of forming beliefs, as I will argue, does this 
passage not commit Plato to the view that one has to grasp at least one 
intelligible – opposition, in order to form beliefs (about hardness and softness)?  
Lorenz (2006: 76), for one, is very convinced that the term ‘opposition’ 
designates a common. In fact, his whole interpretation relies crucially on this 
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assumption. According to Lorenz, Plato’s point is that one has to grasp 
opposition in order to apply a perceptual predicate, e.g. ‘hardness’. However, if 
this really is Plato’s point, then it is simply astonishing that he does not bother 
to list ‘opposition’ explicitly among the commons. It would be odd for Socrates 
to expect Theaetetus to understand that ‘opposition’ is a common unless it was 
explicitly stated. This is one problem with counting opposition as one of the 
commons. The second problem (I am not aware of any commentator raising this 
issue) is that opposition might plausibly not be a common at all. At least it is 
difficult to see how opposition could be a common in the criterion set for 
commons at stage one. Commons were initially introduced as properties that 
belong to the proper objects of different senses (185A). Can the proper objects 
of the senses reasonably be said to be opposed to each other (is sound opposed 
to color)? Indeed, it seems that opposition is not cross-modal. Therefore, I think 
that Plato is not making a point that the soul has to grasp intelligibles in order to 
reason. Socrates’ point is simply that one has to reason and calculate and 
compare in order to successfully ‘attain the being’ of opposition (i.e. deciding 
whether opposition ‘has reality’ in regard to or about hardness and softness), 
and then in order to determine whether something is (really) soft or hard. Why 
is the deciding of being of opposition necessary for deciding the being of 
hardness and softness (whether hardness ‘has reality’ in regard to or about x)? I 
think that the answer is that Socrates assumes that in order to successfully 
decide the being of hardness, one has to have some sort of grasp of the fact that 
hardness is opposed to softness. However, this is not necessary for forming 
beliefs tout court (as Lorenz suggests (2006: 76ff)). Rather, it is required for 
successfully reaching the goal of ‘attaining being’, i.e. deciding correctly 
whether a given thing is hard or soft. Thus the above sentence supports neither 
of the claims that Lorenz attributes to Plato. First, ‘intelligibles’ are not grasped 
in all beliefs, since opposition might not be an ‘intelligible’. Second, even if 
opposition could be seen as an ‘intelligible’, Socrates is not claiming that 
opposition has to be grasped in all beliefs; he is simply saying that grasping 
opposition is necessary for achieving the goal of ‘attaining being’. 
The dynamics of the discussion are as follows. Theaetetus has recognized 
that in the case of properties like good or beautiful, the soul has to compare 
these properties to one another in order to ‘attain the being’ or to determine 
successfully whether they are, in fact, instantiated. That Socrates thinks that 
Theaetetus is on to something important is reflected by the expression ‘hold 
on’.200 Socrates’ next move is to point out that in the case of perceptual features, 
                                                     
200 There is a long-standing discussion as to the precise import of the expression ‘ἔχε δή’ in 
this passage. The question is whether Socrates indicates that Theaetetus is on to something 
correct and important or whether he thinks that Theaetetus is making a mistake. According 
to Schmidt (1877: 512) the discussion on this topic was already quite lively among the 
nineteenth-century German scholars (between Heindorf and Stallbaum). McDowell (1973: 
190) thinks that Socrates is saying that Theaetetus is on the wrong track. Kanayama (1987: 
77) and Lorenz (2006: 86 n. 41) prefer the second option (both referring to Gorg. 460A), as 
do I.  
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too, a great deal of activity of the soul is required in order to attain the being of, 
e.g. hardness. The expression πρὸς ἄλληλα, i.e. ‘in relation to one another’, 
repeats what Theaetetus has just said in regard to investigating the being of the 
good and beautiful. Thus Socrates says that deciding the being of hardness (i.e. 
attaining the being of hardness about something, i.e. correctly settling the 
question whether something is hard) also requires that the soul compare it with 
softness. The soul does this independently of perception. Socrates` point is not 
semantic, but rather epistemological. What he is trying to say is that if one 
wants to determine whether a given thing is really hard (or soft, or beautiful), 
one has to engage in reasoning and, perhaps, in making inferences. Socrates is 
not suggesting that one has to grasp the commons in order to reason. In fact his 
point is exactly the converse – one has to reason in order to grasp (at least one 
of the) commons, i.e. to ‘attain being’. The exact nature of this reasoning is left 
undetermined (but it does minimally involve comparing, calculating and taking 
into account past, present, and future), but nowhere does the text suggest that 
one has to have already ‘attained the being’ of something in order to compare 
and review and calculate (as the standard view suggests). It is quite plausible 
that Socrates would take a similar stance towards the rest of the commons other 
than being. In order to grasp or attain, e.g. the (being of) difference of 
something (from other things), one has to engage in comparing, reviewing, and 
making inferences.  
Having acquired Theaetetus`consent that even in the case of perceptual 
features the soul has to work in order to determine whether they have being, i.e. 
whether something is hard, Socrates is ready to to make another important 
distinction before clinching the final argument. 
 
S. So there are some things which both men and animals are able by nature to 
perceive from the moment they're born (οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις 
πάρεστι φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις): namely, all the 
experiences reach the soul by means of the body (ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος 
παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει). But as for calculations about those things, with 
respect to being and usefulness (τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε 
οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν), they're acquired, by those who do acquire them, with 
difficulty and over a long time, by means of great deal of troublesome 
education μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας 
παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται). T. Definitely (παντάπασι μὲν οὖν).  
 
Here Socrates makes a distinction between the παθήματα (experiences) that 
reach the soul by means of the body and the calculations about these 
experiences. In the literature one finds many suggestions as to the precise 
character of the παθήματα in question201. It seems to me that Socrates is not 
                                                     
201 For discussion, see Kanayama (1987: 48–49 and 78–80). The word παθήμα has a wide 
range of meanings in Plato. It often just means a ‘cognitive state’. In the Timaeus all 
representational states of the mortal soul are called παθήματα (Tim. 69D1). Similarly, in 
Republic the segments of the Line (and the corresponding states) are called παθήματα (Rep. 
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being overly precise here. Again, the point that he is trying to make concerns 
the epistemological requirements for grasping the οὐσία of something – namely 
that even in case of perceptual properties, the soul has to reason in order to 
determine how things are.  
The sentence above does raise some questions that are not very easy to 
answer. First, is it correct to take ‘being’ at 186C3 as referring to the being 
(reality) of hardness and softness (of something)? In the immediate context 
‘being’ should rather refer to the being of παθήματα, and not hardness and 
softness. In that case, Socrates would be saying that it takes long and arduous 
education in order to calculate according to being of παθήματα. This poses a 
problem for the realist reading. What sense would it make to say that the soul 
has to receive education in order to determine whether the experiences are 
real?202 However, it is not at all mandatory to take οὐσία to be referring to the 
being of experiences (as do, e.g. Modrak (1981) and Silverman (1990)). It 
seems rather that ‘being’ is here used in an indeterminate way so that it harks 
back to the use of οὐσία throughout the second stage of the Passage of the 
Commons. The idea is that it takes education to learn to reason in a way that 
enables the soul to determine whether the experiences (of, e.g. hardness) 
correspond to reality (e.g. whether a particular thing really is hard). As 
Theaetetus suggested above, determining this requires calculations concerning 
past and future (and of course, determining their oppositeness, etc.). It is likely 
that this is also why Socrates stresses the notion of ‘usefulness’ (ὠφέλεια). 
Theaetetus learned earlier (at 177–179), that determining whether something is 
useful always requires taking into account the future; it is never enough to 
simply focus on the present time, whereas perception is always tied to the 
present (Tht. 179C)203. 
Second, the realist reading commits Socrates to a view that ‘attaining being’ 
in the sense of correctly settling the question whether something, e.g. is hard, is 
impossible to accomplish without reasoning and education. What could he mean 
by this? Is it not possible for someone without any education to reach the being 
of hardness or softness in case of, say, rocks or pillows, i.e. to decide that ‘this 
rock is hard’ or that ‘this pillow is soft’, while attaining the οὐσία of hardness in 
relation to rocks? This passage has been the main motivation behind the reading 
of οὐσία as essences or Forms204, since it does make sense to say that one 
cannot grasp the essence or a Form of softness without going through long and 
arduous education. However, as I have tried to indicate, οὐσία in the sense of 
essences or Forms does not fit with how οὐσία is used within the rest of the 
Passage of the Commons. Thus, the question is whether it is possible to explain 
why Theaetetus would think that it is necessary to go through a great deal of 
                                                                                                                                  
511D7). Thus the term does not have to mean ‘non-cognitive passive affection’ (although 
this meaning might be expressed in Phlb. 39A), as it is sometimes taken.  
202 I thank Blake Hestir for bringing this problem to my attention. 
203 Aristotle, too, takes perception to be only of the present, see e.g. De Mem. 449B 
204 For references, see footnotes to p. 68 and p. 71 of this dissertation. 
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education in order to settle the question about whether the παθήματα correspond 
to reality?  
It might seem odd to say that determining adequately whether a given 
perceptual property really applies to a given thing requires education (and 
taking into account future and past, etc.). But the underlying assumption here is 
thoroughly Platonic. It is important to note that Socrates is not referring to all 
properties, but to properties that in fact have opposites 205 : good and bad, 
hardness and softness, beautiful and ugly, etc. It is somewhat remarkable that 
although Plato begins by discussing sound and color at stage one, he suddenly 
switches to hardness and softness at stage two. This is probably because he feels 
that the point he is endeavoring to make would be more clearly presented by 
relying on hardness and softness. It is well attested in the dialogues (e.g. Rep. 
522E–524D) that Plato is inclined to think that determining whether perceptual 
properties that have opposites are instantiated is especially difficult, since they 
are contextual in at least two senses: a given thing is beautiful compared to one 
thing but ugly compared to another thing; and a given thing seems ugly to some 
but beautiful to others. The same applies to other opposites, including hard and 
soft, etc206.  
This proposal is supported by the prominent place given to ‘oppositeness’ in 
the preceding sentence – in order to determine whether a given property of this 
kind is really instantiated, one has to be clear on how, exactly, hardness and 
softness are opposite to each other. Thus, I propose that the thought behind 
Socrates` claim for the necessity of education relies on the Platonic assumption 
about certain perceptual properties. This assumption is, then, expanded to cover 
all perceptual predicates. Socrates makes an ampliative inference (with 
Theaetetus` consent) from the claim that (i) in the case of some perceptual 
properties, it is necessary to engage in reasoning in order to ‘attain being’, to the 
claim that (ii) reasoning is necessary to ‘attain being’ in case of all perceptual 
predicates. Now, since the inference is ampliative, it leaves open the possibility 
that there might be some perceptual properties where this is not the case. 
However, it is not easy to give examples of perceptual properties that are not 
context-dependent in the above sense. For example, Plato does not take colors 
to have opposites (Tim.67D–68D). But colors could still be seen to be context-
dependent, and in order to determine whether a given thing really instantiates, 
e.g. redness, one has to take into account the possibility that a given thing 
appears red to one and, say, orange, to another person. Thus, it easy to see how 
Socrates can infer that the soul has to make inferences and calculate (taking into 
account the past and present) when trying to decide the being (reality) of any 
perceptual predicate. Therefore, given the assumptions Plato works with, the 
conclusion of the Passage of the Commons is completely justified. 
                                                     
205 This is usually neglected in the scholarly literature. 
206 See, especially Rep. 523–5 and Irwin’s (1999) and Annas’s (1981) discussion of this 
passage. 
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 We have now reached the final stage of the Passage of the Commons. 
Socrates and Theaetetus have isolated two different kinds of cognitive activities 
of the soul and two corresponding sets of objects. Theaetetus has agreed, in 
stage one, that there are commons that cannot be accessed by means of the 
senses. He has, further, come to realize that the access to commons, in particular 
to the common ‘being’, is something that requires a great deal of activity from 
the soul. The soul has to be able to calculate, compare, and take into account the 
past and future in order to reach ‘being’. In order to engage in these activities, 
the soul has to have received education. I have argued that ‘being’ should be 
understood as ‘reality’. I have also argued that calculating and comparing 
should not be equated with framing a propositional structure (as suggested by 
the standard account), but rather with inference-making, aiming to find out how 
things are. What Socrates has established is that the soul has to work hard to 
discover whether any property (a common property or perceptual property) is 
instantiated by a given thing.  
 The final argument moves extremely quickly. 
 
S. Well now, is it possible that someone should attain truth if he doesn't attain 
being? (οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μηδὲ οὐσίας) T. No (ἀδύνατον). S. And 
will someone ever have knowledge of something whose truth he doesn't attain 
(οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται)? S. So knowledge 
is not located in our experiences, but in our reasoning about those things we 
mentioned, because it's possible, apparently, to grasp being in the latter, but 
impossible in the former (ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ 
τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ: οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μέν, ὡς ἔοικε, 
δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον). T. Evidently (φαίνεται). S. Well now, are 
you going to call them by the same name, when they have such great 
differences (ἦ οὖν ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, τοσαύτας διαφορὰς 
ἔχοντε;). T. No, that wouldn't be just/right (οὔκουν δὴ δίκαιόν γε). S. Then 
what name do you give the: seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling hot? (τί οὖν δὴ 
ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὁρᾶν ἀκούειν ὀσφραίνεσθαι ψύχεσθαι 
θερμαίνεσθαι) T. Perceiving, of course (αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε: τί γὰρ ἄλλο). S. 
So you call all of that, taken together, perception (σύμπαν ἄρ᾽ αὐτὸ καλεῖς 
αἴσθησιν)? T. Yes, one must (ἀνάγκη). And we say it has no share in the 
grasping of truth, because it has no share in the grasping of being either (ὧι γε, 
φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἅψασθαι: οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας). T. No (οὐ γὰρ οὖν). 
S. So it has no share in knowledge, either (οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐπιστήμης)? T. No (οὐ 
γάρ). So knowledge and perception could never be the same things, Theaetetus 
(οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἴσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτόν). T. 
Evidently not, it has now become absolutely clear that knowledge is something 
other than perception (οὐ φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστά γε νῦν 
καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὂν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη).  
 
Socrates asks rhetorically, whether it is ‘possible for something to attain truth if 
it does not attain being?’207 (186C6–7). Theaetetus says that it is not. For the 
                                                     
207 The standard translation (e.g. McDowell’s) is the following: ‘Is it possible for someone to 
attain truth if it does not even attain being?’. However, Schmidt (1878:523–524) already 
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standard account this means that being (as a copula) is necessary for truth (i.e. 
for propositional structure as the primary truth bearer). However, for the realist 
reading the connection is closer. Attaining how things really stand, i.e. 
determining facts is the same as attaining truth. There is no grasp of being that 
is not simultaneously a grasp of truth and vice versa. For Plato, truth requires an 
existing object in the mind-independent reality. It has been plausibly maintained 
that Plato has a ‘realist notion of truth’208. The second stage of the Passage of 
the Commons suggests that this object (in modern language a ‘truth-maker’) 
should be understood as a state of affairs of a property objectively belonging to 
something, i.e. ‘being’ understood in the realist manner.  
I have urged that throughout the Passage of the Commons, οὐσία should be 
understood as the reality (of something). This means that attaining οὐσία in the 
sense of reality is both necessary and sufficient for attaining truth. Since 
attaining being and truth was, quite at the beginning of the discussion of 
Theaetetus’ first definition, set as the criterion of knowledge (152C5–6), 
Socrates can now smoothly infer that attaining being is necessary for 
knowledge. In principle, this claim could have been made at the end of stage 
one as well. However, Socrates immediately draws attention to the results of 
stage two. Socrates goes on to point out that reasoning (συλλογισμῷ) is in fact 
necessary for attaining being (not, as one would suspect at the end of stage one, 
that it suffices to entertain a thought involving the term ‘is’). He then goes on to 
make a rather strong claim that only in reasoning is it possible to reach being 
                                                                                                                                  
remarks that the alternative is just as possible. Cornford, for example, translates the sentence 
in the way I suggest (without the ‘even’): ‘Is it possible, then, to reach truth when one cannot 
reach existence?” (Cornford 1935:107) 
208 ‘“True” in these discussions always means “true of a real objective world,” and that is 
how the word “true” had been used since Protagoras and before. Protagoras' book was called 
Truth precisely because it offered an account of the conditions under which things really are 
as they appear to be. The Greek use of the predicates “true” and “false” embodies the 
assumption of realism on which I have been insisting all along.’ (Burnyeat 1982: 26). In 
light of this claim it is especially puzzling that in his (1976) Burnyeat rejects reading ‘being’ 
in the Passage of the Commons as reality, on the account that ‘No defence is offered of the 
idea that knowledge, let alone truth, pre-supposes a grasp of being in the specific sense of 
existence, reality or essence, and if any such narrow notion of being were intended, the 
argument would be left to limp on an unargued assumption of the first magnitude. That is 
not Plato’s manner in this dialogue’ (Burnyeat 1976: 25). However, if ‘truth’ always 
involves ‘true of a real objective world’, then ‘reality’ would not be a too narrow notion of 
‘being’ after all, in fact it becomes perfectly understandable why Plato connects ‘being’ (as 
reality) and ‘truth’ in the Passage of the Commons. For Plato’s ‘realist notion of truth’, see 
also Szaif (1998: esp. 332–343). Further, Plato’s realism about truth does not have to mean 
that he supports a correspondence theory of truth in any pregnant sense (i.e. as introducing 
some form of a relation of mirroring between statements (beliefs) and facts), see Hestir 
(2003). In the Theaetetus Plato takes the relation between being and truth to be obvious and 
not in need of any explanation. He uses the expressions ‘x is F for S’ and ‘‘x is F’ is true for 
S’ interchangeably throughout the discussion of Protagoras’ relativism. There no additional 
argument in the Passage of the Commons that would connect the notions of ‘attaining being’ 
and ‘attaining truth’, it seems that for Plato the one simply implies the other. 
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and truth. Again, the copula reading takes συλλογισμός to mean something like 
‘framing a propositional structure’ (I argued in Chapter 2 that this is quite 
implausible). It seems more natural to take Socrates` point to be that it is 
impossible to determine what is really the case without engaging in reasoning. 
He then sums up the results of the earlier discussion, where perception was 
identified as a process requiring bodily organs. It is only here, quite at the end 
of the discussion where the narrow notion of αἴσθησις is clearly out in the open 
– αἴσθησις is comprised of seeing, hearing, smelling and feeling hot (curiously 
the sense of taste is omitted, but since it was mentioned at 185C3 it can easily 
be added to the list). And then Socrates goes on to claim that perception cannot 
be knowledge. The argument is simple: 
(1) Perception does not grasp being. 
(2) Grasping being is necessary (and sufficient) for grasping on truth. 
(3) Grasping truth is necessary for knowledge. 
(4) Therefore, perception is not the same as knowledge. 
Of course, stated in this way, the argument does not do justice to what Socrates` 
midwifery has achieved in the Passage of the Commons. First, Socrates has 
helped Theaetetus to ‘give birth’ to a novel notion of perception. Second, while 
relying on Theaetetus` framework of beliefs, Socrates has managed to isolate 
certain properties of things that are not perceptual, i.e. the commons. Thirdly, at 
stage two, Socrates has pointed out that the aisthetic model of cognition does 
not apply to the common ‘being’. The soul has to engage in reasoning in order 
to ‘attain being’. I do not think that the ‘propositional nature of thought’ and 
commons as semantic entities are ever the issue in the Passage of the Commons. 
The argument simply shows that (i) ‘being’ and the rest of the commons are not 
perceptible and (ii) the soul needs to reason and work in order to ‘attain being’. 
The Theaetetus never claims that the soul has to have ‘attained being’ in order 
to engage in reasoning.  
 Before closing this section, I would like to raise one final issue. I have 
maintained that Plato’s goal in Theaetetus 184B–187A is to stress the activity of 
reasoning in regard to ‘attaining being’. I have also suggested that the main 
argument of the passage does not consist in contrasting the complexity of 
propositional thought (i.e. the subject-copula-predicate structure) with the non-
propositional nature of perception. One might ask, however, whether Plato 
nevertheless maintains, in the course of the argument, that thoughts do have 
propositional structure? This question can be understood in two ways. First, one 
could inquire whether Plato recognizes that the notion of ‘being’ implies 
ontological complexity of states of affair? Plato might, by contrast, assume that 
the term ‘being’ refers to a (simple) property, just like the terms ‘beauty’ or 
‘hardness’. Secondly, one could ask whether Plato recognizes that the process 
of forming beliefs involves (among other things) connecting the subject with a 
predicate? He might, by contrast, assume that holding a true belief involves a 
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direct mental grasp of its object (even though this mental grasp is a result of 
calculations and reasoning). 209  
 It seems that the Passage of the Commons remains systematically ambiguous 
concerning both issues. As to the first question, at stage one the term ‘being’ 
refers to a non-complex property that all things share. At stage two, on the other 
hand, ‘being’ refers to the relation (of instantiation) between the property and its 
bearer (F-being-about-x). Thus, it seems that Plato is inclined to view being 
both as a relation on the one hand and as a property in its own right, on the 
other. He does not distinguish between the two ways to understand the role of 
term ‘being’ in the Passage of the Commons, although perhaps he draws this 
distinction later, in the Sophist.  
 A similar ambiguity pertains to the second question. At stage one, verbs such 
as ‘thinking’ and ‘grasping’ are very often used in about-constructions (i.e. ‘S 
thinks F about x’), which might indicate that Plato takes thoughts to necessarily 
involve complexity. However, at stage two the about-constructions virtually 
disappear and ‘being’ is used as a direct object in constructions with verbs for 
thinking or calculating. This could indicate that Plato, at times, implies that 
holding a true belief involves a direct grasp of its object (e.g. an obtaining state 
of affairs or a fact). Thus, it is hard to determine Plato’s position on this matter 
in the Passage of the Commons. In any case, in the Sophist (262D–264A) Plato 
arrives at a much clearer conception about these issues. Plato says, namely, that 
thinking minimally involves connecting a noun with a verb, and that a thought 
must always predicate something about something.  
 Thus, Plato might be, at the time of writing the Theaetetus, somewhat 
unclear about the issues surrounding the ontology of states of affair and the 
semantic complexity of thought. However, I do not think that this should be 
seen as a serious problem in the context of interpreting the Passage of the 
Commons. In this passage Plato aims to make an epistemological point that 
finding out how things are requires the activity of reasoning. Therefore, I think 
it is a mistake to look for well-developed ontology or semantic theory in 
Theaetetus 184B–187A.  
 
 
                                                     
209 Even if Plato believes that the objects of thought are complex states of affair, he could 
still think that the relation of true beliefs to these complex states of affair is best understood 
as direct mental grasping of these states of affair. This would generate the paradox of false 
belief ‘by way of being and not-being’ (Tht. 188D-189B). When Socrates presents the 
second paradox of false belief, it is, indeed, possible to understand the notions of ‘that which 
is’ (τὸ ὂν) and ‘that which is not’ (τὸ μὴ ὂν) (and the corresponding notions of ‘one thing’, 
‘something’ and ‘no one thing’, ‘nothing’) as referring to states of affair (e.g. Socrates-
being-snubnosed and Socrates-being-tall, respectively). Thus, if one thinks that Socrates is 
tall, then one grasps nothing (Socrates is not tall, the state of affairs of Socrates-being-tall is 
not). This was suggested to me by B. Hestir. However, since Socrates (at 188C7) indicates 
that it is also not possible to grasp ‘things that are not’ about other things that are, it might be 
the case that τὸ ὂν and τὸ μὴ ὂν refer to properties, rather than (complex) states of affair. It 
might also be that τὸ ὂν and τὸ μὴ ὂν refer to both properties and states of affair. 
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2. The Notion of Belief 
Plato does not endorse the claim that commons are grasped in all thoughts, i.e. 
that commons are ‘semantic’ or conceptual entities. I would now like to 
consider the notion of belief-formation that emerges from the passage. This 
notion is novel in Plato’s thinking, and it can also help to explain the differences 
between the middle and late dialogues’ claims about belief. That is, it explains 
why Plato starts to regard belief-formation as a rational capacity. To put the 
point briefly, I think that the Passage of the Commons could be seen as 
advocating for a notion of belief that takes ‘aiming at being’ or ‘aiming at 
reality’ as a necessary feature of belief-formation. 
To set out my proposal it is useful to recall the outlines of the standard 
account. According to the standard account, grasping intelligibles like ‘being’ 
and ‘opposition’ is a cognitive precondition for engaging in predication. 
Broadly speaking, there are two versions of the standard account. According to 
one view, one has to grasp the copula ‘be’ (οὐσία) in order to form any beliefs 
and to engage in propositional thought in general. According to the second 
view, one has to be able to ‘recognize’ or ‘identify’ properties in order to 
predicate these properties about something. This ‘recognition’ requires that one 
have access to intelligibles like sameness, difference and opposition, i.e. one has 
to be able to distinguish the predicate from others (i.e. ‘grasp difference or 
opposition’) and identify it as what it is (i.e. to ‘grasp the sameness’). 
According to both versions, the activities of reasoning, comparing, reviewing, 
and calculating are the mental prerequisites of forming beliefs (framing a 
propositional structure or predicating).  
I have been urging that this view cannot be correct. Plato is not concerned 
with what enables one to form beliefs (in general) but with the necessary 
conditions for ‘attaining being’, i.e. for grasping how things really are. In order 
to ‘attain being’, one has to engage in comparing, reviewing, and calculating. 
After Theaetetus and Socrates have reached the conclusion that perception is 
not knowledge, they identify belief-formation with ‘what the soul is doing when 
it’s busying itself, by itself, about the things that are (πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ 
ὄντα)’ (187A). The activity picked up by the expression ‘πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ 
ὄντα’ must be the same activity described at stage two, i.e. reasoning, reviewing 
and calculating. In forming beliefs, the soul has to work and cannot rely 
exclusively on perceptual input. The question is why Socrates and Theaetetus 
insist that reasoning is part and parcel of belief-formation? Can one not arrive at 
a belief by simply asserting – e.g. ‘this is hard’ or ‘this is beautiful’, without 
reasoning about it?  
I propose that the answer is roughly the following. Throughout stage two 
Socrates and Theaetetus take being (objectivity, facts) to be something that the 
soul ‘yearns for’ or ‘tries to decide’ (by means of itself). I take this to be 
included in the scope of the expression ‘busying itself about things that are’ (at 
187A8). Therefore, belief-formation is an activity where the soul is actively 
searching for ‘being’, where it is trying to determine how things are (not the 
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way they seem). It is quite natural to suppose that comparing, reviewing, and 
calculating are the means to reach this goal, i.e. to establish whether a certain 
property is instantiated.  
In what sense, exactly, can the soul be said to have being as its goal in 
forming beliefs? There are two questions that need to be answered in order to 
clarify this rather obscure notion of ‘aiming at facts’ or ‘aiming at being’ (or, to 
connect these notions with contemporary epistemology, ‘aiming at truth’). First, 
it is important to distinguish goals that are intrinsic to (or constitutive of) an 
activity from extrinsic goals (see, e.g. Vahid 2009:27). For example, one can 
play chess with the aim of appearing intelligent. This is not an intrinsic or 
constitutive aim of playing chess, for one could play chess without aiming to 
appear intelligent. On the other hand, aiming to win the game by means of legal 
moves seems to be an intrinsic goal of playing chess; unless one does this, one 
is simply not engaged in chess playing. If ‘attaining being’ is an intrinsic goal, 
then belief formation is by its very nature aiming at representing facts. If 
representing facts is an extrinsic goal, then beliefs can be formed having in 
mind exclusively other goals as well (pleasantness, instrumental value, etc.). 
Secondly, one should also distinguish between explicit and implicit goals of an 
action or a state. An action can be performed without the conscious recognition 
of what the goal of an action is. To use the same example, one can aim to look 
intelligent by playing chess without being aware of this aim at all, or, on the 
other hand, one can be perfectly aware of what one is doing. Similarly, when 
forming beliefs, one can aim at representing facts in forming beliefs without 
being aware of that this is indeed what one is doing, or one can consciously aim 
at finding out how things are210. So the question is the following. If I am right 
that forming beliefs has ‘reality (of something)’ as its goal, then is this goal (i) 
intrinsic or extrinsic, and (ii) implicit or explicit? In what follows I will offer 
some reasons for thinking that the Passage of the Commons takes ‘attaining 
reality’ to be an intrinsic and explicit goal of forming beliefs. 
First, Plato takes ‘attaining being’ to be an intrinsic goal of forming beliefs. 
This is supported by the following consideration. Only when ‘attaining being’ is 
taken as an intrinsic goal of forming beliefs does it make sense to include 
                                                     
210  For example, in the literature (especially Engel 2004) a distinction has been made 
between three kinds of truth-directedness of belief: (1) Causal truth-directedness. According 
to this account, truth-directedness is simply a fact about beliefs – belief has a function of 
yielding true information, and the contents of beliefs can be either true or false. (2) 
Normative truth-directedness. According to this account, beliefs enter into rational relations 
and have normative properties – in other words, belief is governed by the Norm of Truth 
(NT): For all p one ought to believe that p only if p. ‘To think of oneself as believing that p 
involves the recognition of (NT)’ (Engel 2004). The recognition of (NT) is necessary for 
belief-ascription, but not for having beliefs. Children and animals have beliefs but don’t 
recognize the norm (Engel 2004). Thus both (1) and (2) involve truth as an implicit goal; (3) 
Teleological truth-directedness: believing involves the conscious recognition of (NT), and 
(b) an intention to respect (NT) (Velleman 2000). This involves truth as the explicit goal. 
According to this account, a cognitive state counts as a belief only if the agent has a 
concept/conception of what it is for a belief to be true.  
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reasoning, comparing, and reviewing within the scope of forming beliefs (as 
Plato clearly does). The whole point of these activities is to determine whether 
F ‘has being’ (whether it is real, whether the fact containing the property F 
obtains). If ‘attaining being’ were an external goal of forming beliefs, the 
activities of comparing, reviewing, and reasoning would not be a necessary part 
of forming beliefs. On the other hand, if belief formation is, by its very nature, 
directed at grasping objectively obtaining facts, then belief formation is also an 
activity that is sensitive to reasoning and inference. This is the message of the 
Passage of the Commons—belief formation is by its very nature an activity that 
tries to reach objective being. Since the realist reading insists on the close 
connection between being and truth, one could say that it is part of the very 
notion of belief that it aims at being true, i.e. it aims at reflecting objectively 
obtaining facts ‘out there’. The Passage of the Commons insists on what has 
been recently called an ‘alethic notion of belief’:  
 
Consider, first, the possibility that Plato endorses what I shall call an 
alethic notion of belief. On this way of thinking about belief, believing 
that p requires more than merely being disposed to act as if p; one must 
also have the aim of believing p only if p is true. According to the alethic 
account, beliefs are products of goal-directed behaviour. Part of what 
makes something a belief is the way it comes about: beliefs are products 
of the practices we engage in with the aim of determining how things are 
(Ganson 2009:184). 
 
Ganson thinks that this notion of belief is already applicable to the Republic. 
However, I will argue below that the ‘alethic notion of belief’ only applies to 
the late dialogues. In the Republic Plato does not yet recognize that beliefs are 
aimed at ‘attaining being’. As to the second question, I believe that Socrates and 
Theaetetus take ‘attaining being’ to be an explicit goal of forming beliefs. This 
is, for example, the reason why animals and babies are incapable of forming 
beliefs, i.e. incapable of reasoning and inference that is explicitly (or 
reflectively) directed at ‘attaining being’. As I argued in Chapter II (Section III), 
there is ample evidence that Plato takes animals and babies to be capable of 
representing the world around them. However, they are not capable of 
reasoning, i.e. of the internal dialogue meant to find out how things are in the 
world, and this is why they lack beliefs.  
 Beliefs, for later Plato, have the following characteristics (based on the 
Passage of the Commons):  
(A) Forming beliefs is, intrinsically and explicitly, aimed at ‘attaining being’, 
i.e. at finding out how things are in the (mind-independent) world. 
(R) Forming beliefs necessarily involves reviewing, calculating, and com-
paring, i.e. reasoning. 
According to this interpretation, for Plato belief is a rather special cognitive 
state – it is formed with the explicit intention of finding out how things are. 
Unless the soul engages in explicit reasoning, reviewing, and calculating, the 
resulting ‘mental state’ does not qualify as a belief (this rules out perceptual 
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appearances, images, etc.). In what follows I will call this notion of belief the 
‘teleological’ notion, in virtue of the centrality of the goal-directedness.  
 It is also important to note what is not included – namely the two central 
claims of the standard account – that forming beliefs is rational because it requires 
a prior grasp of intelligibles, and that belief for Plato is distinguished from other 
representation mental states by being ‘propositional’ (there might be propositional 
representations that do not count as beliefs since they are not goal-directed in the 
way belief is). I will now briefly consider two possible objections. 
 Objection 1. It can be objected, however, that I am committed to these two 
claims anyway: do not (A) and (R) imply that belief has a propositional 
structure and that one has to have a prior cognitive grasp of intelligibles, e.g. 
being in order to form beliefs? That is, isn’t ‘aiming to attain being’ a cognitive 
attitude towards being? As to the first half of the objection, I think that belief 
indeed does have a propositional structure for later Plato (this is made clear in 
the Sophist 264A), but this is not the feature that sets beliefs apart from other 
propositional attitudes. What is specific about belief (and what is not the case 
with all propositional attitudes, such as, e.g. fear) is that it is formed in a way 
that is explicitly and intrinsically directed at ‘attaining being’, i.e. how things 
are. But what about the second part of the objection – if belief is a cognitive 
attitude that has a goal of ‘attaining being’, does it not mean that in order to 
engage in forming beliefs the soul has to have prior cognitive access to ‘being’? 
A great deal depends, of course, on how ‘cognitive access’ is understood here. 
In a way, ‘yearning after being’ does seem to require some understanding of 
‘what it is to be’, i.e. it might require possessing the concept ‘being’. However, 
I do not think that this sort of ‘concept’ of being is what Plato has in mind when 
he addresses the issue of ‘attaining being’. Being, in the Passage of the 
Commons, is always addressed in the material mode. And perhaps it is even 
plausible that one does not need the concept of ‘being’ in order to determine the 
fact that ‘Theaetetus sits’, for example. In any case, this notion of being (the 
concept of ‘being as a something to be attained’) is certainly not what the 
scholars have in mind when they mention ‘cognitive access’ to being – rather, 
their idea as expressed in the language of the Passage of the Commons, is that 
one has to already have ‘attained being’ in order to form beliefs. And I do think 
that I have shown that this is not the case. 
 Objection 2. The second possible objection is more general. (R) seems 
simply too strong a claim to attribute to Plato. Is it not plausible that beliefs can 
be formed on the basis of immediate perceptual recognition and that forming 
these beliefs does not require any reasoning or deliberation? For example, when 
something is clearly present to the sight, there is no need to deliberate as to 
what this something might be in order to form a relevant belief. Thus, it is not 
clear why Plato would require that all belief formation involve deliberation and 
reasoning. Thus it seems that (R) is false.  
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 There are two possible replies to this objection. The first reply211 would 
consist in relaxing the necessity requirement and maintain, that instead of (R), 
Plato subscribes to (R*): Forming beliefs can require reviewing, calculating and 
comparing, i.e. reasoning (e.g. in case where perceptual objects are not clearly 
presented to the sight). (R*) allows that beliefs can be formed without 
reasoning. However, (R*) seems to be too weak to capture Plato’s intent in the 
passages where he discusses the notion of belief. First of all, the Passage of the 
Commons clearly implies that reasoning (the soul’s ‘busying itself by itself 
about the things that are’) is a necessary component of forming beliefs. 
Otherwise stage two (186A–C) of the Passage of the Commons would be 
simply redundant (as I stressed above). Further, all passages (esp. Phlb. 38C-E 
and Tht. 189D–190A) in Plato’s later dialogues where he discusses forming 
beliefs, the cognitive process always involves a complex inner dialogue. It is 
difficult to explain why Plato would, in defining the notion of belief, focus on 
the cases which involve a complex inner dialogue (involving reasoning), if he 
did not take it to be a necessary component of forming beliefs. This would be 
highly misleading. I believe, therefore, that the first reply to the second 
objection is somewhat problematic. 
 The second possible reply (which I take to be the correct one) is that, for 
Plato, forming beliefs indeed always requires reasoning, i.e. the (R) is correct as 
it stands. The reason why (in defining the notion of belief) he focuses on, e.g. 
cases where the observer cannot get a clear view of the object seen (Phlb. 38C-
E), and where an especially long explicit inner dialogue is required, is that in 
these situations the inner dialogue is presented especially vividly. It is very 
likely that Plato thinks that even when an object is in plain sight, there occurs a 
similar inner dialogue. However, in these, perhaps more typical, cases this inner 
dialogue is less explicit. From a phenomenological point of view, this position 
is not at all absurd. There is an obvious difference between perceptually re-
presenting an object in one’s vicinity (I assume that for Plato perceptual 
representations are not beliefs) and forming a belief (or judgment) about what 
this particular object is. The second cognitive process clearly involves a more 
significant effort, and it is easy to see why Plato would think that in forming a 
belief, e.g. ‘this is a book’, involves a (quick) comparison of this object with 
other books one has seen, and perhaps distinguishing this book from other 
things that might look like books. Thus, I think that in face of the second 
objection, it is more reasonable to simply bite the bullet, and assume that, for 
Plato (in his later dialogues), belief formation always requires reasoning and 
deliberation212. 
                                                     
211 The objection was raised by J. Szaif who also suggested the first reply. 
212 Plato’s notion of belief is perhaps close to what some contemporary philosophers have 
called ‘acceptance’ (Cohen 1992: 1–20) or ‘opinion’ (Dennett 1981). For example, Cohen 
takes acceptance to be formed in an active manner, as a result of an occurent thought 
(whereas beliefs are dispositions and are essentially passive). Acceptance is also tied to 
linguistic formulation, and acceptances are outside the cognitive reach of infants and animals 
(whereas beliefs are not). In this sense, Cohen’s notion of acceptance is close to Plato’s later 
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 Now I want to consider the questions as to why is the Theaetetus the one 
dialogue where Plato changes his mind about what is involved in forming 
beliefs and starts to view belief formation as a rational capacity? I think that the 
teleological notion of belief provides a defense for Socrates’ method against 
Protagoras’ relativistic charges. I pointed out (Chapter 3, Section 2) that 
Protagoras’ notion of belief formation has three distinctive features. Protagoras 
takes belief formation to be passive, flat and atomistic. According to Protagoras, 
belief formation is passive, since beliefs are equated with ‘appearances’; 
forming beliefs does not require any activity; beliefs just ‘come to’ one (the 
wine appearing sweet constitutes a belief that the wine is sweet). Forming 
beliefs is flat, since second order considerations (e.g. is the wine really sweet or 
does it simply appear to be sweet) never play any role. Finally, forming beliefs 
is atomistic – whether or not a particular belief we hold is consistent with other 
beliefs we hold never plays any part in forming beliefs, for the simple reason 
that, according to Protagoras, each person can hold only one belief.  
All these features of forming beliefs derive from Protagoras’ complex 
ontology, according to which all beliefs are true (tout court); jointly they 
constitute a serious challenge to Socrates’ dialectical method (as Socrates 
recognizes at 161E–162A). Why should this be? Socrates’ method is designed 
to detect inconsistencies within the interlocutor`s framework of beliefs (Tht. 
154E). This is the main reason why, throughout the dialogues (and in the 
Theaetetus as well, e.g. 181C.) Socrates insists that his interlocutors say what 
they really believe. In case an inconsistency is detected, the interlocutor has to 
give up one of his beliefs (usually it is the definition that the interlocutor has 
offered for discussion)213.  
Socratic method, then, assumes that the interlocutor aims at maintaining a 
consistent framework of beliefs. Otherwise the interlocutor would gladly accept 
that his beliefs are inconsistent and Socrates’ method would end up being 
powerless. Therefore, Socratic method assumes that beliefs are formed in a 
holistic manner – they are formed (and given up) in relation to the background 
of other beliefs that the interlocutor holds, and questions are posed as to 
whether or not a given belief is consistent with the rest of the beliefs that the 
interlocutor holds214. Further, since the interlocutor has to be able to detect the 
                                                                                                                                  
notion of belief. However, for Cohen, acceptance is not truth-directed in the same way belief 
is for Plato. Acceptances are ‘policies of reasoning’. One can accept a proposition without 
believing it to be true. In this sense, Plato’s notion of belief is different form acceptance. 
Dennett’s ‘opinion’ is also not available to animals, is a result of mental activity (is not 
passive), and has a lingusitic form. In this sense, it resembles Plato’s notion of belief. 
However, Dennett thinks that ‘opinions’ come about only when one changes one’s mind. 
This is importantly different form Plato’s notion of belief, since Plato does not require that 
beliefs arise in this manner. 
213  ‘When such a conflict [Robinson is referring to the passage in Tht. 154C–D] arose 
between consistency and ‘what I really think’, consistency won the day, and the answerer 
had to abandon one of his opinions, whichever he chose’ (Robinson 1953: 78).  
214 That Plato recognizes the connection between Socratic method and desire for truth (or 
desire for reality) is also indicated by a passage in the Sophist. First, the Eleatic Visitor 
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inconsistencies within his own framework of beliefs and form new beliefs 
accordingly, the interlocutor has to be able to consider what it is that he himself 
believes; he has to be able make his own beliefs into objects of reflective 
thought. Socratic method assumes that belief formation cannot be flat. And of 
course, given the fact that forming beliefs is a reflective attempt to maintain 
consistency, it is by its very nature an activity. For Socrates, forming beliefs is 
not tantamount to a passive reception of an appearance. 
Plato’s teleological account of belief formation takes these fundamentally 
Socratic assumptions about belief and forms them into a single coherent notion 
of what it is to form beliefs. Forming beliefs is an intrinsically and explicitly 
goal-directed activity aimed at representing the world as it is, i.e. aimed at 
forming true beliefs. It is easy to see how this fundamental fact about belief 
formation justifies Socratic method. Since, in forming our beliefs, we engage in 
an activity of finding out how things are, it is natural that we aim at holding 
consistent beliefs, for the simple reason that two inconsistent beliefs cannot 
both be true (by definition). Further, since for Plato forming beliefs is explicitly 
aimed at finding out how things are, it is a reflective activity, in which the soul 
engages in an inner dialogue. If forming beliefs is understood in this manner, 
Socrates is perfectly justified in expecting that his interlocutors would have to 
revise their beliefs if Socrates’ elenchus shows these beliefs to be inconsistent. 
Therefore, a plausible reason behind Plato’s adopting a novel notion of belief in 
the Theaetetus (the only late dialogue that depicts Socratic method in action) 
can be seen in Plato’s attempt to justify the method of his teacher215.  
                                                                                                                                  
points out to Theaetetus that ignorance always involves missing an aim – truth: ‘Well then, 
suppose something that’s in motion aims at a target and tries to hit it (σκοπόν τινα θέμενα 
πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν), but on every try passes by it and misses (παράφορα αὐτοῦ 
γίγνηται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνῃ). Are we going to say that it does this because it’s properly 
proportioned (συμμετρίας) or because it’s out of proportion (ἀμετρίας)? – Out of proportion, 
obviously. – But we know that no soul is willingly ignorant of anything (ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν 
πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν). – Definitely. – But ignorance occurs precisely when a soul tries for 
the truth (ἀγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπ' ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης ψυχῆς), but swerves aside from 
understanding (συνέσεως) and so is beside itself.’ (Soph. 228C–D) Then, shortly after that 
the Visitor gives a description of the ‘sophist of the noble lineage’, who is probably 
Socrates: ‘They cross-examine (διερωτῶσιν) someone when he thinks he’s saying something 
though he’s saying nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently (πλανωμένων 
τὰς δόξας), these people will easily scrutinize (ἐξετάζουσι) them. They collect his opinions 
together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with each 
other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things and in the same 
respects (ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὑταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ 
ἐναντίας).’ (Soph. 230B). Socratic method would be pointless if people did not try to 
maintain consistency in their beliefs. This desire for consistency derives from the desire to 
attain truth. 
215 A further reason why Plato starts to think of belief formation as aiming at reality might be 
that in later dialogues Plato has a more relaxed notion of ‘reality’. In the middle dialogues, 
the notion of οὐσία was firmly attached to Platonic Forms. In the later dialogues Plato takes 
the material world and the properties instantiated therein to have their own, divisible reality. 
In the Timaeus (35A1–3) Plato speaks of two kinds of οὐσία, one that is ‘indivisible and 
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I shall now explain how Plato’s teleological notion of belief accounts for the 
differences between Plato`s conceptions of belief in the middle and late 
dialogues. I remind the reader that the differences are the following:  
In the middle dialogues Plato thinks that:  
(i)  all parts of the soul and the body are capable of forming beliefs (Rep. 
602C–603A; cf. Phd. 83D),  
(ii) non-human animals are capable of forming beliefs (Rep. 430B),  
(iii) beliefs include sensory appearances (Rep. 602C–603A, Tht. 152D–179D),  
(iv)  beliefs include blind and non-reflective acceptances (Rep. 602C–606D).  
Whereas in the late dialogues Plato is committed to the claims according to 
which:  
(i*)  only reason is capable of forming beliefs (Tim. 37C, 77B),  
(ii*)  non-human animals are incapable of forming beliefs (Tht. 186C),  
(iii*)  beliefs differ from sensory appearances (Phlb.38C–E),  
(iv*)  belief-formation necessarily involves reasoning and deliberation (Tht. 
189E–190A, Phlb. 38C-E).  
In what follows I will argue that the differences between (i-iv) and (i*–iv*) can 
be accounted for by the novel teleological notion of belief formation, together 
with ancillary assumptions Plato is inclined to make about the cognitive abilities 
of the reasoning part of the soul, animals, and the irrational parts of the soul.  
First, the shift between (i) and (i*) can be explained as follows. In Plato`s 
middle dialogues the distinguishing epistemic216 feature of the reasoning part of 
the soul is its desire for truth and learning. Reason is ‘always wholly straining to 
know where the truth lies’ (Rep. 581B), whereas the irrational parts of the soul 
desire bodily pleasures, money and honor, among other things. The desire for 
truth accounts for why the reasoning part is never satisfied with how things 
appear, but uses calculation in order to find out how things really are (Rep. 
602C–603A). This is exactly parallel to ‘yearning after’ and ‘trying to decide’ 
being (in the sense of ‘reality’ in the Theaetetus. The cognitive desire to view 
reality is a primitive feature of reason that cannot be explained by anything 
more fundamental (e.g. previous acquaintance with Forms).  
For example, in Socrates’ second speech on love in the Phaedrus, all souls 
(before they are incarnated) are striving to view the reality of Forms, regardless 
of whether or not they have seen it before. 
                                                                                                                                  
always changeless (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης) and the one that divisible and comes to be in 
the corporeal realm (αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆ)’. Further, in the Philebus Plato 
speaks of the ‘third kind: I treat the joint offspring of these two other kinds [the limit and the 
unlimited] as a unity, a-coming-into-being (γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν) created through the measures 
imposed by the limit’ (26D). See also Phlb. 27B. Both passages say that perceptible objects 
(and their properties) share in οὐσία. I only briefly mention this here, because the topic 
would require a lengthy treatment and a thorough discussion of both the relevant passages 
(and their context) of the Timaeus and the Philebus. The ontology presented in these 
dialogues is not, at least not obviously relevant to the Theaetetus.  
216 In the moral sense the distinguishing feature of reason is its desire for the good (for the 
whole soul). For some discussion, see Irwin 1995: 203–23 and 287–298. 
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Many souls are crippled by the incompetence of the drivers, and many 
wings break much of their plumage. After so much trouble, they all leave 
without having seen reality (τοῦ ὄντος), uninitiated, and when they have 
gone they will depend on what they think is nourishment – their own 
opinions (δοξαστῇ χρῶνται). The reason there is so much eagerness to see 
the plain where the truth (ἀληθείας) stands is that this pasture has the 
grass that is the right food for the best part of the soul ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ) 
[i.e. the rational part], and it is the nature of the wings that lift up the soul 
to be nourished by it. (Phdr. 248B–C)  
 
Here Plato makes two important claims (I am disregarding the fact that Plato 
speaks of reality in an elevated sense, as the reality of Forms). First, it is the 
desire of reason to view reality217. Secondly, beliefs are seen as the inferior 
cognitive states of those souls who have failed to see the reality of Forms. One 
reason218 why Plato is committed to the second claim is the fact that in his 
middle period writings, Plato does not take beliefs to be intrinsically directed at 
grasping how things are. Since beliefs are, for the middle period Plato, not 
intrinsically aimed at being, he might easily think that beliefs have to be 
separated from what he takes to be reality (i.e. the Forms). The claim that Plato 
does not take beliefs to be intrinsically aimed at reality can be substantiated by 
the following passage from the Republic: 
 
And isn't this also clear? In the case of just and beautiful things, many 
people are content (ἕλοιντο) with what are believed (τὰ δοκοῦντα) [to be 
so], even if they aren't really [so], and they act (πράττειν), acquire 
(κεκτῆσθαι), and form their own beliefs (δοκεῖν) on that basis. Nobody is 
satisfied to acquire things that are merely believed to be good, however, 
but everyone wants the things that really are good (τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσιν) and 
disdains (ἀτιμάζε) mere belief (δόξα) here. (Rep. 505D) 
 
In the Republic Plato does not take beliefs to be a result of a goal-directed 
behavior, aiming to find out how things are. As the above passage shows, most 
of the people do not care whether the beliefs about, e.g. beauty that they act 
upon are in fact true. The beliefs simply are seemings (note the shift from 
δοκεῖν to δόξα in the above passage). For this reason beliefs are not taken to be 
                                                     
217 Already as early as the Phaedo Plato assumes that the soul reaches out or yearns for what 
is real: ‘And indeed the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it, neither 
hearing or sight, nor pain nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body 
and as far as possible having no contact or association with it in its search for reality 
(ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος)’ (Phd. 65C). Grube’s translation of ὀρέγηται as ‘search’ does not quite 
correspond to the verb’s basic meaning, which according to Liddell-Scott Dictionary is 
‘reach at’, ‘grasp at’, ‘aim at’ and, metaphorically, ‘yearn for’. Again, here Plato has in mind 
reality in an elevated sense (Forms). The later Plato allows for sensibles, too, their share in 
the real (see above, fn. 215)  
218 Of course, this is by no means the only reason. For an illuminating discussion of the 
alternative interpretations as to why Plato might be inclined to think that Forms are outside 
the reach of forming beliefs, see Szaif 1998: 183–210 and 292–324. 
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rational cognitive states – they simply lack the required intrinsic goal to 
represent reality. The Passage of the Commons, on the other hand, emphasizes 
that it is even in the case of beautiful or same or indeed hard and soft, that the 
soul tries to ‘judge being’, i.e. to attain how things objectively stand. I think that 
this is the crucial new aspect in Plato’s understanding of the notion of belief – 
that belief formation is not simply the acceptance how things seem but the 
aiming at representing the facts, i.e. aiming at how things are. Reality is 
something that the soul is ‘yearning for’ and it engages in comparing, reviewing 
and calculations in order to achieve this. Since the desire for reality is a 
distinguishing feature of reason, it is natural that Plato starts to think of beliefs 
as a specifically rational capacity. In other words, if Plato comes to recognize in 
the Theaetetus that belief formation is intrinsically directed at grasping how 
things are, then it is only natural that in the dialogues that come after the 
Theaetetus, he would assign beliefs exclusively to the rational part of the soul. 
Here it is possible to raise another, textual, objection.  
 Objection 3. I have claimed that the telelogical notion of belief is novel in 
Plato’s dialogues. However, there is a passage the Republic that might suggest 
that forming true beliefs (or at least avoiding falsehood) is the aim of all human 
beings.219  
 
I simply mean that to be false in one’s soul about the things that are (περὶ 
τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαί), to be ignorant and to have and hold falsehood there, 
is what everyone would least of all accept, for everyone hates a falsehood 
(τὸ ψεῦδος) in that place most of all. – That’s right. – Surely, as I said just 
now, this would be most correctly called true falsehood (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) 
– ignorance (ἄγνοια) in the soul of someone who has been told a 
falsehood. Falsehood in words is a kind of imitation (μίμημά) of this 
affection (παθήματος) in the soul, an image (εἴδωλον) of it that comes 
into being after it and is not a pure falsehood (ἄκρατον ψεῦδος). Isn’t that 
so? – Certainly. – And the thing that is really a falsehood is hated not only 
by the gods, but by human beings as well. (Rep. 382B–C)  
 
As with many passages in Plato, the interpretation is controversial220 . It is 
possible that Plato says that everyone hates false beliefs (and that everyone 
abandons a belief when they become aware that the belief is false). If so, it 
could be maintained that, already in the Republic, forming beliefs aims at 
grasping ‘things that are’. The expression ‘τὰ ὄντα’ should probably be here 
understood in its pre-philosophical sense as ‘facts’ or ‘how the world is’ (since 
Forms have not yet been introduced to the dialogue). The passage could then be 
interpreted as saying that belief formation aims at representing reality correctly, 
i.e. it might express the teleological notion of belief. However, this is probably 
not so. It is important to notice that the notion of belief is not at all mentioned in 
                                                     
219 I am grateful to J. Szaif for bringing this passage to my attention. 
220 For some discussion of the passage, see Woolf (2009) and Harte (2010). 
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the passage221. Thus, although Plato does stress that everyone avoids falsehood, 
he does not say that forming beliefs as a cognitive process necessarily manifests 
this desire. In fact, later on in the Republic (505D) he plainly denies that people 
form their beliefs with the intention of getting things right. Rather, the above 
passage might be the first expression, in the Republic, of the primitive desire of 
reason for truth and learning (581B). Of course, Socrates cannot refer to this 
desire as specifically rational, since the parts of the soul are introduced later in 
the dialogue, in Book IV. Since every human being has (or is) a rational soul-
part, it is natural that every human being desires to avoid falsehood222. It is 
actually quite telling that Plato does not mention belief in this passage. This 
suggests that he does not, in the Republic, consider belief formation to be a 
cognitive process that aims to ‘attain being’, i.e. that he is not inclined to take 
forming beliefs as a rational capacity. It is for this reason, I think, that Objection 
3 fails. 
As to the difference between (ii) and (ii*), Plato explicitly denies animals the 
capacity to reason (e.g. Rep. 441A-B). We have seen that he takes reasoning, 
calculating, and comparing to be necessary features of belief-formation, since 
belief-formation is intrinsically and explicitly aimed at grasping objective facts. 
Since animals do not reason, they do not form beliefs (see Sorabji 1995 on this 
issue). Now, why does Plato think that animals do not reason? I think that that 
the Passage of Commons offers an answer to this question as well – namely, 
that reasoning requires education (παιδεία). Plato also takes education to be 
something that only human beings can receive; it requires the social background 
of tradition and language (see. Rep. Book III and esp. Laws Books II and III). 
Therefore, infants and animals are incapable of reasoning and, consequently, 
forming beliefs. Infants have yet to receive education, whereas animals simply 
lack the necessary social framework to be educated into the demands of reason. 
However, this does not mean that infants and animals do not represent the 
world in any way, which brings me to the next point. 
Third, the difference between (iii) and (iii*) is also accounted for if one takes 
Plato to have a teleological notion of belief. The middle dialogues (esp. Rep. 
602C–603A) took perceptual appearances themselves to be beliefs. This is no 
longer the case in the late dialogues. There rational belief formation usually 
enters the scene when there is an indication that something is wrong with how 
things appear (when the soul is for some reason ‘divided’ (Tht. 190A)), for 
example, when the perceptual appearances are simply too indeterminate. This is 
                                                     
221 Some scholars have questioned, I think correctly, whether ‘falsehood in one’s soul’ is 
equivalent to false beliefs, and have suggested that it should rather be understood as 
ignorance (Harte 2010). Others have maintained that Plato has in mind only false beliefs 
concerning important, philosophical matters, and not false beliefs tout court (Woolf 2009). 
222 There is a complication here. For Plato, not every human being is governed by the 
reasoning part of the soul. So why does he say that everyone desires to avoid falsehood? I 
think that Harte (2010: 49) might be right in saying that that the above passage says what the 
rational person should so, rather than what everyone does. Thus the account given by 
Socrates is normative, rather than descriptive. 
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made amply clear by the description of belief formation in the Philebus (38B-
E).  
And is it not memory (μνήμης) and perception (αἰσθήσεως) that lead to 
belief (δόξα) or the attempt to come to a definite belief, (διαδοξάζειν) as 
the case may be? /--/ Wouldn't you say that it often happens that someone 
who cannot get a clear view because he is looking from a distance 
(πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ σαφῶς) wants to make up his mind about/discern 
(βούλεσθαι κρίνειν) what he sees? /--/ And might he then not raise 
another question for himself? ‘What could that be that appears to 
(φανταζόμενον) stand near the rock under a tree?’ Do you find it plausible 
that someone might say these words to himself when he sets his eyes on 
such appearances (φαντασθέντα)? (Phlb. 38CD) 
 
When someone is presented an appearance that is too indeterminate (‘when 
someone cannot get a clear view’) the soul starts a dialogue with herself: ‘What 
could that be that appears to stand near that rock under a tree?’ (37D). It is also 
important to note that the expression ‘wants to decide’ (βούλεσθαι κρίνειν) is 
almost exactly parallel to the expression used in the Passage of the Commons 
(186C), where the soul also ‘tries to decide’ (κρίνειν πειρᾶται) the being of 
hardness and softness. It seems that the Philebus passage also supports the view 
that belief formation for late Plato always involves an explicit desire to ‘attain 
being’. After weighing the possible answers the soul comes to a conclusion: 
‘this is a man’, for example. Belief is a result of this kind of inner dialogue, by 
means of which the soul tries to find out how things are. Beliefs, for later Plato, 
are formed in an explicitly truth-directed manner. It is important to note that the 
soul is presented by an appearance (φανταζόμενον, 38D1) prior to forming any 
beliefs about what it is that it sees. These pre-belief appearances have 
representational (and, perhaps, propositional) content. But since these 
appearances are formed in a manner that is not explicitly and intrinsically truth-
directed, they are not beliefs. As the above Philebus passage shows, Plato takes 
appearances to have content that is independent of reasoning and forming 
beliefs. Similar passages are also found in the Timaeus (42E–44D, 46A, 71D–
E)223. To repeat – belief is, for later Plato, the result of a cognitive behavior that 
is explicitly and intrinsically directed at grasping how things are. For Plato there 
is representation below belief224.  
                                                     
223  For the argument that Plato, in both the Timaeus and the Philebus takes some 
representational content to be independent from reason, see Moss (2012). 
224  It is sometimes suggested that, for later Plato, all perceptual appearances involve a 
corresponding belief. This claim can be supported by referring to a passage in the Sophist 
(263E-264B). The Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus discuss how false sentences come about. 
When they have reached the conclusion that false statement is possible, the visitor inquires into 
what kind of cognitive states do admit falsity. It turns out that thought, belief and appearance 
(διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία) can be false; φαντασία is described as a ‘blending of 
perception and belief” (σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης) and a belief by means of perception 
(δι' αἰσθήσεως). Now, this description of φαντασία does not, at first sight, square well with my 
proposed interpretation. According to my interpretation, there are appearances (representations) 
that do not involve beliefs. And this, indeed, seems to be strongly suggested by the above 
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It has been argued (Bobonich 2002) that recognizing belief as a rational 
capacity undermines Plato’s theory of the tri-partite soul and that this is (one of) 
the reason(s) why Plato is thought to have abandoned this theory in his later 
thought. This would be plausible, if Plato had conceived of beliefs as 
paradigmatic cognitive states, and if he had regarded all representations as 
involving a belief-element. Since beliefs, in the later dialogues, are attributed 
only to reason, according to this line of thought the lower parts of the soul 
would become devoid of all representational content and the notion of a ‘non-
rational soul-part’ would eventually turn out to lose its psychological and moral 
explanatory force. However, according to the interpretation defended here, 
belief is not a paradigmatic representational state. Therefore, assigning beliefs 
exclusively to the reasoning part of the soul does not significantly affect the 
psychological life of the lower parts of the soul. They can still generate action 
and stand in representational conflict with the reasoning part of the soul, just as 
they did in the Republic. Therefore, Plato is not forced to abandon his theory of 
the tri-partite soul (at least his novel notion of belief does not force him to). In 
this I am broadly in agreement with Lorenz’s (2006) account. However, I 
disagree with Lorenz where he takes the distinctive feature of belief to be its 
‘propositional’ or ‘predicational’ nature225. I believe that the distinction between 
the cognitive states of the reasoning part of the soul and the rest of the soul-
parts should be drawn as a distinction between those representational states that 
are a product of an explicitly goal-directed behavior (aiming at grasping how 
things are) and those representational states that are not formed in this manner. 
In the Timaeus, the latter may include ‘propositional’ states of the rational part 
that do not count as beliefs (Tim. 44A), but also ‘propositional’ states of the 
non-rational spirit, that can have expectations (ἐλπίδα, Tim. 69D3), that can 
listen to reason (λόγου κατήκοον, Tim. 70A5), and understand its reports 
(παραγγείλαντος, 70B4). The non-rational appetitive soul-part can certainly 
enjoy images (71B-E) and, being able to perceive (Tim. 77B), it can presumably 
also enjoy perceptual appearances (Tim. 45E–46A). These passages indicate 
that non-rational soul-parts engage in both propositional (at least the spirited 
soul-part) and non-propositional representation226. The Timaeus suggests that 
                                                                                                                                  
passage from the Philebus. On the other hand, appearing is described in the Sophist as a 
mixture or blending of perception and belief. This suggests that each perceptual appearance 
involves a belief. Is Plato inconsistent? Not necessarily. Plato can very well mean that 
φαντασία is a kind of belief that is based on or is derived from perception. This means 
φαντασία is not itself a perceptual appearance, crucially involving a belief-element, but rather a 
belief that is formed on the basis of what is perceived. For a reading along these lines, see 
Kanayama 1987. For an opposite interpretation, see Silverman 1991.  
225 In fact, Lorenz and Bobonich in agreement concerning this. The difference is simply that 
for Bobonich there is no non-propositional (non-conceptual) content while for Lorenz there 
is. I think that this distinction is not a very fortunate heuristic device, because it is 
anachronistic with respect to interpreting Plato’s theory of cognition.  
226 Sometimes commentators (e.g. Bobonich) take Plato’s talk to be (somewhat) metaphorical. 
The reason behind this is that Plato identifies the ‘cognitive abilities’ of the non-rational soul-
parts with bodily processes and states (blood-flow, pounding of heart, bile in the liver, etc.) It 
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Plato allows for: (1) propositional representations that belong to the reasoning 
part of the soul, i.e. beliefs that explicitly aim to ‘attain being’, (2) propositional 
representations of the non-reasoning parts of the soul that are not explicitly 
aimed at being (e.g. expectation, fear, etc.), and (3) non-propositional 
representations of the appetite (perceptions, images, etc.).  
Therefore, if one does not wish to maintain (with the standard account) that 
beliefs are special representational states requiring ‘cognitive access’ to Forms 
(which seems to be flatly denied anyway at Tim. 37B–C), it is reasonable to 
think that beliefs are specifically rational because of their cognitive goal – to 
represent reality correctly227. 
Fourth, we must consider the difference between (iv) and (iv*). The most 
comprehensive descriptions of belief formation in the late dialogues, in the 
Theaetetus 189E–190A and the Philebus 38B-E (quoted in Chapter One) stress 
the activity of reasoning and calculating. Plato takes beliefs to be a result of a 
complex inner dialogue. This is sometimes taken to be a curiosity, that Plato is 
‘inclined to exaggerate the mental preconditions of belief’ (Cooper). However, 
the teleological notion of belief formation explains this ‘curiosity’ quite well. 
As the Passage of the Commons shows, for later Plato beliefs are necessarily 
formed as a result of reasoning and deliberation. This is so because belief 
formation is an activity that is intrinsically and explicitly aimed at representing 
reality correctly. Since, for Plato, attaining being is an explicit goal of forming 
beliefs, it is quite natural that he takes belief-formation to involve an explicit 
(even if silent) dialogue within the soul. But as Tht. 189E–190A clearly shows, 
the reason why the soul engages in this dialogue is to consider candidate 
answers in order to finally reach a belief that ‘this is so’. Thus the whole 
internal dialogue of the soul is aimed at reaching an agreement as to how 
matters objectively stand. 
The teleological notion of forming beliefs as explicit inner dialogue stands in 
striking contrast to descriptions of belief formation in the Republic X (quoted in 
Chapter One, Section 1), where the non-rational parts of the soul blindly accept 
how things appear, without any previous deliberation. In the Republic Plato 
                                                                                                                                  
might therefore seem plausible that these ‘representational states’ are simply bodily states that 
are the somehow ‘conceptualized’ by the rational part. To me this seems an anachronism. Plato 
has no mind - body dualism, and there is no reason why he could not think that bodily 
movements simply are cognitive states. After all, he even claims that the cognitive states of 
reason consist in revolutions of the circle of the same and circles of the different (Tim. 37B–C). 
Thus, for Plato, movement of the body and movement of the soul are simply cognitive states. 
Reason does not conceptualize or interpret the processes in the body. These processes are 
themselves representational. This does mean that reason cannot affect the course of these 
bodily processes (and the corresponding representations). It can, but precisely because 
reasoning itself is also a movement (see Johansen 2004: 137–159). 
227  It is possible, that the reasoning part of the soul can also enjoy non-propositional 
representations, i.e. that late Plato takes knowledge to be non-propositional (intuition-like). 
This view is defended in Gerson (2003). It is also possible that knowledge is non-propositional 
in a way that understanding is non-propositional. This position does not imply that knowledge 
is an intuition-like direct grasp of Forms. See below, pp. 183–184, esp. fn. 236. 
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calls these acceptances beliefs. He also thinks that the rational part uses 
calculation and measurement in order to form its beliefs about how matters 
stand, e.g. is the oar in the water really crooked or does it simply appear to be? 
In the Republic, Plato does not offer reasons why blind acceptances and the 
deliberative belief formation of the rational part should both have end results 
that count as beliefs. I suggest that, at the time of writing the Republic, Plato did 
not yet take beliefs to be teleological in the sense he does in the Theaetetus. In 
the Republic, the rational part of the soul indeed does form its beliefs in a truth-
directed manner, but this is due to the specific constitution of the rational part. 
Even though beliefs can be true, for Plato of the middle period, there is nothing 
in the nature of belief that would intrinsically tie it to truth and objectivity. In 
the Republic, truth and falsehood of beliefs are an external matter – some 
beliefs simply happen to be true and some false. In the Theaetetus this changes. 
Plato recognizes that we form beliefs with the explicit aim of getting things 
right. If belief formation is by its very nature meant to determine how things 
are, then it is only natural that non-reflective acceptances do not count as beliefs 
in late Plato (although I suspect that, for him, both would count as ‘pro-
positional attitudes’).  
Thus, I conclude that the teleological account of forming beliefs successfully 
explains well all the significant differences between Plato`s understanding of 
the notion of belief in his middle and late dialogues. 
The last issue I would like to raise is whether Plato provides an answer to the 
question of where the contents of our beliefs derive from, if they are not the 
result of ‘cognitive access’ or ‘acquaintance’ with the commons or Forms. 
Based on the Theaetetus one can offer the following answer: the content of our 
beliefs is provided by language, perception, and memory. Contrary to what the 
standard account suggests, Platonic Forms need not be apprehended at all in 
order to form beliefs. I suggest that the soul can refer to abstract properties 
simply because it has the relevant words in its vocabulary. The soul need not 
grasp what these properties are; in fact it can easily have many false beliefs 
about these properties. That words or names (Plato’s Greek does not contain 
separate terms for ‘word’ and ‘name’) are relevant in this context is suggested 
by something Socrates says at Theaetetus 185C4–6: ‘But what about the power 
which reveals to you that which is common to everything, including these 
things: that which you call by the name of (ἐπονομάζεις) ‘is’, ‘is not’ and the 
others we used in our questions just now?’ (185B6-C8). Commentators have not 
sufficiently stressed the act of naming in this passage. According to (CA), to 
form a belief one has to ‘grasp the ‘terms’ employed in it’ (Bostock 1988:119) 
and, consequently, naming is just ‘a small point’ (ibid. 124). However, if, as I 
have suggested, the commons are not grasped (or revealed) in every thought 
(and if Socrates agrees to this only for dialectical reasons), naming becomes 
more important.228 It has been quite convincingly maintained that Plato’s theory 
                                                     
228 In fact, there is an alternative translation of the whole sentence according to which it 
stresses the act of naming. The masculine dative at 185B5 can be read as dativus 
178 
of naming as it occurs in the Cratylus, for example, does not require that the 
person who uses the name should have understanding of the property to which 
the name refers. Although Plato says in the Cratylus that correct names preserve 
the ‘outline’ of a thing (Crat. 432B–433B), and that in this sense names have 
descriptive content (Fine 1977: 125–131), this content is objectively attached to 
the name, and it does not have to match the content in the ‘heads of the 
speakers’. For Plato, it is possible for a person (especially a non-philosopher) to 
have a name in one’s vocabulary and at the same time to misunderstand its 
descriptive content.  
 
…words such as 'justice' or 'the fine' have a descriptive content by 
themselves, but this descriptive content is not fixed by what the speaker 
has in mind. Rather, the descriptive content has been fixed by the name-
giving of the original name-giver who coined, e.g., 'jus- tice'. This 
descriptive content picks out something and when the name is correct, it 
picks out the real nature of a natural kind and correctly describes it. So the 
descriptive content of' justice' might still correctly describe justice and 
pick out its real nature, even if what is 'in the head' of the speaker is badly 
mistaken. (Bobonich 2002: 311) 
 
The (objective) descriptive content of a name fixes the reference of the name 
and, for Plato, whatever is associated with these names by the speakers does not 
have to correspond to the objective content of names229.  
                                                                                                                                  
instrumentalis (just like the ones at 184B7ff), designating the particular activity of the soul, 
i.e. the ‘with’, as opposed to ‘by means of’. This is Schleiermacher’s translation. Most 
subsequent German translations have adopted it (e.g. Becker 2007). The sentence would then 
be the following: ‘But what about the power which reveals to you that which is common to 
everything, including these things; with what [i.e the soul] do you apply the words ‘is’, ‘is 
not’ and the others we used in our questions just now?’ McDowell’s translation does not 
take the dative to be instrumental and the sentence runs: ‘But what about the power which 
reveals to you that which is common to everything, including these things; that to which [i.e 
the commons] you apply the words ‘is’, ‘is not’ and the others we used in our questions just 
now?’ Deciding between these two translations would require an entire paper on its own. 
Grammatically both seem to be possible. Even though Schleiermacher’s translation would be 
helpful to my case, I think that McDowell’s translation is the more natural one. It makes it 
easier to see why Theaetetus, in his answer (185C9-D3), focuses on the features named and 
not on what does the naming. 
229 Thus, Plato is an externalist about meaning (to use a somewhat anachronistic term). For 
classic discussions of modern externalism, see Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975). For Plato, 
too, the meaning of a term is determined by factors external to what is in speakers’ minds, 
i.e. by the descripitive content of a name (which is, of course, different from what modern 
externalists think). I will leave open the large question whether Plato takes names to be 
referring to sensible things or to the Forms, i.e. whether the term ‘beautiful’ refers to 
beautiful things or to the property (Form) of Beauty. It seems likely, however, that Plato 
subscribes to the latter view, namely that names (those that actually do have have 
corresponding Forms), refer to properties (Forms), rather than things that have these 
properties (Phd. 78E, 102B, Rep. 596A, Crat. 423E).  
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 Socrates’ mentioning of naming in the Passage of the Commons might 
likewise be seen to hint that all one needs for holding beliefs and framing 
thoughts about the common properties is having a name for them in one’s 
vocabulary. One can hold many false beliefs about the common that the name in 
fact (objectively) names. It would seem that, according to Plato, one could have 
a word or name in one’s vocabulary without being in cognitive contact with the 
relevant property that the word refers to, without understanding what this 
property is. This is confirmed by what Plato says in other dialogues. Non-
philosophers systematically misapply the names/words they (think they) know. 
Most famously, the prisoners in Republic’s Cave think that the words they use 
refer to the shadows on the wall of the cave, when in fact they refer to the things 
outside the cave.: ‘And if they could talk to one another, don’t you think they’d 
suppose that the names they used applied to the things they see passing before 
them?’ (Rep. 515B, trans. Grube and Reeve). One does not need to be in contact 
with intelligibles in order to entertain a thought about them—all that is needed 
is having the relevant words in one’s vocabulary, words that the agent can use 
incorrectly in some (most or even all) possible situations. In these cases the soul 
fails to be ‘in contact’ with commons. 
What makes it the case that these beliefs are about particular sensible things? 
Plato’s answer to this is based on memory and perception. Indeed, just a couple 
of pages later in the Theaetetus, Socrates discusses belief-formation exclusively 
in terms of perception and memory. This is the famous image of the Wax Block 
(191D–E). Socrates explains the formation of false beliefs (mistaking 
Theodorus for Theaetetus or vice versa) in the following way:  
 
I know you and Theodorus, and have imprints of the two of you on that 
piece of wax, like those of signet rings. I see you both, some way off and 
not properly, and I’m eager (προθυμηθῶ) to assign the imprint which 
belongs to each, and to insert it and fit the seeing into its own trace, so 
that recognition may take place. But, missing that aim (ἀποτυχὼν), and 
making a transposition, I attach the seeing of each one to the imprint 
which belongs to the other, like people who put their shoes on the wrong 
feet; or alternatively my going wrong is because the same sort of thing 
happens to me as happens to sight in mirrors, when it flows in such a way 
as to transpose left and right. It’s then that other judging/believing and 
making of false judgments/beliefs occur (193B9–D3) 
 
The Wax-Block model of beliefs takes forming beliefs about x to require no 
other mental prerequisite than simply a previous (perceptual) encounter with x. 
This encounter leaves a memory-trace on the Wax-Block of the soul. This 
memory-trace is then fitted (or mis-fitted) to the thing perceived. Nothing else is 
required – a perceptual interaction between the object and the soul that has 
occurred in the past creates a memory-trace and a novel perception is brought 
into relation with the existing memory trace. This is a purely empiricist account 
of forming beliefs. In the Philebus, too, belief is analyzed in terms perception 
and memory (38B), and the mechanics of belief formation are described 
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roughly in the same manner. Memory is merely the retaining of perceptions 
(σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως) (34A). Thus, it seems that Plato does allow beliefs to be 
based on perception and empirical memory, i.e. the ability to retain perceptions. 
Again, commons or intelligibles or Forms are completely absent from these 
descriptions of forming beliefs. However, the passage just quoted suggests that 
forming beliefs involves the desire to fit the memory trace to the occurrent 
perception correctly. While forming his belief, Socrates ‘is eager to assign the 
imprint which belongs to each’ but doing it falsely, he ‘misses that aim’. Thus, 
the Wax Block supports my interpretation of belief formation as ‘aiming at 
being’. 
All in all, then, there are two possible ways to construe Plato’s account of 
where the content of belief derives from – one is based on language and the 
other on perception and memory. In fact, it might well be possible that these 
two models support each other – the contents of beliefs that refer to abstract 
objects are acquired by language learning and the contents of beliefs about 
perceptual objects are acquired by perception and memory. The beliefs that 
include both (e.g. ‘Theaetetus is beautiful’) require both. Neither, however, 
requires ‘cognitive access’ to Forms, intelligibles, or commons. Indeed, this 
seems to be exactly how one of the first Platonic commentators, Alcinous, 
understood the matter: 
 
Opinion is the combination of memory and perception (Δόξα δέ ἐστι 
συμπλοκὴ μνήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως.). For when we first encounter some 
perceptible, and from it we get a perception, and from that a memory, and later 
we encounter the same perceptible again, we connect the pre-existing memory 
with the subsequent perception and say within ourselves ‘Socrates!’, ‘Horse!’, 
‘Fire!’, etc. And this is called opinion (ἐν ἑαυτοῖς λέγομεν φέρε Σωκράτης, 
ἵππος, πῦρ, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖται δόξα) – our connecting the 
pre-existing perception with the newly produced perception. Didaskalikos 
154,40–155, 5 (Trans. Dillon) 
 
It is noteworthy that, for Alcinous, the perceptual fitting is (always) accom-
panied by the act of saying. In fact, Alcinous combines Plato's account of 
memory and recognition as fitting the current perception with the perceptual 
trace (Theaetetus 193B–C) with Plato's account of thought as silent speech 
(Theaetetus 189E–190A)230. I see no reason why Alcinous’ interpretation of the 
genesis of the content of perceptual beliefs could not generally be along the 
right lines, provided that one also maintains that the ability to speak does not 
require understanding of ‘what it is’ that the general terms refer to. One could 
easily say ‘this is fire!’ and be completely oblivious as to what the (non-
sensible) essence of fire might be. In the Timaeus Plato offers an account of fire 
in terms of ‘elementary triangles’ that he himself declares to be quite ‘unusual’ 
(Tim. 53C). In addition, Alcinous unfortunately fails to notice that the goal of 
                                                     
230 The exact relation that Alcinous sees between speech and fitting of perception to a 
memory-trace is not that clear. See Sedley (1996a: 307–308). 
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belief-formation is representing reality, i.e. fitting the memory trace to the 
perception correctly.  
 Thus, in order to form beliefs, one does not need to have understanding of 
what a particular thing is – it suffices either to have a word for a particular thing 
in one’s vocabulary or to have a memory trace of this particular thing (or even 
both). Belief formation is not rational for Plato because it assumes 
understanding of what the object of beliefs is. Belief is rational because it aims 
to represent reality.  
 It might be objected that the subsequent discussion in the Theaetetus shows 
that Plato cannot subscribe to this rather pessimistic account of forming beliefs. 
First of all, Socrates and Theaetetus agree (at Tht.188A–188D and 190B-E) that 
in order to hold a belief about something one must know or grasp this 
something. This certainly suggests that one must have understanding of what 
the terms involved in one’s beliefs refer to. Secondly, quite at the end of the 
dialogue (209A-E) Socrates suggests that one needs to be in possession of a 
‘distinguishing mark’ of something in order to have beliefs about this 
something, i.e. that one needs to be able to distinguish a thing from everything 
else in order to form beliefs about it. Both of these claims obviously conflict 
with the account of belief formation outlined above.  
 However, here one should note the context. The first claim derives from the 
discussion of the puzzles of false beliefs. According to the puzzle of ‘knowing 
and not-knowing’, one either knows the terms involved in belief, and 
consequently cannot make mistakes is using these terms (since knowledge 
implies infallibility), or one does not know the terms involved in a belief and is 
therefore incapable of forming any beliefs at all involving these terms. The 
interpretation of this whole section (Tht. 187C–200C) is highly controversial. 
One line of interpretation231 suggests that Plato himself is (somewhat) puzzled 
by how false beliefs come about. This would imply that Plato indeed takes 
belief formation to involve knowledge of the terms involved. The second line of 
interpretation 232  sees the puzzles of false belief as mainly dialectical, and 
maintains that Plato is, indirectly, trying to show that there is a (set of) false 
assumption(s) that create these puzzles.  
 I believe that the second line of interpretation is much more promising. 
Indeed, one of the assumptions that can be seen as being responsible for the 
                                                     
231 See, e.g. Bostock (1988). Bostock (1988: 272) thinks that the whole discussion of false 
beliefs shows that Plato is struggling with accounting for lower-level knowledge, required to 
use terms in sentences and thoughts (i.e. linguistic understanding). Lorenz makes a similar 
claim (2006: 91–92). However, it is much more likely that the puzzles of false belief arise 
because Theaetetus defines knowledge as true belief. Thus the whole section should be 
viewed as a reductio of Theaetetus’ definition. The false belief section suggests that Plato 
takes knowledge always to be infallible (this is what generates the puzzles), which is why 
linguistic understanding does not count as knowledge for Plato (linguistic understanding is 
also not discussed in the Theaetetus, pace Bostock).  
232 See, for instance, Cornford (1935), Fine (1979), Benson (1992), Adalier (2001). See also 
above, p. 82, fn. 109. 
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puzzles of false beliefs is precisely the over-optimistic premiss that the ability to 
form beliefs about x necessarily involves knowledge of x. But this assumption 
is not Plato’s own, it follows from Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge as true 
belief (as Benson persuasively and at length argues in Benson (1992)). It can, 
for example, be the case that, for Plato, forming beliefs about x simply requires 
having (at least) one true belief about x. Theaetetus’ (false) definition that 
knowledge is true belief and the (Platonic) premiss that one needs at least one 
true belief about x in order to think about x, add up to the claim that one must 
have knowledge of x in order to think about x. This leads to the paradoxical 
conclusion that false belief is impossible (since knowledge is infallible). Thus 
the puzzles of false belief can be read as a reductio of Theaetetus’ second 
definition of knowledge. I do not think that the assumptions made during the 
puzzles of false belief should be seen to commit Plato to a more demanding 
account of what is required to form beliefs. 
 What about the second claim? Is it correct to attribute to Plato the position 
that to form any beliefs about x, one must be able to distinguish x from 
everything else? A closer look at the text shows that Socrates is not discussing 
any beliefs (true or false)233 – he is discussing the genesis of true beliefs: 
 
S. In fact it won’t, I think, be Theaetetus who figures in a judgment/belief 
in me until precisely that snubness has imprinted and deposited in me a 
memory trace different (διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον) from those of the other 
snubnesses I’ve seen, and similarly with the other things you’re composed 
of. Then if I meet you tomorrow, that snubness will remind be and make 
me judge/form a belief correctly about you (ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ 
σοῦ). – T. Yes, that’s quite true. – S. So correct judgment/belief (ὀρθὴ 
δόξα) about anything, too, would seem to be about its differentness 
(διαφορότητα). (209C4-D1)  
 
Socrates` point seems to be that in order to reach true beliefs about x, one 
should take into account the differentness of x from all other things. Nothing is 
implied about what it takes to have beliefs tout court. Even so, this seems to be 
a suspiciously strong requirement for forming true beliefs234 . Can Socrates 
really mean that in order to reach a true belief about something, one must be 
able to distinguish this particular thing from everything else in the universe? In 
order to form a true belief about Theaetetus, must one really be able to 
distinguish him from ‘the remotest peasant in Asia’ (209B)? This seems an 
implausible requirement. Perhaps one must be able to distinguish Theaetetus 
from the rest of his surroundings, in order to form a true belief about him, but it 
is certainly not necessary that one should be able to distinguish him (at all 
times) from all there is in the universe. Even if this requirement might seem 
plausible in case of persons, such as Theaetetus, does it make sense to say that 
in order to have a true belief about e.g. this stick or this stone, I must be able to 
                                                     
233 See Burnyeat (1990: 227, n. 112). 
234 See Bostock (1988: 233). 
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distinguish this stick or stone from all other sticks and stones in the world? 
Further, can any imprinted perceptual memory-trace achieve such a feat? It is 
hard to understand how a particular perceptual memory-trace will always and in 
all circumstances enable one to cognitively pick out the thing that left this 
memory-trace.  
 I suggest that this passage should not be read as making a claim about what 
it takes to have true beliefs. Rather, at the close of the dialogue, Plato hints at a 
correct answer as to what he takes knowledge to require (although the dialogue 
ends, officially, in an aporia). Plato suggests that knowledge of a thing involves 
the ability to distinguish this particular thing from everything else. The aporetic 
form of the dialogue leaves it undecided whether perceptual particulars, such as 
Theaetetus, are knowable in this sense at all. Furthermore, it leaves undecided 
whether a particular (true) belief can ever become knowledge, i.e. whether there 
is a suitable interpretation of ‘account’ in the formula ‘knowledge is true belief 
with an account’. Account as ‘a distinguishing mark’ might contain a hint as to 
what knowledge requires – the ability to distinguish a thing from everything 
else. We have seen that a perceptual memory-trace is (sometimes) required in 
order to form belief about a perceptual object (such as Theaetetus). Could 
perceptual memory also account for the ability to distinguish a thing from 
everything else? I believe that Plato’s answer to this question is decidedly ‘no’. 
Rather, in order to have knowledge, what one needs is the ability to grasp how 
something is different from something else, and how it is the same as itself (or 
the members of its class). And the Passage of the Commons has taught us that 
perception on its own can never account for this; one needs to reason in order to 
grasp the sameness, difference and being.  
 I have suggested that the commons are properties of things (not meanings or 
concepts). These properties are not grasped simply in virtue of entertaining a 
thought involving a term that designates the commons. Sameness and 
difference, then, would be relational properties. What is their relevance in 
regard to Plato’s conception of knowledge?  
As I understand it235, knowledge for later Plato is essentially holistic – to 
have knowledge of something requires placing the particular thing into a large 
network of connections with other things in the same subject area. However, 
this is precisely what grasping the sameness and difference of a thing is – to be 
able to tell how a thing differs from others and how and in what respect is it the 
same (Pol. 278A–D, Phlb.17A–119A, Tim. 37A–D, Soph. 253D–E). In this 
sense it can be maintained that sameness and difference are properties that have 
a certain explanatory role; they have to figure in all accounts that explain what a 
particular thing is (in what relation it is the same as something and in what 
relation it is different from something). It is doubtful whether this grasp of 
difference and sameness of a thing or a kind, the ability to situate a thing or a 
kind in a complex web of interconnections, can ever be expressed in a single 
                                                     
235 Many scholars share this view. See, for example: Fine (1979a), (1990), Mccabe (2000), 
D. Frede (1989), etc. 
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belief (and this might be one of the reasons why the Theaetetus ends apore-
tically). It seems that to this extent knowledge, for Plato, is non-propositional – 
it can never be expressed by a single proposition. Since knowledge is essentially 
ability, there might not even be a particular body of propositions that expresses 
a particular kind of knowledge (say, carpentry). There is no body of pro-
positions that one can learn by heart and thus acquire knowledge (I suggested in 
Chapter 3, Section 1 that a similar intuition might plausibly be seen behind 
Socrates’ peculiar pedagogical methods). Non-propositionality does not mean 
that knowledge consists of some sort of quasi-mystical gaze at the eternal 
Forms (although Forms as explanatory properties might be seen as a necessary 
component of all knowledge). Knowledge, for Plato, is similar to what 
contemporary epistemologists sometimes call ‘(objectual) understanding’236 – a 
non-propositional ability to grasp the connections in a given subject-area. For 
Plato this understanding always involves the grasp of sameness and difference. 
It is in regard to knowledge that the ‘intelligibles’ of sameness and difference 
matter the most, not (as the standard account suggests) in regard to the ability to 
form beliefs.  
Indeed, it can be argued that the method of collection and division practiced 
in the Phaedrus, Sophist and Statesman aims at precisely this – placing a thing 
or a kind in a network of connections with other things or kinds, taking into 
account the object’s (or kind’s) sameness to and difference from other, related 
objects (or kind’s). It is all the more surprising that commons (playing such an 
important role in Plato’s account of knowledge) are dropped from the 
discussion in the Theaetetus (but see D. Frede 1989). There are several ways to 
understand this curious phenomenon. One of the possibilities is that commons 
are simply not relevant to the definition of knowledge at this stage of Plato’s 
thought; that Plato aims at defining knowledge without any appeal to the 
specific kind of objects of knowledge. The other possibility is that the sub-
sequent definitions of knowledge fail precisely because commons are neglected 
and that this points to the true (non-aporetic) conclusion of the dialogue.  
I will not even attempt to answer this very large question here. What is 
important for my purposes is that the notion of belief that I have been extracting 
from the Passage of the Commons can accommodate both of these possible 
readings. Belief formation is an activity that aims at finding out how things are 
                                                     
236  ‘Understanding requires the grasping of explanatory and other coherence-making 
relationships in a large and comprehensive body of information. One can know many 
unrelated pieces of information, but understanding is achieved only when informational 
items are pieced together by the subject in question. One might even propose a more radical 
thesis, to the effect that a change occurs metaphysically when understanding is achieved. 
Whereas knowledge can have as its object individual propositions, understanding may not. It 
may be that when understanding is achieved, the object of understanding is an ‘informational 
chunk” rather than a number of single propositions. In such a view, propositional under-
standing is not the primary form of understanding, but results via abstraction from this 
primary form.’ (Kvanvig 2003: 198) I think Plato would gladly accept that there is a 
metaphysical shift from a particular true belief to knowledge and that one isolated true belief 
can never be identified with knowledge. 
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and for that reason it necessarily involves reasoning. What exactly are the 
objects that have to be included in the reasoning if belief is to become 
knowledge (or whether that is even possible) can be left an open question. It 
might be the case that, in order to become knowledge, forming beliefs has to 
include reasoning about non-sensible explanatory properties such as Forms (or 
commons). However, it might also be the case that, for Plato during the writing 
of the Theaetetus, knowledge could be achieved without reasoning involving 
Forms. It can also be the case (which to me seems to be the most promising 
approach to the dialogue) that Plato intends us, the readers, to ask this very 
question and come up with our own answer (Burnyeat 1990: 2–3). Whichever 
way this question is handled, I hope that the lesson of the Passage of the Com-
mons can still be appreciated – namely that in order to grasp how things are, 
one must engage in reasoning and deliberation – it does not suffice to simply 
open our eyes and see, and it also does not suffice to simply entertain a thought 
that something is the case. The soul has to work in order to find out how things 
are. ‘Attaining being’ has to be achieved. Aiming for this already begins at the 
level of forming beliefs. Perhaps these beliefs will one day become knowledge.  
 
[The name for] δόξα either derives from the pursuit (τῇ διώξει) the soul 
engages in when it hunts for the knowledge (τὸ εἰδέναι) of how things are 





This dissertation offered an explanation as to why Plato, in his later dialogues, 
begins to view the capacity to form beliefs as necessarily involving the 
reasoning part of the soul, i.e. why later Plato thinks of belief as rational. This 
problem has surfaced quite recently in Plato-scholarship. According to the 
standard account, later Plato starts to think that forming beliefs requires 
cognitive access to intelligibles (Forms), and this, in turn, requires exercise of 
rational capacities. In this dissertation I argued, first, that the standard account is 
unsatisfactory. Later Plato does not take apprehension of Forms to be necessary 
for forming beliefs. Plato’s Forms are not semantic entities grasped in everyday 
thought and beliefs. For both middle and late Plato, Forms are meant to explain 
how knowledge is possible. Knowledge, on the other hand, is a demanding 
cognitive state that is not achieved by non-philosophers. The cognitive 
preconditions of forming beliefs of non-philosophers include perception, 
memory and, in case of more complex beliefs, language. Thus, we could say 
that Plato is an empiricist when it comes to explaining how beliefs are formed, 
but rationalist when it comes to the question of how knowledge is acquired. The 
standard account fails, since it falsely assumes that later Plato changes his mind 
about Forms and begins to see them relevant for explaining ordinary non-
philosophical thinking. Therefore, an alternative explanation to the shift in 
Plato’s notion of belief is required. Providing this alternative account was my 
main aim in this dissertation. 
I developed the alternative explanation to the rationality of belief by relying 
on an important and notoriously difficult passage in Plato’s Theaetetus (184B–
187A). I argued that this passage is crucial for understanding Plato’s later 
notion of belief. I also argued that the passage does not support the standard 
account (as is usually maintained), and developed a novel reading of the 
passage. I argued that Theaetetus 184B–187A should not be read as a 
straightforwardly doctrinarian piece of reasoning. Theaetetus is a dialogue with 
multiple levels and not all claims made in the dialogue can be attributed to 
Plato. If one takes into account the dialectical context of the passage (especially 
Socrates’ method of midwifery), as indeed on should, it can be shown that Plato 
aims to convey an account of belief, according to which forming a belief is a 
goal-directed activity aiming at representing reality correctly (‘attaining being’). 
That beliefs are formed in this manner is simultaneously an argument against 
both Protagorean relativism and Theaetetus’ definition according to which 
knowledge is perception.  
Thus, Theaetetus supports a teleological account of belief formation. 
‘Attaining being’ is the epistemic goal of forming beliefs. Since Plato takes the 
distinguishing feature of rationality to be the cognitive desire for grasping truth 
and reality, he naturally starts to view belief formation as an activity involving 
reason. This explanation has the advantage over the standard account, since it 
grounds the rationality of belief on a condition that is both necessary and 
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sufficient for rationality, rather than merely on the sufficient condition 
(apprehension of Forms) like the standard account suggests.  
For Plato, beliefs are formed with the explicit and intrinsic goal of repre-
senting correctly the reality independent from us. This makes forming beliefs 
sensitive to reasoning. It furthermore suggests that beliefs are formed (and 
abandoned) depending on whether a particular belief is consistent with other 
beliefs we might have. In Plato’s middle dialogues beliefs were not formed in 
this manner. Plato took beliefs to involve unreflective and passive acceptances; 
the relation between beliefs and truth was taken to be external, some beliefs 
simply happen to be true and some don’t. In the middle dialogues Plato also 
assigned beliefs to non-human animals and very young children. In his later 
dialogues he denies belief to animals and children, and he maintains that all 
belief-formation involves reasoning and reflection, and that reasoning requires 
education. The teleological notion of belief smoothly explains all the diffe-
rences between Plato’s conception of belief in the middle compared to the late 
dialogues.  
Interestingly, the teleological notion of belief was tacit in Plato’s early 
Socratic dialogues – Socrates’ elenctic method assumes that his interlocutors 
aim for consistency in forming their beliefs since Socrates expects the inter-
locutors to abandon their proposed definitions after Socrates has shown that the 
definitions they propose are inconsistent with other beliefs that his interlocutors 
hold. Thus Plato, in his later dialogues, comes to incorporate elements of 
Socratic epistemology into his own. It is all the more natural that he expresses 





Minu väitekirja „Plato on Belief (doxa). Theaetetus 184B–187A” („Platon 
uskumusest (doxa). „Theaitetos“ 184A–187B“) eesmärk on analüüsida „doxa“ 
ehk „uskumuse“ mõistet Platoni hilisdialoogides, tuginedes peaasjalikult 
dialoogile „Theaitetos“. Ma püüan vastata küsimusele, kuidas selgitada seda, et 
Platon käsitleb uskumust oma hilistes tekstides („Theaitetos“, „Philebos“, 
„Timaios“ ja „Sofist“) erinevalt võrdluses nn. keskmiste dialoogidega (nt. 
„Phaidon“ ja „Politeia“). Kõige silmatorkavamad erinevused Platoni keskmiste 
ja hiliste dialoogide vahel on järgnevad. Esiteks omistab Platon keskmistes 
dialoogides uskumused kõigile kolmele hingejaole: mõistuslikule (logistikon), 
söakale (thymoeides) ja ihalevale (epithymetikon). Lisaks sellele omistab Platon 
„Phaidonis“ uskumused ka kehale. Seevastu hilistes dialoogides (nt. „Timaios“) 
kõneldakse uskumustest ainult mõistusliku hingejao puhul. Mitte-mõistuslikud 
hingejaod ja keha pole siin võimelised uskumusi kujundama. Teiseks 
keskmistes dialoogides kõneleb Platon ka loomade ja väikeste laste 
uskumustest, hiljem ta aga eitab, et loomadel ja lastel on uskumused. 
Kolmandaks keskmistes dialoogides kuuluvad tajusisud samuti uskumuste 
hulka, samas kui hilistes dialoogides eristab Platon tajusisud uskumustest. 
Neljandaks keskmistes dialoogides peetakse uskumusteks kõikvõimalikke 
mitte-reflektiivseid representatsioonilisi seisundeid. Hilistes dialoogides 
käsitleb Platon uskumuste kujundamist aga reflektiivse protsessina, milles hing 
vaeb poolt- ja vastuargumente ning lõpuks jõuab kaalutava väitega 
nõustumiseni või lükkab selle tagasi. Niisiis seisneb üks hiliste ja keskmiste 
dialoogide peamisi erinevusi selles, et uskumuse kujundamise võime muutub 
hilistes dialoogides mõistuslikuks võimeks. Minu väitekirja eesmärk on selgi-
tada, miks uskumuse kujundamine on hilise Platoni jaoks ratsionaalne võime 
ning milles seisneb uskumuse ratsionaalsus.  
Minu tõlgenduse kohaselt tugineb Platon oma hilistes dialoogides teleoloo-
gilisele või eesmärgipärasele uskumuse mõistele. Uskumuse kujundamise ees-
märk on kujundada tõeseid uskumusi, peegeldada oma uskumustes maailma 
sellisel kujul, nagu ta on, sõltumatuna meie soovidest, vajadustest ja kaldu-
vustest. Selline teleoloogiline uskumuse mõiste selgitab hästi ülaltoodud 
erinevusi keskmiste ja hiliste dialoogide vahel. Kuna iha tõe järele on omane 
üksnes hinge mõistuslikule osale, siis on mõistetav, miks Platon oma hilistes 
dialoogides omistab uskumused ainult mõistuslikule hingeosale – uskumuste 
kujundamine hinges väljendabki soovi peegeldada maailma nii, nagu see on. 
Uskumused on tõekspidamised. Kuna uskumus on tõele suunatud, siis peab 
uskumuste kujundamise mehhanism võtma arvesse loogilisi suhteid teiste 
uskumustega, sest suhestades kaalutavat väidet meie teiste tõekspidamistega, 
langetame otsuse, kas nõustuda väitega või mitte. Teleoloogiline uskumuse 
mõiste toob endaga kaasa uskumuse kujundamise holistliku kontseptsiooni, s.t. 
uskumusi kujundades on hinge eesmärgiks kujundada harmooniliselt kokku-
sobiv uskumuste süsteem. Seega kuulub hilise Platoni jaoks uskumuse kujunda-
mise juurde alati kaalutlemine ja reflekteerimine, teiste tõekspidamistega 
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seostamine. Platon loobub siin oma keskmise perioodi atomistlikust uskumuse 
mõistest, mitte-reflektiivsed representatsioonilised seisundid pole hilise Platoni 
jaoks enam uskumused. Kaalutlemine ja vaagimine nõuab Platoni järgi haridust 
ning kuna loomad pole hariduse saamiseks võimelised ja väikesed lapsed ei ole 
veel haridust omandanud, ei kvalifitseeru loomade ega laste representsioonilised 
seisundid enam uskumustena.  
Minu dissertatsioonis on kesksel kohal dialoog „Theaitetos“ ja eriti selle lõik 
184B–187A. Olgugi et ka teised hilised dialoogid näitavad, et Platoni uskumuse 
käsitlemises on aset leidnud märkimisväärne nihe, ei võimalda need selgitada, 
millised on selle nihke põhjused. „Theaitetoses“ aga tuuakse sellele ka põhjen-
dus. Nii moodustab suure osa minu tööst just „Theaitetose“ interpretatsioon. 
„Theaitetos“ on ülesehituselt ilmselt kõige komplitseeritum Platoni dialoog, 
mistõttu selle erinevad osad võimaldavad väga erinevaid tõlgendusi. Ma tuginen 
„Theaitetose“ analüüsis metoodilisele eeldusele (vt Sedley 2004), et tegu on 
dialoogiga, milles tuleb eristada kaht tasandit – sokraatilist ja platoonilist 
tasandit. Tuginedes nimetatud eristusele, näitan ma oma töös, et „Theaitetose“ 
keskset osa tuleks vaadelda just teleoloogilise uskumuse mõiste väljatööta-
misena. „Theaitetoses“ (186A–E) väidab Platon sõnaselgelt, et uskumusi kujun-
dades pürib (eporegetai) hing „olemise“ (ousia) poole, vaagides sealjuures 
tuleviku ja mineviku sündmusi ning tehes järeldusi. Ma näitan, et kõigist 
erinevatest võimalikest „ousia“ tõlgendusest tuleks „Theaitetose“ kontekstis 
eelistada „ousia“ tõlgendamist reaalsusena, sellena, mis meist sõltumatult 
maailmas olemas on. Nõnda võibki „Theaitetost“ pidada teleoloogilise usku-
muse mõiste esmakordseks väljatöötamiseks Platoni dialoogides. 
Miks on just „Theaitetos“ see dialoog, kus Platon teleoloogilise uskumuse 
mõisteni jõuab? Minu põhjendus koosneb kahest osast. Esiteks, teleoloogiline 
uskumuse kontseptsioon töötatakse välja, et eristada uskumust meeletajust 
(Theaitetose esimene teadmise definitsioon on „teadmine on taju“). Teiseks, 
teleoloogiline uskumuse mõiste on tarvilik Protagorase relativismi kummuta-
miseks. Protagoras väidab, et kõik uskumused on tõesed (nende jaoks, kellel 
need uskumused on). Platoni argument seisneb näitamises, et uskumuse mõiste 
kui selline eeldab objektiivse, meist sõltumatu maailma olemasolu.  
Hilise Platoni uskumuse mõiste teleoloogilisel käsitlemisel on mitmeid 
eeliseid standardse käsitluse ees. Standardse käsitluse (Bobonich 2002, Lorenz 
2006) järgi hakkavad ideed hilistes dialoogides täitma semantilist rolli – ideede 
haaramine selgitab mõistete omandamist, kontseptualisatsiooni ja predikat-
siooni. Nõnda muutuvad ideed ka mittefilosoofidele kognitiivselt ligipääse-
tavaks. Uskumuse kujundamine muutub ratsionaalseks võimeks, kuna Platon 
eeldab, et uskumuste kujundamiseks on tarvis teatud kognitiivset eeltingimust, 
nimelt ideede haaramist. Käesolevas dissertatsioonis väidan ma, et standardne 
käsitlus on ekslik. Esiteks ei ole standardse käsitluse alusväide, nimelt et 
ideedeõpetus muutub (osaliselt) teooriaks selle kohta, kuidas inimesed 
omandavad mõisted, tekstuaalselt põhjendatud. Ka Platoni hilisdialoogides 
tähistavad ideed asjade olemusi, mis on ligipääsetavad ainult neile, kellel on 
teadmine. Enamikul inimestest on kõigest uskumused ja mitte teadmine. Seega 
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jäävad ka hilistes dialoogides ideed mittefilosoofidele kättesaamatuks. Teiseks 
isegi siis, kui kognitiivne ligipääs ideedele oleks predikatsiooni ja 
kontseptualisatsiooni eeltingimuseks, ei selgitaks see sugugi, miks Platon leiab, 
et uskumuse kujundamiseks on tarvilik kaalutlemine ja hinge kahekõne 
iseendaga. Nendel põhjustel on tarvilik alternatiivse selgituse väljatöötamine, 
mis ongi olnud minu väitekirja eesmärgiks. Teleoloogiline uskumuse mõiste ei 
eelda, et uskumuste kujundamiseks on tarvilik haarata ideesid. Ideede 
haaramine on vajalik tingimus teadmise omandamiseks. Uskumuste 
kujundamine eeldab aga meeletaju, mälu ja keeleoskuse koosmõju. Ükski neist 
kolmest kognitiivsest võimest ei tarvitse ligipääsu ideedele.  
Siin töös välja pakutud Platoni uskumuse mõiste interpretatsiooni eelis seis-
neb selle sõltumatuses küsimusest, kuidas täpselt mõista Platoni hilist ideede-
teooriat (see on üks vastuolulisemaid küsimusi kogu kaasaegses Platoni-
uurimises). Ühtlasi osutab siin kaitstud tõlgendus, et kõnealune osa Platoni 
epistemoloogiast on jätkuvalt tähtis, sest uskumuse tõelesuunatusega seotud 
problemaatika on keskne ka tänapäeva filosoofias (vt. näiteks Velleman 2000 ja 
Vahid 2009). Eriti tähtis on Platoni tähelepanek, et oma uskumusi kujundades 
oleme kõik anti-relativistid, sest meie uskumuste kujundamise seesmiseks 
eesmärgiks on peegeldada maailma säärasena, nagu ta meist sõltumatult on. 
Meie uskumused ei ole samastatavad sellega, kuidas asjad meile paistavad, 
nagu väidab relativist Protagoras, uskumuste kujundamisel on keskses rollis 





APPENDIX. Theaetetus 184B4–187A9237 
 
{ΣΩ.} Ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρη- 
184.b.5  μένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἴσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω·  
ἦ γάρ;  
   {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί.  
 {ΣΩ.} Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ' ἐρωτῴη· ‘Τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα  
ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξέα καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει;’ εἴποις ἂν  
184.b.10 οἶμαι ‘Ὄμμασί τε καὶ ὠσίν.’  
   {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἔγωγε.  
184.c.1  {ΣΩ.} Τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ  
μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές,  
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε  
ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως  
184.c.5  ἣν ἀποκρίνῃ, ᾗ οὐκ ὀρθή. σκόπει γάρ· ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα  
ὀρθοτέρα, ᾧ ὁρῶμεν τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὗ ὁρῶμεν,  
καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν ὦτα, ἢ δι' οὗ ἀκούομεν;  
   {ΘΕΑΙ.} Δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ  
Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.  
184.d.1  {ΣΩ.} Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν  
ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ  
εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅτι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα  
ταῦτα συντείνει, ᾗ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα  
184.d.5  ὅσα αἰσθητά.  
   {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως.  
   {ΣΩ.} Τοῦδέ τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ τινι ἡμῶν  
αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε  
184.e.1  καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἑτέρων αὖ τινῶν· καὶ ἕξεις  
ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἴσως  
δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ  
ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καί μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ  
184.e.5  καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνῃ, ἆρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος  
ἕκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός;  
   {ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.  
 {ΣΩ.} Ἦ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν ἃ δι' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως  
185.a.1  αἰσθάνῃ, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ  
δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς;  
   {ΘΕΑΙ.} Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;  
 {ΣΩ.} Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοῇ, οὐκ ἂν διά γε  
185.a.5  τοῦ ἑτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων  
αἰσθάνοι' ἄν.  
 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.  
 {ΣΩ.} Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ  
                                                     
237 Ed. Burnet, revised for 1995 Oxford edition. 
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τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἦ διανοῇ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν;  
185.a.10 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἔγωγε.  
   {ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον, ἑαυτῷ  
δὲ ταὐτόν;  
185.b.1  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Τί μήν;  
   {ΣΩ.} Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἑκάτερον δὲ ἕν;  
 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Καὶ τοῦτο.  
   {ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν,  
185.b.5  δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπισκέψασθαι;  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἴσως.  
   {ΣΩ.} Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν διανοῇ; οὔτε  
γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν  
περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ  
185.b.10 γὰρ δυνατὸν εἴη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι ἆρ' ἐστὸν ἁλμυρὼ ἢ οὔ,  
185.c.1  οἶσθ' ὅτι ἕξεις εἰπεῖν ᾧ ἐπισκέψῃ, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε  
ἀκοὴ φαίνεται, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο.  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, ἥ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις;  
{ΣΩ.} Καλῶς λέγεις. ἡ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό τ' ἐπὶ  
185.c.5  πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ τὸ ‘ἔστιν’  
ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ ‘οὐκ ἔστι’ καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἠρωτῶμεν  
περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα δι' ὧν  
αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα;  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα  
185.c.10 καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν τε καὶ [τὸ] ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ  
185.d.1  ἕν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι  
καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἐρωτᾷς, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τού- 
τοις ἕπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ  
αἰσθανόμεθα.  
185.d.5  {ΣΩ.} Ὑπέρευ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ ἐρωτῶ  
αὐτὰ ταῦτα.  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν  
ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλήν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι  
τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ'  
185.e.1  αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων  
ἐπισκοπεῖν.  
   {ΣΩ.} Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε  
Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός τε καὶ  
185.e.5  ἀγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου  
ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεταί σοι τὰ μὲν αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ  
ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ  
ἦν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι.  
186.a.1  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεταί γε.  
   {ΣΩ.} Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα  
ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.  
   {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἐγὼ μὲν ὧν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἐπορέγεται.  
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186.a.5  {ΣΩ.} Ἦ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ  
ἕτερον;  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί.  
   {ΣΩ.} Τί δέ; καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν;  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς  
186.a.10 ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ  
186.b.1  γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.  
   {ΣΩ.} Ἔχε δή· ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα  
διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα  
ὡσαύτως;  
186.b.5  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί.  
{ΣΩ.} Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὅτι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα  
πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ  
ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν  
πειρᾶται ἡμῖν.  
186.b.10 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.  
{ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει  
186.c.1  αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος  
παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει· τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀνα- 
λογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ  
διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ  
186.c.5  παραγίγνηται;  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.  
   {ΣΩ.} Οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μηδὲ οὐσίας;  
   {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀδύνατον.  
{ΣΩ.} Οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων  
186.c.10 ἔσται;  
186.d.1  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες;  
{ΣΩ.} Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη,  
ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀλη- 
θείας ἐνταῦθα μέν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ  
186.d.5  ἀδύνατον.  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Φαίνεται.  
{ΣΩ.} Ἦ οὖν ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, τοσαύτας  
διαφορὰς ἔχοντε;  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὔκουν δὴ δίκαιόν γε.  
186.d.10 {ΣΩ.} Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὁρᾶν ἀκούειν  
ὀσφραίνεσθαι ψύχεσθαι θερμαίνεσθαι;  
186.e.1  {ΘΕΑΙ.} Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;  
{ΣΩ.} Σύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν;  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀνάγκη.  
{ΣΩ.} Ὧι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἅψασθαι· οὐδὲ  
186.e.5  γὰρ οὐσίας.  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.  
{ΣΩ.} Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης.  
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{ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐ γάρ.  
{ΣΩ.} Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἴσθησίς τε καὶ  
186.e.10 ἐπιστήμη ταὐτόν.  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐ φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστά γε νῦν  
καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὂν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη.  
187.a.1  {ΣΩ.} Ἀλλ' οὔ τι μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἠρχόμεθα δια- 
λεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὕρωμεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί  
ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν  
αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι,  
187.a.5  ὅτι ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται  
περὶ τὰ ὄντα.  
{ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς  
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‒ “Plato on the Rationality of Belief” in Trames. A Journal of the Humanities 
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Century philosophy”, 2008 (in Estonian) 
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